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THE

WORKS

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

VOL. III.

THE

WORKS

OF

NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of FLORENCE.

Tranſlated from the ORIGINALS;

ILLUSTRATED WITH

NOTES, ANNOTATIONS, DISSERTATIONS,

And ſeveral New Plans on the ART of WAR,

By ELLIS FARNEWORTH, M. A.

Late Vicar of Roſthern in CHESHIRE,

Tranſlator of the Life of POPE SIXTUS V. and DAVILLA's Hiſtory of the Civil Wars of FRANCE.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

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ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

READER,

FROM

The FRENCH TRANSLATION concerning the enſuing DISCOURSES.

MACHIAVEL has been ſo generally decried, on account of the little regard he is ſuppoſed to have ſhewn to Religion and Morality in his writings, that a good man perhaps might think himſelf in ſome danger of being corrupted if he ſhould venture to read them. I confeſs I was long of that opinion myſelf, and therefore cannot well tell how to blame others for it. But after I had carefully peruſed them, and found ſufficient reaſon to alter my ſentiments in that matter; I thought many others might probably do the ſame, and that it would not be an unacceptable performance to ſeveral perſons of worth and candour, who do not underſtand Italian,

if I ſhould furniſh them with the means of reading Machiavel's works, by tranſlating them into the vulgar tongue; that ſo they might have an opportunity not only of undeceiving, but even of profitting themſelves by the many admirable maxims and inſtructions they will find in them. For indeed it is impoſſible that any one, who maturely conſiders them, ſhould not be convinced of their excellence and utility, both in the management of State affairs, and in the common tranſactions of life; in one or other of which every man has ſome concern, and conſequently will find his account in peruſing theſe writings. I might add, for my own juſtification, that having duly examined the reaſons, which have given riſe to ſo unfavourable an opinion as hath been generally conceived of Machiavel, I find it has rather been owing to prejudice than any rational foundation: ſince he ſeems to have taken no greater liberties than ſeveral other Hiſtorians whoſe writings have never been objected to; and, whilſt he is painting mankind in their true colours (which is a matter of great conſequence to know) neither recommends their vices, or enormities, or wicked maxims, as rules of conduct and practice for the imitation

of

of others, in oppoſition to Virtue and Morality. On the contrary, it is very obſervable in the courſe of this work, which chiefly treats of the foundation and government of States, that the firſt Principles he lays down for thoſe purpoſes, are the fear of God, a love of unity and order, honeſt induſtry, a ſtrict regard to juſtice, good military diſcipline, temperance, and other rules for the prevention or ſuppreſſion of idleneſs and luxury.

If this be the caſe then, Machiavel's writings muſt be ſadly tortured in order to extract that poiſon, which is ſuppoſed to lurk in them. Let any one read them however without prepoſſeſſion, and interpret them fairly as he ought to do, by referring the ſeveral *traits* to their proper Characters, and applying the different Maxims to the Hypotheſes he lays down, and I am perſuaded he will ſoon diveſt himſelf of the prejudice he had conceived againſt him. But if, inſtead of that, he detaches ſome parts, and applies them to others, where they neither are nor can be applicable, if he puts a bad conſtruction upon expreſſions which will naturally admit of a good one, if he makes it his buſineſs to carp only at the wicked exam-

ples that are quoted, the Author certainly is not in that caſe worthy of cenſure, but he that abuſes him in ſuch a manner: at this rate it might be reckoned dangerous to read any Hiſtorian: becauſe there are none, in whoſe writings we may not find maxims both avowed and practiſed, that are at leaſt as exceptionable as thoſe imputed to our Author. A man muſt exclude himſelf from the world, if he would avoid meeting with bad examples, even amongſt people in *high places*, and who pique themſelves upon their devotion. Have we not ſeen authors, and thoſe of great fame too, who have made no ſcruple of celebrating actions as *holy*, which another man of common ſenſe only would have deteſted as the moſt perfidious and inhuman? Have we not known Princes, otherwiſe great and illuſtrious, who have declared in their edicts, that they were reſolved to violate the privileges and immunities they had confirmed to their Subjects by the moſt ſolemn oaths and promiſes *? Nay, they have been ſo far from being aſhamed of ſuch an infamous man-

* The French Tranſlator, Monſieur Tetard, who was a Proteſtant Refugee, may be ſuppoſed to allude here to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Lewis XIV. in the year 1685.

ner

ner of proceeding, that they have thought themſelves worthy of all praiſe, and reckoned it amongſt the moſt meritorious actions of their life. This aſtoniſhing depravation of the human heart is not indeed altogether a new thing, though it is in a manner peculiar to the latter ages of Chriſtianity, to give flaming and magnificent titles to a Prince who would have been abhorred in the primitive times. What muſt any one think, if we were here to recite the reaſons aſſigned for Canonizing Lewis IX. a Prince naturally inclined to be good, it muſt be confeſſed, but corrupted by the monks to ſuch a degree, as to perſecute the poor Albigenſes in the moſt bloody and unmerciful manner? What ſhall we ſay of the ſplendid title of *Holy Office*, that is given to a Tribunal, the maxims and practice of which are ſufficient to inſpire any one with horror that only hears them related? It is certain that the very worſt things we meet with in Machiavel are far from being at ſuch variance with humanity and morality, as theſe *holy matters*, which ſo many weak people reverence, with a prejudice ten thouſand times more dangerous than what can ariſe from the tenets of the Florentine Politician.

But ſomebody perhaps may ſay, whence then proceeds this general prepoſſeſſion againſt an author, who, I maintain, has not tranſgreſſed the bounds of decency and moderation; whilſt many others that have exceeded them are looked upon with a favourable eye; and even young people are allowed to read Tacitus, who in point of morality very often ſtands in need of correction: whereas the *Holy Inquiſition* excommunicates all thoſe that read Machiavel? To which I anſwer, that in this caſe his Accuſers are his Judges: for he has touched upon the vices of Monks and other Prieſts in ſuch a manner, that it is no wonder if they do not love him. Every one knows that theſe perſons have the artifice to cover their own private intereſts under the veil of Religion, and fight their enemies with conſecrated arms. Machiavel therefore with them is a Heretic, an abandoned, profligate, dangerous fellow, for daring to preſent the world with ſuch a picture of the *Holy* Roman Church; which being founded only upon the prejudices of the multitude, will not ſuffer its Myſteries to be developed with impunity: it is making a cruel war upon it, thus to expoſe its ſecrets, and ſtrip off the diſguiſe of its Prieſts. But if one was to ſtrike out all the paſſages in the writings

writings of this great Politician which bear hard upon them; thoſe very people, who are now his bittereſt enemies, would then be the loudeſt in his praiſe. As the common Reader however is likely to be the moſt diſintereſted Judge, we ſhall leave the matter to his deciſion, without ſaying any thing further to bias his opinion in this cauſe. For the reſt, Machiavel indeed ſometimes lets himſelf looſe upon the Ultramontanes. At the head of this work he treats the French and Germans as perfidious, rapacious Barbarians, &c. as if the Italians ſurpaſſed all other people in point of probity, generoſity, and humanity. But he may appear in ſome meaſure pardonable even in this reſpect, when we conſider the cruel treatment his country met with from thoſe nations. Few people love their Conquerors; and for that reaſon, we may ſuppoſe, he ſpeaks ſo harſhly of Charles VIII. whom other Hiſtorians mention with great honour, conſidering him as a young Prince. But to ſpeak truth, it ſeems as if the Italians, and particularly the Florentines, have no more reaſon than the Ultramontane Princes to boaſt of Sincerity, diſintereſtedneſs, or politeneſs in any of the quarrels they were ever engaged in with the latter. This, however, ought not to diſguſt any one, or deter him from reading ſo uſeful a work.

Every Author has his faults; and Machiavel is not entirely exempt from them. The ſame may be ſaid of what he relates concerning the ancient Gauls and their neighbours: ſince neither Cæſar nor Tacitus repreſent thoſe Ultramontanes in ſo unfavourable a light as our Author has done.

MA-

MACHIAVEL's
DEDICATION
OF HIS
POLITICAL DISCOURSES
TO
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTE
AND
COSIMO RUCELLAI.

IF the preſent I here ſend you, my dear friends, is not anſwerable to the obligations you have laid upon me, it is the beſt, however, I am able to offer you in my circumſtances, as it contains all the political knowledge I have collected from much reading, and long experience in the affairs of the world. Your uſual Candour, therefore, I am perſuaded, will not ſuffer you to expect more than I am able to give; though, perhaps, you will find juſt cauſe to be diſguſted at the poverty of my ſtyle, as well as at ſome errors of judgment, which I may

I may probably be guilty of in the courſe of my reaſonings. Should that be the caſe, I cannot tell whether you will not be as blameable for urging me to undertake a taſk, which I ſhould otherwiſe never have attempted, as I ſhall be for not executing it in a better manner. Accept it, however, I beſeech you, like friends, who always conſider the good intention of the giver, rather than the value of the gift; and believe me, when I aſſure you, it gives me a particular ſatisfaction to reflect, that how much ſoever I may have erred in other points, I have acted with judgment in inſcribing theſe Diſcourſes to you: for, as I am more obliged to you than any other perſons in the world, it ſhews ſome gratitude for the favours I have received at your hands.

It is true, I deviate in this from the cuſtom of moſt authors, who generally dedicate their works to ſome Prince, and, either out of ambition or avarice, baſely extol him to the ſkies for the practice of

every virtue, when perhaps his vices deſerve the utmoſt deteſtation. But as I was determined to avoid all ſuſpicion of flattery, I have made choice of perſons to patronize my works, who, though not Princes in reality, yet highly deſerve to be ſo, for their numberleſs good qualities; not of ſuch as have it actually in their power to heap riches and honours upon me, but of thoſe that I know would not fail to do it, if they were as able as they were willing. For to judge rightly of things, we certainly ought to ſhew a greater degree of eſteem and regard for thoſe that have it in their will, than for others that only have it in their power to be liberal; and to reſpect ſuch as are worthy of a ſovereignty, more than thoſe that poſſeſs one without worth. Thus, Hiſtorians who praiſe Hiero the Syracuſan, though but a private man, ſeem to make little account of Perſes the Macedonian, notwithſtanding he was a Prince; becauſe Hiero wanted nothing but a crown to make him a King, and Perſes had no other qualification to entitle him to that dignity. Vouchſafe, then,

then, my dear Friends, to accept this work (ſuch as it is), ſince I undertook it at your own requeſt; and if this part ſhall have the good fortune to meet with your approbation, I will proceed in it, according to my promiſe. Farewell.

THE

AUTHOR's INTRODUCTION.

WHEN I conſider what veneration is ſhewn to Antiquity, how often it happens (to omit other inſtances) that an immenſe price is given by the curious for a fragment of an old ſtatue, either to adorn their cabinets, or to ſerve as a model for ſtatuaries to copy after in works of that kind; and what pains thoſe artiſts take to come up to their pattern: on the other hand, when I obſerve that the great and illuſtrious examples of ſeveral ancient Kingdoms and Republics which are recorded in Hiſtory, that the noble deeds of former Kings, Generals, Citizens, Legiſlators, and others, who have conſecrated their labours to the ſervice and glory of their country, are now rather admired than imitated, and indeed, ſo far from being followed by any one, that almoſt every body is indifferent about them to ſuch a degree, that there ſeem to be hardly any traces left amongſt us of the virtue of the Ancients, I cannot help being both ſurpriſed and concerned at it; and ſo much the more, when I have taken notice, that in civil differences, as well as in the various maladies that are incident to mankind, we

we always have recourſe to ſuch deciſions and preſcriptions as have been handed down to us from our Anceſtors. For, in fact, the Civil Law is nothing more than a collection of determinations and decrees, that have been made by ancient Lawyers, which being now digeſted into due order and method, ſerve as precedents to direct our magiſtrates at this day in the diſtribution of juſtice. And what is the knowledge of Medicine, but the reſult of former experience delivered down from the Profeſſors of it in old times; and by which our Phyſicians at preſent regulate their practice? But in forming a Republic, in ſupporting a State, in governing a Kingdom, in diſciplining an Army, in conducting a War, in extending an Empire, there is now neither Prince, nor Republic, nor General, nor eminent Citizen, that ſeems to pay the leaſt regard to the examples of Antiquity upon ſuch occaſions.——I cannot perſuade myſelf, however, that this proceeds ſo much from the effeminacy which the modern way of education has introduced into the world, or yet from the diſorder which an idle and luxurious manner of living has occaſioned in many ſtates and provinces in Chriſtendom in particular, as from a want of being ſufficiently converſant in Hiſtory, or at leaſt from an inattention to the precepts and example

amples it lays before us: to which it is owing, that few people underſtand them, fewer ſtill find any true reliſh or pleaſure in reading them, and of thoſe very few, perhaps here and there one, may be delighted for a while, with the recital of the many ſtrange accidents and occurrences he meets with, but without any further thought or deſign of improving himſelf by them; from an imagination that the great examples he there ſees, are not only difficult, but impoſſible to be equalled: as if the ſtars had changed their courſe, and not only the Elements, but even mankind themſelves, had loſt their priſtine vigour, and degenerated from what they were in former times.

Being deſirous, therefore, to undeceive thoſe that may poſſibly have fallen into this error, I thought the beſt method I could take for that purpoſe, would be to write ſuch a comment upon thoſe books of Livy's Roman Hiſtory, which have been ſpared us by the malevolence of time, as might beſt conduce to make them clearly underſtood, and moſt profitable to the reader, by exhibiting to view the courſe of ancient and modern times and circumſtances; that ſo they may reap that advantage from theſe Diſcourſes, which ought to be the true and only end of reading Hiſtory. And though indeed this is an arduous under-

undertaking, yet with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that encouraged me to embark in it, I am not altogether without hope that I ſhall be able to acquit myſelf in ſuch a manner, as may, in ſome meaſure, anſwer the end propoſed.

THE

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK I.

CHAP I.

Concerning the Origin of Cities in general, and that of Rome in particular.

WHOEVER examines the Origin of the City of Rome, in what manner, and by what laws it was governed, will find no great reaſon to wonder that it preſerved its virtue for ſo many ages, and that it afterwards acquired ſo vaſt a dominion. As I intend therefore to ſay ſomething of its Origin in the firſt place, I muſt premiſe that all Cities are founded either by natives of the Country where they are ſituated, or by foreigners. The firſt happens when the inhabitants, being diſperſed or ſeparated into little communities, cannot live in ſecurity: as no one of them of itſelf would be able to make a ſufficient defence, if it ſhould be aſſaulted by an enemy; nor would it have time in caſe of a ſudden attack to unite with others for that purpoſe. But ſuppoſing that could be effected, they muſt ſtill be obliged to aban-

don many of their habitations and poſſeſſions to the mercy of the Enemy: to avoid ſuch dangers, they commonly agree at laſt either of their own accord, or by the advice of ſome perſon of the greateſt authority amongſt them, to unite and live together in ſome one place choſen by general conſent, where they may mutually furniſh each other with the neceſſaries and conveniences of life, and make better proviſion for their common ſafety. In this manner, Athens and Venice, amongſt many others, were founded at firſt; the former under the authority of Theſeus, and by people who before had been ſcattered and diſperſed at a diſtance from each other; the latter by ſuch as had fled into certain little Iſles at the extremity of the Adriatic, (to avoid the miſeries which were daily occaſioned in Italy, by the continual irruption of Barbarians after the declenſion of the Roman empire) where they lived together under no particular governor, though they agreed to obſerve certain laws which ſeemed abſolutely neceſſary for their future ſupport and eſtabliſhment. And in this they ſucceeded ſo well from the long repoſe they enjoyed in that ſituation, (being ſeparated from the continent, and not liable to be annoyed by an Enemy who had no ſhips to invade them) that from this ſmall beginning they at laſt arrived at that prodigious degree of power and grandeur in which we ſee the Venetians at preſent *.

In the ſecond caſe, that is, when a City is founded by foreigners, it is done either by ſuch as are entirely free, or dependent on others; as by Colonies, for inſtance, which are ſent out by ſome Prince or Common-wealth, either to diſburden their own territories when they are too full of inhabitants, or to keep poſſeſſion at little or no expence of ſome Country they have newly conquered, (many of which the Romans planted in every part of their Empire) or perhaps by ſome Prince, not with any deſign to reſide

* This was writen when that Commonwealth was in the Zenith of its glory, and before it was humbled by the famous League of Cambray. It is now in very different circumſtances. See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book I.

there himſelf, but for his glory and reputation, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the Great. But theſe Cities, not being free in their Original, ſeldom attain to that degree of eminence as to become Capitals of Kingdoms or Empires. Of this kind was Florence, which (whether built by the Soldiers of Sylla, or perhaps by the inhabitants of the mountains about Fieſole *, who, being encouraged by the long peace which the world enjoyed under the reign of Auguſtus, left their faſtneſſes, and came to live upon the banks of the Arno) was certainly founded under the Roman Empire, and therefore could never raiſe itſelf from ſuch a beginning to any greater height, than its Sovereign was pleaſed to allow of.

The founders of Cities may be ſaid to be free, when a people either quit their native country voluntarily, or are forced out of it by peſtilence, famine, or war, to ſeek new habitations under the conduct of ſome Prince or other leaders of their own. And theſe muſt either inhabit ſuch Cities as they find ready built in the country they get poſſeſſion of, as Moſes did; or they muſt build new ones like Æneas. In the latter caſe, the Conductor of the undertaking has the greater opportunity of diſplaying his abilities; on which the future good or bad fortune of the City chiefly depends: and thoſe abilities are diſtinguiſhable principally in two points: firſt in the choice of a convenient ſituation, and next in making good laws. Now ſince ſome men betake themſelves to labour through mere neceſſity, and others only by choice, and it always happens that there is more virtue in thoſe countries where labour cannot poſſibly be diſpenſed with, than in others where there is more room for choice, it ſeems worthy of conſideration whether it is not the beſt way to build in a barren country; that ſo, when men are obliged to work hard and cannot afford to be idle, they may live more united; for the poverty of a country is ſeldom the occaſion of

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book II. at the beginning.

diſſenſions: in proof of which, we might alledge if neceſſary the concord of the Raguſans, as well as of the inhabitants of ſome other cities that have been built in ſuch ſituations. And without doubt ſuch a choice would be both a very prudent and advantageous one, if men could be content with their own, and not covet the poſſeſſions of others. But ſince the depravity of human nature is ſuch, that it is impoſſible for any one to live in ſecurity, unleſs he fortifies himſelf with power, it is better to build in a fertile country, where plenty of all things will make the inhabitants increaſe, and enable them not only to defend themſelves againſt any attack, but to humble thoſe that ſhould dare to oppoſe their riſing fortune. As for the idleneſs which ſuch abundance may occaſion, it may be prevented by proper laws, according to the example of ſeveral wiſe Legiſlators, who, having lived in ſuch pleaſant and fruitful countries as naturally incline men to be lazy and unfit for honeſt induſtry, have always obviated the inconveniencies which otherwiſe muſt have happened, by laying thoſe citizens who were deſigned for Soldiers, under a neceſſity of uſing hard labour and exerciſe, which rendered them better Soldiers than thoſe who had been bred up in rough and barren countries. Of this, the Kingdom of Egypt may ſerve for an example; which, though one of the moſt delightful countries in the World, availed itſelf however of wiſe laws and reſtrictions in ſuch a manner, that it produced many brave and excellent men, whoſe actions, if the memory of them had not been almoſt extinguiſhed by time, would have been more extolled than thoſe of Alexander the Great, and ſeveral others which are ſtill held in ſo much admiration*. For whoever conſiders the Government of the Soldans, the diſcipline of the Mamalucs and the reſt of their Soldiery, before they were conquered by Selim the Grand Turk,

* Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona
Multi, ſed omnes illacrymabiles
Urgentur, ignotique longâ
Nocte. Hor. Book III. Ode ix.

will

will find many admirable regulations with regard to their forces; from whence it may eaſily be perceived how apprehenſive they were of their being enervated by that idleneſs to which the benignity of the climate muſt naturally have inclined them, if it had not been guarded againſt by the ſtricteſt injunctions of due exerciſe and labour.

I ſay therefore, it is the moſt prudent way to make choice of a fertile ſituation, provided proper care be taken to obviate the evils by ſalutary laws, which otherwiſe luxury and abundance may probably occaſion. When Alexander the Great intended to found a City to prepetuate his name, Dinocrates an Architect adviſed him to build it upon Mount Athos, which would not only be very ſtrong, but might be reduced into the ſhape of a man; a circumſtance that could not fail of being much admired, and muſt contribute greatly to his glory. But the King aſking how the inhabitants were to be furniſhed with proviſions, he confeſſed he had not thought of that *, at which Alexander could not help laughing very heartily, and leaving the mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where he knew people would be glad to live on account of the richneſs of the Soil, as well as the advantages they might reap from the vicinity of the Sea and the river Nile.

If then we conſider the Origin of Rome, and admit it to have been founded by Æneas, it muſt be numbered amongſt thoſe cities that have been built by foreigners; but if the foundation of it is to be aſcribed to Romulus, it may be looked upon as built by the natives of the country in which it ſtands. In either caſe we ſhall find that it was free in the beginning and independent on any one. It will likewiſe appear (as we ſhall ſhew hereafter) that the inhabitants were laid under ſuch ſevere reſtrictions in ſeveral reſpects, by the laws which were made by Romulus, Numa, and others, that neither the fertility of the country, the conveniency of the Sea, the frequent

* Plutarch, in vit. Alexandri.

and ſignal victories they gained, nor the greatneſs of their Empire, were able to corrupt them for many ages: on the contrary, they maintained their virtue with ſuch inflexible rigour, as there are few or no examples of in any other Common-wealth. And ſince the great exploits performed under that Government both at home and abroad, which are recorded by Livy, were conducted either by public or private Councils, I ſhall begin my Diſcourſes with what ſeems moſt worthy of obſervation in their civil and domeſtic affairs, and the conſequences attendant thereon, with which, the firſt book, or rather the firſt part of this work will conclude.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the different ſorts of Government, and eſpecially that of Rome.

OMITTING all mention at preſent of ſuch Cities as were dependent in their firſt foundation, I ſhall ſpeak of thoſe only that were originally free, and conducted themſelves as they thought fit, either in a Republican or a Monarchical form of Government, and theſe, as their plan and origin were different, had likewiſe different laws and conſtitutions. Some of them had laws delivered to them by one perſon at the firſt, or at leaſt very ſoon after their foundation; as the Spartans received theirs immediately from Lycurgus: others had their laws given them at different times, according to the ſeveral accidents and exigencies that happened; which was the caſe of Rome. That State, therefore, may juſtly be deemed fortunate, which falls into the hands of a wiſe man, who makes ſuch laws at firſt, as want no amendment or new-modelling afterwards, but are ſufficient of themſelves to ſecure and protect thoſe that live under them; as it happened to the Spartans, whoſe laws were ſo excellent that they were inviolably obſerved

obſerved for above eight hundered years, without occaſioning any murmurs or commotions of conſequence. On the other hand, that State, muſt be in ſome meaſure unhappy, which, for want of prudence and foreſight in the Legiſlators at firſt, is reduced to the neceſſity of reforming and altering its laws upon ſudden emergencies: ſtill more unhappy when its laws are of ſuch a nature, that inſtead of conducing to promote the true ends of government, they have a quite different tendency; for in that caſe, there is hardly any poſſibility of reforming it. As to others which are eſtabliſhed upon good principles at firſt, and capable of improvement, if they are not altogether perfect, they may become more and more ſo in time by divers accidents and occurrences, though perhaps not without ſome dangerous ſhocks and concuſſions; for men are naturally averſe to any innovation or change in their cuſtoms and laws, except they are convinced there is an abſolute neceſſity for it: and as this neceſſity muſt be occaſioned by ſome impending danger, the State may be ſubverted, before the remedy can have its effect. Of this we have ſufficient proofs in what has happened to the Republic of Florence, at various times, and upon different occaſions: particularly upon the commotions that happened at Arozzo and Prato; the former of which produced a new reformation in the State, and the latter great confuſion.

But as I propoſe to treat more particularly of the laws and conſtitution of the Roman Republic, and ſhew what accidents contributed to bring it to perfection, I muſt obſerve in the firſt place, that acording to ſome authors, there are but three ſorts of government, *viz.* Monarchy or Principality, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; and that thoſe who intend to erect a new State, muſt have recourſe to ſome one of theſe which he likes beſt. Others (and with more judgment, as many think) ſay there are Six ſorts; three of which are very bad, and the other three good in themſelves, but liable to be ſo corrupted that they

may become the worſt. The three good ſorts have been juſt now mentioned; the other three proceed from theſe, and every one of them bears ſuch a reſemblance to that on which it reſpectively depends, that the tranſition from one to the other is ſhort and eaſy: for Monarchy often degenerates into Tyranny, Ariſtocracy into Oligarchy, and Democracy into licentious Anarchy and confuſion. So that whoever ſets up any one of the former three kinds of Government, may aſſure himſelf it will not be of any long duration; for no precaution will be ſufficient to prevent its falling into the other that is analogous to it, on account of the affinity which there ſeems to be in this caſe betwixt virtue and vice, perfection and imperfection.

This variety of Governments amongſt mankind, appears to have been the effect of chance: for in the beginning of the World, the inhabitants being few, they ſome time lived ſeparate from each other like beaſts; but afterwards as they multiplied, they began to unite for their mutual defence, and put themſelves under the protection of ſuch as were moſt eminent amongſt them for courage and ſtrength, whom they engaged to obey and to acknowledge as their chiefs*. Hence aroſe the diſtinction betwixt honeſt and diſhoneſt, juſt and unjuſt: for when any one injured his benefactor, his ingratitude excited a ſort of fellow-feeling and indignation in others, as well as kindneſs and reſpect for thoſe that behaved differently: and as they conſidered that they might ſome time or other perhaps be treated in the ſame manner themſelves, if proper meaſures were not taken to prevent it, they thought fit to make laws for the reward of good men,

* Cum prorepſerunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum & turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Pugnabant armis, quæ poſt fabricaverat uſus;
Donec verba, quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre: dehinc abſiſtere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, & ponere leges,
Ne quis fur eſſet, neu latro, neu quis adulter.
Hor. Satir. lib I. iii.

and

and the punishment of offenders. This first gave rise to justice in the world *; and from this consideration it came to pass in process of time, that in the election of a new Chief, they had not so much regard to courage and bodily strength as to wisdom and integrity. But afterwards, as this kind of government became gradually hereditary instead of elective, the the heirs of these Chieftains soon began to degenerate from the virtue of their Ancestors, and to behave themselves as if they thought the main duty of a Prince consisted in surpassing all other men in luxury, extravagance, effeminacy, and every sort of voluptuousness; by which in a while, they first grew odious to their Subjects, and then so jealous for themselves, that they were forced to distress and cut off others for their own security, and at last to become downright Tyrants. This first occasioned combinations and conspiracies for the destruction of Princes; not amongst the weak and pusillanimous part of their subjects, but amongst such as being more eminent for their generosity, magnanimity, riches, and birth, could not endure any longer to submit to these pitiful and oppressive Governors.

The multitude therefore, swayed by the authority of the Nobles, rose in arms against their Prince, and being freed from his yoke, transferred their allegiance to their deliverers, who being thoroughly disgusted at Monarchy, changed the form of Government, and and took it into their own hands. After which they conducted both themselves and the State, according to the plan they had formed, preferring the common good to any particular advantage, and behaving in private as well as public affairs with assiduity and moderation, whilst the remembrances of their past sufferings continued fresh upon their minds. But this authority afterwards devolving upon their Sons, who had not seen these changes, nor experienced the miseries of tyranny, they began to grow so dissatisfied with that sort of civil equality, that they cast off all

* —Utilitas justi prope mater & æqui. Hor. Satir. lib. I. iii.

restraint,

reſtraint, and giving themſelves up to rapine, ambition, and luſt, ſoon changed the government again from Ariſtocracy into an Oligarchy. Their adminiſtration however becoming as inſupportable in a while as the tyranny of the other had formerly been, the people naturally began to look out for ſome deliverer; and having fixed upon a leader, they put themſelves under his banners, and aboliſhed Oligarchy. But when they had done this, and came to reflect upon the oppreſſions they ſuſtained under a Tyrant, they reſolved never to be governed again by any one man; and therefore agreed to ſet up a popular Government, which was conſtituted in ſuch a manner, that the chief authority was not veſted either in a Prince or in a Junto of the Nobility. Now as all new eſtabliſhments are held in ſome degree of reverence and veneration at firſt, this form ſubſiſted for ſome time; though no longer than thoſe people lived who had been the founders of it: for after their death, their deſcendants degenerated into licentiouſneſs, and ſuch a contempt of all authority and diſtinction, that, every man living after his own caprice, there was nothing to be ſeen but confuſion and violence; ſo that either by the advice of ſome good and reſpectable man, or compelled by the abſolute neceſſity of providing a remedy for theſe diſorders and enormities, they at laſt determine once more to ſubmit to the dominion of one: from which ſtate they fell again in time through the ſame gradations, and from the abovementioned cauſes, into miſrule and licentiouſneſs. Such is the rotation to which all States are ſubject; nevertheleſs they cannot often revert to the ſame kind of Government, becauſe it is not poſſible that they ſhould ſo long exiſt as to undergo many of theſe mutations; for it frequently happens that when a State is labouring under ſuch convulſions, and is deſtitute both of ſtrength and counſel, it falls a prey to ſome other neighbouring community or nation that is better governed; otherwiſe it might paſs through the

the ſeveral abovementioned revolutions again and again to infinity.

All theſe ſorts of government then, in my opinion, are infirm and inſecure; the three former from the uſual ſhortneſs of their duration, and the three latter from the malignity of their own principles. The wiſeſt Legiſlators therefore being aware of theſe defects, never eſtabliſhed any one of them in particular, but contrived another that partakes of them all, conſiſting of a Prince, Lords, and Commons, which they looked upon as more firm and ſtable, becauſe every one of theſe members would be a check upon the other: and of thoſe Legiſlators, Lycurgus certainly merits the higheſt praiſe, who conſtituted an eſtabliſhment of this kind at Sparta, which laſted above eight hundred years, to his own great honour as well as the tranquility of the Citizens. Very different was the fate of the Government eſtabliſhed by Solon at Athens, which, being a ſimple Democracy only, was of ſo ſhort a continuance, that it gave way to the tyranny of Piſiſtratus before the death of the Legiſlator: and though indeed the heirs of that Tyrant were expelled about forty years after, and the Athenians not only recovered their liberty, but reeſtabliſhed Solon's laws and plan of government, yet they did not maintain it above a hundred years, notwithſtanding they made ſeveral new regulations to reſtrain the inſolence of the Nobles, and the licentiouſneſs of the Commons; the neceſſity of which Solon had not foreſeen: ſo that for want of tempering his Democracy with a ſhare of Ariſtocracy and princely power, it was of ſhort duration in compariſon of the conſtitution of Sparta.

But to return to Rome. Though that City had not a Lycurgus to model its conſtitution at firſt, in ſuch a manner as might preſerve its liberty for a long courſe of time; yet ſo many were the accidents which happened in the conteſts betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, that chance effected what the Law-giver had not provided for. So that if it was not perfect

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at the beginning, it became ſo after a while; for though the firſt laws were deficient, yet they were neither incapable of amendment, nor repugnant to its future perfection: ſince not only Romulus but all the reſt of the Kings that ſucceeded him made ſeveral good alterations in them, and ſuch as were well calculated for the ſupport of liberty. But as it was their intention to found a Monarchy and not a Republic, when that City had ſhaken off the yoke of a Tyrant, there ſeemed to be many proviſions ſtill wanting for the further maintenance of its freedom. And notwithſtanding tyranny was at laſt eradicated by the ways and means abovementioned, yet thoſe who had chiefly contributed to it, created two Conſuls to ſupply the place of Royalty; by which it came to paſs that the name alone, and not the authority of Princes, was extinguiſhed. So that the Supreme power being lodged only in the Conſuls and Senate, the Government conſiſted of no more than two of the three Eſtates which we have ſpoken of before, that is, of Royalty and Ariſtocracy. It remained therefore ſtill neceſſary to admit the people into ſome ſhare of the Government; and the Patricians growing ſo inſolent in time (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) that the Plebeians could no longer endure it, the latter took arms, and obliged them to relinquiſh part of their authority, leſt they ſhould loſe the whole; on the other hand, the Conſuls and Senators ſtill retained ſo much power in the Common-wealth, as enabled them to ſupport their rank with dignity and honour. This ſtruggle gave birth to certain Officers called *Tribunes of the People*; after the creation of whom that State became more firm and compact, every one of the three degrees abovementioned having its proper ſhare in the Government; and ſo propitious was fortune to it, that although it was changed from a Monarchy into an Ariſtocracy, and afterwards into a Democracy, by the ſteps and for the reaſons already aſſigned, yet the Royal power was never entirely aboliſhed and given to the Patricians, nor that of the Patricians wholly

to

to the Plebeians; on the contrary, the authority of the three Eſtates being duly proportioned and mixed together, gave it the higheſt degree of perfection that any Common-wealth is capable of attaining to; and this was owing in a great meaſure, if not altogether, to the diſſenſions that happened betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, as ſhall be ſhewn more at large in the following Chapters.

CHAP. III.

To what accidents it was owing that the Tribunes of the People were created at Rome; and how they contributed to make that Common-wealth more perfect.

THOSE that have written upon Civil Government, lay it down as a firſt Principle, and all Hiſtorians demonſtrate the ſame, that whoever would found a ſtate, and make proper laws for the government of it, muſt preſuppoſe that all men are bad by nature *, and that they will not fail to ſhew that natural depravity of heart, whenever they have a fair opportunity; and though it may poſſibly lie concealed for a while, on account of ſome ſecret reaſon which does not then appear to men of ſmall experience; yet Time, (which is therefore juſtly called *the Father of truth*) commonly brings it to light in the end. After the expulſion of the Tarquins at Rome, there ſeemed to be a perfect harmony betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians; the former having laid aſide their uſual arrogance, and aſſumed an appearance of familiarity and affability even towards the loweſt of the people. The reaſons of this were not diſcovered whilſt the Tarquins lived; for the Patricians being ſtill afraid of them, were likewiſe apprehenſive that

* This ſeems a harſh ſuppoſition. But does not every Chriſtian almoſt daily juſtify the truth of it, by confeſſing it before God and the World; and are we not expreſsly told the ſame in ſeveral paſſages of the Holy Scriptures, and in all Syſtems of human Philoſophy.

if

if they ſhould oppreſs the people, they might be tempted to call in that family again; and this was the true cauſe of their ſeeming moderation. But as ſoon as the Tarquins were dead, and the Patricians delivered from thoſe apprehenſions, they began to vent that malice upon the Plebeians which they had ſo long concealed, and to treat them in the moſt inſolent and injurious manner, which may ſerve as a ſufficient proof of what I have juſt ſaid, that men are never good but through neceſſity; on the contrary, when good and evil are left to their choice, and they can practiſe the latter with impunity, they will not fail to throw every thing into diſorder and confuſion. Hence ariſes the common obſervation, that *hunger and poverty may make people induſtrious, but laws only can make them good:* for if men were ſo of themſelves, there would be no occaſion for laws, but as the caſe is far otherwiſe, they are abſolutely neceſſary.

After the Tarquins were dead, who had been ſuch a check upon the Nobility, ſome other expedient ſeemed wanting that might have the ſame effect; ſo that after much confuſion and diſorder, and many dangerous conteſts betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians, certain Officers, called *Tribunes*, were created for the ſecurity of the latter: who, being veſted with ſuch privileges and authority as enabled them to become Arbiters betwixt thoſe two Eſtates, effectually curbed the inſolence of the former.

CHAP. IV.

The diſſenſions betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians made the Roman Common-wealth more powerful and free.

I Muſt here ſay ſomething of the conteſts that happened at Rome betwixt the death of the Tarquins and the creation of the Tribunes, and afterwards endeavour to refute the opinion of thoſe who aſſert, that the Roman Republic was ſo ſubject to tumult, ſedition,

ſedition, and confuſion, that if its good fortune and military virtue had not over balanced theſe defects, it would have been much inferior to any other. It muſt be owned indeed, that both fortune and valour did not a little contribute to the aggrandizement of that Empire: but it ſeems to me as if theſe people did not conſider, that where there are good Soldiers there muſt be good order and diſcipline, which is likewiſe generally attended with good fortune.

But to deſcend to ſome other particulars relating to that City. I ſay thoſe that cavil at the diſſenſions betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians, cavil at the very cauſes which in my opinion contributed moſt to its liberty; for whilſt they object to them as the ſources of tumult and confuſion, they do not conſider the good effects they produced; ſeeming either to forget, or never to have known, that in all Commonwealths, the views and diſpoſition of the Nobility and Commonalty muſt of neceſſity be very widely if not totally different: and that all the laws which are made in favour of liberty, have been owing to the differences betwixt them, as might eaſily be demonſtrated from what happened at Rome; for from the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, which was a period of above three hundred years, the conteſts that aroſe were very ſeldom attended with the baniſhment, and ſtill ſeldomer with the execution of any of the Citizens.

There is no reaſon then to look upon thoſe humours as noxious, nor that Republic as diſunited, in which during ſo long a ſpace, and ſo many ſtruggles, not above eight or ten people were ſent into Exile, very few put to death, and not many puniſhed with pecuniary fines on account of thoſe commotions; nor can it with any juſtice be called a diſordered or ill governed State, where there were ſo many examples of every kind of virtue; ſince good examples proceeded from good education, and good education from good laws, and thoſe laws from thoſe diſſenſions which many ſo inconſiderately condemn. For whoever

ever will look into the conſequences of them, will find that they ſeldom occaſioned baniſhment or any other violence that was detrimental to the public good; but laws, on the contrary, that were highly conducive to the preſervation of their common liberties. If any one however ſhould object, that it muſt be a ſtrange and horrible ſight to ſee not only the Commonalty in an uproar againſt the Nobility, and the Nobility againſt the Commonalty, and both of them running through the ſtreets in a tumultuous manner; but tradeſmen ſhutting up their ſhops, and all ſorts of people flying by droves out of the City; a Spectacle, as they imagine, that muſt frighten any perſon that beheld, and even thoſe that read of it: I anſwer, that every State ought to have proper means in its hands to gratify the demands of the people, eſpecially thoſe States that are obliged to have recourſe to the Commonalty for their aſſiſtance upon any exigency: and as the Roman Republic was ſuch, whenever the people wanted to have a new law made, they either raiſed a tumult or refuſed to enliſt themſelves as Soldiers in time of war, till they had obtained ſome ſort of Satisfaction. And it ſeldom happens that the demands of a free people are either unreaſonable or prejudicial to liberty, as they commonly proceed either from actual oppreſſion, or the dread of it; but if that apprehenſion ſhould prove groundleſs, it is no difficult matter to pacify them by a public conference, where they are always ready to liſten to any man of worth and authority that ſhall think fit to harangue them: for though the people may ſometimes be in an error, as Tully ſays, they are open to better information, and ſoon convinced, when a perſon of whoſe veracity and integrity they have a good opinion, undertakes to ſhew them their miſtake.

We ſhould not therefore be too forward in cenſuring the conſtitution of the Roman Republic; eſpecially when we conſider that the vaſt things which it accompliſhed muſt be owing to proportionable cauſes; and that if the diſſenſions that happened in it occaſioned

ſioned the creation of Tribunes, they were rather of advantage than otherwiſe: for they not only procured the people a ſhare in the adminiſtration of Government, but were the Guardians and Conſervators of the public liberty, as I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter *.

CHAP.

* "Monteſquieu hath often given it as his opinion, ſays the Au-
" thor of *the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times*, Vol.
" II. Sect. xii. That Factions are not only natural but neceſſary to
" free Governments." This opinion, however, is in ſome ſenſe erroneous, becauſe too general. The Author borrowed it with many other important obſervations in his book from Machiavel's Diſcourſes upon Livy. But in juſtice to the Florentine, we muſt obſerve that *he* limits the obſervation to the times in which public Spirit was predominant: whereas the other extends it to later periods, when ſelfiſh Ambition had quenched the love of one's country; and hence aroſe his error. As theſe two Authors, in the writer's opinion, poſſeſs the higheſt ſtation in the political ſcale, it may be worth while to give a comparative ſketch of their different characters. Machiavel, born and bred in tumultuous and profligate times, and occupied in the affairs of a diſtempered Republic, caught his firſt principles from what he *ſaw*. Monteſquieu, more happy in his birth and fortune, enjoying an early leiſure in a quiet and well regulated Monarchy, drew his firſt principles of Politics from what he *read*. Yet neither was the former given up to mere perſonal obſervation, nor the latter to mere ſtudy: in the progreſs of life, Machiavel applied himſelf to books, and Monteſquieu to men; yet, as was natural, their firſt habits prevailed, and gave to each his diſtinct and peculiar character. Hence, though both ſaw the internal and ſecret pangs of Government, (which, in my opinion, no writer but theſe two did ever fully comprehend or penetrate) yet they ſaw them by different lights, and through different mediums. Machiavel's leading guide was *Fact*; Monteſquieu's was *Philoſophy*. In conſequence of this, Simplicity forms the Character of one, Refinement that of the other. The Speculative Frenchman forms a fine ſyſtem; to the completion of which, he ſometimes tortures both Argument and Fact; the plain and downright Florentine builds on Facts, independent on all Syſtems. The polite and diſintereſted Sage is warm in the praiſe of *Honeſty*: the active and penetrating Secretary, above praiſe or cenſure, gives a bold and ſtriking picture of *the ways of men*. Hence, whilſt the firſt gains every heart by the force of moral Sympathy, the latter hath been unjuſtly deteſted, as the Enemy of Virtue and Mankind. Machiavel is negligent, yet pure and ſtrong, ſcorning the minuter graces of compoſition; Monteſquieu is elegant, yet nervous; and to the acuteneſs of the Philoſopher, often adds the fire of the Poet. Both were the friends of freedom and mankind; both ſuperior to the Genius of their time and country; both truly great: the Florentine ſevere and great; the Frenchman great and amiable.

Before we can determine therefore, whether the Factions that divide a free country be ſalutary or dangerous, it is neceſſary to know what is their foundation and object. If they ariſe from freedom of opinion and aim at the public welfare, they are ſalutary: but if their ſource be ſelf-intereſt of what kind ſoever, then they are dangerous and de-

CHAP. V.

Whether it is safer to truſt the guardianſhip of Liberty in the hands of the Nobility or the Commonalty: and whether thoſe that only deſire to maintain what they have, or thoſe that want to uſurp more, are the moſt likely to excite commotions in a State.

THE wiſeſt Legiſlators have always made it their principal care to provide a barrier for the liberty of the States they have founded; and according as that has been well or ill ſecured, the freedom of thoſe States has been of longer or ſhorter duration; and, as there muſt of neceſſity, be both Grandees and Commoners in every Republic, it has been a matter of doubt, in which of thoſe two orders, it would be moſt proper to veſt that charge. The Spartans formerly, and the Venetians lately, committed it to the Nobility; but the Romans thought fit to lodge it in the hands of the Commonalty. Let us examine then, which of theſe Republics made the wiſer choice.

ſtructive. I cannot give a better comment on this truth, than in the words of Lord Bolingbroke: "As long, ſays he, as the Spirit of Liberty prevailed, a Roman ſacrificed his own, and therefore no doubt, every other perſonal intereſt, to the intereſt of the Common-wealth: when the latter (that is, the Spirit of Faction) ſucceeded, the intereſt of the Common-wealth was conſidered no otherwiſe, than in ſubordination to that *particular* intereſt which each perſon had eſpouſed. The principal men, inſtead of making their grandeur and glory conſiſt, as they formerly had done, in that which the grandeur and liberty of the Common wealth reflected on them, conſidered themſelves now as Individuals, not as Citizens; and each would ſhine with his own light. To this purpoſe alone they employed the Commands they had of armies, the Government of Provinces, and the influence they acquired over the *Tribes* (or different Claſſes of people) at Rome, and over the Allies and Subjects of the Republic. Upon principles of the ſame kind, inferior people attached themſelves to them; and that zeal and induſtry, nay that courage and magnanimity, which had been formerly exerted in the ſervice of the Common-wealth, were exerted by the Spirit of Faction, for Marius or Sylla, for Cæſar or Pompey."

Now,

Now, if we weigh their reſpective motives for acting in this manner, we ſhall find that very powerful reaſons may be aſſigned on each ſide of the queſtion; but, if we conſider the duration of thoſe States, we muſt declare in favour of the former; as the liberties of Sparta and Venice were of longer continuance, than thoſe of Rome. To come to their ſeveral motives then; and, in the firſt place, to what may be urged in behalf of the Romans.—It may be ſaid, that the guardianſhip of Liberty ought always to be lodged in the hands of ſuch as are leaſt deſirous to encroach upon the rights of others; and that if we reflect upon the different views and paſſions of Nobles and Commoners, we ſhall always find a luſt of power and dominion in the former; whilſt the latter ſeldom aſpire to any thing further than to defend themſelves from oppreſſion; and conſequently, as they have no ambition to rule, they muſt be truer friends to liberty than the Nobles; ſo that, when the people are entruſted with the conſervation of liberty, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, they will be moſt zealous in its ſupport; and that, as they do not deſire to violate it themſelves, they will take care to prevent others from ſo doing. On the other hand, the Advocates for the Spartan and Venetian eſtabliſhments may alledge, that two very good ends are anſwered, by committing the care of the public liberty to the Nobility: for, in the firſt place, it ſatiates the ambition of thoſe, who by that means, will have the chief authority in the Common-wealth, and leaves them no pretence to be diſcontented: and, in the next, by taking that power from the reſtleſs multitude, it deprives them of the opportunity of raiſing tumults and ſeditious commotions in the State, which often drive the Nobility to deſpair, and always are attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences. In confirmation of this, they produce the Republic of Rome itſelf for an example; where the Tribunes of the people having got the power into their hands, were not content with one Plebeian Conſul, but in-

ſiſted that both of them ſhould be choſen out of that order; after which, they likewiſe ſeized upon the Cenſorſhip, the Prætorſhip, and all the other great offices in the Common-wealth. But not ſatisfied with this, they proceeded with the ſame degree of licentiouſneſs, to encourage certain bold and popular men, to thwart and inſult the nobility; which in time gave riſe to the domination of Marius, and at laſt proved the ruin of that Common-wealth.

It muſt be confeſſed, therefore, that after maturely conſidering both ſides of the queſtion, it ſtill ſeems a doubtful point, in what hands one ought to truſt the guardianſhip of Liberty; ſince it is no eaſy matter to determine, whether thoſe that only deſire to ſupport themſelves in the poſſeſſion of what they already have, or thoſe that want to uſurp more, are the moſt dangerous ſort of people in a Republic. But to come to ſome concluſion upon the whole; if the State in queſtion be deſigned to extend its dominion, and become a large Empire, as Rome did; the conduct of the Romans muſt be cloſely copied in every thing; but, if it is ſuch a one as deſires nothing more than to maintain its own, it will be ſufficient to imitate the example of the Spartans and Venetians, in ſuch a manner, and for ſuch reaſons, as ſhall be given in the next Chapter.

Let us now diſcuſs the other part of the queſtion, viz. whether thoſe that are afraid of loſing what they have, or thoſe that graſp at more, are the moſt dangerous ſort of people in a Common-wealth. Marcus Menenius being made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius, General of the Horſe (both Plebeians), to quell a conſpiracy which had been formed at Capua, were likewiſe veſted with a power of inquiring into the conduct of ſuch citizens at home, as had been guilty of bribery, or any ſort of undue means, to obtain the Conſulſhip and other honours in the Government. But the Nobles apprehending this enquiry was chiefly levelled at them, gave out, that it was not the Nobility that had been guilty of ſuch practices, but

the Commonalty, who having neither virtue nor birth to entitle them to honours, were obliged to have recourſe to thoſe mean artifices, of which they accuſed the Dictator in particular, with ſuch virulence, that after he had made a ſpeech in public, in which he complained of the aſperſions that had been thrown upon him by the Nobles, he laid down the Dictatorſhip, and ſubmitted to be tried by the people, who acquitted him. But in the courſe of this trial, it was warmly debated, which of the two were the moſt dangerous perſons, thoſe that contented themſelves with defending what they had, or thoſe that wanted to uſurp more: as too obſtinate a manner of proceeding in either, might excite great diſturbances and commotions *. Such evils, however, are moſt frequently

* "I look upon it as a peculiar happineſs, ſays an excellent Modern "of this nation, that were I to chuſe under what form of Government "I would live, I ſhould moſt certainly give the preference to that "which is eſtabliſhed in my own Country. In this point, I think, I "am determined by reaſon and conviction; but, if I ſhall be told, "that I am actuated by prejudice, I am ſure it is an honeſt prejudice; "it is a prejudice that ariſes from the love of my Country, and there-"fore ſuch a one as I will always indulge. That form of Government "appears to me the moſt reaſonable, which is moſt conformable to the "quality that we find in human nature, provided it be conſiſtent with "public peace and tranquillity. This is what may properly be called "*Liberty*, which exempts one man from ſubjection to another, ſo far "as the order and œconomy of government will permit. Liberty "ſhould reach every Individual of a People, as they all ſhare one com-"mon nature: if it only ſpreads among particular branches, there "had better be none at all; ſince ſuch a Liberty only aggravates the "misfortune of thoſe that are deprived of it, by ſetting before them "a diſagreeable ſubject of compariſon. This Liberty is beſt preſerv-"ed, where the Legiſlative Power is lodged in ſeveral Perſons, eſpe-"cially if thoſe Perſons are of different ranks and intereſts; for where "they are of the ſame rank, and conſequently have an intereſt to ma-"nage peculiar to that rank, it differs but little from a deſpotic Go-"vernment in a ſingle Perſon. But the greateſt ſecurity a People can "have for their Liberty, is when the Legiſlative Power is in the hands "of Perſons ſo happily diſtinguiſhed, that by providing for the par-"ticular intereſts of their ſeveral ranks, they are providing for the "whole body of the People: or in other words, when there is no part "of the People that has not a common intereſt with at leaſt one part "of the Legiſlators.

"If there be but one body of Legiſlators, it is no better than a Ty-"ranny; if there are only two, there will want a caſting voice, and "one of them muſt at laſt be ſwallowed up by diſputes and conten-"tions that will naturally ariſe betwixt them. Four would have the "ſame inconvenience as two; and a greater number would ſtill cauſe

frequently occaſioned by thoſe that are in poſſeſſion of power; for the apprehenſion of loſing what they have operates as ſtrongly in them, as the deſire of

" more confuſion. I could never read a paſſage in Polybius, and another in Cicero, to this purpoſe, without a ſecret pleaſure in applying " it to the Engliſh Conſtitution, which it ſuits much better than the " Roman. Both theſe great authors give the pre-eminence to a " mixed Government, conſiſting of three branches, the Regal, the " Noble, and the Popular. They had doubtleſs in their thoughts " the Conſtitution of the Roman Common-wealth, in which, the " Conſul repreſented the King, the Senate the Nobles, and the Tribunes the People. This diviſion of the three Powers in the Roman " Conſtitution was by no means ſo diſtinct and natural, as it is in the " Engliſh form of Government. Amongſt ſeveral objections that " might be made to it, I think the chief are thoſe that affect the " Conſular Power, which had only the ornaments, without the force " of the Regal authority. The Number had not a caſting voice in " it; for which reaſon, if one did not chance to be employed abroad, " whilſt the other ſat at home, public buſineſs was ſometimes at a " ſtand, whilſt the Conſuls pulled two different ways in it. Beſides, " I do not find that the Conſuls ever had a negative voice in paſſing " a Law, or Decree of the Senate; ſo that indeed they were rather " the chief body of the Nobility, or firſt Miniſters of the State, than " a diſtinct branch of the Sovereignty; in which none can be looked " upon as a part, who are not a part of the Legiſlature. Had the " Conſuls been inveſted with the Regal authority to as great a degree " as our Monarchs, there would never have been any occaſion for a " Dictatorſhip, which had in it the Power of all the three Orders, " and ended in the ſubverſion of the whole Conſtitution.

" Such a Hiſtory as that of Suetonius, which gives us a Succeſſion " of abſolute Princes, is an unanſwerable argument againſt deſpotic " power. Where the Prince is a man of wiſdom and virtue, it is " indeed happy for his people, that he is abſolute; but ſince, in the " common run of mankind, for one that is wiſe and good, you find " ten of a contrary character, it is very dangerous for a nation to " ſtand to its chance, or to have its public happineſs or miſery depend " upon the virtues and vices of a ſingle perſon. Look into the hiſtory " I have mentioned, or into any ſeries of abſolute Princes, how many " tyrants you muſt read through, before you come to an Emperor " that is ſupportable! But this is not all; an honeſt private man, " often grows cruel and abandoned, when converted into an abſolute " Prince. Give a man power of doing what he pleaſes with impunity, you extinguiſh his fear, and conſequently overturn in him " one of the great pillars of Morality. This too we find confirmed " by matter of fact; how many hopeful heirs apparent to great Empires have become ſuch monſters of luſt and cruelty, as are a reproach to human nature, when in poſſeſſion of them?

" Some tell us, we ought to make our Governments on earth like " that in Heaven, which, ſay they they, is altogether Monarchical and " unlimited. Was man like his Creator, in goodneſs and juſtice, who " would not follow the great model? But where goodneſs and juſtice " are not eſſential to the Ruler, who would wiſh to put himſelf into " his hands, to be diſpoſed of according to his particular will and " pleaſure?"

gaining

gaining more does in others; because, men are apt to think they cannot ſecurely enjoy what they poſſeſs already, without adding ſtill more to it. Beſides, the more power they have, the more able they will be to raiſe tumults, and to bring about any change or alteration they deſire. And, it may be added, that their inſolent and extravagant manner of living, inſpires thoſe that are excluded from the adminiſtration, with a ſort of envy, and a deſire of having their ſhare in it, either to plunder their adverſaries, or to get thoſe honours and emoluments into their own hands, which they ſee others make ſo bad a uſe of.

CHAP. VI.

Whether ſuch a form of Government could have been eſtabliſhed at Rome, as could have prevented animoſities betwixt the Senate and the People.

WE have already ſhewn what effects the conteſts betwixt the Senate and the People produced at Rome. Now as theſe ſtruggles continued till the time of the Gracchi, and then proved the bane of public liberty, it may be aſked perhaps, whether that State might not have attained to ſuch a height of grandeur and authority as it did, under another form of Government, which could have either prevented or extinguiſhed thoſe inteſtine diſcords? To ſolve this queſtion, we muſt examine the conſtitution of ſuch Republics as continued free for a long courſe of years without any tumults and diſſenſions, to ſee what kind of Government they lived under; and then conſider whether the ſame could have been introduced at Rome; and ſince I have already mentioned thoſe of Sparta and Venice, let the former ſerve for an example in ancient, and the latter in modern times. Sparta was governed by a King, and a ſmall Senate: Venice does not give any different titles to thoſe that govern; for all ſuch as are qualified to be admitted into the adminiſtration, are called by one common appellation, *Gentlemen* or *Nobles*, which

indeed was rather owing to chance, than the prudence of their Law-givers. For, as a great number of people were forced to retire into thoſe Iſles, where Venice now ſtands, (for the reaſons abovementioned) and the multitude at laſt encreaſed to ſuch a degree, that it became neceſſary to make ſome laws, in order to live peaceably and ſecurely together, they eſtabliſhed a form of government; and aſſembling frequently in council to make further proviſion for their common ſafety, when they thought they were numerous enough to ſubſiſt of themſelves, they ordained that nobody that ſhould come thereafter to live amongſt them, ſhould have any ſhare in the government. But their numbers ſtill increaſing, and many others coming afterwards to ſettle there, who therefore could not be admitted into the adminiſtration, they called thoſe that were already poſſeſſed of it, *Gentlemen* or *Nobles*, for their greater honour, and the reſt, only *Citizens*.

This form then, might both be eſtabliſhed at firſt, and afterwards ſupported without tumults or conteſts; for, when it was introduced, all the inhabitants being admitted to a ſhare in the Government without diſtinction, no body had any reaſon to complain; and thoſe that came to live there afterwards, finding the adminiſtration already fixed and ſettled, had neither cauſe nor means to diſturb it; for they could not pretend they were deprived of any privilege, nor had they power or weight ſufficient to raiſe diſſenſions, becauſe the government kept a ſtrict hand over them, and did not employ them in any charge that might give them ſo much authority. Beſides, after all, the number of new comers was not ſo great, as to exceed that of the firſt Settlers, or *Noble Venetians*; ſo that the latter had not only an opportunity of eſtabliſhing their government firmly at the beginning, but the power likewiſe of keeping it united afterwards.

Sparta, as I ſaid before, being governed by a King, and a little Senate, was alſo enabled to ſupport itſelf a conſiderable time; for all foreigners being excluded, the number of inhabitants in that State

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was but ſmall, and theſe living with great reputation, under the laws given by Lycurgus (the ſtrict obſervation of which prevented all cauſes of tumult and diſſenſion) continued a long while united; for though, by his laws, there was a diſtinction of rank and condition eſtabliſhed, yet the revenues of the lands were almoſt equally divided amongſt them: ſo that one being very little, or perhaps, not at all richer than another, the people were the leſs diſſatisfied by being kept at ſome diſtance by a few Nobles who were in the adminiſtration; and not being oppreſſed by them, never thought of aſpiring to any higher degree of power. This was in ſome meaſure owing to the condition and circumſtances of their Kings, who, being elective, and ſurrounded by the Nobility, had no better expedient to ſupport their dignity, than by protecting the people from violence and injuſtice: by which, the latter being freed from all fear of oppreſſion, did not deſire any ſhare in the Government; and therefore, when there was no reaſon for envy or ſtrife with the Nobility, there could be nothing to diſturb their union. But the two principal cauſes of this long union, were the following: In the firſt place, the number of inhabitants in Sparta was ſo ſmall, that they might eaſily be governed by a few: and, in the next, as they admitted no foreigners into their Common-wealth, they were neither liable to be ſoon corrupted, nor to multiply in ſuch a manner as to become formidable to the few that governed them.

Theſe things being conſidered, it plainly appears, that if the Roman Law-givers had intended to conſtitute a Republic, that ſhould continue in peace and unity, like thoſe abovementioned, they muſt have taken one of theſe two courſes; that is, they muſt either have acted like the Venetians, in not employing the common people in their wars; or, like the Spartans, in admitting no foreigners into their State. But as they did both, it threw ſuch a degree of ſtrength into the hands of the Plebeians, that they had it in their power to raiſe tumults and ſeditions whenever they

they pleaſed. On the other hand, if this Republic had been leſs divided, it would not have been ſo ſtrong, nor could it ever have arrived at ſuch a pitch of grandeur as it did. So that if any method had been found to prevent the diſſenſions that happened in it, it muſt likewiſe have extinguiſhed the cauſes of its agrandizement; for whoever will examine the courſe of human affairs, will ſoon ſee, that it is almoſt impoſſible to remedy one inconvenience without falling into another.

If then you ſuffer a people to encreaſe, and train them up to arms, in order to extend your Empire, you will not be able to govern them as you could wiſh; and, if you keep them low and diſarmed, in order to render them more tractable, they will either make no conqueſts at all, or not be able to maintain them if they do, or become ſo daſtardly and effeminate, that you muſt of neceſſity fall a prey to the firſt Invader. In all ſuch undertakings, therefore, we ought to take that courſe, which after mature deliberation, ſeems to be ſubject to the feweſt and leaſt inconveniencies, and to look upon it as the beſt; for none are wholly exempt from difficulties and accidents. Rome, indeed, after the example of Sparta, might have choſen a prince to rule over it for his life, and have formed a little Senate; but it could not likewiſe have extended its Empire, without augmenting the number of its citizens; and, in that caſe, ſuch a King and ſuch a Senate would have contributed but little to its domeſtic peace and union. Whoſoever then intends to found a new Common-wealth, ſhould firſt conſider, whether he would have it extend its dominion, or be content with a narrow territory of its own: becauſe, in the firſt caſe, he ought to imitate the Romans, and make the beſt proviſion he can againſt diviſions, if it is not in his power intirely to prevent them; for, without a great number of men, and thoſe too well diſciplined, no Republic can ever make any conqueſts, or, if it could, it would not be able to keep poſſeſſion of them. In the ſecond caſe,

caſe, he ſhould follow the example of the Spartans and Venetians; but he muſt uſe all poſſible means to prevent new acquiſitions, becauſe conqueſts are generally deſtructive to ſuch feeble Common-wealths; and, indeed they proved ſo, both to Sparta and Venice: the former of which, having reduced almoſt all Greece, diſcovered its weakneſs upon a very ſlight occaſion. For Thebes rebelling at the inſtigation of Pelopidas, ſeveral other cities likewiſe revolted, and at laſt quite overturned the Lacedæmonian Government. The Venetians alſo, after they had made themſelves maſters of the greater part of Italy, rather by artifice and dint of money, than arms, preſuming too much upon their ſtrength, loſt almoſt all in one battle that they had ever acquired before *.

For my own part, I am of opinion, that if any one would found a Common-wealth, which ſhould ſubſiſt for a long time, it would be the beſt way to form its interior conſtitution after the model of Sparta; and to build the capital in a ſtrong and inacceſſible ſituation, like that of Venice: that ſo it might not be in the power of an enemy to cruſh it on a ſudden. Beſides which, care ſhould be taken on the other hand, to hinder it from growing ſo great and powerful, as to become formidable to its neighbours; for the common motives that induce people to make war upon a State, are either the deſire of conquering it, or the fear of being conquered by it themſelves. But both thoſe cauſes are exſtinguiſhed by the precautions juſt now recommended: becauſe, if its natural ſituation makes it difficult to be aſſaulted (as I preſuppoſe) and it is pretty well provided for its defence, it will ſeldom or never happen, that any one will have the hardineſs to attempt it: and if it is content with its own territory, and every one ſees it has no ambitious views, others will have no occaſion to make war upon it for their own preſervation, eſpecially if its laws and conſtitution are ſuch as will not allow it to enlarge its do-

* In the year 1509, at Agnadal, near the river Adda.

minion.

minion *. And, I verily believe, if things could be balanced in this manner, it would be far the beſt model of government for any State that deſired to live in quiet and tranquillity. But, as the affairs of this world are perpetually fluctuating, and nothing continues long in the ſame condition, all States muſt of courſe grow either better or worſe in time†; neceſſity often forcing men to do ſuch things, as their reaſon diſapproves: ſo, when a State is founded that might

* "This reaſoning (ſays the above cited Author of the *Eſtimate of the manners and principles of the times*, Vol. II. Sect. ii.) is applied by Machiavel to Sparta and Venice: I need not point out to the Reader, how much more applicable it is to Britain: in ſome reſpects, perhaps, there is no time nor country delivered down to us in Story, in which a wiſe man would ſo much have wiſhed to have lived, as in our own. If it be aſked in what reſpects? Let us do juſtice to our age and country in every regard. A political Conſtitution, ſuperior to all that Hiſtory hath recorded, or preſent times can boaſt: a Religious Eſtabliſhment which breathes univerſal Charity and Toleration: a Separation from the Continent that naturally ſecures us from the calamities of Invaſion and the temptation of Conqueſt: a Climate fertile in the ſubſtantial comforts of life: a Spirit of liberty yet unconquered: a general Humanity and Sincerity beyond any nation upon Earth: an adminiſtration of juſtice that hath ſilenced envy. Theſe are Bleſſings which every Engliſhman feels, and ought to acknowledge. Search through all the moſt admired periods of the moſt admired Countries, the moſt flouriſhing æras of Greece, Italy, or France; and tell me, if, in any of theſe, ſuch an Union can be found? A volume might be written in proof and diſplay of this ſuperiority."

† To this purpoſe, Montaigne ſays very juſtly, Vol. III. Chap. ii. "Though the features of the pictures I draw alter and vary, there is ſtill a likeneſs. The univerſe is but one perpetual motion, in which all things are inceſſantly wheeled about; the Rocks of Caucaſus, the Pyramids of Egypt, the Earth itſelf is ſo, both by a general motion, and a particular one of its own. Conſtancy itſelf is no other than a more languid motion. I cannot be ſure of my object: 'tis always diſturbed and ſtaggering by a natural giddineſs. I take it at the point it is in at the inſtant when I conſider it. I do not paint its being, I paint its paſſage; not a paſſage from one century to another, or from one ſeven years to another ſeven; but from day to day, from minute to minute. I muſt accommodate my Hiſtory to the time; I may ſoon change not only my fortune, but my intentional ſo. It is a true colour of various and changeable accidents and of imaginations, that are wavering, and ſometimes contrary. Whether it be that I am not then the man I was, or that I lay hold on the ſubjects with other circumſtances and conſiderations; ſo it is, that perhaps I may plainly contradict myſelf; but, as Demades ſaid, I do not contradict the truth. Could my Soul once take ſure footing, I would then ſpeak definitively and peremptorily: but, as it is, it is always learning and making trial."

continue

continue firm and indiſſoluble for a long courſe of years, provided it did not attempt to extend its dominion, and it afterwards becomes abſolutely neceſſary to do ſo, its firſt principles and foundations being deſtroyed, it muſt ſoon fall to ruin. On the other hand, if fortune ſhould be ſo propitious to it, that it ſhould have no occaſion to engage in any war, the inhabitants would then degenerate into idleneſs, and from idleneſs into effeminancy and faction; which two evils together, or indeed either of them alone, would be ſufficient to cauſe its deſtruction. However, ſince it is hardly poſſible, I think, to balance things ſo exactly, or to obſerve ſo juſt a medium as I have been ſpeaking of above, it is the beſt way to have a particular regard in the conſtitution of a Republic to what ſeems moſt honourable; and to make ſuch proviſions, that if it ſhould ever become neceſſary to enlarge its empire, in may be able to keep poſſeſſion of what it ſhall acquire. Upon the whole, therefore, I ſhould chuſe to form a Common-wealth upon the Roman model, rather than upon that of the other States abovementioned (ſince it is impoſſible to obſerve a due medium betwixt them) and to bear with the diſſenſions that muſt ariſe betwixt the Senate and Plebeians, as an inconvenience altogether neceſſary in a people that would emulate the grandeur of the Romans; for, beſides the reaſons already aſſigned to ſhew the advantage of having Tribunes for the conſervation of the public liberties, it is eaſy to ſee the benefit that muſt accrue to a Common-wealth from the power thoſe officers had, amongſt other privileges, of freely impeaching ſuch as were thought culpable; of which I ſhall ſpeak more particularly in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

How neceſſary it is for the preſervation of Liberty in a Common-wealth, that any Criminal may be freely accuſed, with impunity to the Accuſer.

NOTHING can be of greater importance to the ſafety of the State, than a power lodged in the hands of thoſe that are appointed Guardians of its liberties, to accuſe ſuch perſons as violate the laws of their Country, either before the people, or the Magiſtrates, or ſome Council that takes cognizance of ſuch offences; for it produces two very ſalutary effects. In the firſt place, the Citizens, being awed by theſe accuſations, ſeldom dare attempt any thing againſt the State: and if they do, they are preſently brought to puniſhment, without any reſpect of perſons *. In the next, a paſſage is opened for the evacuation of ſuch humours as are common in all great cities: for when theſe humours cannot diſcharge themſelves through a proper channel, they are apt to take ſome other courſe, that may be fatal to the Common-wealth †. It is of the utmoſt conſequence, therefore,

* Of this we may ſee Tully's ſenſe in many parts of his works: let the following ſuffice. "Accuſatores multos eſſe in civitate utile eſt, "ut metu contineatur audacia." *Pro. Sex. Roſc. Amer.* "Facile "omnes patimur eſſe quamplurimos accuſatores, quod innocens ſi "accuſatus ſit, abſolvi poteſt; nocens niſi accuſatus fuerit, condemnari non poteſt Utilius eſt autem abſolvi innocentem, quam nocentem cauſam non dicere." *Ibid.* "Nihil mali eſt, canes ibi "quamplurimos eſſe ubi per-multi obſervandi, multaque ſervanda "ſunt." *Ibid.*

† Machiavel might here have added another ſalutary effect from the abovementioned great authority, viz. the particular care of one's own conduct. "Omnes qui alterum, nullis impulſi inimicitiis, nullâ "privatim læſi injuriâ, nullo præmio adducti in judicium Reipublicæ "cauſâ vocant, providere debent, non ſolum quid oneris in præſentia "tollant, ſed etiam quantum in omnem vitæ negotii ſuſcipere co"nentur. Legem enim ſibi ipſi dicunt innocentiæ, continentiæ, vir"tutumque omnium, qui ab altero rationem vitæ repoſcunt: atque "eo magis, ſi id, ut ante dixi, faciunt nullâ re commoti aliâ, niſi utili"tate communi. Nam qui ſibi hoc ſumpſit ut corrigat mores alio"rum, ac peccata reprehendat, quis huic agnoſcat, ſi quâ in re ipſe "ab

therefore, to the welfare and repoſe of every Republic, that a legal proviſion be made, to give vent to theſe fermentations: of which many proofs may be adduced, particularly the caſe of Coriolanus, as it is related by Livy. The Roman Nobility being exaſperated at the Plebeians, who they thought had gained too much authority by the creation of Tribunes to ſupport their claims upon all occaſions; and the city labouring under ſuch a ſcarcity of proviſions, at the ſame time, that the Senate was forced to ſend to Sicily for corn; Coriolanus, who was a bitter enemy to the popular faction, ſuggeſted to the Nobility, that they had then a fair opportunity of humbling the Plebeians, and depriving them of the authority they had uſurped, to the great prejudice of the Nobles, by refuſing to let them have any ſhare of the corn that was to be imported. But this advice coming to the ears of the people, they were ſo enraged at Coriolanus, that they raiſed a tumult, and, falling upon him, as he came out of the Senate-houſe, would certainly have torn him to pieces, if the Tribunes had not interpoſed their authority, and cited him to anſwer the charge that was brought againſt

" ab religione officii declinârit? Quapropter hoc magis ab omnibus " ejuſmodi civis laudandus ac diligendus eſt, qui non ſolum reipu- " blicæ civem improbum removet, verum etiam ſeipſum ejuſmodi " fore profitetur ac præſtat, ut ſibi non modo communi voluntate " virtutis atque officii, ſed etiam, ut quâ lam magis neceſſariâ ratione " rectè ſit honeſtèque vivendum.

" Furem aliquem, aut rapacem accuſâris? vitanda tibi ſemper erit " omnis avaritiæ ſuſpicio; maleficum quempiam adduxeris aut cru- " delem? cavendum erit ſemper, ne quâ in re aſperior aut inhumanior " fuiſſe videare; corruptorem aut adulterum? providendum dili- " genter, ne quod in vitâ veſtigium libidinis appareat. Omnia poſ- " tremo, quæ vindicâris in altero, tibi ipſi vehementer fugienda ſunt. " Etenim non modo accuſator, ſed ne objurgator quidem ferendus " eſt, qui quod in altero vitium reprehendit, in eo ipſo deprehendi- " tur." *In Verrem. orat.* VIII. *in init*——" Monui illum, quem " planè diligo, ut cum alius accuſaſſet, cautius viveret." *Epiſt. ad Attic.* Lib. VI. i. " Cognoſce ex me quam multa eſſe oporteat in eo, " qui alterum accuſat. Primum integritatem atque innocentiam ſin- " gularem. Nihil eſt enim quod minus ferendum ſit, quam ratio- " nem ab altero vitæ repoſcere cum, qui non poſſit ſuæ reddere. " Deinde accuſatorem firmum verumque eſſe oportet." *Divinat. contra Cæcil.*——See the Note concerning Informers, *Hiſt. Flor. lib.* II. towards the end.

him. From hence we may obſerve the utility or rather abſolute neceſſity of making proper laws in a Common-wealth, to diſſipate the choler and reſentment, ariſing from the hatred of the multitude to a ſingle perſon; which, if not diverted by ſome ſuch method, would take a different turn, and prove much more prejudicial to the State. And though, indeed, it may ſometimes happen, that a citizen is unjuſtly puniſhed by the Magiſtrates, yet the Common-wealth will be but little, or not at all hurt by it; becauſe it is done neither by private violence, nor foreign aſſiſtance, which are the bane of liberty; but under the ſanction of laws, and by public authority, which, having their due bounds preſcribed them, cannot injure the Community.

To prove what I have aſſerted by examples, this of Coriolanus may ſerve for one of ancient date; and let any one conſider, what confuſion it muſt have occaſioned in the Roman government, if he had been killed in a tumultuary manner: for that would have been an act of private revenge; and violence of that kind always makes individuals afraid of each other; fear puts them upon providing for their defence, and in order to defend themſelves they muſt form parties; and parties at laſt turn to factions, which generally end in the ruin of a State; but, by the interpoſition of public authority, all theſe evils were prevented. As to modern inſtances of the bad conſequences of not providing the people with ſome legal means of venting their rage againſt any of their fellow-citizens, we have ſeen ſeveral in our own times, and one in particular at Florence, in the caſe of Franciſco Valori, who being a leading man, was ſuſpected by many who knew his pride and ambition, of a deſign to ſeize upon the Government himſelf: and, as they had no other way to prevent it, but by ſetting up another faction againſt him; Valori, who had nothing to fear on his ſide, but ſome popular commotion, began to fortify himſelf with partizans and followers, to defend him in caſe of need. On

the

the other hand, thoſe that oppoſed him being utterly unprovided with any lawful method of dealing with him, reſolved to have recourſe to arms; ſo that, though he might have eaſily been cut off in the ordinary way of juſtice, without hurting any one elſe, if their laws had been properly calculated for it, many other eminent citizens ſuffered as well as himſelf. I might likewiſe alledge what happened in the ſame City, with regard to Pietro Soderini; which was entirely owing to the want of due means, to call a powerful and ambitious citizen to account: becauſe eight Signiors only (and there were no more in that Republic) were not ſufficient for that purpoſe, which required a greater number of judges; as a few are liable either to be corrupted, or over-awed by a man in power. But had ſuch neceſſary proviſions been made, the citizens might either have accuſed him with ſecurity, if he deſerved it, and ſatiated their fury, without calling in a Spaniſh army to their aſſiſtance; or, if he did not deſerve it, they would not have dared to proceed againſt him in that manner, leſt he alſo ſhould have accuſed them in their turn: and thus that conteſt might have been ended, which cauſed ſo much tumult and diſorder.

We may conclude then, that when foreign aid is called into a Republic by any party, it is owing to a bad conſtitution, and that they have no legal way to purge off thoſe ill humours that are ſo natural to mankind; for which, the only remedy is to appoint a great number of judges out of the moſt reputable citizens to receive all accuſations in a legal manner. This method was ſo well eſtabliſhed and obſerved at Rome, that in all the diſſenſions which happened betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians, neither the Senate, nor the People, nor any particular citizen ever thought of availing themſelves of foreign aſſiſtance: for as they had a remedy at home, they had no occaſion to ſeek for one abroad. And though the examples already cited may ſuffice to evince the truth and neceſſity of what I have laid down, I will yet

produce another out of Livy, who tells us, that one Lucumo having debauched the Sister of Aruns at Clusium (one of the principal cities of Etruria at that time), Aruns not being able to revenge himself on so powerful a delinquent, had recourse to the Gauls for assistance (who were then in possession of that part of Italy now called Lombardy), and encouraged them to lay siege to Clusium, by representing the advantage they might reap to themselves from such an expedition, at the same time that they procured him redress for the injury he had sustained. Now if Aruns could have had justice done him at home, he would not have applied to foreigners for it.

But if legal accusations are serviceable to a Republic, calumnies are no less dangerous and pernicious; as we shall endeavour to shew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. VIII.

That Calumnies are as pernicious, as legal Accusations are serviceable to a Common wealth.

THOUGH Furius Camillus was so highly revered for his valour in delivering his Country from the yoke of the Gauls, that no Roman Citizen of what rank soever, thought it any diminution either to his dignity or reputation to give him the precedence: yet Manlius Capitolinus (so called, because he saved the Capitol) who thought he had done as much for his Country as Camillus, and was in no wise inferior to him in military abilities, could not bear to see such extraordiny honours conferred upon him. Full of envy, therefore, and perceiving he could make no impression upon the Senate, he applied to the people; amongst whom he scattered various aspersions and insinuations to the prejudice of Camillus; particularly, that the ransom money which was collected for the Gauls, but had not been appropriated to that use, was

was distributed amongst some few Citizens; and that, if it could be recovered out of their hands, it would be of great advantage to the people, who might apply it either to lessen the public taxes, or discharge their private debts. These suggestions had such an effect upon the people, that they began to form cabals, and at last to raise tumults in the City; which giving great offence to the Senators, who thought they might prove of dangerous consequence, they appointed a Dictator to enquire into the matter, and to call Manlius to account for his behaviour. This Magistrate accordingly cited Manlius to appear immediately, and answer to the charge exhibited against him in a public assembly; whither the Dictator coming in the midst of the Nobility, and Manlius surrounded by the Plebeians, the latter was desired to declare in whose hands the money was, which he had spoken of; because the Senators were as desirous to be informed of that as the people. But Manlius, instead of answering particularly to the question, endeavoured to evade it, by saying, he had no occasion to inform them of what they already knew so well themselves; upon which, the Dictator sent him directly to prison.

From hence we may observe how detestable such calumnies ought to be, not only in all free States, but in every civil Society; and how necessary it is to punish those that are guilty of them, without partiality or respect of persons. And certainly no method so effectual can be taken to prevent or suppress them, as to encourage legal accusations as much as possible; since they are no less detrimental than such accusations are serviceable to a Common-wealth. For there is this difference betwixt them, that a Calumniator calls in no testimony or evidence to prove the truth of what he says; so that it is in any man's power to abuse another; but an Accuser must produce witnesses and substantial proofs to support his charge *.

Accu-

* "Aliud est maledicere, aliud accusare. Accusatio crimen desi-
"derat, rem ut definiat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teste

Accuſations are lodged before Magiſtrates, or Councils, or Aſſemblies of the people: but Calumnies are whiſpered about in holes and corners; and it always happens that Calumnies prevail moſt in thoſe States, where there are the feweſt accuſations, and the government is leaſt diſpoſed to encourage them.

A founder of a Republic therefore ought to make ſuch laws and proviſions, that any one citizen may ſecurely accuſe another, and to ſee that they are duly and ſtrictly obſerved: after which, he ſhould puniſh Calumniators with the utmoſt rigour; who indeed would have no reaſon to complain of it, when they had an opportunity of openly and ſafely accuſing thoſe whom they had baſely ſlandered in private. Where this is not duly attended to, great diſorders muſt always enſue; for Calumnies inſtead of making men better, only ſerve to irritate and provoke them; and when they are thus exaſperated, they naturally endeavour to revenge themſelves, as they will rather be apt to hate, than ſtand in any fear of thoſe that have aſperſed them. Excellent proviſions were made at Rome for this purpoſe, as we have ſaid before; and very poor ones, or in fact none at all, at Florence: accordingly the former Republic reaped great advantage from them, and the latter ſuffered much by that neglect. For whoever reads the Hiſtory of our Common-wealth will ſee how many aſperſions have been caſt at all times, upon thoſe that were employed in the management of its moſt important affairs; one being charged with embezzling the public money, another with being bribed by the enemy to loſe a battle, or raiſe a ſiege; and a third with being too ambitious;

" confirment. Maledictio autem nihil habet, propoſiti, præter con-
" tumeliam." Cic. pro M. Cælio orat. XIII. in init. " Quid eſt
" enim minus, non dico Oratoris, ſed hominis, quam id objicere ad-
" verſario, quod ille ſi verbo negârit, longius progredi non poſſit qui
" objecerit?" Philip. II. Add to theſe the words of Lactantius.
" Turpe eſt hominem ingenioſum dicere id, quod ſi neges, probare
" non poſſit." Inſtit. Divin. lib. II. cap. xxviii. The Reader, if he pleaſes, may ſee two excellent diſcourſes upon this ſubject, in the 451ſt and 594th Numbers of the Spectator, and a Diſſertation upon defamatory Libels, by Mr. Bayle.

which occaſioned endleſs animoſities, diviſions, factions, and finally the ruin of that State. But if proper care had been taken at Florence to encourage legal accuſations againſt ſuch Citizens as were ſuppoſed to be guilty of any crime, and to puniſh Calumniators, all theſe evils might have been prevented; for thoſe Citizens, whether acquitted or condemned, would not have had it in their power to hurt the State, and fewer people would have been expoſed to Accuſations than Calumnies: becauſe, as I juſt now ſaid, it is a much eaſier thing to calumniate, than to maintain a juſt accuſation. It has likewiſe ſometimes happened, that an aſpiring Citizen has availed himſelf of calumnies, to gratify his ambitious views: for if he is oppoſed by any other perſon of weight and power in the State, he immediately aſperſes him, and puts himſelf at the head of the Plebeians, whom he confirms in the bad opinion of his adverſary, which he had inſtilled into them before; and thus ſecures their ſuffrages and intereſt to promote his own deſigns; of this ſeveral inſtances might be produced, but I ſhall content myſelf with one only.

When the Florentine army laid ſiege to Lucca, under the command of their Commiſſary Giovanni Guicciardini; whether it was owing to ill fortune or bad conduct, he could not make himſelf Maſter of that City. However it might be, he was charged with being corrupted by the Luccheſe; which calumny being induſtriouſly propagated by his enemies, enraged him to ſuch a degree, that it almoſt drove him to madneſs: and though he offered to put himſelf into the hands of a Magiſtrate till he ſhould be brought to a trial, yet he never could entirely wipe off the imputation, becauſe there were no laws in that Commonwealth to which he might have recourſe for his juſtification. Hence aroſe a mortal enmity betwixt Guicciardini's friends (who conſiſted of the greater part of the Nobility), and thoſe that wanted to ſee a change of Government *; which animoſities, and others of

* See the Hiſtory of Florence. Book IV. towards the end.

the like nature daily increaſing, at laſt ended in the total deſtruction of the Republican Government there.

Manlius Capitolinus then being a Calumniator and not a fair Accuſer, the Romans have ſhewn us by their example, how ſuch people ought to be puniſhed: for they ſhould be obliged to bring a formal accuſation, inſtead of ſpreading private calumnies; and rewarded (at leaſt not puniſhed), in caſe they make good their charge; if not, to be dealt with as Manlius was *.

CHAP.

* Tenes or Tennes, who gave name to the Iſle of Tenedos, made a Law there, that a man ſhould always ſtand behind the Judge with an axe in his hand, ready to cut off the head of any perſon immediately, who ſhould be convicted of a falſity. Ex Heraclide de politiis. Others ſay he ordered an Executioner to ſtand with an axe lifted up behind the Accuſers, to put thoſe to death directly that ſhould be found guilty of falſe accuſations. Suidas in voce Τενης ανδρωπος. This puts one in mind of a Maxim which a French Civilian of the Sixteenth Century has commented upon. It imports, that a man who takes upon him to attack the Religion which has been eſtabliſhed for ſeveral ages, ought not to be heard but upon this condition, that he ſhall be capitally puniſhed, if he does not convince the people, that his own particular opinion is truer than that of the Public. "Qui antiqua, "legitima, atque ordinaria ſacra, audet in controverſiam adducere, "eum non audiendum eſſe, niſi periculo ſui capitis, ſi non perſuadeat "veriorem eſſe ſuam ſententiam." Petrus Ætodius decretorum. lib. I. p. xviii. Paris 1573. 8vo. He quotes upon this occaſion a remarkable example from Joſephus Book XII. Chap. vi. of his Jewiſh Antiquities. "The Jews and Samaritans having had a conteſt in the City of "Alexandria, upon the queſtion, whether the Temple of Jeruſalem "was preferable to that of Gerazim, the cauſe was brought before "the Council of Ptolemy Philometer King of Egypt: and before it "was argued, it was determined, that the Advocates of that party, "which ſhould loſe the point, ſhould be condemned to die. The Ad-"vocate of the Jews ſpoke firſt, and ſo clearly proved the juſtice of "his cauſe, that a decree was made agreeable to his deſire; ſo that "Sabbeus and Theodoſius, the two Advocates of the Samaritans, "were put to death."——One might here obſerve that Joſephus has not mentioned whether the Samaritan Advocates ſpoke at all or not. This might lead one to think, that Sentence was given without their being heard. It is not probable, however, that Ptolemy would be guilty of ſuch a piece of injuſtice. Joſephus therefore has violated the laws of Hiſtory——The abovementioned Civilian, preſently after, cites the Law of Zaleucus, by which, all thoſe that propoſed any innovations, were obliged to do it with a rope about their neck; that ſo, if they did not prevail for the abrogation of the old cuſtoms, they might be hanged upon the ſpot; and concludes with a wiſh that there was the ſame law in France. He thinks that this would have prevented thoſe factions and confuſions, which the deſire of novelty had occaſioned

CHAP. IX.

That only one person should be concerned, either in founding a new State, or making a thorough reform in an old one.

IT may be thought perhaps that I have entered too far into the Roman History, before I make any mention either of the very Founders themselves of that Republic, or the laws they made relating to Religion and Military discipline. Not to keep those in suspence any longer, who may desire some information in these matters, I say, that many may possibly think it a bad precedent in Romulus, the founder of a State, to kill his own brother first, and afterwards to connive at the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom he had associated with himself in the government *; as any of his own Subjects, if prompted by ambition

occasioned in that Kingdom. "Quibus omnino rationibus atque conditionibus, si nos præsertim in hoc tempore uteremur, quo is demum nihil scire, & illiberalis esse dicitur, cui non placent absurdissima quæque, modo recentissima; non ita planè res incertæ essent ac turbulentæ, neque tam multi multarum partium, factionum, opinionum, auctores evaderent: cum suo saltem periculo eo discerent amare, colere, pacem patriamque, leges ac Magistratus, quæ odio sane prosequuntur." It is evident he would have had the dispute betwixt the Popish Clergy and the Protestants, determined like that of Alexandria. But was there a Tribunal in France like that of the King of Egypt? The latter consisted of persons who were neither Jews nor Samaritans; and the contending parties might therefore expect an impartial judgment. Luther and Calvin and their followers could not promise themselves the same thing; since the same persons who would have been their Judges, were likewise parties. So that neither the Laws of Zaleucus, nor that of the King of Tenedos, nor lastly the practice of the Romans either can or ought to be extended to matters of religion.——Manlius was thrown headlong from the Capitol.

* After the death of Remus, a war having been commenced betwixt the Sabines and Romans, upon the rape of the Sabine virgins, Tatius, the general of the former, made himself master of the Capitol, and otherwise so harrassed the Romans, that Romulus was obliged to come upon terms with them, and not only to incorporate them into his new State, but to admit Tatius to an equal share in the Sovereignty. Five years afterwards, however, as they were offering sacrifice together at Lavinium, an insurrection was raised, as some say by the contrivance of Romulus, in which Tatius lost his life.—Upon

ambition and desire of Command, might plead the example of their Prince, in dispatching such as endeavoured to oppose or impede their designs. And indeed their opinion would seem just and reasonable, if the motives were not to be considered which induced Romulus to act as he did. For it must be laid down as a general rule, that it very seldom or never happens that any Government is either well founded at first, or thoroughly reformed afterwards, except the plan be laid and conducted by one man only, who has the sole power of giving all orders, and making all laws that are necessary for its establishment. A prudent and virtuous Founder of a State therefore, whose chief aim it is to promote the welfare of many, rather than to gratify his own ambition; to make provision for the good of his country, in preference to that of his Heirs or Successors, ought to endeavour by all means to get the supreme authority wholly into his own hands: nor will a reasonable man ever condemn him for taking any measures, even the most extraordinary, if they are necessary for that purpose: the means indeed may seem culpable, but the end will justify them, if it be a good one, as that of Romulus was, and will always be admitted as a sufficient ex-

this passage, one E. Dacres, who translated Machiavel's Political Discourses, in the year 1636, says as follows, "Without question the end "was ambition, Royalty admitting no companion: of whom to free "himself, it seems, that Romulus stood not much upon how lawful "means he used, for Cain-like, he slew his brother, and consented to "Titus Tatius his death, without doubt, for venturing to take part "in the authority." And touching this, it may be Machiavel will speak truer, near the latter end of his eighteenth chapter of this book, where he says, "Because the restoring of a city to civil and politique "government pre-supposes a good man; and by violence to become "Prince of a Common-wealth, pre-supposes an evil man, for this "cause it shall very seldom come to pass, that a good man will ever "strive to make himself Prince by mischievous ways, although his "ends therein be all good; nor will a wicked man, by wicked means "attaining to be Prince, do good, nor ever comes it into his heart to "use that authority well, which by evil means he came to." And so at the very end of the same eighteenth chapter he concludes, "That "though the intent were not good, there might be a fair colour set "upon it by a good success." Whereby our Politician, however he winds and turns, comes at length to discover his evil ground, "Jus "regnandi gratiâ violandum est, aliis in rebus pietatum colas."

cuse;

cuſe; for he is only blameable who uſes violence to throw things into confuſion and diſtraction, and not he who does it to eſtabliſh peace and good order *. But a Legiſlator ought likewiſe to be ſo provident and diſintereſted as not to leave the authority he has aſſumed as an inheritance to another: for men being naturally more prone to evil than good, his Succeſſor perhaps may be tempted by ambition to abuſe that power which he himſelf made a wiſe and virtuous uſe of. Beſides, it is further to be conſidered, that although it is the moſt proper that one man alone ſhould form the firſt model, yet any Government that he ſhall eſtabliſh will be but of ſhort duration if it devolves upon a ſingle perſon: but if it is transferred to many it will be much better, becauſe many will be intereſted in the maintenance of it. For as it is not convenient that the multitude ſhould be concerned in laying the foundations of a government; ſince the diverſity of their opinions would not ſuffer them to agree in what may be moſt for its good: ſo when things are once ſettled upon ſome good and advantageous bottom, they will hardly ever all agree to abandon it.

That Romulus therefore was excuſable for putting to death both his brother and the other aſſociate in his government; and that what he did was not out of motives of ambition, but for the public good, plainly appears from his eſtabliſhing a Senate ſoon after they were dead, according to the reſolutions of which he acted in all things, reſerving only to himſelf the privilege of calling the Senators together, and of com-

* Human Policy ſeems to be at great variance with ſound reaſon and true religion in this point: for the beſt Caſuiſts ſay, "Bonitas intentionis "non ſufficit ad bonitatem actus, i. e. A good end does not juſtify bad "means to compaſs it;" but the Jeſuits ſay otherwiſe. The Maxim, however, "Let us do evil, that good may come," is utterly diſclaimed by one of much higher authority than either of them — A ſharper, perhaps, may avail himſelf of tricks and fineſſes for a while, but a fair and good player will have the advantage at the long run. Let any one conſider the conduct of Henry III. of France, as it is related by Davila, and he will ſoon be convinced how fatal ſuch meaſures prove in the end; and that "Honeſty, according to the old proverb, is the beſt Policy."

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manding their Armies in time of war. A proof of this we have from what happened afterwards, when the Romans recovered their liberties by the expulſion of the Tarquins: at which time they made no change in their firſt conſtitution; except that inſtead of one King for life, they annually created two Conſuls: which ſhews that the firſt inſtitutions of that State were rather calculated for a free Republican Government, than the ſupport of abſolute and tyrannical power. To confirm what I have laid down, I might quote many more examples, as thoſe of Moſes, Lycurgus, Solon, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Republics, who, by aſſuming the ſole power were enabled to make excellent laws for the government of their reſpective States; but it is here unneceſſary, as they are already ſo well known: I ſhall therefore add only one more, which, though not ſo brilliant and illuſtrious perhaps as the reſt, is yet worthy of being conſidered by thoſe that would form a good eſtabliſhment. Agis, King of Sparta, being deſirous to reduce his Subjects to the obſervation of the laws that had formerly been given them by Lycurgus, for want of which he perceived they had loſt much of their ancient virtue, and conſequently their power and command, was killed, before he could accompliſhed his deſign, by the Ephori *, who ſuſpected that he wanted to introduce tyranny and make himſelf abſolute Lord over them. But Cleomenes, his Succeſſor, being determined to purſue the ſame deſign by ſome papers that Agis left behind him, from which he perceived that his intention was only to reform the State; and finding he could not do his country that Service, any way but by taking the Government wholly into his own hands, (as the malevolence and oppoſition of a few, often prevent one man from doing a public good) he took a proper opportunity, and cauſed not

* Magiſtrates at Sparta, like the Tribunes at Rome. The people uſed to appeal from their King to them, as the Romans did from their Conſuls to the Tribunes: at firſt they were choſen to be aſſiſtants to the King; but in a ſhort time their authority grew much greater than his.

only

only the Ephori, but all others that were capable of obſtructing his meaſures, to be put to death, and afterwards reſtored the laws of Lycurgus to their former vigour and authority. A reſolution that would have retrieved the glory of Sparta, and given as much reputation to Cleomenes as Lycurgus himſelf had acquired, if the overgrown power of the Macedonians, and the feeble condition into which the other Republics of Greece were then fallen, had not prevented it. For being ſuddenly invaded by the Macedonians, before it had gained ſtrength enough to defend itſelf; and having no allies that were capable of giving it any aſſiſtance, it was forced to ſubmit, and that great and laudable deſign proved abortive in the end. Theſe things being duly conſidered, I conclude, that in order to found a State, one perſon alone ſhould have all the power veſted in him; and that Romulus was excuſable, at leaſt, in putting Remus and Tatius to death.

CHAP. X.

If thoſe that found States deſerve praiſe; others that introduce Tyranny ought to be held in deteſtation.

OF all men that are praiſe-worthy, thoſe are moſt ſo that have made Religion and Divine worſhip their chief care; and, in the next place, thoſe that have founded Kingdoms or Republics. After whom we may reckon great Commanders, who have either enlarged their own dominion or that of their Country. To theſe we may add Learned men of all kinds, that have excelled in their ſeveral profeſſions. And laſtly, all eminent Artificers and Mechanics, of whom the number is infinite, deſerve ſome ſhare of commendation. On the contrary, thoſe wretches are worthy of nothing but infamy and deteſtation, who extirpate Religion, ſubvert Kingdoms and Common-wealths, make war upon Virtue, Merit, Letters, Arts, Sciences,

ences, and every thing elſe that is uſeful or honourable to mankind; in which rank are the prophane, the tyrannical, the ignorant, the idle, the diſſolute, and debauched. Now certainly there can be no man living, whether wiſe or ſimple, good or bad, but muſt praiſe the one, and condemn the other, if at liberty to ſpeak his mind. Nevertheleſs, the generality of mankind, deluded by a falſe appearance of what ſeems good and great, ſuffer themſelves either wilfully or ignorantly to follow the example of thoſe that deſerve the higheſt degree of reproach inſtead of admiration, who when they might have founded a Kingdom or a Common-wealth to their immortal honour, become tyrants; not conſidering what glory, what reputation, what ſecurity, tranquillity, and peace of mind they forfeit by ſuch a manner of proceeding; and, to what infamy, abhorrence, remorſe, diſquietude, and to how many dangers and alarms they expoſe themſelves. Every man that reads and conſiders the Hiſtory of former times, whether he be a ſubject of a Common-wealth, or one that has advanced himſelf to Sovereignty, would certainly chuſe, if a Republican, to have been Scipio rather than Julius Cæſar; if a Prince, rather to have been Ageſilaus, Timoleon, or Dion, than Nabis, Phalaris, or Dionyſius; for he cannot help ſeeing how highly the former were admired and revered, and how much the latter were condemned and abominated by all good men. He will likewiſe ſee, that Timoleon and the others had as much authority in their reſpective States, as either Phalaris or Dionyſius had in theirs, and lived with infinitely more comfort and ſecurity. We ought not to be dazzled with Cæſar's falſe glory, when we behold him ſo much extolled by ſome writers; for thoſe writers were either ſo corrupted by his good fortune, or overawed by the long continuance of his power, that they durſt not ſpeak truth. But, if thoſe Hiſtorians had been under no reſtraint, without doubt they would have ſpoken as freely of him, at leaſt, as others have done of Catiline; for Cæſar was certainly the more wicked

wicked of the two, if one man that actually commits a crime, is worſe than another, who only intended it. Such a Reader may alſo obſerve, what Eulogies they beſtow upon Brutus; for, as they durſt not ſpeak impartially of Cæſar, on account of his power, they were forced to content themſelves with magnifying his adverſary. Let it be conſidered likewiſe, by all ſuch as have changed Republics into abſolute governments, in what ſecurity thoſe Emperors lived, who after Rome became an Empire, ſtrictly obſerved the laws of their country, and reigned like good Princes; in compariſon of thoſe that behaved in a different manner: and they will find that Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius, had no occaſion either for Prætorian bands or legions to guard them; becauſe their own goodneſs, and the affections both of the Senate and people were a ſufficient defence to thoſe Princes. On the contrary, it may be remarked, that the moſt powerful armies, both in the eaſtern and weſtern parts of the Empire, were not able to ſecure Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and ſeveral other bad Emperors, againſt ſuch enemies as their wicked and tyrannical government had created them. Now, if the reigns of theſe different Emperors be well conſidered, they may ſerve as excellent leſſons to any other Prince, who is deſirous not only to avoid infamy, but to immortalize his name, to live in ſecurity, and free from dangers and alarms: for of twenty-ſix Emperors, who reigned betwixt the time of Julius Cæſar and Maximin, ſixteen were murdered, and ten only died a natural death. But if ſome of thoſe that happened to be murdered were good Princes (as Galba and Pertinax were) their death was owing to the corruption which their Predeceſſors had introduced amongſt the Soldiery: and, if any one of thoſe that died a natural death was a bad Prince (as Severus was) it may be attributed to ſuch a degree of good fortune and valour, as are ſeldom incident to the ſame perſon. One may further learn from the hiſtory of the Roman Emperors, upon what foundation a Monarchy

narchy ought to be built, in order to make it ſtable and permanent; for all the Emperors that ſucceeded to the Imperial dignity by inheritance, proved very bad, excepting Titus; and thoſe, on the contrary, who enjoyed it by adoption, were all good Princes, as might be inſtanced in the examples of Nerva, and the four ſucceeding Emperors in particular; but when the Empire became hereditary, it began to decline very faſt.

Let a Prince then compare the times that happened betwixt the reigns of Nerva and Marcus Aurelius, with thoſe that went before and thoſe that came after, and then declare in which he would chuſe either to have been born or reigned. For when good Princes were upon the throne, he will ſee them reigning in ſecurity in the midſt of their Subjects, peace and juſtice firmly eſtabliſhed, the Senate in full authority, the Magiſtrates honoured and reſpected, the citizens enjoying their properties without fear or ſuſpicion, Nobility and virtue exalted, and the world in repoſe and tranquility; all rancour, licentiouſneſs, corruption and ambition ſeemed to be extinguiſhed in thoſe golden times; every man was at liberty both to chuſe and maintain his own opinion *. In ſhort, he will ſee the world exulting in all manner of felicity; the Princes full of glory, and revered by their people; and the people happy and ſafe, under the protection and paternal affection of their Princes.

In the next place, let him examine the reigns of the other Emperors, and he will find them full of commotion, diſcord, ſedition, inhuman murders, aſſaſſinations of Princes both in peace and war, foreign and domeſtic broils, Italy diſtracted with daily alarms, its cities plundered and deſtroyed, the metropolis itſelf burnt, the Capitol demoliſhed by its own Citizens, the temples pulled down, Religion corrupted, the cities full of adulteries, the Sea covered with Exiles, and the Shores ſtained with blood; he will ſee end-

* "Rara temporum felicitas," ſays Tacitus, "ubi ſentire quæ velis & quæ ſentias dicere licet." Hiſt. I. lib. I. c. i.

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leſs enormities and cruelties in Rome, and not only riches and nobility, but even virtue itſelf looked upon as a capital offence. He will ſee infamous Accuſers and Calumniators rewarded, Servants bribed to betray their Maſters, Children to rebel againſt their Parents, and thoſe that had no Enemies, oppreſſed and undone by their friends *.——Upon ſuch an examination it will appear, what mighty obligations Rome, Italy, and the whole world lay under to Julius Cæſar; and certainly, if a Prince, who reads theſe things, has any principles of humanity in him, he will not only be deterred from following the example of theſe wicked Emperors, but inflamed with a deſire of imitating the good. For one that aſpires to fame and reputation in the world would wiſh to ſucceed to a corrupted ſtate, not utterly to ſpoil and ſubvert it, as Cæſar did; but to new-model and reform it, like Romulus: and heaven cannot give, nor man deſire a more favourable opportunity of acquiring true glory. If it ſhould happen, however, that he cannot effect that reform, without entirely giving up his power and authority, he would be in ſome meaſure inexcuſable without doubt, in caſe he did not do that; but, if he could accompliſh the one without loſing the other, he would be unpardonable

* Machiavel has borrowed this picture, and many others from Tacitus. "Opus aggredior plenum caſibus, atrox prœliis, diſcors ſeditionibus, ipſâ etiam pace ſævum. Quatuor Principes ferro interrempti. Tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque premixta. Proſperæ in Oriente; adverſæ in Occidente res. Turbatum Illyricum, Galliæ nutantes; perdomita Britannia, & ſtatim amiſſa. Coortæ Sarmatarum ac Suevorum gentes, Nobilitatus cladibus mutuis Dacus. Mota etiam prope Parthorum arma falſi Neronis Ludibrio. Jam vero Italia novis cladibus, vel poſt longam ſæculorum ſeriem repetitis, afflicta. Hauſtæ aut obrutæ urbes fæcundiſſimâ Campaniæ orâ. Urbs incendiis vaſtata, conſumptis antiquiſſimis delubris, ipſo Capitolio civium manibus incenſo. Pollutæ cærimoniæ, magna adulteria, plenum exiliis mare, infecti cædibus ſcopuli, atrocius in urbe ſævitum. Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi geſtique honores pro crimine, & ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium. Nec minus præmia delatorum inviſa quam celera; cum alii ſacerdotia & conſulatus ut ſpolia adepti, procurationes alii & interiorem potentiam, agerent, ferrent cuncta. Odio & terrore corrupti in do**minos ſervi**, in patronos liberti; & quibus deerat inimicus, per amicos oppreſſi." Hiſt. I. iii.

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if he neglected it. Let those consider, therefore, who are blessed with such an opportunity, that they have the choice of two courses, one of which will make them happy and secure whilst they live, and crown their memory with glory; the other will lead them into continual troubles and dangers in this life, and make them for ever infamous after their death *.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning the Religion of the Romans.

NOtwithstanding Romulus was the original Founder of Rome, and that it owed its birth and the first rudiments of its constitution to him; yet Heaven foreseeing that his laws and institutions alone were not sufficient either to form or support so great an empire as that of Rome was ordained to be, inspired the Senators of that City to make choice of Numa Pompilius to succeed Romulus in the government of it; that so, what was left defective by the former, might be completed by the latter. Numa, therefore, finding the people fierce and warlike, and being desirous to civilize and make them obedient to laws by peaceable measures, had recourse to Reli-

* Excellent was the advice which Antoninus Pius gave his son Commodus. Two days before he died, he assured his friends, that he did not desire to live, because the ill conduct of his son had made life uneasy to him. However, he recommended him to the Soldiery; and we have an excellent discourse of his in Herodian, in which he desired his friends to assist him with their advice, and directed him in what manner he ought to govern. He further charged his friends to make him sensible, "That all the riches and honours in the Universe were not "sufficient to satisfy the luxury and ambition of a Tyrant, nor the "strongest guards and armies able to defend him from the hatred and "insults of his Subjects. That no tyrannical Prince ever enjoyed a "long and peaceable reign; but such only as gained the hearts of "their people by clemency. That not those who served out of con-"straint, but such as obeyed voluntarily, would continue faithful in "all trials, and free from either flattery or treachery. And lastly, "that it was exceeding difficult, and yet highly necessary, for those "Princes to set bounds to their passions, who had none to their "power." Herodian, lib. I. cap. viii.

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gion, as a thing abſolutely neceſſary to maintain civil polity: and in this he ſucceeded ſo well, that for many ages no ſtate ever ſhewed a greater degree of reverence for the Gods; which very much facilitated the execution of ſuch undertakings as the Senators and chief Magiſtrates had reſolved upon. For whoever will be at the pains of examining the many great actions that were performed, either by the people in general, or by particular perſons, will find they were always more afraid of violating an oath, than of diſobeying the laws; as they dreaded the power of the Gods much more than the authority of men. Of this we have a manifeſt proof in the examples of Scipio and Manlius Torquatus; for, after the great overthrow, which Hannibal had given the Romans at Cannæ, the people were in ſuch a panic, that numbers of them aſſembling together determined to quit Italy, and tranſport themſelves into Sicily: of which Scipio being informed, immediately went to them, and drawing his ſword, obliged them all to take a ſolemn oath never to abandon their country. Lucius Manlius, the father of Titus Manlius, afterwards ſurnamed Torquatus, had an accuſation lodged againſt him by Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the People; but before the day appointed for hearing his cauſe, Titus went to the Tribune, and threatened to kill him directly, if he would not take an oath to withdraw the accuſation: which he accordingly did, and ſtrictly obſerved it. Here we ſee Citizens, whom neither the love of their country, nor regard of the laws could have prevented from leaving Italy, ſtill kept firm to it by the fear of violating an oath, though they had been compelled to take it: and a Tribune laying aſide the enmity he had with the father, forgetting the outrage received from his ſon, and diſdaining the reflections that muſt be caſt upon his own honour, only to avoid breaking his oath: all which was entirely owing to the Principles of Religion inculcated by Numa in that City.

It likewiſe appears, in the courſe of the Roman Hiſtory, of what admirable ſervice Religion was in governing armies, re-uniting the people, ſupporting virtue, and diſcouraging vice. So that if it ſhould be diſputed, whether Rome was more obliged to Romulus or Numa, I ſhould think Numa was the greater Benefactor to it; for where a due regard is had to Religion, it will be an eaſy matter to introduce military virtue and good diſcipline; but without that, it will be found very difficult to introduce it, and much more ſo to bring it to any degree of perfection. It is further obſervable, that, in forming a Senate, and eſtabliſhing certain other inſtitutions both civil and military, Romulus did not avail himſelf of Divine authority; but Numa, finding it abſolutely neceſſary, pretended to have private conferences with the Nymph Egeria, who dictated to him what he was to preſcribe to the people. This he did, becauſe he wanted to introduce ſome new laws and cuſtoms, and was afraid his own authority alone would not be ſufficient for that purpoſe. And indeed, no man could ever ſucceed in getting new and extraordinary laws admitted amongſt a people without the ſanction of Religion; for though a ſagacious and provident Legiſlator may foreſee their ſalutary effects, yet, if they do not appear obvious to the vulgar, he will not otherwiſe be able to convince them, either of the utility or neceſſity of them: upon which account, wiſe Law-givers always have recourſe to Religion, in order to remove that difficulty. Lycurgus, Solon, and many others, acted in this manner, and for theſe reaſons: and thus the Roman people revering the piety and wiſdom of Numa, ſubmitted in all things to his inſtitutions *. It is true,

* "Religion," ſays Biſhop Fleetwood, in his Charge delivered to the Clergy of the Dioceſe of Ely, at Cambridge, Aug. 7, 1716, "is ſo uſeful and ſo neceſſary to the well-being of the world, and ſo "perfective of human nature, that it commands the eſteem of all "men, and obtains it of all that are reaſonable. There never was a "country in any manner civilized without Religion; nor have any "of our Travellers in their diſcoveries, either of the old or new

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the devotion of thoſe times was ſuch, and the ignorance of the people he had to deal with ſo great, that they contributed very much to facilitate his deſigns, and gave him an opportunity of making any new impreſſion upon them he pleaſed: and, without doubt, any perſon that ſhould undertake to found a State at preſent, would find a parcel of mountaineers, and illiterate uncivilized men, more tractable and obedient than others, who had been uſed to live in communities, and had their morals and principles corrupted: as a rough unhewn block of marble may more eaſily be wrought into a good Statue, than one that has been already ſpoiled by ſome bungling workman.

All theſe things being conſidered, I conclude, that the introduction of Religion at Rome by Numa, was one of the cauſes that chiefly contributed to its grandeur and felicity: for Religion produced good order, and good order is generally attended with good fortune and ſucceſs in any undertaking. And, as a ſtrict obſervation of Divine worſhip and religious duties, always tends to the aggrandizement of a State; ſo a neglect and contempt of them may be reckoned amongſt the firſt cauſes of its ruin. For, where there is no fear of God, it muſt either fall to deſtruction, or be ſupported by the reverence ſhewn to a good Prince; which indeed may ſuſtain it for a while, and ſupply the want of Religion in his Subjects. But as human life is ſhort, the Government muſt of courſe ſink into decay, when the virtue that upheld and informed it is extinct. Hence it comes to paſs, that States which depend upon the ſpirit of one man alone, are generally ſhort-lived: for when he dies, his virtues dies with him, and ſeldom revives in his ſucceſſor, as Dante has juſtly obſerved.

" world, found and populous town or City without a Temple or " place of public worſhip."—In ſhort, human Society could not ſubſiſt without it, as might eaſily be ſhewn, if it was neceſſary at this time of day. See alſo a Book written not long ago by Wortley Mountague, Eſq. upon this Subject.

Rade volte diſcende per li rami
L'umana probitate, e queſto vuole
Quel che la dà, perche da lui ſi chiami.

The virtue of the Sire,
Seldom to heirs deſcends,
With him it oft begins,
And with him often ends;
Though wonderful to us,
Such is the will of Heaven,
That we may aſk of him,
By whom alone 'tis given.

It is not ſufficient, therefore, for the firm eſtabliſhment either of a Kingdom or Republic, that it is wiſely governed by a prince whilſt he lives: it is further neceſſary, that he ſhould lay the foundations in ſuch a manner, that it may be able to ſupport itſelf after he is dead. And though ignorant and unpoliſhed people are more ſuſceptible of new doctrines and laws, than thoſe that think themſelves already ſufficiently polite and civilized, yet it is not an impoſſible thing to make an impreſſion upon the latter. The Florentines do not look upon themſelves as either rude or ignorant people; and yet they were prevailed upon by Girolamo Savonarola to believe, that he converſed with God *. For my own part, I will not pretend to determine, whether that was true or not; becauſe ſo great a man ought not to be ſpoken of, but with the utmoſt reverence: this, however, I will take upon me to ſay, that many thouſands believed it, who never ſaw him perform any thing miraculous, that might be a good foundation for ſuch an opinion: his life, doctrine, and manner of converſation, being ſufficient, as they thought, to convince them. Let no one deſpair then, of being able to do what has been done by others: for mankind (as I have obſerved before, in my introduction to theſe diſcourſes) are born, live and die, in the ſame manner as formerly.

* See Chap. VI. of the Prince.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of what importance it is for the preſervation of a State, to pay a due veneration to Religion; and how much the neglect of it, occaſioned by the Church of Rome, has contributed to the ruin of Italy.

THE rulers of all States, whether Kingdoms or Common-wealths, who would preſerve their governments firm and entire, ought above all things to take care that Religion is held in the higheſt veneration, and its ceremonies at all times uncorrupted and inviolable; for there is no ſurer prognoſtic of impending ruin in any State, than to ſee Divine worſhip neglected or deſpiſed. This may eaſily be demonſtrated, by examining the foundation upon which the Religion of any Country is built; for the Religion of all nations is founded upon ſome principles. That of the Gentiles was founded chiefly upon the anſwers of Oracles, Divination, and Auguries; all the reſt of their Rites, Ceremonies, and Sacrifices, depending wholly upon theſe: for they thought the ſame Being that could foretell things to come, could alſo confer them if good, or avert them if evil; for which reaſon they erected Temples, offered up Sacrifices and Prayers, and inſtituted other ceremonies for the worſhip of that Supreme power: and thus the Oracle at Delphos, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated ſhrines, kept the world in admiration and devotion. But when the Prieſts of theſe Temples began to give anſwers accordingly as they were influenced by great men, the fallacy was detected, and the people growing incredulous, became at laſt rebellious, and diſpoſed to throw off all civil government and reſtraint.

All rulers of Kingdoms and Common-wealths therefore, ought to have a ſpecial regard to the fundamental principles of the religion of their

country: for whilſt they are kept ſacred and inviolate, it will be an eaſy matter to maintain devotion, and conſequently good order and union, amongſt their ſubjects. For which purpoſe, they muſt carefully attend to all circumſtances and events (how falſe or frivolous ſoever they may appear to themſelves) that ſeem in any wiſe conducive to this end; and the wiſer and better acquainted they are with the natural courſe of things, the more they will avail themſelves of ſuch aſſiſtances *. This method being taken by prudent Governors, produced the opinion of miracles; many of which have been pretended to be wrought even in nations under the influence of falſe religion: for ſuch Governors always endeavour to confirm the people in the belief of them, to what cauſes ſoever they may have been owing; and the authority of the Prince never fails to ſtrengthen the faith of the people. Many of theſe Miracles might

* "Nothing," ſays M. Brueys, *Hiſtorie du Fanaticiſme*, p. 230, "has a greater aſcendant over the mind of man than Religion; all "things appear lawful to thoſe that firmly believe God is on their "ſide, and that they only execute his orders. Thoſe who know the "uſe which the artful Greeks and Romans made of their Oracles, "their Soothſayers, their Augurs, their Aruſpices and Feciales, "whoſe employment it was to foretel the will of the Gods, whenever "any important affair was debated; ſome in viewing the entrails of "Victims, the harmony, the flight, or various motions of certain "birds: thoſe I ſay, who know of what uſe theſe things were formerly, know likewiſe that perſons of good ſenſe gave no manner of "credit to them, nor made any other uſe of them, than to inſpire "Nations and Soldiers with deſigns (as if dictated by the Gods) "which were nothing but what they had reſolved upon themſelves "before they had conſulted their Oracles."——Old Dacres ſays upon this paſſage as follows: "Ammiratus here taxes Machiavel, ſaying, "This was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man, than of "one that had either any Religion or Morality in him, whoſe plain "and ſimple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falſhood; "and however the Romans were deceived here, which cannot be "denied, yet without doubt they never did this, thinking to deceive "themſelves, or with intention to deceive others." Thus Ammiratus. And indeed it favours of Atheiſm to bring the Miſtreſs to ſerve the Handmaid, Religion to ſerve Policy, as if the Seaſons of the year ought to accommodate themſelves to men, rather than men accommodate themſelves to the Seaſons; not conſidering that Religion propounds to men a further end than Policy points at. A Prince therefore ſhould be well aware of ſuch evil devices, believing conſtantly that Religion hath no need of help from falſhood, nor can gain any ſtrength by lies.

be inſtanced from the Roman Hiſtory, but we ſhall produce only one. When the Romans ſacked the City of Veii, a party of Soldiers went into a Temple there, dedicated to Juno, and addreſſing themſelves to an image of that Goddeſs, aſked her if ſhe would go to Rome; to which ſome of them ſaid, ſhe gave her aſſent by a nod, and others affirmed, that ſhe actually ſpoke, and ſaid ſhe would. Now theſe men being more religious than Soldiers commonly are (as Livy infers from the ſilence, reſpect, and veneration, with which they entered the Temple) eaſily perſuaded themſelves they had an anſwer given them, which very likely they fully expected before they aſked the queſtion. However that might be, this opinion was induſtriouſly propagated, and encouraged by Camillus, and other leading men in the Common-wealth, who endeavoured by all means to foment the credulity of the people.

If Chriſtian Princes then had taken care to maintain their Religion in the purity it was delivered by its Author; it is certain Chriſtendom would have been much more happy and united than it is at preſent: but it is the ſureſt ſign of its declenſion, to ſee that thoſe who live neareſt to the Church of Rome, which is the Head of our Religion, have the leaſt devotion: for, whoever will examine its firſt principles, and compare them with the practice of theſe times, will will find it no difficult matter to perſuade himſelf, that either ſome dreadful ſcourge, or perhaps utter deſtruction is hanging over our heads *. But ſince there are ſome who maintain, that the welfare of Italy depends upon the Church of Rome, I ſhall endeavour to evince the contrary by ſome arguments, which, in my opinion, are unanſwerable. In the firſt place, then, the corrupt example of the Romiſh Court has extinguiſhed all ſenſe of Religion and Piety in that province; and conſequently been the

* Machiavel ſeems here to have had the Spirit of prophecy upon him, and to have foretold the Reformation which happened not long after in Chriſtendom.

cauſe of numberleſs evils: for as all things go well where Religion is duly ſupported, ſo where that is neglected and trampled upon, every thing runs into confuſion and diſorder. We Italians, therefore, are certainly under great obligations to this Church and its Prieſts, for aboliſhing all Religion and polluting our morals; but under greater ſtill upon another account, which has been our utter ruin; and that is, for fomenting endleſs diſcords and diviſions amongſt us. For certainly no nation can ever expect to be happy, that is not united in obedience to ſome one Prince or Common-wealth, as France and Spain are at this time: and it is wholly owing to the Church of Rome, that Italy, at preſent, is neither entirely under a Republican, nor a Monarchical government. For though the Popes fixed their reſidence there, and obtained a temporal as well as ſpiritual juriſdiction, yet they never were able to poſſeſs themſelves of all Italy: and, on the other hand, they were never reduced to ſo low an ebb, but upon any apprehenſion of loſing their temporal dominion, they could call in ſome foreign potentate to defend them againſt other States that were grown too ſtrong for them; of which there occur many examples in the hiſtory of former times; particularly, when by the aſſiſtance of Charlemagne they drove out the Lombards, who had made themſelves maſters of almoſt all Italy; and in our own times, when they curbed the power of the Venetians by the help of France, and then drove out the French by the aid of the Swiſs. As the church then never was able to get Italy wholly into its own hands, it would not ſuffer any body elſe to do ſo; and this is the reaſon why it never could be united under one head, but ſtill continues divided into ſeveral Principalities and Republics; which has brought it into ſuch a State of diſunion and weakneſs, that it now lies at the mercy of the firſt Invader, and for this we may thank the Church alone. To prove the truth of which aſſertions, if it was poſſible to tranſplant the Court of Rome and all its authority in Italy,

into

into the territories of the Swiſs, who at preſent are the only people that have preſerved both their religious and military inſtitutions in their original vigour, it would ſoon be ſeen that the wickedneſs and depravity of that court would occaſion more diſorder and confuſion in Switzerland, than any other misfortune that ever did, or ever could happen to it*.

* Voltaire, in his general Hiſtory of Europe, part IV. chap. vii. draws a ſtriking picture of that Court, and of thoſe times. "The "Comedies of Arioſto and Machiavel, ſays he, though not very de- "licate in regard to modeſty and Religion, were frequently acted "at this Court in the preſence of the Pope (Leo X.) and Cardinals, "by young perſons of the higheſt rank in Rome. The merit alone "of thoſe pieces, great indeed for that age, made an impreſſion upon "the Spectators. Whatever might be offenſive to Religion paſſed "unobſerved at a Court entirely intent upon intrigues and pleaſures, "and which had no notion that Religion could be injured by theſe "liberties. And indeed, as they attacked neither the Doctrine, nor "Juriſdiction of the Church, the Court of Rome took no more ex- "ceptions againſt them, than the Greeks and ancient Romans did "againſt the wit and raillery of Ariſtophanes and Plautus. Even "affairs of the higheſt importance, never broke in upon the Pope's "pleaſures; he created thirty new Cardinals, moſtly Italians, whoſe "tempers were every way comformable to that of their Sovereign. "If they had not the ſame taſte and knowledge as the Pontif, at leaſt "they imitated him in his pleaſures. Almoſt all the other Prelates "followed their Example. Spain was at that time the only Country "remarkable for the exemplary lives of the Clergy. This ſtrictneſs "of Morals had been introduced by Cardinal Ximenes; a man of a "ſour diſpoſition, who had no reliſh but for arbitrary power, and "who ſtrutted in a Cordelier's habit when he was Regent of Spain, "and ſaid he knew how to bind the Grandees to their duty with his "*cord*, and would cruſh their pride under his Sandals. In every other "country the Prelates lived like voluptuous Princes, ſome of them "being poſſeſſed of eight or nine Biſhopricks. The whole torrent, "both of Proteſtant and Popiſh writers, make loud complaints of the "looſe morals of thoſe times. They tell us that the Biſhops, the in- "ferior Clergy, and the Monks, led moſt indolent and ſcandalous "lives; that nothing was more common than for Prieſts to bring up "their children publicly, after the example of Pope Alexander VI. "We have ſtill the will of Croui, Biſhop of Cambray in thoſe days, "in which he leaves ſeveral legacies to his children, and reſerves a "Sum *for the baſtards, which he ſtill hopes God will be ſo gracious to give "him, in caſe he recovers from his illneſs.* Theſe are the very words of "the Will ——But what gave the greateſt Scandal of all was, the "public Sale of Indulgencies, Abſolutions, and Diſpenſations of all "prices; that Apoſtolic revenue, unlimited and uncertain before "the time of Pope John XXII. was by him digeſted as a Code of the "Canon Law. A Deacon, or Subdeacon, guilty of murder, was "abſolved with permiſſion to hold three Benefices, for about twenty "Crowns. A Biſhop, or an Abbot might aſſaſſinate for three hundred

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

How the Romans availed themſelves of Religion in reforming the State, in proſecuting their wars, and in compoſing tumults.

IT may not appear foreign to our purpoſe, to ſhew by ſome examples in what manner the Romans availed themſelves of Religion in reforming their State, and in the proſecution of other enterprizes; and though many more might be produced out of Livy, yet I ſhall content myſelf with the following.

The people having created Tribunes with conſular power, and all of them, except one, being choſen from amongſt the Plebeians; it happened that there was a great peſtilence and famine the ſame year at Rome: of which the Nobility making a handle at the next creation of Tribunes, pretended that the Gods were offended at the people, for debaſing the Majeſty

" Livres; all manner of uncleanneſs, even the moſt ſhocking to nature, " had its ſettled price. Beſtiality was rated at two hundred and " fifty Livres. Diſpenſations were granted, not only for paſt ſins, but " for ſuch as any one had a mind to commit. In the Archives of Join- " ville an Indulgence was found, granted to the Cardinal of Lorrain " and twelve of his retinue, whereby the remiſſion of three Sins, " which ever they choſe to name, ſhould be anticipated to each of " them. Le Laboureur relates of the Ducheſs of Burgundy and Au- " vergne, Siſter to Charles VIII. that ſhe had the privilege of obtain- " ing abſolution from all her ſins as long as ſhe ſhould live, for herſelf " and ten of her attendants, upon forty-ſeven feſtivals, without reck- " oning Sundays. This created no ſurprize in thoſe times. Public " offices of Indulgences were opened in all parts, and they were farmed " out like Cuſtom-houſe Duties. Moſt of thoſe public offices were " kept in alehouſes, by which means the Preacher, the Farmer, and " the Diſtributor were all gainers. The Pope gave part of the money " to his Siſter, and no body as yet complained. The Preachers de- " clared openly from the Pulpit, that if a man was even to raviſh the " Virgin Mary, he would be forgiven upon purchaſing an Indulgence, " and the people liſtened to them with devotion. But this farm in " Germany happening to be given to the Dominicans, the Auguſtines, " who had been long in Poſſeſſion of it, grew jealous; and this little " claſhing of intereſts betwixt thoſe two Orders of Friars in a corner " of Saxony, was the Source of the Reformation." See Paolo Sarpi's Hiſtory of the Council of Trent, towards the beginning.

of

of the Empire; and that there was no other way to appeaſe them, but by reducing the election of Tribunes to its ancient footing; at which the people were ſo terrified that they choſe all their Tribunes the next year out of the Nobility. We may ſee likewiſe how the Roman Generals had recourſe to Religion, to encourage their troops at the ſiege of Veii, for the Alban Lake having overflowed its banks, to the great ſurpriſe of every body, and the Soldiers being tired out with the hardſhips of a ten years ſiege, and impatient to be at home again, the Commanders pretended to conſult the Oracle of Apollo, from which they aſſured them they received for anſwer, that they ſhould take Veii the ſame year that the Alban Lake overflowed its banks. Animated with this hope, the Soldiers patiently ſubmitted to all the fatigues of war, till Camillus took the City; which he did that very year *. Thus Religion was of great Service in reducing that place, and reſtoring the Tribuneſhip to the Nobility; neither of which perhaps could otherwiſe

* Livy relates a noble circumſtance concerning the behaviour of Camillus upon this occaſion.—It appears from a thouſand paſſages in the Ancients, that the Heathens imagined there were ſome Deities who envied the proſperity of mankind, and never failed, ſooner or later, to viſit thoſe that were remarkably happy, with ſome heavy misfortune. Camillus therefore could not ſee the triumphs of Rome, over the ruins of Veii, without apprehending ſome ſuch viciſſitude; upon which account, he prayed that if the proſperity of Rome was to be balanced by ſome evil, he alone, and not his Country, might ſuffer it. "Dictator Camillus, ſays Livy, lib. V. cap. xxi. captâ Veiorum "urbe, præcones edicere jubet, ut ab inermi turbâ abſtineatur: is "finis ſanguinis fuit. Dedi inde inermes cœpti, & ad prædam miles "diſcurrit; quæ cum ante oculos ejus aliquanto ſpe atque opinione "major, majoriſque pretii rerum ferretur, dicitur manus ad cælum "tollens precatus eſſe Dictator, ut ſi cui hominum Deorumve nimia "ſua fortuna populique Romani videretur, eam invidiam lenire ſuo "privato incommodo, quam minimo publico populique Romani li-"ceret." Could any thing be more Heroic than this in a Heathen? What greatneſs of mind! does it not in ſome meaſure reſemble St. Paul's "wiſhing himſelf accurſed for the Iſraelites his brethren and "kinſmen?" Plutarch obſerves that when Camillus beheld the devaſtation of ſo flouriſhing a City, he could not refrain from tears before he made his prayer to the Gods. "Αλωσης δε της πολεως κατα κρατος, και "των Ῥωμαιων αγοντων και φερομενων απειρον τινα πλουτον, εφορων ὁ Καμιλλος απο της "ακρας τα πραττομενα, πρωτον μεν εως εδακρυσεν, ειτα μακαριστεις υπο των "παροντων, ανεχε τας χειρας τοις θεοις, και προσευχομενος ειπε," &c. Plutarch in Vita Camilli. See Valerius Maximus, lib. I. cap. v.

have

have been effected without much difficulty.—Let me quote another example to the ſame purpoſe. There had been great Tumults in Rome, occaſioned by Terentillus, a Tribune of the people, who wanted to have a Law paſſed, (the tenor of which ſhall be taken notice of in its proper place) that would have borne hard upon the Nobility. To prevent this, the Nobility availed themſelves of Religion two ways. In the firſt place, they cauſed the Sibylline books to be conſulted, and this anſwer to be returned from them, "that "the City would be in great danger of loſing its liberties "that very year, if civil diſcords were not prevented:" which artifice, (though it was diſcovered by the Tribunes) had ſuch an effect upon the people, that they grew cool in the matter, and refuſed to ſupport them any longer. The other expedient was this. One Appius Herdonius, having put himſelf at the head of a multitude of Slaves and Exiles, which amounted to no leſs than four thouſand, ſeized upon the Capitol in the night, to the great conſternation of the whole City; it being feared that if the Æqui and the Volſci, perpetual enemies of the Roman name, ſhould make any attempt upon the City at that time, they would certainly take it; and the Tribunes ſtill obſtinately perſiſting in having the Terentillan law paſſed, and pretending that the report of the Capitol being ſeized upon, was only a falſe alarm, Publius Rubetius, a man of gravity and authority, came out of the Senate-houſe, and partly by fair words, partly by threats, ſometimes repreſenting to them what danger the City was in, ſometimes how unſeaſonable their demand was at that time, made ſuch an impreſſion upon the minds of the Plebeians, that having all taken an oath of fidelity and obedience to the Conſul, they preſently ran to arms, and recovered the Capitol. But the Conſul Publius Valerius, being killed in the attack, Titus Quintius was immediately made Conſul in his room; who not giving the people time to take breath, leſt they ſhould revive their clamours for the Terentillan law, ordered them to march with him directly againſt

againſt the Volſci; inſiſting that by the oath they had taken to obey the Conſul, they were obliged to follow him; and though this was oppoſed by the Tribunes, who alledged, that the oath they had taken extended no further than to the late Conſul: yet ſuch was the veneration for Religion in thoſe times, as Livy informs us, that the people choſe rather to follow the Conſul, than liſten to the ſuggeſtions of the Tribunes, and adds the following reflection to their great honour. "Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet ſæculum, negligen-" tia Deorum venerat, nec interpretando ſibi quiſque " jusjurandum & leges aptas faciebat." i. e. "That " contempt of the Gods which has overſpread this " age, was not then known, nor did private men dare " to interpret oaths as they pleaſed, or accommodate " the laws to their own private intereſt and advan-" tage." The Tribunes therefore apprehending they ſhould otherwiſe loſe all their power, promiſed to obey the Conſul, and not to inſiſt upon the Terentillan law for the ſpace of twelve months; provided the Conſuls did not lead out the people to war during the ſame term. And thus Religion enabled the Senate to ſurmount this difficulty; which they could not have done without that aſſiſtance.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans interpreted their Auſpices according to the neceſſity of the times, and wiſely pretended to conform to the Inſtitutions of their Religion, even when they were obliged to act counter to them: but if any one openly and raſhly deſpiſed them, he was always puniſhed for it.

AUGURIES, as I have ſaid before, were a conſiderable part of the Gentile Religion, and contributed not a little to the grandeur and felicity of the Roman Common-wealth. Upon which account, the Romans held them in greater veneration than any other ordinance or Religious inſtitution, and always had

had recourſe to them in the election of Conſuls, in engaging in any enterprize, in conducting their armies, in chuſing the time and place of battle, and in ſhort, in all undertakings of importance, whether civil or military: nor did they ever go upon any expedition, till they had poſſeſſed their Soldiers with a perſuaſion that the Gods had promiſed them ſucceſs. Now amongſt other orders of their Soothſayers, there were certain officers called *Pullarii* *, who always attended their armies, and were to give their preſages when they were preparing to engage the enemy. If the poultry would eat, they looked upon it as a good omen, but if they would not, they carefully avoided an engagement. Nevertheleſs, when their own reaſon ſhewed them the abſolute neceſſity of acting, they proceeded accordingly, though the Auſpices proved ever ſo unfavourable; but in this they conducted themſelves ſo adroitly, and with ſuch caution, that they ſeemed not to have acted either in defiance or contempt of their Religion; as the Conſul Papirius did before an engagement with the Samnites, which was of ſuch fatal conſequence to them that they never afterwards were able to make head againſt the Romans. For Papirius lying encamped with his army near that of the Samnites, in ſuch a ſituation and circumſtances, that he thought a victory certain if they came to action, was very deſirous to engage; and therefore ordered the Pullarii "to take an omen;" but the poultry refuſing to peck, and the chief of the Pullarii ſeeing the eagerneſs of the army to fight, as well as the aſſurance that both the Soldiers and the General had of a victory, and being loath to diſappoint them of ſo fair an opportunity of ſucceſs, reported to the Conſul, that he had taken an omen, and that it was a very propitious one. Upon which, Papirius immediately drew up his forces in order of battle; but ſome of the other Pullarii happening to blab it out

* They took Omens from the feeding of the Sacred Poultry, as they called the chickens that were under their care and inſpection for that purpoſe.

amongſt

amongſt the Soldiers that the poultry would not eat, they acquainted Spurius Papirius, the Conſul's Nephew, with it, who immediately carried the report to his Uncle. But the Conſul calmly replied, "do you "take care of your own poſt, as to the army and my-"ſelf, the Auſpices are ſufficiently favourable to us, "and if the Chief of the Pullarii has told me a falſe-"hood, the conſequences will fall upon himſelf." That the event therefore might correſpond with the omen, he ordered his Officers to place the Pullarii in the front of the Battle, and marched directly againſt the enemy. But as they were advancing, one of the Roman Soldiers, throwing a dart at random, happened to kill the Chief of the Pullarii; which being reported to the Conſul, "Then, ſaid he, I am ſure all "things will go well, the Gods are appeaſed, and "the death of the Pullarius has expiated his lie;" and thus by dexterouſly accommodating his reſolution to the Auſpices, he engaged the enemy, and beat them; his Soldiers being perſuaded he had not in anywiſe acted contrary to the rites of their Religion. —Appius Pulcher, on the contrary, happening to command in Sicily, during the time of the firſt Punic war, and being deſirous to engage the Carthaginian army, ordered the Pullarii to take an omen; and they informing him that the poultry would not eat, he ſaid, "let us ſee then whether they will drink," and immediately threw them into the Sea. But coming to an engagement with the enemy, he loſt the day; for which he was ſent for to Rome and diſgraced *, whilſt

* Valerius Maximus relates this of Publius Claudius, l. I. c. iv. It is alſo told of Diagoras, or as ſome ſay of Protagoras, who was puniſhed by the Athenians for ridiculing their eſtabliſhed Religion: for he not only divulged the Eleuſinian myſteries and laughed at them, but cut a Statue of Hercules to pieces, for fire wood to boil his turnips; as we are told by the Schliaſt on Ariſtophanes in Nub. Act III. Scene i. and by Athenagoras in Legat. Father Garaffe likewiſe ſpeaks of it in his Doctrine curieuſe, liv. II. ſect. v. "Diagoras, ſays he, "going one day into an Inn, in which he found there was nothing to "be had for dinner but a few turnips, laid hold of an old Statue of "Hercules, who was the tutelar Deity of the houſe, and accoſted him "in this manner, Veni Hercules, tertium Decimum ſubi certamen,

Papirius,

Papirius, on the other hand, was honoured and rewarded; not becauſe one had gained a victory and the other been defeated; but becauſe one had prudently evaded the Auſpices, and the other had raſhly and openly defied them. For this ſort of Divination was calculated only to inſpire the Soldiery with that courage and aſſurance of ſucceſs in time of action, which ſo much contributes to victory; and it was practiſed not only by the Romans, but by other people, of which I ſhall give an example in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

That the Samnites had recourſe to Religion, as the only Remedy when their affairs were become deſperate.

THE Samnites having been often defeated by the Romans, and reduced to the laſt extremity by the death of a great number of their Soldiers and Officers, who were killed in a battle that happened in Tuſcany; their allies alſo, the Tuſcans, Gauls, and Umbrians, being ſo weak that they were incapable of giving them any further aſſiſtance, Livy tells us, "nec ſuis nec externis viribus jam ſtare poterant, "tamen bello non abſtinebant, adeo ne infeliciter "quidem defenſæ libertatis tædebat, & vinci quàm "non tentare victoriam malebant." i. e. "They "could neither ſupport themſelves by their own "ſtrength nor that of others, yet they continued the "war; and though they had been ſo unſucceſsful in "the defence of their liberties, they ſtill perſiſted in "it, and choſe rather to be conquered, than not en-

"& excoque lentem." "Come Maſter Herculus, here's a thirteenth "labour for you, you muſt boil me theſe turnips." Another time, "going into a Court-yard where the Prieſts were taking an Augury "from the feeding of birds, and ſeeing the whole College was greatly "terrified becauſe the chickens did not eat, he took them, in a ſeem-"ing paſſion, and dipping them three or four times over head in a "tub of water, you ſhall drink, however, ſaid he, if you won't eat."

deavour

"deavour to conquer." They reſolved, therefore, to exert their utmoſt endeavours in the laſt puſh they were able to make; but, as they well knew a victory was not to be hoped for, when the ſoldiers were diffident and diſpirited, and that nothing could ſo effectually inſpire them with courage as Religious conſiderations, they determined, by the advice of Ovius Paccius, one of their Prieſts, to revive an ancient ceremony that had long been neglected; which they did in this manner. Having erected an Altar, they offered up a ſolemn ſacrifice, and made the principal officers of their army ſwear, never to run away in time of battle: after which they called the common ſoldiers one by one, into an area near the Altar, ſurrounded by Centurions with drawn ſwords in their hands; where they firſt obliged them to take an oath, not to divulge any thing they ſhould either ſee or hear there. When this was done, having repeated ſeveral forms of execration, and fearful curſes upon thoſe that ſhould violate their oath, they made them promiſe and ſwear again, that they would always be ready to march whitherſoever they were commanded by their Generals; that they would never turn their back in battle; that they would kill any of their fellow-ſoldiers, if they ſaw them do ſo; and then to pray, that if they did not religiouſly obſerve all this, deſtruction might fall upon themſelves, their families, and poſterity; but ſome of them making a ſcruple of taking theſe oaths, were inſtantly run through the body by the Centurions; which had ſuch an effect upon the reſt, who were terrified at the ferocity of the ſpectacle, that they all complied. To add ſtill more to the ſolemnity and magnificence of this ceremony, one half of the army, which conſiſted of forty thouſand men, were cloathed in white, with creſts and plumes of feathers upon their helmets; after which, they encamped near Aquilonia. But Papirius being ordered to march againſt them, told his ſoldiers at the concluſion of an harangue which he made to animate them, "Criſtas non vulnere facere, & picta atque

" aurata ſcuta tranſire Romanum pilum." i. e. " That " creſts and plumes could do them no harm, nor " were gilt and painted ſhields proof againſt a Ro- " man javelin :" and to prevent his men from being diſpirited by the effects which perhaps they might think the oaths beforementioned, would have upon the enemy, he ſaid, thoſe oaths were more likely to daunt than animate them ; becauſe, they muſt of neceſſity be afraid, not only of the Gods, but of their enemy ; nay, of their own fellow-ſoldiers too, at the ſame time. However, when the two armies came to engage, the Samnites were routed : for the valour of the Romans, and the dejection of an enemy, who had been ſo often defeated by them, got the better of all that reſolution which Religion and their oaths had inſpired them with. Nevertheleſs, we may ſee from hence, the opinion they had of theſe things, by having recourſe to them as the laſt and only expedient that could give them any hopes of reſtoring their former courage ; which fully ſhews how much confidence Religion is capable of creating in the minds of men when prudently applied. And though, perhaps, this diſcourſe might more properly have been inſerted amongſt thoſe, that relate to tranſactions which happened out of the City ; yet, as it has ſome ſort of connection with one of the moſt important inſtitutions in the Roman Common wealth, I thought it better to introduce it in this place ; leſt by leaving the Subject unfiniſhed, I ſhould be forced to return to it hereafter.

CHAP. XVI.

If a people accuſtomed to live under the dominion of a Prince, ſhould by any accident become entirely free, they will find it a very difficult matter to maintain their liberty.

HOW hard it is for a people that have been uſed to live in ſubjection to a Prince, to preſerve their liberty, if by any means they become free, as the

the Romans did after the expulsion of the Tarquins, may be shewn from numberless examples that occur in ancient history. Indeed it cannot well be otherwise: for the multitude differs but little from a wild beast, which, (how fierce and savage soever it may be by nature) if it gets loose after it has been long confined and kept in subjection, yet, not knowing how to support itself, or whither to fly for shelter, may easily be taken and chained up again, by any one that pleases. So it is with a people, that has been used to be governed by others: for not knowing how to act either offensively or defensively for their own preservation, and having no connexions with any other State, they soon submit to the yoke again, which often proves more heavy and intolerable, than that which they had shaken off before *. These difficulties they are sure to encounter, even when the people are not totally depraved; but where the whole mass is corrupted, they cannot maintain their freedom for any time, no not a moment, as I shall shew presently. Let it be remembered then, that I here speak of a people, amongst whom corruption has not yet arrived at the last pitch, but where there are more sparks of virtue than vice still subsisting. To the difficulties already mentioned, we may add one more; and that is, whenever a State becomes free, it is always sure to have many enemies, that will endeavour to subvert it, and

* Strabo says, lib. XII. "That the Royal Family being extinct in "Cappadocia, the people refused the permission which the Romans "would have given them to be free, and sent Ambassadors to Rome, "to declare, that liberty was insupportable to them, and to ask a "King. The Romans were surprized at it, and gave them leave to "confer the Kingdom on whom they pleased. Accordingly, they "chose Ariobarzanes, whose posterity failing in the third generation, "Archelaus, though not at all related to that family, was made their "King by Mark Anthony!" Might we not justly say of them, "O "homines ad Servitutem natos:" "O wretches born to slavery." After all, it is plain, Monarchy was fitter for them than a Common-wealth: a certain turn of mind is necessary not to abuse liberty, and all people have not that turn. Justin says, "the Roman Senate chose Ario-"barzanes;" which is the more probable: for what likelihood is there that they should leave the Election of a King to the discretion of the Cappadocians at such a conjuncture?

but few, or no friends to ſupport it. By enemies, I mean thoſe minions that find their advantage in living under a tyrannical government, and grow rich by the bounty and favour of their Prince; who, being deprived of theſe emoluments, cannot afterwards live contented, but endeavour to introduce tyranny again, that they may be reſtored to their former authority. The reaſon why ſuch a State will have few or no friends, is, becauſe free governments uſually confer honours and employments upon none but ſuch as have merited them by particular ſervices, and then too with a frugal hand: ſo that when a man enjoys no more than what he thinks he has deſerved, he does not look upon himſelf to be under any obligation to thoſe that gave it. Beſides, the value of thoſe benefits which reſult from living under a free State, is ſeldom either acknowledged or known by any, till after they are loſt; I mean the quiet enjoyment of their properties without fear or ſuſpicion, as well as the protection of their own perſons and children, and the honour of their wives: for no body will own that he is obliged to another man only for doing him no wrong.

To remedy ſuch diſorders and inconveniencies, therefore, as muſt naturally be occaſioned by theſe difficulties, in a State that is newly become free, the wiſeſt, the ſafeſt, the moſt efficacious and neceſſary expedient is, *to kill the ſons of Brutus*; who, as hiſtory informs us, entered into a conſpiracy with ſeveral other young Romans againſt their country, for no other reaſon, but becauſe they did not enjoy ſo much authority under a Conſular government, as they had done before, under a Regal one, and thought, whilſt the generality were become free, they alone were become ſlaves*. For, whoever undertakes to govern a people, either under a Monarchical or Republican form of government, will find that he builds upon a ſandy foundation, if he does not ſecure thoſe that are averſe to his new eſtabliſhment. Indeed I muſt own,

* They were ordered by their own father to be put to death, who aſſiſted at the execution.

I think

I think thoſe princes unhappy, who are obliged to have recourſe to violence, in order to maintain their authority, when the multitude are their enemies; for thoſe that are hated by a few only, may eaſily find means to rid themſelves of them, without much ſcandal or offence; but when the whole body of the people is provoked, they never can be ſafe: and the more rigorous they are, the weaker will their government become: ſo that the beſt way is, to make the people their friends.

Now though this may ſeem inconſiſtent with what I have juſt before laid down (as I was then ſpeaking of a Common-wealth, but now of a Prince) I ſhall diſcuſs the matter as briefly as I can in this place, that I may have no occaſion to revert to it hereafter.

If then a Prince would recover the affections of a people (I ſpeak of ſuch Princes as have loſt them by becoming Tyrants) he muſt in the firſt place conſider what they moſt naturally and ardently deſire; and he will find they chiefly wiſh for two things; one of which is, revenge upon thoſe that have been the occaſion of their ſlavery; and the other, an opportunity of recovering their liberties; in the former of which, a Prince has it in his power to give them full ſatisfaction; but, in the latter, only in ſome meaſure. As to the firſt caſe, the following example is exactly to the purpoſe.

Clearchus, the Tyrant of Heraclea, having been baniſhed from thence, it happened that the Nobility, finding themſelves too weak to cope with the Plebeians in ſome diſſenſions which aroſe betwixt them, entered into a confederacy with the Tyrant, and brought him into the government again, to the great mortification of the people, who thereby entirely loſt their liberties. But Clearchus ſoon perceiving himſelf wholly in the hands of the Nobility, who grew ſo inſolent and ambitious, that he could neither ſatiate nor reſtrain them; and that he was at the ſame time expoſed, on the other hand, to the reſentment of the people, who were enraged to the laſt degree, at the loſs of their

liberties, reſolved to rid himſelf of the former, and to make the latter his friends. Taking a convenient opportunity, therefore, he had all the Nobility cut to pieces, to the great ſatisfaction of the people; and, in this manner, he gratified their revenge, one of the two appetites abovementioned, which are ſo natural to them.—But, as to the other, that is, the deſire of having their liberty reſtored, in which a Prince cannot wholly comply with them; he ought to examine upon what motives they ſo paſſionately wiſh to be free; and he will find that ſome few of them do it out of ambition and a thirſt of power; but that the generality aſpire to it, for no other reaſon, than that they may live in ſecurity, and without fear of oppreſſion. For in all Governments, howſoever they may be conſtituted, there are ſeldom more than forty or fifty perſons that have any ſhare in the adminiſtration; who being but few in compariſon with the reſt, may eaſily be guarded againſt, either by cutting them off, or by conferring ſuch honours and offices upon them, according to every man's rank and importance, that they may all be ſatisfied. As to the others, who deſire nothing more than to live in ſecurity, they are ſoon contented, if ſuch laws and proviſions are made as are ſufficient to protect them, as well as to ſupport the power of the Prince. When this is once done, and the people obſerve that their Prince does not attempt to violate thoſe laws upon any occaſion whatſoever, they will be eaſy, and think themſelves ſafe. A proof of this we may deduce from the Kingdom of France, which entirely owes its tranquility to the obligation its Kings lie under to obſerve an infinity of laws, which effectually provide for the welfare of their ſubjects. By the fundamental conſtitutions of that Realm, the King may diſpoſe of his armies and finances as he pleaſes; but in all other things he is circumſcribed by the laws.

Such Princes, therefore, or ſuch Republics as did not take proper care to ſecure themſelves at firſt, muſt

muſt either ſeize the firſt opportunity of doing it afterwards, as the Romans did, or they will certainly repent of it, when it is too late. For that people not being yet thoroughly corrupted when they recovered their liberty, after the expulſion of the Tarquins, and the execution of the ſons of Brutus, were enabled to maintain it, by ſuch expedients as we have already mentioned; but if they had been totally debauched, they could not have found any means ſufficient to preſerve it; and this we ſhall demonſtrate in the enſuing Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

If a corrupt People ſhould happened to recover their Liberty, it is almoſt impoſſible they ſhould preſerve it.

IF the regal Government had continued any longer at Rome, I am apt to believe, that City would ſoon have become very weak and contemptible: for, conſidering what a pitch of corruption thoſe Kings were arrived at, had it been propagated through two or three other ſucceeding reigns, and the people been corrupted too, it would have been utterly impoſſible to find any means of reſcuing it from deſtruction. But as the body of the people ſtill continued ſound, after kingly authority was aboliſhed, it did not prove a matter of any great difficulty to reſtore liberty and good order. We muſt lay it down then as a certain truth, that a corrupted State, which has been accuſtomed to the dominion of a Prince, can never become free, though that Prince and his whole race ſhould be extinguiſhed. For ſome new Lord will always ſtart up, out of the ruins of his Predeceſſor; nor will that State ever be ſettled till a good one ſucceeds, whoſe virtue may poſſibly reſtore liberty; but even this will continue no longer than the life of ſuch a perſon: as it happened to Syracuſe, at two different times, that is, under the reigns of Dion and Timoleon, whoſe

virtue re-eſtabliſhed liberty in that City whilſt they lived, though it relaſped into ſlavery after they were dead. But the moſt remarkable example is that of the Romans themſelves, who, after the expulſion of the Tarquins, preſently recovered their liberty, and maintained it; but after the death of Julius Cæſar, Caligula, Nero, and all that family, the ſame people were never able to make the leaſt ſtruggle for the recovery of their liberties: and this contrariety of events in that State proceeded only from hence, that in the time of the Tarquins the people were not yet debauched; whereas in the reigns of the abovementioned Emperors, they had ſunk into the loweſt degree of corruption. For, at the former period, it was ſufficient to make them take an oath, that they would never ſuffer any one perſon to rule over them again, in order to inſpire them with an averſion to the name of King, and to keep them firm in their reſolution to defend their liberties; but at the latter, neither the authority nor rigour of Brutus, though ſupported by all the Legions in the Eaſt, were capable of making them uſe any endeavours to maintain that freedom, which, after the example of the firſt Brutus, he had attempted to reſtore. This was owing to the corruption that had been introduced amongſt the people by the Marian faction, of which Julius Cæſar being afterwards the Head, took ſuch means to dazzle the eyes of the multitude, that they were not aware of the yoke which they themſelves were rivetting upon their own necks.

Now, though perhaps what I have already ſaid, may ſeem ſufficient to prove the truth of my aſſertion; yet, for a further corroboration of it, I ſhall take leave to inſtance another example or two of more modern date, and ſuch as may be more familiar, ſince they relate to tranſactions that happened amongſt people well known in our own times. I ſay then, that no accident or revolution whatſoever, could have reſtored the liberties either of the Milaneſe or Neapolitans, becauſe their manners are totally corrupted: and

and this plainly appeared upon the death of Philip Viſconti, when the City of Milan made ſeveral efforts to recover its freedom, but could never effect it. Happy therefore was it for Rome, that its Kings diſcovered their corruption ſo ſoon; as it cauſed their expulſion before the venom had time to ſpread itſelf amongſt the people, and ſeize upon the vitals of the State: ſo that the tumults and inſurrections which it occaſioned there, was ſo far from being of any prejudice, that they were of the higheſt ſervice to the people; becauſe the intentions of thoſe that excited them were juſt and upright. From whence we may draw this concluſion, that where the people are not corrupted, tumults and commotions cannot injure any State; but where they are debauched, the beſt laws and inſtitutions will ſignify nothing, except they are enforced by ſome perſon of authority, with ſuch a degree of rigour, as will compel the multitude to obey, and become good by neceſſity. Now, whether this has ever been the caſe, I confeſs, I know not: nor am I able to judge, with any certainty, whether it ever can be: for, as I ſaid before, when a City is falling to ruin, through the corruption of the people, if it ſhould ever recover itſelf for a while, it muſt be owing to the virtue of ſome one man, and not to the multitude, who have neither diſpoſition or deſire to ſee good order reſtored, nor power to maintain it afterwards. And even in that caſe, it will ſink again into its former confuſion, as ſoon as ſuch a perſon is dead: as it happened to the Thebans, who were enabled, by the virtue of Epaminondas, to keep up the form of a republic whilſt he lived; but after his death it was quickly diſſolved: the reaſon of which, is, that the life of one man is not ſufficient to accuſtom a State to live quietly under wholſome laws and inſtitutions, which has been long uſed to riot in miſrule and licentiouſneſs. And if one good man ſhould either live to extreme old age, or be ſucceeded by another equally virtuous, and neither of them can work a thorough reformation in the people, every thing

thing will go to wreck and ruin again when they die; unleſs, as I before obſerved, it is prevented by much bloodſhed and running great riſques: for this corruption and inaptitude to live in freedom ariſes from an inequality in the State; and, in order to aboliſh that, it is abſolutely neceſſary to uſe very extraordinary means indeed, which few people neither know, or would care to put in practice if they did, as ſhall be ſhewn more particular in another place *.

CHAP. XVIII.

How Liberty may be ſupported in a corrupt State, where it has been once eſtabliſhed; and in what manner it may be introduced, if it was not eſtabliſhed there before.

IT may appear neither unneceſſary nor inconſiſtent with the foregoing diſcourſe, to conſider whether Liberty can be maintained in a corrupted State, where it has been once eſtabliſhed; and whether it is poſſible to introduce it, if it was not eſtabliſhed there before. I ſay then that it will be very difficult to do either: and though it is almoſt impoſſible to preſcribe any certain rules to be obſerved for the accompliſhment of ſuch a plan, (becauſe it will be neceſſary to proceed according to the degree of corruption in that State) yet, in order to form ſome judgment of the matter, I ſhall here enter into a diſcuſſion of it.

We muſt therefore ſuppoſe ſuch a State to be corrupted to the laſt degree, in which caſe the difficulty will be exceeding great; nay, indeed, it is almoſt impoſſible that any laws or regulations whatſoever ſhould be efficacious enough to reform a State, where the depravation is univerſal: for as good Manners cannot ſubſiſt without good Laws, ſo thoſe Laws cannot be put in execution without good Manners †. Be-

* See the 26th and 55th Chapters of this book.

† "Political writers," ſays the Author of the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, vol. II. ſect. xi. "have generally "attributed the fall of States to ſome defective, falſe, or improper

ſides,

ſides, the Laws that were made when a State was in its infancy, and whilſt the morals of the people were yet untainted, will no longer ſerve the purpoſe of government, after men are become wicked and corrupt: for though the laws of a State may be altered upon various accidents and emergencies, yet the fundamental conſtitutions are ſeldom or never changed; upon which account, new Laws are not ſufficient, becauſe the ancient inſtitutions, which remain in force, often make them liable to be perverted.

For a further explanation of this matter, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that in Rome certain fundamen-

" Principle woven into the original Conſtitution of their Laws."—— Now this, in that extent in which it is generally affirmed and underſtood, ſeems an entire miſtake. For Salutary Principles and Manners will of themſelves ſecure the duration of a State, with very ill modelled Laws: whereas the beſt Laws can never ſecure the duration of a State, where its Manners and Principles are corrupted. Of theſe truths, Hiſtory affords inſtances abundant. The general defect therefore of political Inſtitutions hath been, their not effectually providing for the continuance and ſtability of Principles and Manners; of Religion, Public Spirit, Honour, Temperance, Fortitude. This truth will perhaps be readily allowed, as it regards nations that are deeply ſunk in effeminacy, and ready to be ſwallowed up by ſome warlike neighbour. But it is no leſs certain, as it regards the internal balance of power in any nation whatſoever; although volumes have been written on that ſubject, without ſo much as taking this truth into the account. To offer one inſtance out of innumerable that might be brought from every period of Hiſtory.——It is the ſole force of Manners and a Principle, that prevents France from falling into the deepeſt and moſt abandoned Deſpotiſm. This Principle and its correſpondent Manners give the French many of the Bleſſings of Liberty; whilſt their mere political Conſtitution favours as much of Deſpotiſm as that of many of their neighbours, who feel all the rigours of oppreſſion.

Hence then appears the important uſe of inveſtigating the real and particular State of the Manners and Principles of a Common-wealth; ſince, though it is a circumſtance totally overlooked by many ſuperficial Pretenders to political Science, and loofely and blindly declaimed upon by others, yet it is the only method by which we can rationally determine the ſtrength or weakneſs, the danger or ſecurity of a State.——And here the penetrating Machiavel ſeems to have erred in his determination upon this point He ſays, " As good " Manners cannot ſubmit without good Laws, ſo thoſe Laws cannot " be put in execution without good Manners." The latter part of the Sentence is a great truth; the former part is a vulgar error. So long as the cauſes of corrupt Manners are abſent, good Manners preſerve themſelves without Laws, or with bad Laws. Good Laws are only then neceſſary, as the means of prevention, when corrupt Manners or Cuſtoms take place.

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tal inſtitutions of government were firſt eſtabliſhed, and afterwards Laws were enacted by which the Magiſtrates kept the Citizens in their duty. By theſe inſtitutions, the Government was divided betwixt the People and the Senate, the Tribunes and the Conſuls; and forms eſtabliſhed for the ſollicitation of public offices, the creation of Magiſtrates, and enacting Laws: all which inſtitutions were little or not at all changed in the various revolutions which afterwards happened in that State. The Laws, however, which were calculated to reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the people, as thoſe againſt adultery and ambition, the ſumptuary Laws, and ſeveral others, were either made or altered at different times, as the Citizens grew worſe and worſe. But the ancient inſtitutions, which ſtill ſubſiſted, at laſt becoming ineffectual when the people grew corrupt, the new Laws were neither proper nor ſufficent to keep men in due bounds; yet they would have been highly ſo, if the old inſtitutions had been altered and accommodated to them when they were introduced. And that this was the fact, plainly appears from the forms they obſerved in creating Magiſtrates and enacting Laws: for, in the former caſe, the Romans never conferred either the Conſulſhip, or other great offices in the Commonwealth, upon any one that had not ſollicited them. Now this inſtitution, without doubt, was good in the beginning of that Republic, becauſe it was ſuppoſed that no Citizen would venture to ſollicit thoſe honours, except he was conſcious to himſelf that he had merited them: and that as a repulſe would be attended with ignominy, every man, in order to make himſelf worthy of them, would endeavour to behave well. But in courſe of time, when the Citizens were become exceedingly corrupt, this cuſtom, inſtead of anſwering the firſt deſign of it, was of very great prejudice: for then thoſe that had the moſt power, and not thoſe that were the moſt virtuous, began to ſollicit the higheſt honours in the ſtate; whilſt thoſe that were poor, though they

they were good men, durſt not offer themſelves as Candidates, for fear of meeting with a diſgraceful rebuff *. This inconvenience did not come upon the Romans all at once, but ſtep by ſtep, and, like moſt other evils, gradually: for, after they had conquered Aſia and Africa, and reduced by much the greater part of Greece to ſubjection, they began to grow too ſecure and negligent of their liberties, as they thought they had nothing to apprehend from any other quarter. To this fatal ſecurity on the one hand, and the weakneſs of their enemies on the other, it was owing, that in diſpoſing of the Conſulſhip, and other honours, they no longer had ſo much regard to merit and capacity, as to private favour, and advancing ſuch men to theſe dignities, as were better verſed in the arts of treating, and of canvaſſing votes at an election, than in thoſe of conquering an enemy. From this, they afterwards proceeded to prefer thoſe that were the richeſt and moſt powerful: ſo that through the defect of the original Inſtitution, all good and virtuous men were totally excluded from any ſhare in the Adminiſtration.

In the other caſe, that is, in making Laws, a Tribune, or any other Citizen, was at liberty to propoſe a new one to the people; that ſo every one might ſpeak either for or againſt it, before it was paſſed, if

* Upon this paſſage, the late quoted Author ſays, vol. II. ſect. xiii. "Mark the uniform effects of the ſame Principles and Cauſes, working at the diſtance of two thouſand years. As the times were tumultuous till the Union of the Houſes of York and Lancaſter, it was common before that period for Sheriffs to omit or excuſe the not making returns for ſeveral of the Boroughs within their Counties. Sometimes giving for the reaſon of their omiſſion, that theſe Boroughs were not able to ſend any Burgeſſes, becauſe of their Poverty, which was never then complained of, or objected to by the Boroughs themſelves; though ſeveral acts of Parliament had been made to compel the Sheriffs to make returns for all the Boroughs: nay, ſeveral of the Boroughs, after they had once or twice ſent up their Repreſentatives, found the burden too great, and procured perpetual exemptions, which remain to this day."—How differently do we value this Right at preſent, when no price is thought too great for the purchaſe of a Borough; and no Family, how ancient or honourable ſoever, is of any conſequence, but in proportion to theſe modern poſſeſſions?

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he pleaſed: and this likewiſe was a good Inſtitution whilſt the people continued uncorrupt. For then it was certainly of Advantage to the State, that any one who thought himſelf capable of doing the public a ſervice, ſhould have leave to offer his propoſals: and that every other perſon ſhould be indulged with the privilege of declaring his opinion of them; to the end, that when both ſides of the queſtion had been thoroughly examined and diſcuſſed, the people might chuſe that which ſeemed upon the whole to be moſt reaſonable and convenient. But after the Citizens had loſt their virtue, this Inſtitution alſo was attended with very bad conſequences, becauſe none but great and powerful men were then allowed to propoſe any law to the people; of which they made ſo ill an uſe, that they ſeldom propoſed any thing, but what contributed more to eſtabliſh and augment their own power and perſonal intereſt, than to benefit the public: and, what was ſtill worſe, the people were become ſo abject and corrupt, that no-body durſt oppoſe theſe innovators: ſo that being either deceived by their artifices, or over-awed by their power, they were forced to conſent to their own ruin.

In order therefore to have preſerved the liberties of Rome, even after it became ſo corrupt, it was neceſſary, as they made new laws, to have altered the fundamental Inſtitutions alſo: for good men and bad are to be governed in a very different manner, and where the matter is not the ſame, the forms ought to be varied. But ſince theſe Inſtitutions muſt be altered, either all at once, as ſoon as their inconvenience is generally acknowledged; or by little and little, before it is obvious to every one; I ſay that it is hardly poſſible to do either; for to alter them by degrees, the wiſdom of ſome provident and ſagacious Citizen is requiſite, who can foreſee the danger at a diſtance, and warn the people of it before it happens. Perhaps, however, ſuch a man may never be born in a particular State; and if there ſhould, he may not be able to convince others of the expediency of what he himſelf perceives

perceives neceſſary: for when men have been long accuſtomed to any way of life, it is no eaſy matter to introduce a change amongſt them; eſpecially if they do not immediately ſee the evil that is apprehended with their own eyes, but are to be wrought upon by arguments and probable conjectures.—As for altering theſe Inſtitutions all at once, when every body perceives they are no longer of any ſervice, but far otherwiſe; I ſay that it is much more eaſy to find out the inconvenience than to remedy it: becauſe this cannot be done by ordinary means, when thoſe very means themſelves have loſt their efficacy, and would even contribute to a contrary end. Recourſe therefore muſt neceſſarily be had to extraordinary means, ſuch as force and arms: for a man cannot new model a State as he pleaſes, except he firſt ſeizes upon the government, and takes it wholly into his own hands. Now as he muſt be ſuppoſed to be a good man who is deſirous to reform a State; and another a bad man, who makes uſe of violence to get the government of it entirely into his hands; it very ſeldom happens that an honeſt man will avail himſelf of forcible and injurious methods to become abſolute, be his intentions ever ſo upright; or that a wicked man, when he has made himſelf ſo, will ever do any good, or employ that authority well, which he has done ſo much evil to acquire.

From what has been ſaid, it will appear how difficult, or rather how impoſſible it is, either to maintain liberty, or to re-eſtabliſh it, if loſt, in any State, when the people are become corrupt: but if any means could be found out to effect either, I ſhould think it muſt be by reducing it nearer the ſtandard of a monarchical than of a popular Government; that ſo the inſolence of ſuch as could not be kept within proper bounds by laws, might be effectually curbed by the power of a Magiſtrate, whoſe authority ſhould in ſome meaſure reſemble that of a King: and to attempt a reformation any other way, would be an undertaking that muſt prove either vain and fruitleſs, or attended

attended with great violence and cruelty. For if Cleomenes ſucceeded, as I have ſaid before, by cauſing all the Ephori to be killed, in order to take the Government wholly upon himſelf; if Romulus put his Brother Remus, and Titus Tatius the Sabine to death for the ſame purpoſe, and afterwards made a good uſe of their power; it muſt be obſerved, that the Subjects of neither State were corrupted to ſuch a degree as thoſe of whom we have been ſpeaking in this Chapter: and therefore they were both enabled to effect what they undertook, and to put a good face upon it alſo when they had done.

CHAP. XIX.

When a good foundation is once laid, if a weak Prince ſhould ſucceed an able one, he may ſupport himſelf in the Government: but if one weak Prince ſhould ſucceed another, it is impoſſible to maintain any State.

IF we conſider the abilities and conduct of Romulus, Numa, and Tullus Hoſtilius, the three firſt Kings of Rome, we ſhall find it was extremely fortunate for that City that its firſt King was courageous and warlike, the ſecond pacific and devout, and the third of the ſame ſtamp with Romulus, more inclined to war than peace. For if a Prince was neceſſary, after the firſt Inſtitution of Government there, who ſhould civilize and form the people to the duties of Society, it was no leſs neceſſary that he ſhould be ſucceeded by another, who ſhould be animated with the ſame valour and martial ſpirit that Romulus was; otherwiſe the Citizens would have become effeminate, and the City fallen a prey to its neighbours.

From hence we may obſerve, that if a Prince who is not altogether ſo valiant and enterprizing as another whom he happens to ſucceed, the State may ſtill be ſupported by the merits of his Predeceſſor, and he may enjoy the fruit of his labours: but if it comes

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to paſs that either he himſelf lives a long time, or is not ſucceeded by another of the ſame turn with the firſt, the State muſt of courſe be ruined. On the contrary, if a martial and courageous Prince ſucceeds one ſimilar to himſelf, very great things are commonly effected, and ſuch as immortalize their names. David without doubt diſtinguiſhed himſelf no leſs by feats of arms, than by his piety and wiſdom: and the conſequence was, that after he had ſubdued all his enemies, he left his Kingdom in peace to his Son Solomon, who was enabled to ſupport it at all times by the arts of peace only, and reigned happily all his life; which was wholly owing to the virtues of his Father. But it happened otherwiſe to Rehoboam, who inheriting neither the valour of his Grandfather, nor the wiſdom of his Father, was hardly able to keep poſſeſſion of a Sixth part of his Kingdom. Bajazet II. Sultan of the Turks, though naturally more inclined to peace than war, ſtill maintained the acquiſitions that had been made by his father Mahomet; who, like David, having conquered all the neighbouring States, left a large Empire to his Son, and ſo well eſtabliſhed by his valour, that it might eaſily be preſerved firm and entire during his life, by pacific meaſures alone. Nevertheleſs, if Bajazet's Son Selim, the preſent Grand Seignor, had not been more like his Grandfather than his Father, that Empire muſt have been ruined; but as it happens, he ſeems more likely to excel his Grandfather than to fall ſhort of him.

From theſe examples we may ſee that a weak and puſillanimous Prince may ſupport himſelf, provided he ſucceeds a warlike and enterpriſing one: but if one weak Prince immediately ſucceeds another, it is impoſſible any Government ſhould ſubſiſt; except, like France, it be ſupported by virtue of its ancient laws and fundamental conſtitutions. By *weak* Princes, I mean thoſe that are not given to arms; and ſhall conclude this diſcourſe with obſerving that the tranquillity of Numa's reign, which laſted many years, was

owing to the warlike Spirit of Romulus, which being revived in Tullus Hoſtilius, the third King, procured him the ſame degree of reputation. Tullus was ſucceeded by Ancus Martius, a Prince of ſuch a diſpoſition that he knew how to ſupport the State either by the arts of peace or war *. In the beginning of his reign he was inclined to pacific meaſures; but when he perceived that his neighbours judged from thence, that he was effeminate, and made little account of him, he thought it neceſſary for the preſervation of his Kingdom, to convince them of the contrary, by following the ſteps of Romulus rather than of Numa. Let it be obſerved therefore by all Princes, that thoſe, who imitate Numa, may chance either to keep or loſe their dominions, according to the difference of the times and circumſtances of things: but ſuch as follow the example of Romulus, and arm themſelves like him, with prudence and valour, will be able to main-

* It muſt be owned that Machiavel has given us a curious Analyſis, or Inveſtigation of the firſt Principles of the Roman Government, according to the account he receives of their polity from the Hiſtorian he comments upon. But if the Hiſtory of the Seven Kings of Rome reſts upon no better a foundation than that of the Seven Champions of Chriſtendom, as ſome authors of great reputation have not ſcrupled to aſſert, then all that has been ſaid by ſo many writers concerning the remarkable good fortune of Rome, in having ſo many ſucceeding Princes of ſuch particular diſpoſitions as were exactly ſuited to the times, and abſolutely neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of an infant State, muſt ſtand for nothing: Livy's Hiſtory itſelf muſt then be looked upon in no other light than that of a Romance, or "a well invented "flam," and conſequently the magnificent Superſtructure which the Florentine has erected upon it, of courſe fall to the ground. What pity it is that ſuch great and generous actions, and ſuch noble ſpeeches as we meet with in almoſt every page of that Hiſtorian; clothed with ſo many brilliant circumſtances, and related in ſo lively a manner, that one would be apt to imagine he had either ſeen or heard them done and ſpoken himſelf, or at leaſt had them from ſomebody elſe that did, ſhould, after all, prove not to have one word of truth in them, but to be cooked up only for perſons that probably never exiſted! What a ſhame that ſuch "Fathers of Hiſtory," as they are ſometimes called, ſhould more juſtly deſerve the name of "the Fathers of lies!" But ſuch is the *frivolity* (if I may be indulged that word) of all Hiſtory, eſpecially of thoſe that are moſt ſolemn, and appear moſt ſpecious and plauſible. A mortifying conſideration indeed! who can forbear ſhaking his head, and crying out with the Poet,

O Curas hominum, & quantum in rebus inane!

Or rather with the Italians,

Se non è vero, e ben trovato?

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tain their State in all times and circumſtances; except they are overpowered by ſome extraordinary and irreſiſtible force. It may then be looked upon as certain, that if the third King of Rome had not been a warlike Prince, and one that knew how to retrieve the declining reputation of that State by dint of arms, it never could (or with very great difficulty at leaſt) have acquired ſuch a degree of ſtrength and firmneſs, nor have effected the prodigious things it afterwards did. It muſt be owned however, that whilſt it continued under a Monarchical Government, it was liable to the double danger of being ruined either by the weakneſs of one Prince, or the ferocity and tyranny of another.

CHAP. XX.

That if one martial Prince ſucceeds another, they may do very great things: and that as well governed Republics muſt of neceſſity have virtuous men to conduct them, their conqueſts and acquiſitions will be proportionable to their virtue.

AFTER the Romans had aboliſhed Monarchy, they were no longer expoſed to the dangers abovementioned, which they had been ſubject to before, under every King, whether he was pacific and gentle, or fierce and warlike. For the Sovereign power was veſted in Conſuls, who arrived at that dignity, neither by right of ſucceſſion or inheritance, nor by fraud or violence of any kind; but by the free ſuffrages of their fellow-citizens, and therefore were always perſons of diſtinguiſhed merit and valour. So that the State, availing itſelf of a long ſucceſſion of virtuous men, arrived at its higheſt pitch of grandeur in the ſame number of years that it had been governed by kings. And no wonder, when we ſee that even two great Princes (one ſucceeding the other) are ſufficient to conquer the world; as Philip of Macedon,

and his Son Alexander did. If this was poſſible in a Monarchy, ſurely it is much more ſo in a Republic, which has it in its power to elect not only two, but an infinite number of ſuch men in a continual and uninterrupted ſucceſſion to one another: ſo that a ſucceſſion of this kind may eaſily be eſtabliſhed and kept up in a well governed Commonwealth *.

CHAP. XXI.

Thoſe Princes and Republics are highly to be blamed that have not troops of their own †.

IF any Princes or Republics in theſe times have not forces of their own, ſufficient either to defend themſelves, or attack their enemies, they ought to take the ſhame to themſelves: ſince it is plain, from the example of Tullus Hoſtilius, that ſuch a defect is not owing to any want of men that are fit to bear arms, but to their own fault in neglecting to inure their ſubjects to the exerciſe of them. For, when Tullus ſucceeded to the Kingdom, the Romans having been forty years in peace, he could not find a man in his dominions who had ever been a Soldier. Nevertheleſs, as he determined to engage in a war, he wiſely reſolved not to employ either the Samnites, or Tuſcans, or any other Mercenaries, but to avail himſelf of his own Subjects: and ſuch were his military abilities, that he ſoon made them excellent ſoldiers. And, it is moſt certain, that if there are not ſoldiers, wherever there are men enow, it is entirely to be imputed either to the negligence or incapacity

* A Commonwealth may certainly boaſt one advantage, which hereditary Kingdoms have not. In Commonwealths, the Sovereign is neither too young nor too old, and has neither the infirmities of childhood, nor thoſe of old age. But Kingdoms have not that happineſs: they experience at one time the diſorders of a minority, at another, the wild heat of youthful blood, and at another, the tardineſs and weight of declining years.

† See the 12th, 13th and 14th Chapters of the Prince.

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of the Government, and not to any defect in nature, or peculiarity in the Country where they live; of which we have a very recent proof: for every body knows, that when the King of England invaded France a little while ago, he had not a man in his army who was not his own Subject; yet though that nation had not been at war for the ſpace of thirty years before, nor was there either an officer or private man in thoſe troops, who had ever ſeen the face of an enemy; yet they were not afraid to make a deſcent upon a Kingdom, where there were ſo many experienced Generals and ſuch numbers of well diſciplined forces, who had ſerved for many years together in the Italian wars. This was wholly owing to the wiſdom of the Prince, and the good order and military exerciſe kept up in that Kingdom: where they never ceaſe to diſcipline their troops and make them ready for war, even in time of the moſt profound peace *. After Pelopidas and Epaminondas had reſcued their countrymen, the Thebans, from the ſubjection they were under to the Spartans, and ſaw they were become abject and ſpiritleſs by a long courſe of ſervitude; yet, ſuch were the abilities and courage of

* Upon this paſſage, the Author of the "Eſtimate, &c." ſays as follows, vol. II. ſect. vii. "If the Principles maintained in this work "be true, the defect of valour in a national Militia, will not lie "amongſt the private Men, but the Officers. And indeed, who can "ſeriouſly believe that thoſe Gentlemen that find the attendance up- "on a Quarter Seſſions for the ſervice of their Country, too ſevere a "burden of duty upon their enervated bodies and minds, will vigo- "rouſly undertake and go through the dangers and fatigues of war- "like ſervice? It muſt therefore be expected, as a certain event, that "a Militia will, on its firſt inſtitution, and for a long time be uſeleſs. "But this is not ſaid with a view to diſcourage the Eſtabliſhment, but "only to prevent groundleſs expectations, which being diſappointed "in the firſt raiſing of the Militia, might lead the nation into a be- "lief, that the inſtitution could never be uſeful. This, therefore, "is no reaſon why a Militia ſhould not be ſet on foot, but rather a "good reaſon for its ſpeedy eſtabliſhment: becauſe the continued ex- "erciſe of a Militia, if undertaken with that vigour and ſerious in- "tention which it deſerves, is perhaps the moſt promiſing means of "rekindling by ſlow degrees the military Spirit amongſt us. As a "rational encouragement to the hopes of the nation, let us caſt our "eyes back upon former times, and hear the judgment of a great "foreigner." He then quotes this paſſage from Machiavel.—The King of England abovementioned was Henry VII.

thoſe two chiefs, that they ſoon re-eſtabliſhed military diſcipline amongſt that people, and revived their ancient valour to ſuch a degree, that they not only marched boldly into the field againſt the Spartan army, but utterly defeated it. Upon which, the hiſtorian that relates this, remarks, that it was plainly ſeen from the conduct of theſe two Generals, that Soldiers were not born at Sparta alone, but were ſoon to be raiſed in every country where there were men, provided any one could be found that would be at the pains of diſciplining and training them up to arms. The juſtneſs of which remark is fully confirmed by the example of Tullus Hoſtilius, who preſently made excellent Soldiers of a raw multitude; as is well obſerved and expreſſed by Virgil in the following lines.

Reſideſque movebit
Tullus in arma viros, & jam deſueta triumphis
Agmina, &c. Æn. VI. 813.

Him Tullus next in dignity ſucceeds,
An active Prince, and prone to martial deeds.
He ſhall his troops for glorious fields prepare,
Diſus'd to toils and triumphs of the war.
DRYDEN.

CHAP. XXII.

What is to be obſerved from the Combat betwixt the three Horatii of Rome, and the three Curiatii of Alba.

BY the articles of a convention betwixt Tullus Hoſtilius King of Rome, and Metius Dictator of Alba, who had been at war together, it was agreed, that three of each ſide ſhould decide the quarrel in a Combat; and that if the three Romans got the better of the three Albans, the latter State ſhould become ſubject to the former, and contrarywiſe. For which purpoſe, three brothers of the Horatian family being appointed

appointed by the Romans, and three brothers of the Curiatian by the Albans, as their Champions, to end the diſpute; it happened that all three on the Alban ſide were killed, and only one on the Roman was left alive. But the ſurviving Horatian returning in triumph to Rome, with the ſpoils of his Antagoniſts upon his back, amongſt which was a cloke that had been curiouſly wrought by his own Siſter, who was eſpouſed to one of the Curiatii; and chancing to meet that Siſter in his way back to the City, ſhe could not help burſting into tears at the death of her lover, which provoked him to ſuch a degree, that he immediately killed her. For this fact, however, he was brought to a trial; but acquitted after long debate: and at laſt, more through the interceſſion of his father, than any conſideration of his own merit *.

From hence, there are three things to be obſerved. In the firſt place, that no State ought to ſtake its all upon a part of its forces only: in the next, that in a well ordered government a man's merits and crimes ought not to be balanced againſt each other: and laſtly, that it is imprudent to enter into any engagements, where the performance of them is, or ought to be doubted of. For liberty is a thing of ſuch importance to every State, that no one can reaſonably imagine, that either of the two abovementioned would long have continued quiet after they had been reduced into ſubjection, by the ill ſucceſs only of three of their own ſubjects.

This plainly appears from the ſubſequent conduct of Metius, who, though he acknowledged himſelf ſubdued after the Horatii had got the better of the Curatii, and promiſed obedience to Tullus as his Sovereign; yet, in the firſt expedition which the Romans afterwards undertook againſt the Veientes, he ſhewed, that he regretted the loſs he had ſuſtained by the raſh covenant he had lately made, and would have deceived Tullus, if he could. But as I have elſe-

* Livy, lib. I. cap. xxvi.

where diſcuſſed this point more at large *, I ſhall only ſpeak of the two firſt in the two following Chapters.

CHAP. XXIII.

That a State ought not to venture its all upon a part of its forces only: upon which account, it is often of great prejudice to defend paſſes.

HE ſurely can never be thought a wiſe man who riſques his whole fortune, without exerting his utmoſt efforts at the ſame time. And yet, this has been done at various times and in different manners. As firſt, by acting like Tullus Hoſtilius and Metius, when they committed the whole fortune and happineſs of themſelves, their Country, and of ſo many brave men as each of them had in their reſpective armies, to the valour and fortune of three of their ſubjects alone, who were but a very trifling part of their ſtrength: not conſidering that by ſuch a manner of proceeding, all the pains which their Anceſtors had taken, in founding and forming thoſe States, to eſtabliſh liberty upon the firmeſt bottom, and to enable their Succeſſors to defend it, were rendered vain and ineffectual, by putting it in the power of ſo few to loſe it: which was certainly an act of extreme raſhneſs and imprudence.

Thoſe likewiſe are guilty of the ſame error, who, upon the approach of an Enemy, riſque all upon the defence of certain paſſes and ſtrong holds: for this is almoſt always a very dangerous plan, except it can be conveniently done with all their forces; in which caſe, without doubt, ſuch a ſtep ought to be taken: but if thoſe places are either ſo barren or ſo ſtrait that they can neither ſupport nor contain all their forces, it may prove of fatal conſequence. What induces me to think ſo is, the example of ſuch as having been in-

* See the 18th Chapter of the Prince, and the 41ſt and 42d Chapters of the third book of theſe Diſcourſes.

vaded

vaded by a powerful enemy, who, though their country was ſurrounded with mountains, never offered to make any ſtand againſt them in the paſſes upon thoſe mountains, but always either advanced to meet them, or waited for them in ſome ſuch plain and open part of the country nearer home, as they thought would beſt ſuit their purpoſe. The reaſons of which have been already aſſigned: for, as they could not poſt any conſiderable number of men to guard thoſe paſſes, becauſe there would neither be proviſions ſufficient to ſupport them long there, nor room enough to hold many ſoldiers, it would not be poſſible to reſiſt a numerous army that came to attack them: but the enemy may march in as large a body as they pleaſe, becauſe it is not their intention to ſtay in that place, but to paſs it as ſoon as they can, and be gone; whereas, a great number of the other ſide cannot wait long for them, in thoſe barren and ſtrait places; which yet, perhaps, they would find neceſſary from the uncertainty of the Enemy's arrival. So that when that paſs is abandoned, which you had hoped to maintain, and upon which you and your Soldiers chiefly depended, both your own Subjects, and the reſt of your army will be ſo diſpirited, that you will be ruined without ſtriking a ſtroke, by having ſtaked your all upon part of your ſtrength only.

Every one knows what difficulties Hannibal encountered, when he paſſed the Alps, which divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards thoſe mountains that ſeparate Lombardy and Tuſcany: and yet the Romans waited for him firſt upon the Teſino, and afterwards upon the plains of Arezzo, chuſing rather to venture an engagement with him in the field, where their army might have ſome chance to defeat the Enemy, than to lead it into places where it was ſure to periſh through want and other inconveniencies. And if we read Hiſtory with care and attention, we ſhall find that very few good Generals ever thought of defending ſuch paſſes; not only for the reaſons already given, but becauſe it is impoſſible to ſecure them all;

both

both the mountains and plains having their by-roads, as well as thoſe that are common and uſually frequented: and though ſtrangers, perhaps, may not know them, yet the people of the country are well acquainted with them, and always ready enough to ſhew to thoſe who deſire to elude all oppoſition; of which we had a remarkable example, no longer ago than the year 1515. When Francis I. King of France, had formed a deſign to invade Italy, in order to recover the State of Milan: the chief objection that was urged by ſuch as oppoſed it, was, that the Swiſs would obſtruct his paſſage over the mountains. But experience afterwards ſhewed the futility of that objection: for the King turning out of the common road, in which the Swiſs had ſtrongly fortified two or three paſſes, and taking a by-way that they knew nothing of, arrived in Italy cloſe upon their backs, before they heard any thing of his paſſage: at which they were ſo diſmayed, that they quitted thoſe poſts and retired into Milan; and the Lombards, finding themſelves deceived in their opinion that the French would be ſtopped in the mountains, preſently ſubmitted to them.

CHAP. XXIV.

That well governed Republics appoint proper rewards and puniſhments, according to the merits or demerits of their Citizens, and never balance one againſt the other.

VERY great, to be ſure, was the merits of the ſurviving brother of the Horatii; as he alone had conquered the Curiatii, and ſaved his Country: great likewiſe was the crime he committed afterwards in killing his Siſter; at which the Romans were ſo offended, that they brought him to a trial for it, notwithſtanding his ſervices were of ſuch importance, and the ſenſe of them ſo freſh upon their minds. Now, this perhaps, may ſeem to thoſe that conſider the matter

ter but ſuperficially, a piece of the higheſt ingratitude in that people: but whoever weighs it more maturely, and duly reflects how neceſſary a thing juſtice is in every Republic, and how impartially it ought to be adminiſtered, will rather be apt to blame them for acquitting, than for having brought him to a trial. For no well governed Commonwealth ever cancels the demerit of its Citizens, on account of their merit; but having appropriated rewards to the one, and penalties to the other; and having recompenſed a man for doing well; if he afterwards does ill, it puniſhes him according to the nature of his crime, without any regard to his former good actions. Where theſe ordinances are ſtrictly obſerved, a State may preſerve its liberties a long time; but where they are neglected, it will ſoon fall to ruin: for, if a man who has done his Country ſome ſignal ſervice, ſhould expect not only to be honoured and rewarded for it, but to be indulged with impunity, and a privilege to commit any crime afterwards, his inſolence would ſoon grow inſupportable and inconſiſtent with all civil government.

It is highly neceſſary, therefore, for the diſcouragement of bad men, to reward thoſe that are good, as the Romans always did: and, though a State ſhould be poor, and cannot afford to give any conſiderable reward to the higheſt degree of merit, yet it ſhould always ſhew itſelf grateful, and give as much as it is able: for any little preſent or favour that is conferred as a reward for virtuous actions (though of the moſt important ſervice) will always be conſidered by the receiver as great and honourable. The ſtories of Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scævola, are generally known; the former of whom alone, bravely maintained the bridge over the Tiber, againſt the enemy, who wanted to paſs it, till the bridge was cut down behind him, and their paſſage obſtructed: and the latter went to the camp of Porſenna, King of the Tuſcans, with a deſign to aſſaſſinate him; but miſtaking his man, he thruſt his own hand into a fire,

and

and held it there till it was entirely burnt away, to ſhew the courage and reſolution of the Romans: for which extraordinary ſervices, each of them was rewarded with two acres of land *. The example of Manlius Capitolinus is no leſs remarkable, who, having driven away the Gauls from the Capitol, which they had beſieged, was recompenſed for it by his fellow-citizens with a preſent of a ſmall quantity of corn; which, according to the neceſſity of the times, was looked upon as an honourable and adequate reward. But the ſame Manlius, either out of envy or ambition, afterwards endeavouring to excite ſedition and tumults in the City, and to make himſelf too popular, was thrown headlong from the Capitol, which he had relieved with ſo much glory and reputation, without the leaſt regard to the merit of his former actions.

CHAP. XXV.

Whoever would reform the Government in a free State, ought to retain the ſhadow at leaſt of its ancient Cuſtoms and Inſtitutions.

IN order to reform a Government in ſuch a manner as to make it not only firm and permanent, but agreeable to the people, the Reformer ought to keep up the ſhadow and form at leaſt of its ancient cuſtoms and inſtitutions, that ſo the multitude may be as little aware as poſſible of the innovations, though the

* Machiavel ſays, "*due ſtaiora di terra per ciaſcuno*." The words of Livy are as follows, "Tum Cocles, *Tiberine Pater*, inquit, *te ſanc-* "*te precor, hæc arma & hunc militem propitio flumine accipias*: ita ſic "armatus in Tiberim deſiluit, multiſque ſuper incidentibus telis in- "columis ad ſuos tranavit; rem auſus plus famæ habituram ad poſte- "ros, quam fidei. Grata erga tantam virtutem, civitas fuit: ſtatua "in comitio poſita; agri quantum uno die circumaravit datum: pri- "vata quoque inter publicos honores ſtudia eminebant: nam in mag- "nâ inopiâ, pro domeſticis copiis unuſquiſque ei aliquid, fraudans ſe "ipſe victu ſuo, contulit"—"Patres C. Mucio virtutis cauſâ trans "Tiberim agrum dono dedêre, quæ poſtea ſunt *Mucia prata* appel- "lata." Liv. lib. II. cap. x. xiii.

new

new ordinances ſhould be wholly different from the old ones: for the generality of mankind not penetrating very far into things, are often amuſed with the ſhadow as much as the ſubſtance, and ſometimes indeed exterior appearances make a deeper impreſſion upon them than realities. The Romans, therefore, being ſenſible of this in the infancy of their Commonwealth, and having created two Conſuls inſtead of one King, thought proper to allow them but twelve Lictors, that ſo they might not exceed the number of thoſe that were wont to attend upon their Kings. Beſides, as there uſed to be an anniverſary Sacrifice at Rome, which could not be celebrated by any perſon but the King himſelf, the Romans, fearing the people would otherwiſe wiſh for Kings again, created an Officer, whom they called, *Rex Sacrificulus*, or a ſort of *Maſter* of the *Ceremonies* (but in ſubordination to their *Pontifex Maximus*, or High Prieſt) who was to preſide at that ſolemnity; by which expedient, the people were well ſatisfied with the manner of the Sacrifice, and did not at all repine at the expulſion of Kings, becauſe their ancient forms and cuſtoms ſeemed ſtill to be kept up.

This method, therefore, ought to be obſerved by every one that would cancel old Inſtitutions, and eſtabliſh a new and free government; for mankind being naturally averſe to any alterations in their laws and cuſtoms, care ſhould be taken that ſuch an innovation ſhould retain as much as poſſible the reſemblance at leaſt of their ancient conſtitution: and if the Magiſtrates ſhould differ from the former, either in power or number, or the duration of their authority, the ſame Names and Titles however ſhould be continued. This courſe, I ſay again, muſt be followed by thoſe that would introduce a new and ſatisfactory kind of government into any State, whether a Monarchy or a Republic*; but for thoſe that want

* Thus our King Edward VI. at the Reformation, leaving much of the exterior untouched, the people were in a great meaſure ſooner reconciled to it than perhaps they otherwiſe would have been.

to found an abſolute Government, or Tyranny, (as it is called by political writers) they muſt make a thorough alteration in every thing, as we ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XXVI.

That a new Prince muſt change every thing in a State which he has ſeized upon by force.

WHOEVER makes himſelf Maſter of a State, and deſigns to form a government that ſhall neither be a free Kingdom nor yet a Republic, but altogether abſolute, will find it his ſureſt way to alter every thing in it from top to bottom, in order to ſupport himſelf; eſpecially if he perceives his foundations are weak and unſtable, as probably he may do, being a new Prince. That is, he muſt create new Magiſtrates in every City, give them new titles, make choice of new perſons, confer new authority, advance the poor, impoveriſh the rich, "fill the hungry with "good things, and ſend the rich empty away," as David did when he became a King. Beſides this, he muſt build new Cities, demoliſh the old ones, and tranſport the inhabitants of the country from one place to another: in ſhort he muſt turn every thing in it upſide down in ſuch a manner, that no-body ſhall enjoy either honours, or riches, or authority, or privilege of any kind, but what is immediately derived from him. Philip of Macedon, the Father of Alexander the Great, may ſerve him for a pattern: of whom the Hiſtorians ſay, that he removed the people he conquered from one Province to another, as Shepherds remove their flocks; and yet, by proceeding in this manner, from a petty Prince he became Maſter of all Greece. But nothing ſurely can be more barbarous than ſuch a conduct, nothing more directly oppoſite to the ends of all civil government, or unworthy not only of a Chriſtian, but of any one who has

the leaſt ſpark of humanity left in his heart. Every one therefore ought to abhor it, and chuſe rather to live like a private man, than to make himſelf an abſolute Prince, or rather a Tyrant, by the deſtruction of ſo many thouſand innocent people. Nevertheleſs, he that determines to tranſgreſs the bounds of virtue and moderation, muſt of neceſſity be obliged to take this courſe, in order to ſecure himſelf: but the generality of mankind being neither perfectly good nor wholly evil, are apt to halt betwixt both, and take a middle way; which is productive of the moſt fatal conſequences, and will never enable them to execute any thing great, as ſhall be ſhewn in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

That very few men can reſolve to be either perfectly good, or totally bad.

POPE Julius II. marching with an army in the year 1505, to drive the Bentivogli out of Bologna, of which that family had been Sovereigns a hundred years; determined at the ſame time to wreſt Perugia alſo out of the hands of Giovanni Paolo Baglioni, who had uſurped that State; and in ſhort to diſpoſſeſs all thoſe that had ſeized upon any territories belonging to the Church. When he arrived therefore at Perugia with this deſign, which was well known to every one, he did not wait till his army came up to ſupport him, but immediately entered the City attended only by his train and a very ſlender guard, though Baglioni was there in perſon with a good body of troops which he had got together for his defence. In this manner, proceeding with the ſame boldneſs and impetuoſity that he did in all other things, he put himſelf entirely into the hands of his enemy; whom yet he brought out of the City with him, and left another Governor of his own appointment there to account for

for the revenues of that State to the Church. Upon which, all wiſe and conſiderate men could not help being ſurprized at the temerity of the Pope, and the puſillanimity of Baglioni: wondering how it ſhould come to paſs, that the latter did not take the opportunity of ſecuring his enemy, as he might have done with great reputation to himſelf, when he had him fairly in his power, and of filling his coffers not only with the ſpoils of his Holineſs, but of his train too, in which were all the Cardinals with their equipages, and an immenſe booty of treaſure and jewels. For it ſeemed hardly credible that he ſhould be reſtrained by religious motives; becauſe they thought a man who had been ſo wicked as to commit inceſt with his own Siſter, and to murder ſeveral of his couſins and nephews to make his way to the Sovereignty, would have eaſily digeſted any other ſcruple of conſcience. They concluded therefore, that as few men can reſolve to be abſolutely good, ſo it ſometimes happens that others cannot prevail upon themſelves to become thoroughly abandoned, even though they might acquire thereby a conſiderable degree of fame; for when a baſe action ſeems to carry a certain air of magnanimity or generoſity, they know not how to attempt it *. Thus Baglioni, who had made little account of

* Mr. Bayle ſays that the Phænomena in the Hiſtory of man puzzle Philoſophers, as much as the Phænomena in Natural Hiſtory, and that few act according to their own principles. The Mahometans, according to their principles, are obliged to make uſe of force to deſtroy all other Syſtems of Religion: and yet they have tolerated them for ſeveral ages. "When you meet with infidels, ſays Mahomet in the ninth Chapter of the Alcoran, kill them, cut off their heads, or make them priſoners, and bind them till they have paid their ranſom: be not afraid to perſecute them till they have laid down their arms, and ſubmitted to you." For all this, it is certain that the Saracens ſoon left off thoſe violent methods, and that the Greek Churches have maintained themſelves under the yoke of Mahomet to this day. They have their Patriarchs, their Metropolitans, their Synods, their Diſcipline, and their Monks.—On the other hand, Chriſtians were commanded only to preach and inſtruct: notwithſtanding which, many Chriſtian nations have extirpated thoſe who were not of their perſuaſion with fire and ſword, time out of mind, and done nothing but perſecute, though the Goſpel abſolutely forbids it. One may be certain that if the Chriſtians of the Weſt had borne ſway in Aſia, in the room

Inceſt

Inceſt and Parricide, knew not how, (or to ſpeak more properly) had not the Spirit to attempt a thing (even when he had ſo juſtifiable and fair an occaſion) for which every body would have admired his courage, and extolled him to the ſkies: as he would have been the firſt that had ſhewn the Cardinals how little reſpect thoſe deſerved who lived and domineered like them, by an action of ſuch Eclat as would effectually have extinguiſhed all infamy, and ſecured him againſt any future danger.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Whence it came to paſs that the Romans were not ſo ungrateful as the Athenians to their Citizens.

WHoever reads the hiſtories of Republics will find in them all ſome degree of ingratitude to their Citizens; but leſs of it at Rome than at Athens, or perhaps in any other Commonwealth. The reaſon of this I take to be, that the Romans had not ſo much cauſe to be jealous of their Citizens as the Athenians. For at Rome no man ever invaded the liberty of others, from the expulſion of their Kings to the times of Marius and Sylla: ſo that there was no great occaſion for jealouſy or any apprehenſion of that kind; and conſequently all puniſhment was unneceſſary. But the caſe was far otherwiſe at Athens: for that State being deprived of its liberty by Piſiſtratus, when it was in its moſt flouriſhing condition, under a pretence of advancing it to a ſtill higher pitch; as ſoon as the Citizens recovered it, and began to reflect upon the bitterneſs of their ſufferings, whilſt they were ſubject to a tyrannical go-

of the Saracens and Turks, the leaſt traces of the Greek Church would not have been left at this day; and that they would not have tolerated Mahometaniſm, as the Infidels have tolerated Chriſtianity there. The Reader, if he pleaſes, may ſee much more to this purpoſe in the Note *AA*, under the word Mahomet I. in Bayle's Dictionary. But the compariſon is truly ſhocking.

vernment, they gave a full looſe to their revenge, and puniſhed not only the real crimes of their Citizens, but even the leaſt ſhadow or appearance of them; for which many excellent men were put to death, and many baniſhed; and from hence aroſe the cuſtom of Oſtraciſm *, and many other ſorts of rigorous puniſhments, which were inflicted from time to time upon the moſt conſiderable of their Subjects. Very juſt therefore is the obſervation of ſome writers upon government, that thoſe who have recovered their liberties, are always more rigid than others who have only preſerved them †.

* See the Notes upon the fourth Book of the Hiſtory of Florence.

† There are two Letters preſerved in Laertius, which ſhew the ſenſe the Athenians had of their Sufferings under Piſiſtratus; the firſt runs thus. "Epimenides to Solon.—Be of good comfort, my friend; for "if Piſiſtratus was Ruler of Athenians inured to ſervitude and void "of diſcipline, his Government perhaps might be perpetual. Thoſe "however that are now in ſubjection to him, are not men of baſe "minds, but ſuch as being mindful of Solon's inſtructions are aſham-"ed of their bondage, and will not bear his tyranny long. But "though Piſiſtratus ſhould make himſelf Maſter of the State, I hope, "it will not deſcend to his children: for it is hard for free perſons, "brought up under excellent Laws, to ſuffer bondage. As for you, "do not wander about, but haſten to me in Crete; where no Tyrant "will be troubleſome to you. If in travelling up and down, you "ſhould chance to meet with any of his friends, I fear, they will do "you a miſchief."—This ſeems to be in anſwer to the following Epiſtle to Epimenides.—"Solon to Epimenides.—Neither are my Laws "likely to be of any ſervice to the Athenians, nor have you advan-"taged the City by Luſtration. For Divine Rites and Law-givers "alone cannot benefit States; it is of great conſequence of what "mind thoſe are who lead the common people. Divine Rites and "Laws are profitable, if well directed: if ill, they are of no ſervice. "Neither are thoſe Laws which I gave in any better condition; thoſe "perſons who had the care of the Commonwealth not preventing "Piſiſtratus from making himſelf a Tyrant, and thereby mortally "wounding it, which they would not believe when I foretold it. The "Athenians choſe rather to give credit to his flatteries, than to me "who told them the truth. They ſaid I was mad. Laying down "my arms therefore before the Citadel, I declared that I was wiſer "than thoſe who could not ſee that Piſiſtratus was aiming at Ty-"ranny; and more reſolute than ſuch as durſt not aſſert the liberty "of their Country. At laſt I left my Country with this farewell. "O my Country! behold Solon ready to aſſiſt thee in word or deed. "But I am thought mad, it ſeems. I am forced therefore to abandon "thee, though I love all my Countrymen, but Piſiſtratus. Let them "be his friends, if they like it." "For you know, my Friend, by "what artifice he obtained the Government. He begun with flatter-"ing the common people: and then wounding himſelf, he came to

Theſe

These things then being duly considered, there will appear no great reason either to condemn the conduct of the Athenians in this point, or to applaud that of the Romans; since the former were necessitated to act as they did, by various exigencies and accidents which happened in their State. For whoever examines the matter to the bottom, may be convinced, that if the Romans had once been deprived of their liberties as the Athenians were, they would neither have been less jealous of them afterwards, nor more merciful in punishing their Citizens than the others: of which we may be assured from what happened after the expulsion of the Kings to Collatinus and P. Valerius; the former of whom (though he had been very active in asserting the liberties of his Country) was sent into exile upon no other account, but because he bore the name of Tarquin: and the latter very narrowly escaped the same punishment, only for having built a house upon Mount Cælius; from whence it was apprehended that he had some design upon the liberties of the Public. One may naturally conclude therefore, that if the Romans were so suspicious and severe in these two examples, they would have been as ungrateful to their Citizens as ever the Athenians were, had they been injured by them in like manner before their Empire was firmly established. But that we may have no occasion to return to this Subject hereafter, it shall be more thoroughly discussed in the next Chapter.

" Eliæa, pretending he had received those wounds from his Enemies, " and desired a guard of four hundred young men armed with hal- " berds; which they, paying no regard to my remonstrances, simply " granted him. After this he dissolved the popular Government. I " endeavoured to have rescued the poor people from mercenary servi- " tude; but they are now all slaves to Pisistratus." Laert. in vitâ Solonis.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether a Prince or a Commonwealth be generally the more ungrateful.

INgratitude uſually proceeds either from avarice or ſuſpicion: for when a Prince or a Republic ſends a General upon ſome important Expedition, and he executes it with great honour to himſelf, and reputation to thoſe that employed him, they certainly ought to reward him for it: but if, inſtead of doing that, they either caſhier or diſgrace him to ſave the expence of a reward, their ingratitude is inexcuſable, and will leave a ſtain behind it that can never be wiped out. Too many Princes however are guilty of this vice; for as Tacitus ſays, "Proclivius eſt injuriæ quam beneficio vicem exolvere; quia gratia oneri, ultio in quæſtu habetur." "Men are naturally more apt "to return an injury, than to requite a ſervice; becauſe revenge is ſweet, and ſometimes attended "with advantage; but it is thought troubleſome and "expenſive to diſcharge obligations *." But when

* Dion Caſſius, in giving a detail of Caligula's crimes, takes notice of his ingratitude to Macro and his wife Ennia, whom he had reduced to the hard neceſſity of diſpatching themſelves; though one of them had been his Miſtreſs, and it was owing to the other that he mounted the throne without any Collegue. He did not content himſelf with this, however, but baſely traduced Macro's character after he was dead, and even reproached his memory with crimes, the diſgrace of which reflected chiefly upon himſelf; for he declared that Macro had been his Pimp. As Macro, whilſt he was Miniſter to Tiberius, had more than once ſaved Caligula's life, he took upon him to give him his advice with much freedom, correcting the faults of an Emperor whom he had created, and inſtructing him in the Duties that would tend to his glory and reputation. But Caligula deſpiſed his precepts, and boaſted that he had no occaſion for ſuch a Tutor. In this manner Macro drew his hatred upon him to ſuch a degree, that he reſolved to get rid of him, and ſought only for a plauſible pretence, which at laſt he thought he had hit upon; accuſing him of ſaying every where, "Caligula is the work of my hands; he is my creature as "much as if I had begot him. It was owing to my intreaties that "the intended orders of Tiberius to put him to death were three dif-"ferent times prevented. It was owing to me that he ſucceeded alone

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ſuch a General is not rewarded; or (to ſpeak more properly) when he is diſgraced, not out of motives of avarice, but ſuſpicion, then his Maſter, whether a

" to the Government after the death of that Prince." Macro lived but a little while after this, and his whole family was extirpated at the ſame time.—There were three things then that concurred to Macro's ruin, any one of which was ſufficient to have effected it. He had ſaved Caligula's life, and procured him the Empire of the world; he boaſted of this, and took the liberty of reprehending his conduct. There are very few men in great power, that can love thoſe to whom they are too much obliged. " Beneficia eo uſque læta ſunt (ſays Ta-" citus, Annal. lib. IV. cap. xviii.) dum videntur exſolvi poſſe: ubi " multum antevenêre, pro gratiâ odium redditur." A ſaying which was applied to the cold reception Monſieur du Pleſſis Mornai met with from Henry IV. of France. See his Life, p 257. One ſeldom ſees that thoſe who have raiſed a private perſon to a throne long enjoy his good graces: they become hateful to him, either becauſe one has an averſion to men who think they have a right to demand every thing; or becauſe they boaſt too much of their good offices, and complain that they are not ſufficiently rewarded for them. But ſuch in general is the nature of mankind. Caligula therefore, one of the baſeſt and moſt vicious of all Princes, could not long bear with a Benefactor, who ſet forth the important ſervices he had done him in the ſtrongeſt light, and took the freedom of giving him advice as a Tutor. In the ſame manner Abdalla, ſurnamed Motaſeb Billah, who drove the Aglabites out of Africa, and placed one of the family of Ali, named Obeidallah, upon the throne, was ſerved by that Prince; for he ſoon after put him to death: and this act of royal ingratitude has ſometimes been practiſed in other Countries that boaſt of greater humanity than Africa. Thus Lord Stanley was requited by our Henry VII. The Duke of Buckingham by Richard III. The Earl of Warwick by Edward IV. and the Piercies by Henry IV. But it is ſometimes dearly paid for. " The Services which Kings cannot repay," ſays Father Orleans in his Revolutions of England, tom. II. p. 296, and the following; under the year 1464 " commonly make them ungrateful. A man who " has done a great deal for them, ſeems to have a right to aſk a great " deal: and whoever has a right to claim all, is troubleſome, even " when he demands nothing. Edward IV. was indebted to the Earl " of Warwick for his Crown: this was a ſervice beyond all requital; " and being attended alſo with many other great exploits, had gained " the Earl infinite reputation amongſt the people. The King in ſhort " grew jealous of him, and ſuſpecting his Subjects would compare " him with the Earl, in the ſame manner that Saul was compared with " David, began to be afraid, leſt they ſhould ſay in England, as for-" merly in Iſrael, " Saul has ſlain his thouſands, and David his ten " thouſands." This was the firſt cauſe of diſcontent, the Earl was not rewarded as he thought he deſerved, and he perceived the King looked upon him with a jealous eye; for it is impoſſible that a Prince who envies the glory of one of his Subjects, ſhould not diſoblige him ſeveral ways. The ſecond cauſe of diſguſt was, the Earl's being ſent Ambaſſador to negociate his Maſter's marriage with Bonne of Savoy, Siſter to the Queen of France. This marriage was agreed upon, and nothing more waited for but the return of an Ambaſſador, whom the

Prince or a Republic, is in ſome meaſure excuſable. Many inſtances, and reaſons alſo might be deduced from Hiſtory to evince the truth and neceſſity of this. For a General, who by his valour has extended his Maſter's dominions, exterminated his enemies, enriched his Soldiers, and acquired great glory himſelf, muſt neceſſarily conciliate the affections both of the army and his other fellow ſubjects in ſuch a manner, that his Services will be apt to excite jealouſy in the Prince that employed him: and ſince mankind are naturally ambitious as well as jealous, and apt to aſpire to ſtill greater power, it is almoſt impoſſible, when ſuch a General is become elated with his ſucceſſes, and his Prince has begun to grow ſuſpicious of him upon that account, that the jealouſy of the latter ſhould not be ſtill more enflamed either by ſome inſolent ſpeech or action in the former. The Prince therefore ſeems to

King of France had ſent to have the treaty ſigned by Edward, when it came to be known that the King of England had married a Knight's widow. "All that nation," ſays the above cited Author, "beheld "this match with the utmoſt indignation: but nobody was ſo much "chagrined at it as the Earl of Warwick, who made no doubt but "the King did it to expoſe and make him ridiculous to all Europe, by "ſending him to demand a great Princeſs, and afterwards marrying "a private Gentlewoman only. . . . . But King Edward's behaviour "to him, after his return to London, exaſperated him to the laſt de-"gree. He was in hopes, however, that his Majeſty would endeavour "to mitigate his vexation by good words, or ſome lame excuſe at leaſt: "but he was ſo far from making any Apology, that he treated him "with ſuch a degree of haughtineſs, that a man leſs ſtomachful than "the Earl could hardly have helped reſenting it: and to complete his "mortification, he heard that the King had attempted to debauch "his Niece, or, as others ſay, his Siſter; and would have taken a "Miſtreſs out of *his* family, whilſt he thought fit to take a wife out "of another." The Earl therefore, with a heart full of revenge, determined to reſtore Henry VI. to the throne, and ſucceeded in his deſign. Thus he ſported with the Crown; he deprived Henry VI. of it to give it to Edward; and then took it again from him to return it to Henry. He had credit enough to have raiſed himſelf to the throne, but he thought it more glorious to make Kings than to reign himſelf: for ſuch was the turn of his ambition, that it inclined him not to reign, but to govern thoſe that reigned.—This ſort of behaviour has been ſo common both in Princes and Subjects, that moſt Hiſtorians, as well as other Writers, take notice of it: from whom numberleſs examples might be quoted, if neceſſary. But Machiavel himſelf cites ſeveral in this Chapter. See alſo chap. III. of the Prince at the end: and the Note upon Franciſco Spinola, Hiſt. Flor. book V. not far from the beginning.

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be under a neceſſity of ſecuring himſelf againſt his General, either by putting him to death, or by taking away his command, or by leſſening the reputation and influence he has acquired in the army and amongſt his other countrymen, by induſtriouſly inſinuating that his ſucceſs was not owing to his valour or good conduct, but to accident, or the puſillanimity of the enemy, or the ſuperior abilities of his other officers.

When Veſpaſian was ſaluted Emperor by the forces which he commanded in Judea, Antonius Primus being at the head of an army in Illyria, declared for him there alſo, and marching into Italy againſt Vitellius who then was the reigning Emperor, he defeated him twice, and got poſſeſſion of Rome: ſo that Mucian, who had been ſent by Veſpaſian for the ſame purpoſe, found every thing ſettled, and all difficulties already ſurmounted by the expedition and valour of Antonius. But obſerve how Antonius was rewarded for his pains: in the firſt place, Mucian deprived him of all command in the army, and reduced him by degrees to live in a very private condition, without the leaſt power or authority of any kind at Rome: upon which, he went to make his complaints to Veſpaſian, who was at that time in Aſia, from whom he met with ſo cold a reception, that he ſoon after died in obſcurity and deſpair.—Many other examples might be cited from Hiſtory. Every one muſt remember, (as it happened in our own times) that Conſalvo of Cordova, the King of Arragon's General in the Kingdom of Naples, entirely drove the French out of that Country, and reduced it into ſubjection to his Maſter Ferdinand, with great glory to himſelf at the ſame time: in recompence for which, Ferdinand upon his arrival at Naples, firſt turned him out of the government of the ſtrong places which he held for him there, and then deprived him of his command in the army; after which, he took him back with him into Spain, where he ended his days in diſgrace.

Theſe jealouſies therefore are ſo naturally incident to Princes, that they cannot be prevented; nor it is

poſſible for them to be grateful to thoſe that have done them the moſt important Services. And if this be the caſe with Princes, it ought not to ſeem ſtrange that it is the ſame with Commonwealths: for all free governments having two principal ends, one of which is to enlarge their dominions, and the other to preſerve their liberties, they will neceſſarily fall into exceſs by too rigid an obſervation of the Maxims they have eſtabliſhed for the accompliſhment of either of thoſe ends. The errors and inconveniencies that attend making new acquiſitions ſhall be ſpoken of elſewhere: but amongſt others that reſult from being too jealous of their liberties, we may chiefly reckon the diſguſting ſuch Citizens as ought to be rewarded, and the ſuſpecting thoſe in whom they ought to put the moſt confidence. Now tho' theſe things occaſion great evils in a Commonwealth that is become corrupt, and often produce Tyranny at laſt, as it happened to Rome in the time of Julius Cæſar, who took that by force, which the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens had refuſed to give him; yet they are of a great advantage in a State that is not yet corrupted, as they conduce to the preſervation of its liberties, by keeping ambitious and enterprizing men in awe through the fear of puniſhment.

To the reaſons already aſſigned therefore, it was owing that no people ever ſhewed themſelves leſs ungrateful to their Citizens than the Romans did: nay it may truly be ſaid, that they never behaved with ingratitude to any one but Scipio. For as to Coriolanus and Camillus *, they were baniſhed for the in-

* Coriolanus was baniſhed for propoſing to humble the Plebeians by famine. See chap. vii. and Camillus for behaving himſelf with too much pride, in the Triumph which was granted him after he had taken Veii; and for dividing the Spoil amongſt the Soldiery only, without giving the people any ſhare of it. His triumphal Car was drawn by four white horſes. Upon which Plutarch obſerves, that no General ever triumphed in that manner either before or after him, and that the people thought ſuch a Chariot was too magnificent and glorious for any one but a God. "Τα τε αλλα σοβαρως εθριαμβευσε και τετριππον υποζευξαμενος λευκοπωλων επεβη, και διεξηλασε της Ρωμης, ουδενος τουτο ποιησαντος προτερον ουδ' υστερον: ιερον γαρ ηγενται το τοιουτον οχημα τω Βασιλει και παρα των Θεων επι φρισμενον." In vitâ Camilli. He triumphed four juries

juries they reſpectively had done to the people; and though indeed one of them continued in perpetual

times, was five times Dictator, and honoured with the title of the "Second Founder of Rome:" in a word, he acquired all the honour a man can gain in his own Country. During his Cenſorſhip, he found means to make all the ſingle men in Rome marry the widows of thoſe that had been killed in war; and had the glory of putting an end to the war with the Veientes, the ancient Rivals of Rome, See chap. xiii. But as he prevented many of the Roman Citizens from going to ſettle at Veii afterwards, they were ſo provoked at it, that they took an opportunity of revenging themſelves upon him. He had made a vow to give the tenth part of the ſpoils of that City to Apollo, but forgot to do it: upon which, the Senate being informed by the Auruſpices, that the Gods were offended, ordered every Soldier to reſtore the tenth of his ſpoil. This exaſperated the people ſtill more againſt him. Soon after, a war broke out with the Faliſci, in the courſe of which, he generouſly ſent back the children to their parents, whom a Schoolmaſter in one of the towns he beſieged, had perfidiouſly delivered up to him; which had ſuch an effect upon them, that they voluntarily ſubmitted to the Romans. See chap. xx. book III. of theſe Diſcourſes. But this depriving the people of the booty they expected there, gave them a freſh handle to exclaim againſt him: ſo that loſing all patience, Lucius Apuleius, one of the Tribunes, proſecuted him to make him give an account of the Spoil taken at Veii; in conſequence of which, he was condemned to pay a heavy fine, and afterwards voluntarily baniſhed himſelf to Veii. During this baniſhment, he performed the moſt noble action of his life; for inſtead of rejoicing at the ſacking of Rome by the Gauls, (See chap. viii. of this book) and of joining them to be revenged on his Country, he exerted all his wiſdom and courage to drive the Enemy away, and yet obſerved the Laws of Rome with the utmoſt ſtrictneſs, in refuſing to accept the command which ſeveral private people offered him. See Valerius Maximus, lib. IV. cap. i. He waited for the orders of the people, who were repreſented by the few inhabitants of Rome that ſtill held out in the Capitol. But before this he had raiſed troops at Ardea, where he then was, and gained ſome advantages over the Enemy. The Romans therefore that were beſieged in the Capitol appointed him Dictator; in which poſt he acted with ſo much bravery and conduct, that he drove the Gauls entirely out of the Roman territories. This important ſervice however, with ſeveral other victories which he afterwards got, could not ſecure him againſt the rage and envy of the Tribunes, for even whilſt he was Dictator, they ſent a common Officer to ſummon him, who had the audaciouſneſs to lay hands upon him. He appeared before the people attended by the whole Senate; and, as the affair was determined to the ſatisfaction of the people, was conducted back again to his houſe with the higheſt acclamations. What Lucan ſays of this great man, when in baniſhment, is highly in his honour, viz. "that wherever Camillus dwelt, there was Rome;" the Poet's own words expreſs it much ſtronger,

Tarpeiâ ſede peruſtâ
Gallorum facibus, Veioſque habitante Camillo;
Illic Roma fuit. Pharſal. lib. V. xxvii.
When Gallic flames the burning City felt,
At Veii Rome with her Camillus dwelt. Rowe.

exile,

exile, becauſe he ſtill perſiſted obſtinate in his prejudice againſt the people; yet the other was not only recalled, but honoured like a Prince as long as he lived. But the ingratitude that was ſhewn to Scipio was owing to ſuch a degree of jealouſy as they had never entertained of any citizen before: and this aroſe from a conſideration of the powerfulneſs of the enemy he had conquered; the reputation he had acquired by bringing a long and dangerous war to ſo ſpeedy and ſucceſsful a concluſion, after he was appointed Commander in chief of their armies; the favour which his youth, his prudence, and other admirable accompliſhments had gained him in the eyes of the people; all which made him ſo popular that the Magiſtrates began to dread his authority, a circumſtance that was as galling to the graver ſort, as it was new and unuſual to the whole City *. Indeed it appeared ſo extraordinary to Cato the Elder, a man of ſevere and inflexible virtue, that he made a formal complaint of it, and ſaid, that a State could not be

* Livy in the 26th book of his Hiſtory, cap. xix. gives us a fine account of the means by which Scipio made himſelf ſo popular. "Fuit "enim Scipio, non veris tantum virtutibus mirabilis, ſed arte quoque "quâdam ab juventâ in oſtentationem earum compoſitus: pleraque "apud multitudinem, aut per nocturnas viſa ſpecies, aut velut divi- "nitus, mente monita, agens: ſive et ipſe capti quâdam ſuperſtitione "animi, ſive ut imperia conciliaque velut ſorte oraculi miſſa, ſine "cunctatione aſſequeretur. Ad hoc jam inde ab initio præparans "animos, ex quo togam virilem ſumpſit, nullo die prius ullam pub- "licam privatamve rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingreſſuſque "ædem conſideret: & plerumque tempus ſolus in ſecreto ibi tereret. "Hic mos, qui per omnem vitam ſervabatur, ſeu conſulto, ſeu te- "mere vulgatæ opinioni fidem apud quoſdam fecit, ſtirpis eum divi- "næ virum eſſe; retulitque famam, in Alexandro magno prius vul- "gatam, & vanitate & fabulâ parem, anguis immanis concubitu con- "ceptum, & in cubiculo matris ejus perſæpe viſam prodigii ejus Spe- "ciem, interventuque hominum evolutam repente, atque ex occulis "elapſam. His miraculis nunquam ab ipſo eluſa fides eſt, quin po- "tius aucta arte quâdam, nec abnuendi tale quicquam, nec palam "affirmandi. Multa alia ejuſdem generis, alia vera, alia aſſimulata, "admirationes humanæ in eo juvene exceſſerant modum: quibus "freta tunc civitas, ætati haudquaquam maturæ tantam molem rerum, "tantumque imperium permiſit." It might be obſerved here by the bye, that there are conſiderable families in Europe, which pretend to be deſcended from the intercourſe of a woman with ſome ſpirit. Marſhal de Baſſompiere relates it of the founder of his family. See his Memoirs.

called

called free where the Magiſtrates ſtood in awe of any particular Citizen: ſo that if the people of Rome inclined to Cato's opinion in this caſe, they may in ſome meaſure be juſtified in a thing that ſo nearly concerned their liberties, as I ſaid before of Princes and Commonwealths that are forced to be ungrateful through motives of Suſpicion. To conclude this diſcourſe, I ſay, that ingratitude being occaſioned either by avarice or jealouſy, Commonwealths are hardly ever influenced by the former, and much ſeldomer than Princes by the latter, as they have leſs occaſion; which ſhall be ſhewn in its proper place.

CHAP. XXX.

What means a Prince or a Commonwealth ought to take in order to avoid the imputation of Ingratitude; and how a General or other Citizen muſt act to ſecure himſelf againſt the Effects of it.

A Prince who would avoid the neceſſity either of living in continual jealouſy, or of being ungrateful, ought to go in perſon with his forces upon every expedition, as the firſt Roman Emperors uſed to do; as the Grand Turk does at preſent, and as all brave Princes always have done*. For if they ſucceed,

* "If any one ſhould offer to maintain," ſays a French Author "that "it si better for a Prince to carry on wars by others than in his own "perſon, Fortune will furniſh him with examples enow of thoſe whoſe "Lieutenants have brought great enterprizes to a happy iſſue, and of "thoſe alſo whoſe preſence hath done more hurt than good. But no "virtuous and valiant Prince can bear to be tutored with ſuch ſcanda-"lous leſſons, under the colour of ſaving his head, like the Statue of "a Saint, for the happineſs of his Kingdom, they degrade him from "and make him incapable of his Office, which is military throughout. "I know one who had much rather be beaten, than ſleep whilſt an-"other fights for him; and who never heard of any brave thing done, "even by his own Officers, in his abſence, without envy. Selim the "firſt ſaid, with very good reaſon, in my opinion, "that victories ob-"tained without the Sovereign's preſence were never complete." "Much more readily would he have ſaid, that a Sovereign ought to "bluſh for ſhame, who pretended to any ſhare in one, when he had "contributed nothing to it but his voice and thought; nor even ſo

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the honour and advantage of the conqueſt redound ſolely to themſelves: but if they ſtay at home, another reaps the glory and they begin to apprehend they ſhall not be able to maintain their acquiſitions, except they either eclipſe or totally extinguiſh that fame of their Generals, which they could not acquire themſelves; and this forces them into injuſtice and ingratitude, though without doubt much more to their own prejudice than advantage*. However in this caſe, if they are either ſo imprudent, or ſo indolent, or puſilanimous, as to ſtay ingloriouſly at home, and be content with ſending out a Subſtitute, they themſelves muſt needs know what they have to do afterwards, as well as I can tell them. But I will venture to ſay, that if the General finds he cannot otherwiſe eſcape the effects of jealouſy and ingratitude, he muſt

" much as thoſe, conſidering that in ſuch works as that, the direction " and command that deſerve honour are only ſuch as are given upon " the place, and in the heat of action. The Princes of the Ottoman " family (the chief in the world for military fortune) have always " warmly embraced this opinion. Bajazet the ſecond, and his Son, " who ſwerved from it, ſpending their time in Sciences and other em- " ployments within doors, gave great blows to their Empire: and A- " murath the third, following their example, did the ſame. Edward " the third of England ſaid of our Charles the fifth, " There never " was any King who ſo ſeldom put on his armour, that had cut him " out ſo much work." Indeed he might well think it ſtrange, as it " was the effect of chance more than of reaſon. Is it not abſurd to " reckon the Kings of Caſtile and Portugal amongſt warlike and mag- " nanimous Conquerors, becauſe at the diſtance of twelve hundred " leagues from the place where they reſided in idleneſs and eaſe, they " made themſelves maſters of both the Indies, by the conduct of their " Agents; which too, they never had the courage ſo much as to viſit " themſelves." Mr. Bayle ſays, in his Hiſtorical Diſcourſe upon the Life of Guſtavus Adolphus, " That though the conqueſts of a warlike " Prince are frequently of no ſervice to his Subjects, and perhaps it " might be full as well for them, if their Monarch was contented " with the dominions left him by his Predeceſſors; yet they are ſtruck " with I know not what admiration, blended with love for one whoſe " name is renowned throughout the whole world. The Te Deum, " when ſung frequently, and bonfires made for the taking of Cities, " or for Battles won, incline them to furniſh ſubſidies for the conti- " nuation of a war with greater chearfulneſs." Of the truth of this, the year 1761 may afford a memorable example in our own country, when the Supplies granted by Parliament amounted to almoſt nineteen Millions.

* Cecil, Prime Miniſter to Queen Elizabeth, uſed to ſay, " That " nothing could be for the advantage of a Prince, which any way " made againſt his reputation."

have

have recourſe to one or other of theſe two expedients; that is, he muſt either voluntarily quit the command of the army as ſoon as the expedition is over, and not only reſign it into his Maſter's hands, before it is demanded of him, but take great care not to diſcover any ſigns of inſolence or ambition: that ſo when their is no manner of reaſon given for ſuſpicion, he may be duly rewarded, at leaſt not diſgraced, for his Services. But if he cannot ſubmit to this, he muſt take a very different courſe, and boldly reſolve to ſet up for himſelf; for which purpoſe, he muſt endeavour by all means to make it generally believed, that the merit of the late acquiſition is wholly due to him, and that his Maſter had not the leaſt ſhare in it; he muſt ſpare no pains to ingratiate himſelf with the Soldiery, and his other fellow Subjects; to contract Alliances with his neighbours, to ſeize upon fortreſſes, to corrupt the principal Officers in the army, to ſecure thoſe, ſome other way, whom he cannot corrupt; and by theſe means effectually to guard himſelf from the ingratitude of his Maſter. Beſides theſe, there is no other remedy that I know. But ſince very few men can prevail upon themſelves to be either perfectly good or thoroughly wicked, as I ſaid before, and it almoſt always happens that a General is loath to quit his command after a ſucceſsful campaign, they ſeldom either know how to keep their ambition within due bounds, or to have recourſe to extremities, even when they ſeem to have ſomething great and honourable in them: ſo that while they ſtand in ſuſpence and halting betwixt two reſolutions they are commonly ruined.

A Republic indeed that would avoid the ſcandal of ingratitude, has it not in its power to avail itſelf of the ſame remedy that a Prince may do; for not being able to conduct its armies in perſon, that command muſt neceſſarily be delegated to ſome of its Citizens. The beſt way, therefore, in my opinion, for a commonwealth to avoid ingratitude as much as poſſible, would be to follow the example of the Romans, who perhaps had leſs of it than any other peo-

ple. This was owing to the conſtitution of their Government; for as all ſorts of people, both noble and ignoble, were employed in their wars without diſtinction, ſo many brave and virtuous men, and ſuch a number of illuſtrious Generals aroſe in every age, that the State had no occaſion to be afraid of any one of them, when there were others enow of equal abilities to check and oppoſe him. Hence it came to paſs that every man diſcharged his duty with the utmoſt integrity, carefully avoiding any ſtep that might ſavour of Ambition, and give the people the leaſt offence or reaſon to puniſh them as deſigning and aſpiring men; nay, when any one was created Dictator, he piqued himſelf upon laying down his authority again, as ſoon as ever the neceſſity of affairs could poſſibly admit of it. Such a manner of proceeding, preventing all ſuſpicion, likewiſe prevented ingratitude; ſo that a Republic, that would avoid the imputation of being ungrateful, ſhould conduct itſelf like that of Rome; and the perſon who would guard againſt the effects of it, ought to imitate the behaviour of the Roman Citizens*.

* The Romans made a great difference betwixt thoſe Generals, who only gained victories, and others that put an end to a war. Thoſe that entered the City in triumph with the effigies of ſeveral Provinces or Cities which they had conquered, were much more honoured than thoſe, who could only boaſt they had killed a great many men. They ſeldom continued their Generals above two or three years in Commiſſion; but almoſt every year ſent a new Conſul to relieve the Conſul of the foregoing year: ſo that the General did all that lay in his power to put an end to the war, leſt his ſucceſſor ſhould have the honour of finiſhing what he had begun; they all aimed at the glory debellandi. But when a General is certain that he ſhall command the army till the end of the war, he is not always diſpoſed to haſten it; he puts off the peace as long as he can, and regulates his conduct according to the old maxim, "Make a golden bridge for a vanquiſhed enemy:" it is his private intereſt to give them an opportunity of retrieving their affairs, and continuing the war a great while longer. This is the reaſon why battles are ſeldom deciſive. The General of the victorious army being afraid of a peace, will not reduce the enemy to a neceſſity of ſuing for it: according to the practice of the Italian Condottieri or hired Commanders, ſo often mentioned in the Hiſtory of Florence. A Prince, on the contrary, who commands his own forces in perſon, makes the beſt advantage of his victories, in order to bring the war to a concluſion the ſooner; as peace in general muſt be more for his intereſt, and that of his Subjects: but a general, who protracts a war, only ſerves himſelf, and does little or no good to others, except ſuch as deal in crape and black cloth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

That the Romans never punished their Generals with any extraordinary degree of Severity, when they had been faulty; not even when the Commonwealth had suffered, either through their ignorance or misbehaviour.

THE Roman Republic was not only less ungrateful than any other, as I have said before, but also more gentle and merciful in punishing its Generals when they had offended: for if their offence proceeded from wilfulness or malice, even in that case, their chastisements were mild and moderate; but if from ignorance or error, instead of punishing, they often rewarded them. This, however, was very well judged: for they thought it of such importance, that those, who commanded their armies, should have their minds free and disengaged from all other concerns, in forming their designs and taking their resolutions, that they never clogged an enterprize, which was difficult and dangerous of itself, with additional apprehensions and incumbrances, lest they should be discouraged from acting with sufficient spirit and vigour. When they sent an army against an enemy, they imagined the Commander in chief had weight enough already upon his mind, considering the cares, perplexities, and embarrassments, that always attend such expeditions, which must be necessarily very great. Now, if besides these discouragements, weighty as they are, their Generals had been disheartened by the examples of several, who had either been crucified, or put to some other cruel death, after they had lost a battle, it would have been impossible, that such Commanders, amidst so many cares and apprehensions, should ever exert themselves properly, or attempt any thing great and noble. So that the ignominy of having failed in any enterprize being a sufficient punishment in their opinion, they did not care to add to it, lest it should appear

appear too heavy, and deter them from engaging in it at all.

Let us ſhew in the firſt place, how an offence was puniſhed, that proceeded not from error or ignorance, but from wilful and deliberate perverſeneſs. The two Conſuls, Sergius and Virginius, had laid ſiege to Veii: the former was poſted, with part of the Roman army, on that ſide of the town, where they expected to be annoyed by the Tuſcans; and the latter, with the reſt on the other ſide. Sergius, accordingly being attacked by the Faliſci, and other people of Tuſcany, choſe rather to be defeated, than to aſk for any aſſiſtance from his Collegue; whilſt Virginius, on the other hand, expecting his ſtomach would come down at laſt, waited ſo long before he ſent him any ſuccour, that thoſe forces were utterly routed, to the great diſgrace of his Country *. A bad example indeed, and not only worthy of all reprehenſion, but ſufficient to give us a very unfavourable impreſſion of the Roman Government, if both thoſe Commanders had not been puniſhed. Nevertheleſs, though any other people would have put them to death, the Romans contented themſelves with inflicting only a pecuniary fine upon them: not becauſe their offence did not deſerve a ſeverer puniſhment, but becauſe the Romans were unwilling, even in this caſe, to deviate from their antient cuſtoms, for the reaſons which have been already aſſigned. As to excuſing errors or faults that proceeded from want of judgment, we have a remarkable inſtance, in the caſe of Terentius Varro, by whoſe temerity the Romans were ſo totally routed at the battle of Cannæ, that their liberties were in the utmoſt danger. However, as this was owing to raſhneſs and imprudence alone, they were ſo far from puniſhing him, that they ſhewed him great honour: for at his return to the City, the whole Senate went out to meet him in their formalities; and, not having it in their power to congratulate him upon a victory,

* Upon this occaſion, it is not poſſible to forget the conduct of the Admirals Matthews and Leſtock in the Mediterranean, at the beginning of the late French war.

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they thanked him for his return to Rome, and that he had not abandoned them out of deſpair, "quod de "ſalute Reipublicæ non deſperaſſet." When Papirius Curſor, the Dictator, would have had Fabius put to death, becauſe he had engaged the Samnites contrary to orders, the chief reaſon which the Father of Fabius urged againſt the Sentence, was, that the Roman people had never proceeded with ſo much rigour even againſt any of their Commanders who had loſt a battle, as Papirius then would have them do, againſt one that had gained a victory.

CHAP. XXXII.

That a Prince or Commonwealth ought not to defer their beneficence till it is extorted from them by neceſſity.

ALTHOUGH the Romans found their account in being liberal to the people in time of danger, and when Porſenna invaded them in favour of the Tarquins, The Senate (apprehending the commonalty would rather chuſe to have Kingly Government reſtored, than undergo the burden of a war) thought proper to remit all their taxes, in order to keep them firm and ſteady to the new eſtabliſhment; and declared at the ſame time that "the poorer ſort of "people contributed ſufficiently to the good of the "public, by getting children and bringing them up;" (all which was done to make them more chearfully ſubmit to the hardſhips of a Siege) yet, I would not adviſe any other Republic or Prince to truſt ſo far in this example, as to neglect or defer proper means to ingratiate themſelves with the people, till they actually fall into diſtreſs and adverſity. If they do, they muſt not expect to ſucceed as the Romans did: for then the multitude will not think themſelves ſo much obliged to them as to the enemy for this ſudden guſt of beneficence, and will be apt to conclude, that as ſoon as the danger is over, they will take that away again, which they had been forced to give them.

But if the Romans ſucceeded in acting thus, it was becauſe their Government, being a new one, was hardly ſettled at that time, and the people had already ſeen ſeveral laws made in their favour, particularly that which allowed of appeals to them in judiciary matters: ſo that they were eaſily perſuaded, that the laſt indulgence, which was ſhewn them, proceeded rather from the affection of the Senate, than the fear of the enemy; beſides, the remembrance of the injuries and oppreſſions, they had ſuffered under a regal government, was ſtill freſh upon their minds. But as caſes of this nature ſeldom occur, it will likewiſe very rarely happen, that the ſame remedies will have the ſame effect: upon which account, every Commonwealth and Prince ought well to conſider before any exigency compels them to it, what perſons they may beſt avail themſelves of in times of diſtreſs; and afterwards treat them in ſuch a manner, as they muſt otherwiſe be obliged to do, in caſe of neceſſity. Whoever does not purſue this method, whether he be a Governor of a Commonwealth or a Prince, but eſpecially if the latter, and thinks it time enough to court the people, when the ſtorm is ready to break upon him, will find himſelf deceived, and that ſuch a conduct inſtead of doing him any ſervice, will only ſerve to accelerate his ruin *.

* This was the caſe of our King James II. who did himſelf more harm by ſoothing and careſſing his Subjects, and annulling every thing he had done before to their prejudice, when the Prince of Orange was upon the point of invading his dominions and he ſtood in need of their aſſiſtance, than if he had continued firm to his former meaſures; for by ſo doing, he might at leaſt have ſpared himſelf the mortification of making ſo publick and authentic a confeſſion of what was laid to his charge. Beſides, this piece of meanneſs only ſerved to encourage his Enemies the more in the proſecution of their enterprize.

"A certain Perſian King (ſays the Editor of Guliſtan, or Roſarium Politicum) having grievouſly oppreſſed his people, many wealthy and trading men amongſt them withdrew themſelves and their effects into foreign Countries, as the only method to ſecure their liberties and properties; ſoon after this, a war breaking out, the Prince finds his Kingdom deſerted by its inhabitants, his Revenues ſunk to nothing, his Exchequer empty, and no way left to raiſe the ſupplies neceſſary to oppoſe the Enemy, but a military force, which encreaſes the miſchief. For ſays he, in Perſian verſe,

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

That when an evil or inconvenience is arrived at such a height, either at home or abroad, as to become dangerous, it is better for a State to temporize and give way to it, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.

WHEN the Romans had so well established themselves, that their power, reputation, and dominion encreased every day, their neighbours, who

The Prince who desires to have necessary supplies in time of war,
Should govern his people mildly and gently in time of peace.
For even Slaves, though bound with golden chains, will abhor a tyrant:
If you would have Men serve you freely, treat them like free men.

It happened about this time, that a piece of History out of the Treasury of Princes, a celebrated Persian book, was read to the same King, viz, how Suhac, one of the most powerful Princes in the East, was deposed from his Kingdom; and Feridun, a private man, advanced in his room. Upon which, the King asked one of his Courtiers (and as it happened an honest one too) who stood near him, "How this "Feridun, who had neither arms, nor treasure, nor followers, could "possibly obtain the Kingdom? Just as your Majesty hath heard from "the History, answered the Courtier; the people esteeming him for "his liberality and justice, flocked to him from all parts, and exalted "him to the throne with unanimity and resolution. Seeing therefore, "continued he, that the affection of the people is the best security of "the Prince, how could your Majesty, by listening to evil Counsellors, "take so much pains to render your Subjects disaffected, except you "was grown weary of your Kingdom? For since Kings are known to "reign by the favour of the people, they ought to value their favour "as much as their Crown." The King then asking by what means he might gain the love of his subjects; "Ah, Sir (replied the other) "every King that would depend upon their free Assistance in time of "need, should govern them with justice, benevolence, and clemency, "before he has occasion for their help: so that they may think them-"selves secure at all times of being protected in their liberties and "properties under his Government: for an oppressive Prince can no "more be said to be a King, than a Wolf that attends a flock of sheep "can be termed a Shepherd; and that King who injures his Subjects "under the colour of Law, destroys the Fundamentals of his own "Government." The King enraged at his honest freedom, ordered the Courtier to be thrown into prison: but in a short time after the whole Kingdom rebelling, those that had fled their country returned, and added a weight to the defection; and the agents of his oppression, and even the King's own creatures, joining in the revolt concurred to ruin him. For, says the same author,

If a King will do what is unjust, though under the sanction of laws,
Even the instruments of his oppression will become his enemies in the day of trouble.

had paid no attention to them before, began to be aware what a thorn this new Republic was like to prove in their ſides, when it was too late to correct their error; but reſolving to apply ſome new remedy to an evil which they ſhould have taken care to prevent, no leſs than forty little States entered into a confederacy againſt them. The Romans, therefore, amongſt other expedients, which they generally had recourſe to in times of imminent danger, thought fit to create a Dictator; that is, they committed the whole power of the State to one perſon alone, who was to form ſuch reſolutions as he judged moſt proper for the public ſafety, without conſulting any one, or being ſubject to the leaſt controul in the execution of them. This expedient was of ſignal advantage, and not only enabled them to extricate themſelves out of very great difficulties and dangers at that time, but afterwards proved of admirable ſervice in all the various accidents and diſaſters that befel that Commonwealth, before it arrived at its higheſt pitch of grandeur.

From hence, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew in the firſt place, that when any evil or inconvenience threatens a State, either at home or from abroad (whether owing to interior or exterior cauſes) and is got to ſuch a head, that every one begins to be alarmed at it, without doubt, it is much better to temporize and give way to it, than to offer to eradicate it: for it generally happens, that thoſe who endeavour to extinguiſh it, ſtill add to its ſtrength and malignity, and immediately pull down that ruin upon their own heads, which they only apprehended before. Now theſe cala-

Therefore, let Princes make friends of their Subjects in peaceful times;
That ſo they may ſecure them againſt their enemies in time of war:
For even the meaneſt wretch will fight boldly for a juſt and good King."

The ſame author, in many other parts of his work endeavours to excite noble ideas of generoſity in his readers. See the pages 233, 435 to 445, and 586, 587. He much applauds the following inſcription upon the monument of Bihram Cour, a King of Perſia, "A liberal hand is better than a ſtrong arm;" importing that the authority of Princes is better ſupported by bounty and munificence, that by a violent exertion of power, and force of arms.

mities

mities are more frequently occaſioned in a Republic, by interior than exterior cauſes; as when any Citizen aſſumes a greater degree of power and authority than he ought to do, as it often happens; or when ſome law, on which the very life and ſoul of its liberty depended, is either abrogated or neglected, and the evil has been ſuffered to grow ſo predominant, that it is become more dangerous to attempt a remedy, than to let it take its courſe: for it is difficult to diſcover thoſe inconveniencies in their original, becauſe mankind are naturally apt to favour the beginning of things, eſpecially of ſuch as ſeem to have ſome ſort of greatneſs or merit in them, and are patronized by young men. So that if any young man of a noble family, and extraordinary virtue, happens to ſpring up in a Commonwealth, the eyes of the whole City are ſoon turned upon him, every one vying with another in ſhewing him ſuch extravagant honours, that if he has any ſpark of ambition or vain glory in him, his natural endowments, added to the favour of the people, may ſoon ſtrengthen his hands ſo effectually, that when his fellow-citizens are ſenſible of their error, they will hardly find any remedy, but ſuch as will tend only to augment and eſtabliſh his power the ſooner. Many examples might be adduced to ſupport this; but I ſhall content myſelf with one which happened in our own City.

Coſimo d' Medici, from whom the houſe of Medici in Florence originally derive their grandeur, arrived at ſuch a degree of power, by the reputation of his wiſdom and the favour of a blind multitude, that the Republic began to be afraid of him; and the Magiſtrates thought it would be very dangerous to meddle with him, and ſtill more ſo to let him alone. But Niccolò da Uzzano, who was reckoned a man of conſummate experience in State-affairs at that time, perceiving the error his fellow-citizens had been guilty of, and the dangerous conſequences that muſt of neceſſity happen, from ſuffering Coſimo to grow ſo popular, prevented them from incurring further diffi-

culties whilſt he lived, and never would permit them to uſe any means to depreſs him, becauſe he knew ſuch an attempt would end in the ruin of the State, as indeed it did after Uzzano's death. For thoſe that ſurvived him, not following his advice, began to enter into combinations againſt Coſimo, and at laſt prevailed ſo far, that they drove him out of Florence, to the great vexation of his party; who likewiſe prevailing in their turn, ſoon after recalled him, and made him head of the Commonwealth; to which dignity he never could have attained, if it had not been for ſo violent an oppoſition from his enemies *. The ſame happened at Rome in the caſe of Julius Cæſar, whoſe great virtues and excellent qualifications recommended him in ſuch a manner to the favour of Pompey, and his other fellow-citizens, that by degrees he became ſo powerful and formidable, that they no longer loved, but feared him, as Cicero tells us, who ſays, "It was too late when Pompey began to be "afraid of Cæſar." Theſe apprehenſions put them upon ſeeking means to rid themſelves of him; but the remedy proved worſe than the diſeaſe, and only haſtened the ruin of that Commonwealth.

I ſay then, that ſince it is difficult to diſcover theſe evils in their beginning (becauſe men are liable to be ſeduced by favour and flattering appearances at firſt); it is wiſer to temporize and ſubmit when they are clearly diſcerned, than to oppoſe them by force: for in the former caſe, perhaps they may entirely paſs away of themſelves, or at leaſt be averted for ſome time †,

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book IV. towards the end.

† "Experience has taught me (ſays Montaigne, Part III. Chap. xiii. "of his Eſſays) that Evils have their proper limits and duration, and "that we often ruin ourſelves by impatience. Whoever endeavours "to cut them ſhort by force in the middle of their courſe, does but "lengthen and multiply them, and enflames inſtead of appeaſing "them. I am of Crantor's opinion, that we ought neither obſtinately "and wilfully to oppoſe evils, nor truckle to them for want of cou-"rage; but that we are naturally to give way to them according to "their circumſtances and our own: I find they ſtay leſs with me who "let them alone, and have loſt thoſe which are reputed the moſt ob-"ſtinate and tenacious. To kick againſt Neceſſity, is like the folly of "Teſiphon, who undertook to kick with his mule."

and

and in the latter, men ought to be very cautious and circumſpect, leſt whilſt they are endeavouring to eradicate an inveterate evil by violent meaſures, they ſhould ſtill add to its virulence, and either cruſh themſelves by attempting to pull down another, or drown the plant by over-watering it. They ſhould well conſider the nature of the malady, and if they find themſelves able to work a cure, let them ſet about it immediately without any ceremony; if not, they had better give the matter up and ſit ſtill, leſt it ſhould happen to them as it did to the little Princes abovementioned, that confederated againſt Rome, who would have acted more prudently in endeavouring to make that Commonwealth their friend, and to have kept upon fair terms with it, after it had ſo well eſtabliſhed itſelf, than in provoking it by hoſtilities to think of new inſtitutions, and making freſh proviſions both of offence and defence. For this confederacy not only ſerved to keep the Romans united, and conſequently to ſtrengthen them ſtill more, but put them upon creating other officers, and trying new expedients, by which they ſoon extended their power to a very great degree. Accordingly, amongſt other Inſtitutions, was that of a Dictator, to which it was owing, that they not only then, but afterwards ſurmounted many imminent difficulties and dangers, and prevented numberleſs evils which otherwiſe muſt have befallen that Commonwealth.

CHAP. XXXIV.

That the Authority of a Dictator was always of ſervice to the Roman Commonwealth, inſtead of any prejudice: and that the power which is uſurped by any Citizen, not that which is conferred by the free ſuffrages of the people, is pernicious to liberty.

THE inſtitution of the Dictatorial authority at Rome has been condemned by ſome writers, as a thing that chiefly contributed to the eſtabliſhment

of Tyranny. They alledge that Julius Cæsar, the first Tyrant that ever was in that Republic, set himself up under the title of Dictator, and that without it he never could have put any tolerable face upon his usurpation.

Those however, who assert this, seem not to have examined the matter to the bottom, and therefore their opinion ought to have but little weight. For neither the name nor the power of Dictator was the cause of Rome being enslaved, but the authority which was assumed by those that afterwards made the office perpetual: so that if there had been no such Title, Cæsar would certainly have taken some other, that would have served his purpose as well; because where a man has the power in his own hands, he may assume any Title he pleases; but it is not the Title that gives him the power. We see accordingly, that whilst the Dictatorship was disposed of by the suffrages of the people, agreeable to its first institution, and not seized upon by private violence, it was always of great service to the State; for, those magistrates who force themselves into office, and that authority which is illegally obtained, are prejudicial to a Commonwealth, not those that are called to it in the lawful and ordinary course of Government: and we may observe, that no Dictator, who had been duly appointed, ever did the Roman Republic any prejudice during so long a period; but, on the contrary, much service. The reasons of this are very evident. For many circumstances, which would not be suffered in an uncorrupted Republic, must concur to enable a man to assume an extraordinary degree of authority, and oppress his Fellow-Citizens. In the first place, he must be exceeding rich, and have a great number of partizans and adherents; which no well governed Commonwealth will permit: and even if they did, such men are always so dreaded in a free State, that he would not have the suffrages of the independent citizens. Besides this, the Dictator was not appointed for life, but for a time only, and with a limited authority, extending

tending no further than the preſent danger or exigency which he was created to remove: and though, indeed, he was commiſſioned during that term to make ſuch proviſions as he thought proper for the occaſion, without conſulting any one elſe, and to ſentence offenders in a ſummary manner; yet he had no power to do any thing to the prejudice of the State: he could neither deprive the Senate nor the people of their ſhare in the adminiſtration; he could neither abrogate old laws nor make new ones. So that if we jointly conſider the ſhort duration of the Dictator's power, the limited authority he was veſted with, and that the Roman people were not then corrupted, it was impoſſible he could tranſgreſs the bounds of a good Citizen, or injure the State: on the other hand, it plainly appears from experience; that ſuch an officer was always of the higheſt ſervice to it.

It muſt be allowed then, that amongſt many other admirable inſtitutions in the Roman Commonwealth, this deſerves particular regard, and may be reckoned as one of the principal cauſes, that contributed to exalt it to ſuch an amazing height of grandeur: for without it, that State could never have extricated itſelf out of many ſudden emergencies and difficulties, in which their ordinary forms of proceeding, being ſlow and tedious, would have had but little efficacy; becauſe, where no particular Council or Magiſtrate has power to do every thing, but ſtands in need of the aſſiſtance and aſſent of others in many points, and when it happens that the neceſſity is ſo preſſing, that it requires an immediate remedy, time and opportunity ſlip away, and are often loſt, whilſt they are deliberating upon the matter in council; and when they come to any reſolution, it is generally ſo late that the remedy to be applied proves very dangerous.

All Republics, therefore, ſhould have ſome inſtitution of this kind to fly to, in caſes of extreme neceſſity: and indeed the State of Venice (which at this day is the beſt regulated Commonwealth in the world) has reſerved the prerogative of veſting a power in ſome

ſome few of its Citizens, in times of imminent danger; by virtue of which, they may act according to their own diſcretion, without the advice or concurrence of any other Council: for, if there is not ſome proviſion of this kind made in a Commonwealth, it muſt of courſe either be ruined, by ſticking to its old forms, or break them to ſave itſelf. It is much to be wiſhed, that ſuch emergencies might never happen in a State, as make it indiſpenſibly neceſſary to have recourſe to extraordinary means for its preſervation: for though ſuch means may be of admirable ſervice for the preſent, yet the example may afterwards prove of very pernicious conſequence; becauſe, when men have once been taught to break old laws and cuſtoms to ſerve a good purpoſe, they may, perhaps, another time, plead that precedent for breaking them again to anſwer a bad one. No Commonwealth however can be perfect, which has not provided by its laws againſt particular exigencies, prepared remedies for every accident, and taken care to ſecure itſelf in all events by ſpecial Inſtitutions; which cannot be done more effectually than by creating a Dictator, or ſome ſuch Magiſtrate or Magiſtrates upon extraordinary occaſions; for without that, it muſt inevitably be overwhelmed by any conſiderable ſhock *.

We may conclude this Chapter with obſerving, how providently and cautiouſly the Romans proceeded in the election of this officer; for, as the creation of a Dictator muſt of courſe diminiſh the Conſular power, and ſeem to reflect ſome ſort of diſgrace upon thoſe, who from commanding were reduced to obey, this wiſe people, apprehending that ſuch a ſtep might excite reſentment and diſſenſions amongſt the Citizens, prudently left the choice of a Dictator to the Conſuls, well judging that, whenever there ſhould be abſolute occaſion for ſuch an officer, though his authority was

* The States General accordingly inveſted the Prince of Orange with a ſort of Dictatorial power in the year 1688, when it was reſolved to invade England; ſecreſy and expedition being abſolutely neceſſary to ſecure ſucceſs in that Enterprize.

equal

equal to that of a King, they would be ſo far from complaining, that they would chearfully ſubmit to him, as he was appointed by themſelves: and in fact, we ſee that men ſeem to feel much leſs pain from wounds which they give themſelves, than from thoſe they receive from others. Beſides, in ſucceeding times, inſtead of creating a Dictator, they veſted that authority in the Conſuls themſelves by this form of words, "Videat Conſul ne quid detrimenti capiat "Reſpublica, *i. e.* Let the Conſul take care that the "Commonwealth receives no damage." Upon the whole, I ſay, that the neighbouring States, by endeavouring to cruſh the Romans when they did, inſtead of ſucceeding in their deſign, only obliged them to make ſuch proviſions and inſtitutions as not only ſerved to defend themſelves more effectually, but enabled them to act offenſively againſt their enemies, with more vigour, wiſdom, and authority.

CHAP. XXXV.

How it came to paſs that the Creation of the Decemvirate was prejudicial to the liberties of Rome, though it was done by free and public ſuffrage.

THE choice which the Romans made of ten Citizens to new model their laws, who yet ſoon after encroached upon their liberties, and became Tyrants, may ſeem, perhaps, to overthrow my former aſſertion, "That authority legally conferred by the "ſuffrages of the people is not dangerous to the "State, but that which is uſurped and aſſumed by "violence." We muſt conſider, therefore, the bounds and limitations of that authority, and the term for which it was granted: for an abſolute authority, when granted for a long time (that is, for a year or more) will always be very dangerous, and produce either good or bad effects, according to the diſpoſition of thoſe to whom it is given. If then we compare

pare the power of the Decemviri with that of the Dictators, the former will appear to have been much more extenſive than the latter: for by the creation of a Dictator, neither the majeſty of the Senate or the Conſuls was aboliſhed, nor were the Tribunes deprived of their authority. The Dictator could not do that, and if he had the power to remove any one out of the Conſulſhip, or Senate, or Tribuneſhip, yet he could not annul the order nor make new laws: ſo that the Senate, Conſuls, and Tribunes, ſtill ſubſiſting, were a check upon him, and prevented him from doing the State any harm. But the caſe was quite otherwiſe in the creation of the Decemviri; for the Senate, Conſuls, and Tribunes, were totally laid aſide, and not only the power of making laws, but of doing every thing elſe, in ſhort, that of the whole people, was entirely transferred to theſe ten Citizens, who, finding themſelves thus free from all check or controul, and no right of appeal reſerved to any one from them to the people, became inſolent and intolerable the very next year after their creation; of which we have a remarkable inſtance in the ambitious proceedings of Appius.

It muſt be obſerved then, that when I ſay an authority, legally conferred by the free ſuffrages of the people, never hurts any Commonwealth, I preſuppoſe that the people do not confer it without proper reſtrictions, or for any longer than a limited time: for when they are either ſo raſh or ſo blind as to give an abſolute and unlimited power to one or more Magiſtrates, as the Romans did to the Decemviri, they will always ſuffer for it in the ſame manner. This will plainly appear, if we examine to what cauſes it was owing that the Dictators were always good Citizens, and the Decemviri became Tyrants; and conſider likewiſe in what manner thoſe States acted that were eſteemed wiſe and provident, and maintained good order and liberty, though they conferred the ſupreme authority upon one or more for a long term, as the Spartans did to their Kings, and the Venetians ſtill

do

do to their Doges; for then we ſhall find that ſuch reſtraints and limitations were annexed to their power, as effectually prevented them from abuſing it, if they were ſo diſpoſed. Nor is it of any importance in this caſe whether the people are become corrupt or not (for abſolute authority will very ſoon corrupt a people and create itſelf friends and partizans) nor whether the perſon that is poſſeſſed of it be rich or poor, of high or low extraction; becauſe ſuch a degree of power will ſoon ſupply the want of riches, and birth, and every thing elſe; as we ſhall ſhew more particularly, when we come to ſpeak of the creation of the Decemviri.

CHAP. XXXVI.

That Citizens who have filled the higheſt poſts in the State, ought not to be above ſerving in thoſe of a lower degree.

IN the Conſulſhip of Marcus Fabius and Cneius Manlius, the Romans obtained a glorious victory over the Veientes and Etruſci; in which Quintus Fabius (brother to Marcus) was ſlain, who had been Conſul himſelf three years before. From hence we may obſerve, how well the cuſtoms and practice of that Republic were calculated for the aggrandizement of their Empire, and what an error other States are guilty of that deviate from their example. For though the Romans were as ambitious of glory and command as any other people; yet they thought it no diſparagement to obey thoſe whom they had commanded before, nor to ſerve as inferior officers in an army of which they had once been Generals. But ſo different is the cuſtom and ſpirit of our times, that even at Venice, a Citizen, who has once filled a great employment, will never afterwards accept of a leſs, and he is thought excuſable for it by the government: which indeed may be looked upon as honourable and mag-

magnanimous in a private man, but is certainly of great disadvantage to the Public; because a Government may reasonably conceive greater hopes, and put more confidence in one that condescends to accept of a lower post after he has filled a high one, than in one who is preferred from an inferior rank to a greater command; and people cannot well be supposed to rely much upon a raw young man, except he has persons of sufficient wisdom and authority about him to check his youth and correct his inexperience. If, therefore, the same custom had prevailed at Rome as at Venice, and in some other Republics of these times, that a person who had once been Consul, would never serve again in any inferior command, many disasters would have happened which must have endangered its liberty, as well from the errors of new and unexperienced Generals as from their ambition, which they might have freely indulged, when they had no body near them of whom they stood in any sort of awe, to be a check upon their conduct; and thus a full loose being given to their appetites, the government must have suffered no small injury from it.

CHAP. XXXVII.

What tumults and disorders were occasioned at Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how disgustful it is to make a new Law that looks backwards too far, in opposition to old Customs.

IT has been observed by ancient writers, that different causes often produce the same effect, and that mankind are naturally as apt to be satiated with prosperity, as impatient of adversity; and when they are no longer obliged to quarrel by necessity, they will quarrel from motives of ambition, which is so rivetted in the human heart, that they are never contented, even when they arrive at the highest pitch of grandeur.

deur *. The reaſon of this I take to be, that men are born with ſuch appetites as are never to be fully gratified in this State: ſo that their deſires being greater than the power to fulfil them, a ſort of diſcontent, diſſatisfaction and longing for more, is incident to all ranks and conditions. Hence ariſe the viciſſitudes of their fortune: for as they are not only afraid of loſing what they have got, but continually graſping at more, they fall firſt into private quarrels and animoſities, and from ſuch diſſenſions to open wars, which commonly end in the ruin of one State and the exaltation of another.

This I thought fit to premiſe, in ſome meaſure to account for the conduct of the Plebeians, at Rome; who, not being content with having ſecured themſelves againſt the inſolence of the Nobility, by the creation of Tribunes, which (indeed they were compelled to do by abſolute neceſſity) began to quarrel with them afreſh when they had gained this point, out of ambitious motives, and wanted to ſhare with them in their honours and eſtates alſo; two things that are the moſt eagerly coveted by mankind. This gave birth to all the conteſts that happened about the Agrarian Law, which at laſt proved the deſtruction of that Commonwealth. Now ſince all well governed Commonwealths ought to take care that the Public be rich, and the citizens poor, it ſeems, as if that of Rome was guilty of an error with regard to this law, either in not making it one of their fundamental conſtitutions at firſt, that ſo there might have been no occaſion to diſpute the matter repeatedly, as they were obliged to do afterwards; or in deferring it ſo long that retroſpection became diſguſtful and dangerous; or if ſuch a proviſion was made, by ſuffering it to loſe its force thro' neglect and diſuſe. For (however the matter might be) it is certain, that whenever the Agrarian Law was brought into queſtion at Rome, every thing in that City was thrown into confuſion.

* "He that thinks to ſatiate his deſires by poſſeſſing the things he "wiſhes for," ſays an Eaſtern Sage, "is like a man that endeavours "to extinguiſh fire by heaping ſtraw upon it."

The

The heads of this Law were, firſt, that no Citizen ſhould be allowed to poſſeſs above ſo many acres of land; ſecondly, that all the lands that were taken from an enemy ſhould be equally divided amongſt the people; both which articles gave great offence to the Nobility: for by the former, all thoſe that poſſeſſed more land than that Law allowed of (who were Nobles for the moſt part) were to be ſtripped of the overplus; and in conſequence they were deprived of all means of further enriching themſelves. The Patricians, therefore, being moſt intereſted in the matter, and the Plebeians thinking they were defending the cauſe of the Public at the ſame time that they were aſſerting their own rights, ſuch an uproar was raiſed whenever it was brought upon the carpet, that the whole City was in a manner turned topſy-turvy, as I ſaid before *. Sometimes the Nobility openly oppoſed it, ſometimes they endeavoured to ward it off, either by engaging the people in a war, or ſetting up one Tribune to oppoſe another; ſometimes again, by giving up a part of their lands, and at others, by

* Appius Claudius, the grandfather of him that was afterwards the Chief of the Decemviri, in order to prevent the complaints of the Plebeians, propoſed that ten Commiſſioners ſhould be choſen by the Senate, to make a ſtrict enquiry concerning thoſe lands which originally belonged to the Public; that part of them ſhould be ſold for the uſe of the Commonwealth; that another part ſhould be diſtributed amongſt the pooreſt Citizens, who had no land of their own; that marks ſhould be ſet up to diſtinguiſh the limits of every one's poſſeſſions; the want of which had occaſioned the grievance of which the people then complained. What remained of the Public lands, he propoſed to let out for five years at a reaſonable rent; which rent was to be laid out in corn for thoſe Plebeians that ſerved in the army, and for their pay. This, he imagined, would hinder the people from thinking any more of having the lands divided afreſh amongſt them; and that they would rather chooſe to have corn, money, and a ſettled allowance during the whole campaign, than a piece of ground which they would be obliged to cultivate themſelves. He added, that he knew no better method to reform abuſes, than to put things upon the ſame footing again that they were at firſt. His advice was followed, though moſt of the Senators, who had lands that originally belonged to the Commonwealth, could not bear the very name of a retroſpection: however, to amuſe the people, they made a Decree according to the propoſals of Appius: but it was not put in execution till five and thirty years after, when his grandſon was made the firſt of the Decemviri. Dion. Halicarnaſ. lib. VII.

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ſending a colony to take poſſeſſion of the eſtates that were to be divided; as they did to Antium, upon a diſpute that was occaſioned by this law about the diviſion of that territory: but the people in general were ſo averſe to going thither, that very few could be found who would ſet down their names for that purpoſe: upon which Livy obſerves, that they were better contented, even with aſpiring to a fortune at Rome, than the certain poſſeſſion of one at Antium. The conteſts occaſioned by this Law continued till the Romans had extended their conqueſts to the uttermoſt bounds of Italy, and even beyond them; after which they ſeemed to be at an end: for the territories which had been taken from their enemies, being a great diſtance from Rome, and in countries whither the people could not conveniently go to cultivate them, they became leſs deſirous of what did not lie immediately under their own eyes: beſides, the Romans after a while grew more gentle and merciful to their enemies, and if they deprived any ſtate of its lands, they diſtributed the inhabitants amongſt the Colonies which they ſent thither.

For theſe reaſons the Agrarian Law was dropt till the time of the Gracchi, who revived it, to the utter deſtruction of the Roman liberties: for the Nobility were grown then much ſtronger, and oppoſed the Plebeians with ſuch inveteracy, that they at laſt came to an open rupture, which occaſioned much bloodſhed and infinite confuſion amongſt them: ſo that the Magiſtrates finding their authority inſufficient to remedy theſe evils, and neither faction expecting to find any redreſs from them, they both had recourſe to other expedients, and each ſide began to look out for ſome Chief to head and defend them. The Plebeians therefore fixed upon Marius, and threw all their weight into his ſcale in ſuch a manner, that he was four times choſen Conſul, with a very ſhort interval betwixt each Conſulſhip; during which time, he ſo firmly eſtabliſhed his power, that he made himſelf thrice Conſul afterwards. The Nobility therefore, having no other remedy left, were

forced to throw themſelves into the arms of Sylla; and having made him the head of their faction, a civil war immediately enſued: in which, after terrible ſlaughter on both ſides, and many changes of fortune, that of the Nobility at laſt prevailed. Theſe animoſities being afterwards revived in the time of Cæſar and Pompey, Cæſar put himſelf at the head of the Marian, and Pompey eſpouſed the Syllan faction: but Cæſar getting the better of all oppoſition, was the firſt that made himſelf abſolute in Rome; after which, the State never recovered its Liberty.

Such was the beginning and ſuch the conſequences of the Agrarian Law, which may ſeem perhaps to invalidate what I have aſſerted elſewhere, *viz.* "That the diſſenſions which happened at Rome be-"twixt the Patricians and Plebeians contributed to "preſerve its liberties, by occaſioning many good "laws for that purpoſe." However I am ſtill of the ſame opinion: for ſuch is the ambition of the Nobility in every republic, that if they are not effectually reſtrained by proper laws, the State muſt ſoon be ruined. So that if it was above three hundred years before the diſſenſions about the Agrarian Law, occaſioned the ſubverſion of the Roman Commonwealth, that event, in all probability, would have happened much ſooner, if the ambition of the Nobility had not been frequently curbed by the terror of that Law, and ſeveral other ſtruggles, which were made by the Plebeians for the ſupport of their liberties.

From hence we may likewiſe obſerve, how much greater value Men ſet upon riches than honours: for whenever there was any diſpute about the latter, the Nobility often gave up a ſhare of them to the people without much reluctance or oppoſition: but when their eſtates were at Stake, they defended them with ſuch obſtinacy that the people were obliged to have recourſe to extraordinary means in order to gratify themſelves, as I have juſt now ſhewn; to which they were inſtigated by the Gracchi, whoſe good inten-

intentions were more to be commended than their prudence. For to think of eradicating an evil that is grown inveterate in a Commonwealth, by making a Law that looks back too far; is a great piece of indiscretion, and only serves to bring it to a crisis the sooner, as I have demonstrated before at large: whereas by temporizing, it may be palliated a longer time, if not totally discussed, before it comes to a head, and causes a general dissolution.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

That weak Republics are always irresolute, and take wrong measures: and if they come to any resolution, it is rather the effect of necessity than choice.

THE Volsci and Æqui being informed that Rome was visited with a dreadful pestilence, thought the time was arrived when they should be able to conquer that State; and having assembled a powerful army, they invaded the territories of the Latins and Hernici, spoiling and laying waste their country in such a manner, that they were forced to apply to the Romans for assistance; who being prevented sending any by the pestilence, returned for answer, that they must arm themselves, and make the best defence they could, since it was not in their power to succour them. From this instance we may observe the prudence and generosity of that Senate, which maintained its dignity in all vicissitudes of fortune, and constantly prescribed the conduct that was to be observed by those that were dependent upon it; being never ashamed to take a resolution that was contrary to their usual manner of proceeding or former maxims, when necessity required it. This I say, because the same Senate had forbad those people to take up arms upon any occasion whatsoever; and any other Senate less prudent than this, perhaps would have thought it derogatory to their honour, if it had suffered them to arm and defend them-

ſelves at that time. But that body rightly judged that in ſuch caſes, to chooſe the leſs of two evils was the beſt reſolution that could be taken: and though it mortified them, without doubt, not only to find they were not able to protect their ſubjects, but that they muſt be obliged to ſuffer them to defend themſelves, for many reaſons, (ſome of which have been already aſſigned, and others are obvious to every one); yet ſeeing it was abſolutely neceſſary, as the enemy had already invaded them, they took the moſt honourable courſe, and with great majeſty ſent them word they had their leave to defend themſelves if they pleaſed; which indeed they muſt have been forced to do without it; but this was to ſave appearances, and to prevent them from doing ſo upon other occaſions without their permiſſion, when there was no neceſſity for it.

Now though it is eaſy to ſay any other Republic muſt have done the ſame; yet I affirm, that weak and ill adviſed Commonwealths neither can, nor know how to act in that manner, nor to ſave their honour in ſuch exigencies of the State. Duke Valentine having made himſelf maſter of Faenza, and compelled Bologna to ſubmit to his own terms, ſent an officer to demand a paſſage for ſome of his troops through Tuſcany, that were upon their march back again to Rome: upon which, a Council being called at Florence to deliberate in what manner they ſhould act upon this occaſion, it was unanimouſly reſolved not to comply with the Duke's demand. This was not behaving like the Romans: for the Duke having a very powerful army, and the Florentines being in no condition to oppoſe him, it would have been more for their honour to grant him a free paſſage, than to ſuffer him to force one: that ſo, what they could not poſſibly prevent, might ſeem to be the effect of courteſy; which would have been a means of preſerving their reputation, at leaſt in ſome degree. But the worſt property in weak Commonwealths, is that they are irreſolute; and if ever they take any laud-

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able reſolution, it is rather through neceſſity, than the effect of wiſdom or good counſel: of which I ſhall produce two inſtances that happened in Florence in our own times.

In the year 1500, Lewis XII. King of France, having repoſſeſſed himſelf of the Duchy of Milan, was inclinable to have reſtored Piſa to the Florentines, in conſideration of fifty thouſand Ducats, which they promiſed to pay him upon the reſtitution of it. In conſequence of this, the King ſent an army towards Piſa, commanded by Monſieur Beaumont, who, though a Frenchman, was much eſteemed and confided in by the Florentines. Beaumont accordingly arriving with his troops before Piſa, and intending to batter the town, began to make the neceſſary diſpoſitions for a Siege: but whilſt he was thus preparing for it, the Piſans ſent Deputies to him, with an offer of ſurrendering the town to the French, provided the King would give them his word, that he would not deliver it up to the Florentines before the expiration of the four next months: to which the Florentines ſeeming very averſe, the Siege was carried on, and at laſt raiſed with great diſgrace to thoſe that had begun it. The reaſon why the Florentines rejected this propoſal, was becauſe they were doubtful of the King's honour: for ſo weak were their counſels, that they threw themſelves into his arms, though they durſt not truſt him; not conſidering how much better it would be for them, that the King ſhould have poſſeſſion of the town, (that ſo he might either deliver it up to them, or give them an opportunity of diſcovering his deſigns if he refuſed it) than to pay him for promiſes only, before he could poſſibly be in a condition to put it into their hands. Certainly then it would have been much more for their intereſt to have ſuffered Monſieur Beaumont to get poſſeſſion of the town upon any terms whatſoever, as may appear from another event, which happened about two years after. Upon the revolt of Arezzo, the ſame King ſent Monſieur Imbalt with a body of French forces to the ſuccour of the Florentines,

rentines, who ſoon after his arrival near that town, finding the inhabitants (like the Piſans) inclinable to ſubmit to him upon certain conditions, began to enter into a treaty with them for that purpoſe. But the Florentines, not liking the conditions, would not conſent to it: upon which, Imbalt, rightly judging that they did not underſtand their own intereſt, came to a private agreement with the inhabitants, without communicating it to the Florentine Commiſſaries; in conſequence of which, he entered the town with all his forces, and having upbraided the Florentines with their little experience in the affairs of the world, he repreſented to them, that if they really deſired to have Arezzo reſtored to them, now was their time to apply to the King, who having got poſſeſſion of it, had it then in his power to oblige them, which he could not have done before. The Florentines indeed were highly exaſperated at Imbalt for proceeding in this manner, and ſpoke very hardly of him; nor could they be pacified till they were at laſt convinced that if Beaumont had done as he did, they might have recovered Piſa as well as Arezzo. I ſay therefore, that weak and irreſolute Commonwealths never act as they ought to do, except they are abſolutely compelled to it: for their weakneſs will not ſuffer them to come to any reſolution in a matter that is doubtful; ſo that they always continue in ſuſpence till their doubts are removed either by downright neceſſity or violence *.

CHAP. XXXIX.

That the ſame accidents often happen to different people.

WHOEVER compares theſe times with thoſe that are paſt, will find that the ſame appetites, humours and deſires are, and always have been, in-

* See book II. chap. xv. of theſe Diſcourſes.

cident

cident to all States and people: so that by diligently examining the course of former ages, it is an easy matter for men to foresee what will probably happen again in any Commonwealth, and not only to provide such remedies against future evils as their predecessors did, but (if there be no precedents) to strike out new ones, according to the nature and similarity of the case. But since researches of this kind are too often neglected, and history is either not much read, or little understood, especially by those that govern States, it comes to pass that the same evils and inconveniencies happen in all times.

The Republic of Florence having lost Pisa and several other territories about the year 1394, was forced to make war upon those that had seized them. But as they were very powerful enemies, the war was attended with a heavy expence, and but little advantage, which occasioned grievous taxes, and consequently much clamour and discontent amongst the people: and because the war was conducted by a Magistracy consisting of ten Citizens, who were called, I dieci' della guerra, Decemvirate of war, the Commonalty began to be out of all patience with them, accusing them with being the authors of the war, and all the burdens consequent upon it; and seemed to be persuaded that if their authority was abolished, those troubles would soon be at an end. So that when the time came that those Magistrates were to go out of office, instead of chusing a new Council of ten, they threw all their power into the hands of the Signiory. But this step, instead of putting an end to the war, as the common people had persuaded themselves, threw things into still greater disorder, and proved the occasion of much heavier misfortunes: for when that Magistracy was abolished, which had conducted their affairs with some degree of prudence, they likewise lost Arezzo and many other places; so that the people beginning to repent of their folly, and perceiving that their weakness proceeded from the disease, and not from the remedy

that had been made uſe of to cure it, thought proper to re-eſtabliſh the Council of ten.

The ſame thing happened at Rome with regard to the Conſuls: for the Plebeians there ſeeing they were entangled in one war after another, in ſuch a manner, that they enjoyed neither comfort nor reſt, inſtead of imputing it to the ambition of their neighbours, who were perpetually ſeeking their deſtruction, thought it entirely owing to the malice of the Nobility; and that as they could not wreak their revenge upon them whilſt they continued at home, and under the protection of their Tribunes, they led them abroad under the Conſuls, in order to harraſs and diſtreſs them when there was no body at hand to defend them: upon which account, they reſolved either to aboliſh the name and authority of Conſuls entirely, or at leaſt to lay them under ſuch reſtrictions, that they would not have it in their power to oppreſs them either at home or abroad. The firſt that endeavoured to get a Law paſſed for this purpoſe was Terentillus, one of the Tribunes, who moved that a Committee of five perſons might be appointed to enquire into the abuſes of the Conſular power, and to reſtrain it: at which the Nobility were not a little alarmed, as they thought the Majeſty of the State would be degraded, and they ſhould have no ſhare left in the adminiſtration of the Republic. Such however was the obſtinacy of the Tribunes in this point, that the name of Conſuls was wholly extinguiſhed; and after trying ſeveral other expedients, they choſe rather than Conſuls to have Tribunes created with Conſular power: ſo that they ſeemed to be more averſe to the name than the authority of Conſuls. Upon this footing things continued a long time; till at laſt, the people being aware of their error, reſtored the Conſuls, as the Florentines did their Council of ten.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

Concerning the creation of the Decemviri at Rome; what is moſt worthy of notice in it; and whether ſuch an Inſtitution may be of greater prejudice or advantage to a Commonwealth.

BEFORE I ſay any thing of the troubles and commotions that happened at Rome in conſequence of creating the Decemviri there, it may not be amiſs perhaps to give ſome account of the Inſtitution itſelf, and then to point out ſuch things as ſeem moſt worthy of notice in it; which are many indeed, and deſerve to be well conſidered both by thoſe that would maintain the liberties of a Commonwealth, and thoſe that have any deſign to enſlave it. For, upon a thorough examination, we ſhall find many errors committed by the Patricians, many by the Plebeians to the prejudice of their liberty, and ſtill more by Appius, the Head of the Decemviri, to the deſtruction of that Tyranny which he intended to have eſtabliſhed in Rome.

After many conteſts and diſputes therefore, betwixt the Nobility and the People, concerning the introduction of ſeveral new laws for the further ſecurity of their common liberties, it was agreed by both ſides to ſend Spurius Poſtumius and five other Citizens to Athens for a copy of thoſe laws which Solon had formerly given to that State; that ſo they might form a new body out of them for the government of their own. After the return of theſe Deputies, it was thought proper to appoint a Committee to examine and digeſt theſe Laws, and to eſtabliſh ſuch as might ſeem moſt ſalutary and convenient: in conſequence of which, ten Citizens were fixed upon for that purpoſe, who were to continue in office for a whole year; amongſt whom was Appius Claudius, a man of great parts and ſagacity, but of a reſtleſs and turbulent diſpoſition.

diſpoſition. And that they might be at liberty to act without the leaſt reſtraint or controul, in adapting theſe Laws to their own conſtitution, all other Magiſtrates were ſuſpended from their reſpective offices, particularly the Conſuls and Tribunes, and no appeal to the people allowed of: ſo that this Magiſtracy was veſted with abſolute power. But Appius by the favour of the people engroſſed the authority of all the ten: for he had made himſelf ſo popular by his affable and obliging behaviour, that people were aſtoniſhed to ſee ſuch a total change in his nature and diſpoſition; and that one, who but a little before had been the moſt inveterate and implacable perſecutor of the Plebeians, ſhould now all on a ſudden become their avowed Protector and favourite.

During the firſt year, every thing was conducted with great modeſty and decency, the Decemvir of the day having no more than twelve Lictors to attend him in the diſcharge of his office; and though the authority of this Magiſtracy was abſolute, nevertheleſs, one of the Citizens having committed a murder, they cited him to appear before the people, and left them to take cognizance of the matter. The new Laws were written upon ten tables, and expoſed in public before they were ratified; that ſo every one might have the liberty of reading and canvaſſing them, to ſee if there was any defect which might be ſupplied before their confirmation. But before the power of the Decemviri expired, Appius cauſed it to be whiſpered about, that a complete body of laws could not be well compiled without the addition of two more tables to the other ten; upon which inſinuations, the people readily conſented, that the Decemvirate ſhould be continued for another year; not only to prevent the revival of Conſular power, but becauſe they were in hopes they ſhould be able to ſupport themſelves without the aſſiſtance of Tribunes; ſince the cognizance of capital cauſes ſeemed now to be wholly referred to them, as we have ſaid before.

A time

A time being appointed accordingly for the election of a new Decemvirate, the chief of the Nobility exerted all their intereſt to be choſen; and none with more eagerneſs than Appius, who ſollicited the votes of the people with ſo much earneſtneſs, and yet with ſuch a ſhew of humility and complaiſance, that his aſſociates began to ſuſpect him of ſome bad deſign, "credebant enim, ſays Livy, haud gratuitam in "tantâ ſuperbiâ comitatem fore;" for they could not imagine that a perſon of his pride would ſtoop ſo low without ſome private view; and therefore not daring to oppoſe him openly, they reſolved to circumvent him by artifice; and with this view, though he was the youngeſt of all the Candidates, they gave him the power of propoſing all the ten to the choice of the people; not imagining that he would name himſelf for one, becauſe it would be not only a ſcandalous but an unprecedented ſtep. "Ille vero impedimentum "pro occaſione arripuit;" but he made an advantage of what they deſigned as an impediment, and named himſelf firſt of all, to the great ſurprize and diſguſt of all the reſt of the Nobility: after which, he named nine other ſuch perſons as he thought were fitteſt for his purpoſe.

But this election was hardly over, before both the Nobility and people began to be ſenſible of their error: for Appius ſoon "finem fecit ferendæ alienæ "perſonæ," threw off the maſque, and not only began to ſhew his own innate pride, but in a ſhort time made his Collegues as bad as himſelf; increaſing the number of Lictors from twelve to an hundred and twenty, in order to over-awe the whole City. All parties at firſt were equally terrified; but after a while the Decemviri began to wheedle the Senate, and oppreſs the people: and if any perſon was injured by the one, he was ſtill worſe treated upon appealing to the other. So that the Plebeians being at laſt convinced of their folly, began to turn their eyes upon the Nobility, "Et inde libertatis captare auram, un-"de ſervitutem timendo, in eum ſtatum Rempubli-

"cam

" cam adduxerant," and to look up to thoſe very perſons for the preſervation of their liberties, whoſe power they had oppoſed with ſuch a degree of virulence, out of a dread of being enſlaved by them, as had reduced the Commonwealth to that condition. But the Nobility, inſtead of ſympathizing with the people in their miſery, could not help rejoicing at it, " ut ipſi tædio præſentium Conſules deſiderarent," in hopes that the grievouſneſs of their ſufferings would make them wiſh to ſee Conſular power reſtored. At laſt however when the ſecond year of the Decemvirate expired, the two additional Tables were finiſhed, but not yet expoſed to public view: from whence the Decemviri took a handle to continue themſelves ſtill longer in office. For which purpoſe they had recourſe to violence, and appointed guards from among the young Nobility to ſecure them in their uſurpation, to whom they gave the goods and eſtates of ſuch perſons as they thought fit either to put to death or impoſe fines upon; " quibus donis, " ſays the Hiſtorian, juventus corrumpebatur, & ma- " lebat licentiam ſuam, quam omnium libertatem," by which bribes the youth were debauched, and choſe rather to live in licentiouſneſs themſelves, than to ſee the liberties of their country reſtored.

Whilſt things were in this ſituation, the Sabines and Volſci invaded the Romans, which threw the Decemviri into no ſmall conſternation, when they conſidered how looſe they ſat in their Seats, and upon how weak a foundation their power was built: for they were not able to carry on a war without the aſſiſtance of the Senate; and if the Senate ſhould be ſuffered to aſſemble, they knew there would preſently be an end of their uſurpation. Nevertheleſs, as the neceſſity was urgent, they reſolved to run that riſque; and having called the Senators together, many of them ſpoke with great acrimony againſt the arrogance and Tyranny of the Decemviri, particularly Valerius and Horatius; and their authority would certainly have been aboliſhed at that time, if the Senators had thought fit;

fit: but they were ſo jealous of the Plebeians, that they would not exert their whole ſtrength upon that occaſion, leſt if the Decemviri were obliged to reſign their power, the people ſhould ſet up Tribunes again. The matter therefore was compromiſed for the preſent, and a war being reſolved upon, they ſent two armies againſt the enemy, commanded by ſome of the Decemviri, whilſt Appius ſtaid at home to take care of the City. But he happening to fall in love during that interval with a young woman, whoſe name was Virginia, and attempting to carry her off by force, her father killed her with his own hands to ſave her honour and that of his family. This immediately occaſioned ſuch an uproar in Rome, and ſuch tumults in both armies, that the Soldiers leaving the camp, and the people the City, retired to Mons Sacer, where they ſtaid till the Decemviri abdicated the Magiſtracy: after which, new Conſuls and Tribunes were created, and Rome once more recovered its liberty.

From this ſhort narrative, we may obſerve in the firſt place, that the inſtitution of this Tyranny at Rome was owing to the ſame cauſes which often occaſion it in other States; that is, the extravagant deſire of liberty in the people, and the immoderate ambition to command in the Nobility: for when they cannot both agree about any law that is to be made in favour of liberty, and either ſide throws all its weight into the ſcale of ſome one perſon, whom they have made choice of for their champion and protector, from that moment, Tyranny may be ſaid to commence. The Decemviri were created at Rome, and veſted with ſo great a degree of authority by the conſent both of the Nobility and Plebeians, but with different views; one ſide hoping to aboliſh the Conſular Power, and the other, that of the Tribunes: accordingly after their creation, the Plebeians looking upon Appius as their firm friend, began to court and careſs him exceedingly, and to ſtrengthen his hands in ſuch a manner, that he might be able to de-

preſs

preſs the Nobility. But when things once come to ſuch a paſs that the people are weak enough to exalt ſome one man only, to humble thoſe whom they hate, if he is a perſon of any ſubtilty and addreſs, he will ſoon make himſelf abſolute Lord over them all if he pleaſes: for he may extinguiſh the Nobility by the help of the Plebeians, whom he will take care to favour and cheriſh till he has thoroughly effected that; after which, the people having no body to protect them upon occaſion, will begin to perceive when it is too late, that they have loſt their liberty and lie wholly at his mercy. This courſe has always been taken by ſuch as have become Tyrants over free States; and if Appius had followed it, his Tyranny would have taken deeper root and continued longer. But he acted quite the contrary, and imprudently incurred the hatred of thoſe perſons that had advanced him to power, and were able to have ſupported him in it; whilſt he ingratiated himſelf with thoſe that were neither pleaſed at his exaltation, nor ſtrong enough to defend him afterwards; thus abandoning his friends to court others who never could be ſo. For though the Nobility are naturally deſirous to rule and domineer themſelves, yet ſuch of them as have no ſhare in a tyrannical government will always hate the Tyrant; nor can he for his part ever gain them all: for ſo great, generally ſpeaking, are their avarice and ambition, that it is not poſſible any Tyrant ſhould have either riches or honours in his diſpoſal ſufficient to ſatiate them. Thus Appius in leaving the Plebeians, and joining the Nobility, was guilty of an egregious error, for the reaſons juſt now aſſigned; and becauſe it is neceſſary that a man who would keep poſſeſſion by violence of what he has got, ſhould be ſtronger than thoſe that endeavour to wreſt it out of his hands; therefore thoſe Tyrants who make the people their friends, and are hated by the Nobility only, will be more ſecure; becauſe they have a ſtronger foundation to depend upon than others, who make the people their enemy, and the

Nobility

Nobility their friends. For by these means, they may always support themselves without foreign assistance, as Nabis the Tyrant of Sparta did; who having secured the affections of the people, did not give himself much trouble about the Nobility; and yet he defended himself against all Greece, and the whole power of the Romans, which he never could have done without the favour of the people. But, on the other hand, when a Tyrant depends on the Nobility alone, as the number of his friends is small at home, he cannot support himself without foreign aid; for he will want guards for the security of his person, Soldiers, to serve as Militia, instead of his own people, for the defence of the country, and powerful allies to succour him in distress: all which if he can procure, he may possibly maintain his power without the affections of the people. But Appius despising the people, whom he might have made his friends, and having no other resource, was soon deposed.

The Senate and people of Rome likewise committed a gross error in the creation of the Decemviri: for though we have asserted before, in the discourse concerning Dictators, that those Magistrates only endanger the public liberty who force themselves into office, and not those who are legally appointed by the free suffrages of the people; yet the people that chuse them, ought at the same time to take great care to lay them under proper checks and restraints to prevent their abusing their power: but the Romans, instead of taking such measures to oblige the Decemviri to keep within due bounds, entirely freed them from all controul, by making their power absolute, and abolishing all other Magistracies, that might in any wise have served to balance it, and this merely out of the excessive desire (as we have said before) which the Senate had to suppress the Tribunes, and the People the Consuls. These passions so blinded their understandings, that both sides equally contributed to the disorders that ensued: for men, as

King-

King Ferdinand of Arragon uſed to ſay, often reſemble certain little birds of prey, which purſue others with ſuch eagerneſs, that they are not aware of a greater bird that is hovering over their heads, and ready to ſouſe down upon them and tear them to pieces. But enough has been ſaid to ſhew the error which the Romans were guilty of in creating the Decemviri to preſerve their liberty; and that of Appius in the means he took to eſtabliſh Tyranny.

CHAP. XLI.

That it is impolitic in any man who was humble and merciful before, to become arrogant and cruel on a ſudden, and without obſerving any gradation.

AMONGST the other falſe ſteps which Appius took to ſupport his Tyranny, the changing his diſpoſition and manner of conduct ſo ſuddenly was of no ſmall prejudice to him. It muſt be owned indeed, that his artifice in cajoling the people by pretending to be their Champion; the addreſs he made uſe of in getting the Decemvirate prolonged; his reſolution in propoſing himſelf again, contrary to the expectation of the Nobility; and his naming ſuch Collegues as he could make tools of, were maſterly and well timed ſtrokes of policy. But when he had done all this (as we have ſhewn before) he certainly judged very wrong in changing his deportment ſo inſtantaneouſly, in perſecuting and oppreſſing the people after he had been their avowed protector, in becoming ſo fierce and arrogant, after ſuch an appearance of humility and affability; and that too without any excuſe to juſtify himſelf, and in ſo ſudden a manner, that every body preſently diſcovered the deceitfulneſs and villainy of his heart. For a man that has worn the maſk of honeſty and goodneſs for a while, and finds it neceſſary at laſt to throw it off, and alter his conduct for the accompliſhment of ſome great purpoſe, ſhould do

it

it by insensible degrees, and avail himself of proper opportunities and conjunctures; not *per saltum*, by a sudden leap and all at once: that so the difference of his behaviour may not deprive him of his old friends, before * he has had time to gain new ones to support his authority: otherwise his designs will immediately be seen through, and finding himself destitute of all sorts of assistance, he must inevitably be ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

How prone Mankind are to corruption.

IT may further be observed, from what happened under the Decemvirate, how liable men are to be debauched, let their first principles and education be ever so good. If the example of the young Nobility, whom Appius took for his guards, and corrupted to such a degree, that they became friends to Tyranny and supporters of his usurpation, merely for the sake of lucre, and indulging themselves in their licentious desires, was not sufficient, we might add that of Quintus Fabius, one of the Decemviri of the second creation, who though a virtuous and good man before, was so blinded by ambition, and seduced by the cunning of Appius, that he seemed totally to have changed his natural disposition, and became as bad as the other †. A due consideration therefore of human frailty should teach all Legislators, either in Kingdoms or Commonwealths, to make the most effectual provisions they can to bridle the appetites and passions of mankind, and to deprive them of all hopes of impunity when they violate the laws of their country.

* Cromwell excelled most other Tyrants in this sort of Policy.

† Virum egregium olim domi militiæque Decemviratus Collegæque ita mutaverant, ut Appii quam sui similis mallet esse. Liv. lib. III. cap. xli.—A fatal but usual consequence of power, which is too often exerted to oppress others.

CHAP. XLIII.

That thoſe who fight out of a principle of honour make the beſt and moſt faithful Soldiers.

FROM what has been related above concerning the Decemviri, it may likewiſe be remarked how great a difference there is betwixt Soldiers that are well affected to their Commanders, and fight for their own glory, and thoſe that are led into the field againſt their inclination, and fight only to gratify the ambition of others. For though the Roman armies were almoſt always victorious when commanded by Conſuls, yet under the conduct of the Decemviri, they were never ſucceſsful. From hence alſo we may diſcern one of the reaſons at leaſt, why forces are ſo little to be depended upon who have no other motive to fight than their pay, which is by no means ſufficient to ſecure their fidelity, or to make them ſo much your friends as to lay down their lives for you. For Soldiers whoſe hearts are not warmly affected in the cauſe and intereſts of thoſe for whom they fight, will make but a very feeble reſiſtance if vigorouſly attacked: and ſince this ſort of affection and emulation is not to be found, or indeed expected in Mercenaries, thoſe that govern Kingdoms and Commonwealths ought above all things to fortify themſelves with the love and eſteem of their own Soldiers, as in fact all thoſe have ever done who have performed the greateſt exploits. The Roman armies had not loſt their ancient valour under the reign of the Decemviri; but as they were but coldly affected towards them, they did not exert themſelves with their uſual Spirit, nor ſucceed in the manner they had been wont to do. But when the Decemvirate was aboliſhed, and they had recovered their liberties, they fought courageouſly again like free men in the defence of their country; and

conſequently their enterprizes were crowned with glory and ſucceſs as before *.

CHAP. XLIV.

That a multitude without a Head can do but little; and that they ſhould not threaten to make an ill uſe of power, before they have obtained it.

UPON the violence that had been offered to Virginia †, the Plebeians of Rome having taken arms and retired to Mons Sacer, where they were joined by the army, the Senate ſent to demand the reaſon of that Seceſſion, and by what authority the Soldiers had abandoned the camp: and ſo great was

* "With regard to Fleets and Armies," ſays the Author of the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the times, vol. II. ſect. vi. "another Truth offers itſelf to obſervation. Here the love of Glory is neceſſary in the Leaders, as a motive to great and daring Enterprizes. But amongſt the inferior ranks, the fear of ſhame will generally be of ſufficient influence to compel them to their Duty. The reaſon is evident: for, with regard to the Leaders, as it is impoſſible to point out to them the particular track of their Duty in every inſtance; ſo their conduct muſt be left in general to the determinations of their own mind. Great actions will naturally be attended with glory: but the mere omiſſion of great actions, where peremptory orders are not given, is not neceſſarily attended with ſhame. It is the love of Glory only therefore, that can urge a Leader to great and dangerous attempts. But with regard to the inferior ranks, there the particular track of Duty is pointed out, which is only this, "obey "the commands of your Leader." Under this circumſtance no evaſion can take place: every man muſt obey, or Infamy overtakes him; and thus the fear of ſhame becomes ſufficient. This diſtinction will clearly account for that ſtrange difference of conduct in our Britiſh troops during the laſt, as well as the preſent war. It has been remarked, that at ſometimes they have fought like Lions, and at others have been as timorous as Hares. Their bravery in particular inſtances, has been brought as a proof againſt the exiſtence of the Ruling Principle of Effeminacy which runs through this work. But whoever views this matter, according to the diſtinctions here pointed out, will at once ſee the veil drawn off from this myſterious appearance of things. Where did our troops diſtinguiſh their Valour? was it not at Dettingen? at La Feldt? and above all, on the dreadful field of Fontenoy, where honeſt Fame forſook the Standard of the Victor, and wept over the Banners of the retreating Engliſh? And who were their Leaders upon theſe important days? They were ſuch as were inſpired and actuated by the generous love of glory."

† Appius had made a forcible attempt to raviſh her.

the reverence in which the multitude ſtill held the authority of the Senate, that as they had no Head over them, no particular perſon would preſume to return an anſwer: for though, as Livy ſays, there was matter enough for an anſwer, yet no body cared to deliver it. From whence we may obſerve how weak a thing a multitude is without a Head.

But Virginius (the father of Virginia) being aware of this defect, had the addreſs to get twenty military Tribunes created with power to treat and confer with the Senate: after which they deſired that Valerius and Horatius might be ſent to them, to whom they would communicate what they had to ſay. Theſe two Senators, however, refuſed to go upon any ſuch errand, except the Decemviri would firſt abdicate their authority: which being at laſt complied with, they went to the people, who demanded that their Tribunes ſhould be reſtored, that appeals to them from the Sentence of any magiſtrate ſhould be allowed of, and that the late Decemviri ſhould be delivered up to them, whom they would burn alive. The two firſt requeſts were approved by Valerius and Horatius; but they could not help condemning the laſt as Savage and inhuman, telling them, "crudeli-"tatis odio, in crudelitatem ruitis;" whilſt you "abhor cruelty in others, you would be guilty of the "higheſt degree of barbarity yourſelves;" and adviſing them to drop all further mention of the Decemviri at that time, that ſo they might attend more effectually to the recovery of their own liberty and authority; after which, they might find ſufficient means to take proper ſatisfaction. Hence we may learn, how weak and imprudent it is to aſk for a thing, and to declare at the ſame time, that we deſign to make a bad uſe of it as ſoon as obtained: certainly in ſuch a caſe a man ſhould conceal his bad intentions, at leaſt till he has ſucceeded in his ſollicitations, which he ought by all means to make his firſt and principal endeavour. If a perſon had a deſign upon the life of another, would it not be ſufficient to ſay to him,

"pray

" pray lend me your Sword," without telling him you intended to kill him with it; since when you have got the Sword in your hand, you may do what you please with it?

CHAP. XLV.

That it is a bad precedent to break a new Law; especially in the Legislator himself: and that it is very dangerous for those that govern States to multiply injuries and repeat them every day.

WHEN the public tranquility was restored at Rome, and the ancient form of Government re-established, Appius was cited by Virginius to answer for his misdemeanours before the people; and making his appearance in the midst of a great number of the Nobility, he was immediately ordered to Prison. Upon this, he protested against it, and appealed to the people: but Virginius insisted that he who had abolished all appeals, was not worthy of being indulged in one himself, or of being allowed to implore the protection of a people whom he had so grievously injured. But Appius replied, that they who had been so zealous to re establish that privilege, should not be the first to break it. After all, however, he was committed to prison, and killed himself before his trial came on.

Now though without doubt Appius deserved the severest punishment, yet it was a thing of very dangerous consequence for the Roman people to violate their own laws, and especially one that was so lately made: for I think there cannot be a more dangerous precedent in a commonwealth than to establish laws, and not observe them; especially if they are first dispensed with by the Legislators themselves. A reform in the State having taken place at Florence in the beginning of the year 1495, by the assistance and advice of Friar Girolamo Savonarola (whose writings give sufficient proof of his learning, abilities, and Spirit), a new law

was made for the further ſecurity of the Citizens, by virtue of which they were allowed to appeal to the people from any Sentence paſſed in matters of State, either by the Council of eight, or the Signiory. But notwithſtanding this law, which he had ſollicited with ſuch earneſtneſs, and obtained with ſo much difficulty, five Citizens who had been condemned to death by the Signiory, and deſigned to appeal to the people were denied that privilege: a circumſtance that hurt the Friar's reputation more than any thing elſe that could poſſibly have befallen him; for if this law was of ſuch importance as he pretended, it ought to have been ſtrictly obſerved; if not, why was it preſſed with ſuch importunity? This was the more taken notice of becauſe he never made the leaſt mention of the violation of the law in any of his Sermons or harangues, though he afterwards delivered many to the people, nor either condemned or excuſed thoſe that had broke it, for ſince it ſerved his own purpoſes, he knew not how to condemn it, and as to an excuſe, there was no poſſibility of making any; which ſort of behaviour fully diſcovering the partiality and ambition of his heart, entirely ruined his reputation, and loaded him with infamy and reproach *.

It likewiſe creates great diſguſt in a State when the Citizens are terrified every day with freſh proſecutions; as it happened at Rome after the expiration of the Decemvirate, for not only all the Decemviri, but ſo many other Citizens were accuſed and condemned at different times, that the Nobility were in the utmoſt conſternation, and began to apprehend there would be no end of theſe ſeverities, till their whole order was extinguiſhed; and this manner of proceeding would certainly have excited great troubles and inconveniencies, if they had not been foreſeen and prevented by Marcus Duellius one of the Tribunes, who publiſhed an edict, prohibiting every one either to cite or accuſe any Roman Citizen during the ſpace of a year; by

* See Chap. vi. of the Prince, and the Notes upon it.

which

which act of moderation, the Nobility were delivered from all further diſquietude and apprehenſion. From hence it appears, how dangerous it is either for a Prince or a Commonwealth to keep their ſubjects in continual fear and alarm by daily executions. Indeed nothing can be more prejudicial to their intereſt*: for when men begin to dread theſe evils, they will naturally endeavour to ſecure themſelves at all events, and become bolder and more determined to attempt a change of government. Upon ſuch occaſions therefore, it is the beſt way either to puniſh no body at all, or to finiſh the executions at once, and afterwards to give the people no occaſion to fear any thing further; that ſo they may live ſecurely and quietly†.

CHAP. XLVI.

That men uſually riſe from one degree of ambition to another; endeavouring in the firſt place to ſecure themſelves from oppreſſion, and afterwards to oprreſs others.

AFTER the people of Rome had not only recovered their liberty and former power, but were become ſtronger and ſtill more ſecure under the protection of many new laws, it might have been expected they would at laſt have enjoyed ſome repoſe; yet it happened quite contrary, and every day produced new tumults and diſſenſions. The reaſon of which, according to Livy, was that the Nobility and Plebeians being at perpetual variance, when one ſide was humbled, the other grew inſolent; when the populace were content the young Nobility

* Witneſs the caſe of our King James II. who terrified and diſguſted his Subjects to the laſt degree, by the unreaſonable number of Executions which he ordered in the weſt of England at different times upon the Duke of Monmouth's affair.

† As the Emperor Auguſtus did, who after a moſt cruel proſcription and a multitude of Executions, preſently became ſo remarkably indulgent and merciful to his Subjects, that he afterwards reigned in peace and ſecurity all his life, and has been more extolled than almoſt any other Emperor.

began to abuſe them; nor was it in the power of the Tribunes to provide any effectual remedy for this, as they were liable to be inſulted themſelves. The Nobility, on the other hand, though they could not help being ſenſible, that the younger part of their order were too arbitrary and licentious, yet if the bounds of decency and good order were to be tranſgreſſed either by one ſide or the other, choſe rather that their own ſhould be the treſpaſſer than that of the Plebeians. So that the immoderate deſire of preſerving their reſpective privileges, was the cauſe that when either faction prevailed, they oppreſſed the other; for it generally happens, that whilſt men are guarding againſt violence themſelves, they begin to encroach upon others, and when they pull a dagger out of their own breaſt, endeavour to plunge it into their neighbour's; as if they muſt of neceſſity either injure or be injured.

From hence we may obſerve (amongſt other things) in what manner Republics are at laſt diſſolved, how natural a tranſition there is from one degree of ambition to another, and that what Salluſt ſays in the perſon of Julius Cæſar is very juſt, "quod omnia mala "exempla, bonis initiis orta ſunt; that all diſorders and abuſes ariſe from good beginnings." Ambitious Citizens in all Commonwealths, make it their principal buſineſs, as I ſaid before, not only to defend themſelves againſt private violence, but the authority of the Magiſtrates; for which purpoſe, they endeavour to cultivate friendſhips and dependencies by ways ſeemingly honeſt and honourable; as by lending money to thoſe that are poor, or protecting the weak and helpleſs, againſt the oppreſſor and extortioner; all which carrying a fair and good appearance, the people are eaſily deluded and take no care to prevent the conſequences till it is too late, and not only private Citizens but even the Magiſtrates themſelves begin to ſtand in awe of them*. After they have arrived at this

* Such was the conduct of Coſimo de' Medici and his poſterity; by which they at laſt made themſelves Sovereigns of Tuſcany. See the four laſt Books of the Hiſtory of Florence.

height

height without any oppoſition, it becomes very dangerous to meddle with them, for reaſons which I have given before, in diſcourſing on the folly and imprudence of endeavouring to eradicate an evil that is grown to too great a head in a Commonwealth; ſo that when things are once come to this paſs, you muſt either endeavour to pull them down again, which cannot be done without the utmoſt hazard of utter ruin to the State; or you muſt patiently ſubmit to loſe your liberties, except their death, or ſome other accident ſhould chance to deliver you. For when they perceive both the people and Magiſtrates are afraid of them and their friends, they will ſoon begin to domineer and play the tyrant. A Commonwealth therefore ought above all things, to take timely care to prevent its Citizens from doing evil under the appearance of good; and that they may not become ſo popular as to prejudice the State inſtead of advancing its welfare; but of this we ſhall treat more at large in another place*.

CHAP. XLVII.

Though the people are ſometimes miſtaken in general points, yet they ſeldom or never err in particulars.

THE people of Rome, as I ſaid before, growing weary of their Conſuls, and deſirous to have them choſen out of the Plebeians for the future, or at leaſt ſome bounds preſcribed to their power; the Nobility, in order to prevent their Authority from being debaſed either way, took a middle courſe, and conſented that four Tribunes with Conſular power ſhould be elected indifferently out of the Patricians and Plebeians. The people were pretty well ſatisfied, imagining that in conſequence of this the Conſulſhip would at laſt be utterly aboliſhed, and they ſhould have an equal ſhare in the adminiſtration. But it was

* See Chap. lii.

very

very remarkable that at the creation of theſe Tribunes when they had it in their power and every body expected they would have choſen them out of the Plebeians, they were all elected out of the Nobility. Upon which Livy ſays, "quorum commitiorum eventus docuit, "alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris, alios "ſecundum depoſita certamina in incorrupto judicio "eſſe; the event of this election ſhewed that the peo- "ple were of one mind in their conteſts for liberty "and honours, and of another when thoſe conteſts "were over, and their judgment grown cool again."

Conſidering with myſelf therefore what might be the reaſon of this, I think it is becauſe men are more apt to be miſtaken in generals than particulars. The Plebeians at Rome thought themſelves more wothy of the Conſulſhip than the Nobility, as they were ſo much the more numerous body, and not only bore the chief burden and hardſhips in all wars, but were the greateſt ſupport of public liberty, and contributed moſt to the aggrandizement of their country; upon which, their pretenſions ſeeming to them in no wiſe unreaſonable, they reſolved to aſſume that honour at all events. But when they came to make choice of proper perſons from among themſelves to fill the Conſulſhip, they began to find their weakneſs, and ſoon perceived, that no particular man amongſt them was equal to what they thought they had deſerved altogether. Aſhamed of their incapacity therefore, they gave their votes for ſuch as they knew were really more worthy; upon which occaſion, Livy cries out in ſome ſort of admiration, "hanc modeſtiam, æquitatemque "& altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quæ "tunc populi univerſi fuit? Where ſhall we ſee now "a days that degree of modeſty, equity, and magnani- "mity even in any one one man, which was then ſo con- "ſpicuous in a whole people?" As a further confirmation of this matter, I ſhall produce a remarkable proof from what happened in Capua, after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at the battle of Cannæ. Upon that overthrow, all Italy, and the Capuans in particu-

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lar, began to rebel againſt their Governors, out of an ancient emulation which ſubſiſted betwixt the Senate and the People there. But Pacuvius Calavius being then firſt Magiſtrate in that City, and ſeeing the ferment it was in, hit upon the following expedient to reconcile the People and Senate. In the firſt place, he called the Senate together, and having repreſented to them how implacably they were hated by the people, the danger they were in of being murdered by them, and the City delivered up to Hannibal, now the affairs of the Romans were in ſo deſperate a condition, told them at laſt that if they would leave things to him, he would reconcile all differences betwixt them; but that it was abſolutely neceſſary for their preſervation, that they ſhould be all locked up together in the Senate houſe, and delivered up into the hands of the People; after which, he would anſwer for their ſafety. The Senators ſubmitting to this, he told the people in a conference that the time was come at laſt when they might ſufficiently humble the Nobility if they pleaſed, and take a full revenge upon them for the many injuries they had received at their hands; for he had them all ſhut up together in his cuſtody: but as he imagined they would not think of leaving the City wholly unprovided with Magiſtrates and Senators, he was of opinion they ſhould create new ones firſt to ſupply the vacancies, in caſe they had a mind to diſpatch the old ones: for which purpoſe, he had brought a purſe thither with the names of all the Senators in it, out of which he deſired they would draw them one by one, and he would take care that every man of them ſhould be put to death immediately, as ſoon as they had appointed another in his room. The drawing accordingly begun, and upon the firſt name that came out, a great outcry was ſet up of Tyrant, Oppreſſor, &c. and Pacuvius aſking whom they would have to ſucceed him, a general ſilence enſued; after which, one of the Plebeians was propoſed: no ſooner was he mentioned however, but ſome burſt out a laughing, others began to hiſs, and others to abuſe him, ſome in one manner and ſome

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in another: ſo that in ſhort, as they proceeded to name the others, there was not ſo much as one that was thought worthy of that dignity. Pacuvius therefore, taking the advantage of this diſpoſition in the people, told them that ſince they did not think it convenient the City ſhould be without a Senate, and could not agree in the choice of new Senators, they had better be reconciled to the old ones, who would be ſo humbled by the apprehenſions they had been in, that they might expect to find that moderation as well as ability in them, which it ſeemed they could not hope for in others. A reconciliation accordingly enſued betwixt them; and the miſtake they had lain under was ſoon diſcovered, when they came to the diſcuſſion of particulars.

The people are likewiſe often deceived in judging of the circumſtances and ſituation of things; and are not capable of being diſabuſed, till they come to view them more nearly. After the year 1414, moſt of the the principal Citizens of Florence being driven out of that City, and no regular Government left, but rather a licentious ſort of miſrule, under which, things fell into greater confuſion every day; ſeveral of the popular party, who ſaw the Republic could not ſubſiſt, and not being able to penetrate into the true cauſe, imputed it to the ambition of certain leading men amongſt them, who (as they gave out) fomented theſe diſorders, in order to deprive them of their liberties, and mold the State into ſuch a form, as they beſt liked themſelves: theſe aſperſions were induſtriouſly propagated in every part of the City, by perſons who daily abuſed the principal Citizens, both in public and private companies, threatening, that if ever they ſhould get into the Signiory, they would not fail to bring their miſdeeds to light, and puniſh them ſeverely. But afterwards, when ſome of thoſe very men came into authority, as they had wiſhed, and from that degree of eminence were enabled to ſee further and clearer into things, they ſoon began to perceive the cauſes of theſe diſorders, the dangers that hung over their heads, and the

the difficulty of providing any effectual remedy: and finding they were owing rather to the malignity of the times, than to any particular men, they presently changed both their opinion and conduct; as a more intimate knowledge of particulars had opened their eyes, and convinced them of the prejudices they had conceived, and the errors they had lain under, whilst they judged of things by general appearances. So that those who had heard them talk in another strain, whilst they were private men, and saw them act in a manner so different from their former professions when they had got into power, could not be persuaded that this was the effect of more experience, or deeper insight into the State of affairs, but that they were either corrupted by others, or intoxicated with their own power: and the same thing happening several times afterwards gave rise to the proverb, "Costoro hanno un' "animo in piazza, & uno in palazzo; these men are of "one opinion in the house, and another out of doors."

From what has been said therefore, it appears, that it is an easy matter to undeceive the people, by setting particulars before their eyes, when they have been misled by judging of things in general, as Pacuvius did at Capua, and the Patricians at Rome; and, I think, we may conclude upon the whole, that no prudent man ought to despise the judgment of the people in particular matters, such especially as the distribution of offices and honours, in which they are so seldom wrong, that if a smaller number were to have the disposal of them, they would err much oftener*. It may not then

* Very different is old Montaigne's opinion upon this point. "A dozen men, says he, must be culled out of a whole nation, to judge an acre of land; and the judgment of our inclinations and actions, the hardest and most important thing that is, we must refer to, vox populi, the mother of ignorance, injustice, and inconstancy. Is it reasonable that the life of a wise man should depend upon the judgment of fools? "An "quidquam Stultius," says Tully in the fifth book of his Tusculan Disputations, "quam quos singulos contemnas, eos aliquid putare esse uni-"versos? Can any thing be more foolish than to think, that those "you despise when single, can be of any value in the bulk?" He that makes it his business to please them, will never succeed; it is a mark that never to be reached or hit. "Nihil tam inestimabile est quam "opinio multitudinis. Nothing is to be so little esteemed as the

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ſeem foreign to our purpoſe, to ſhew in the next Chapter what methods the Senators of Rome took to overreach the Plebeians, in diſtributions of this nature.

" judgment of the multitude." Demetrius pleaſantly ſaid of the voice of the people, " That he made no more account of that " which came out of their mouth, than of what fumed from their " lower parts." Cicero goes further in his ſecond book de finibus. " Ego hoc judico, ſays he, ſi quando non turpe ſit, tamen non eſſe non " turpe, quum id a multitudine laudatur. I am of opinion that " though a thing be not foul in itſelf, yet it cannot but become ſo when " it is commended by the multitude." No art, no dexterity, could conduct our ſteps in following ſo wandering and ſo irregular a guide. In the confuſion and noiſe of vulgar opinion no good path can be choſen: let us not then propoſe to ourſelves ſo variable a Conductor; let us conſtantly follow our own right reaſon; let the approbation of the public follow us, if it will; and as it wholly depends upon fortune, we have no cauſe to expect it ſooner any other way than that,

—— Non quicquid turbida Roma
Elevet, accedas, examenque improbum in illâ
Caſtiges trutinâ, nec te quæſiveris extra.

—— Whatever reſtleſs Rome
Extols or cenſures, truſt not to its doom:
Stand not th' award of an ill-judging town,
Nor by its falſer ſcale adjuſt your own.
No, no, for other judgments aſk no more,
To know thyſelf, thyſelf alone explore.

PERSIUS, Sat. i. v. 5.

If popular opinion, nevertheleſs, be of that uſe to the Public, as to keep men in their duty; if ſome are thereby excited to virtue; if Princes are moved by hearing the world bleſs the memory of Trajan, and abominate that of Nero; if it moves them to ſee the name of that great beaſt, once ſo terrible and dreaded, now ſo freely curſed and reviled by every ſchool-boy, let it, in the name of Heaven, increaſe and be cheriſhed as much as poſſible amongſt us. For even Plato himſelf, bending his whole endeavour to make his Citizens virtuous, adviſes them not to deſpiſe the good eſteem of the People, and ſays, " That " it happens by a certain Divine inſpiration, that even the wicked " themſelves, as well by word as opinion, can often diſtinguiſh the " good from the evil." This Perſon and his Tutor are marvellous bold Artificers, to add Divine operations and Revelations wherever human force is wanting: and perhaps it was for this reaſon, that Timon railing at him, calls him " the great Forger of Miracles," as Cicero ſays in his firſt book de naturâ deorum, cap. xx. " Ut Tragici Poetæ confugiunt ad Deum aliquem, cum aliter explicare argumenti exitum non poſſunt. As Tragic poets have recourſe to " ſome Deity, when they cannot otherwiſe tell how to wind up the " plot." Book II. Eſſay 16.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLVIII.

To prevent a mean or wicked man from being advanced to the Magiſtracy, care ſhould be taken to ſet a Candidate of the nobleſt family, and moſt eminent merit, in competition with one of the baſeſt and vileſt of the People.

WHEN the Patricians began to be apprehenſive that Tribunes, veſted with Conſular power, would be choſen out of the Plebeians, they always had recourſe to one or other of theſe two expedients; they either ſet up ſome of the worthieſt and moſt reſpectable of their own order, or corrupted ſome of the moſt ſordid and baſeſt of the Plebeians to ſtand Candidates, and boldly to ſollicit that honour which was only due to the moſt deſerving. The latter method made the people aſhamed of beſtowing it upon ſuch unworthy men; and the former, of taking it from thoſe that were the moſt deſerving. This may ſerve as a corroboration of what I ſaid in the preceding Chapter, that though the people are frequently deceived in judging of generals, they very ſeldom err in particulars.

CHAP. XLIX.

If ſuch Cities as Rome, which were originally free, found it exceeding difficult to make laws ſufficiently effectual to ſecure their liberties; it is almoſt impoſſible for thoſe that have always been in a ſtate of ſervility and dependence ever to become free.

HOW difficult a matter it is to eſtabliſh ſuch laws in a Commonwealth, as may at all times effectually preſerve its liberties, is ſufficiently evident from the hiſtory of the Roman Republic. For though many good proviſions were at firſt made by Romulus,

and

and afterwards by Numa, then by Tullus Hoſtilius, Servius, and laſtly by the Decemviri who were created for that purpoſe; yet in proceſs of time freſh exigencies and accidents often made new laws neceſſary; as it happened when they created the Cenſorſhip, which was one of thoſe Inſtitutions that chiefly contributed to preſerve the liberties of Rome ſo long; for as the Cenſors were appointed to inſpect the manners and conduct of the Citizens, and to correct their enormities and extravagancies, it was in a great meaſure owing to them that they continued uncorrupt for ſuch a number of years. They were guilty of a great error however, in the creation of theſe officers, ſince they were to continue five years in power: but this was afterwards wiſely corrected by Mamercus the Dictator, and the term of their authority reduced to eighteen months: at which the Cenſors were exaſperated to ſuch a degree, and watched his conduct ſo narrowly, that they found means at laſt to expel him the Senate, to the great regret both of the Patricians and the Plebeians. That Livy does not inform us whether Mamercus found any redreſs upon this occaſion, muſt either be a neglect in the Hiſtorian, or a defect in the laws: for ſurely that Commonwealth cannot be wiſely conſtituted, where a Citizen is liable to be perſecuted without reſource or means of defence, only for promulging a law for the maintenance of public liberty.

But to our purpoſe: I ſay that from the creation of theſe new Magiſtrates, we may obſerve how difficult it is, even in States that were originally free, like Rome, and ſubject to no other power, to make ſufficient proviſions for the ſupport of liberty: and, how almoſt impoſſible for other States, which were founded, and always have lived in ſubjection, ever to make ſuch laws as may effectually ſecure them in the enjoyment of liberty and tranquillity. We might inſtance in the caſe of Florence, which being ſubject to the Roman Empire in its origin, and always accuſtomed to live under the government of others, continued a long time in that State of ſervility, without ſo much

as ever aſpiring to liberty: at laſt, however, ſome little attempt was made, and the Citizens began to form new laws for themſelves: but as they were mixed and entangled with the old ones, which were bad, they had little or no efficacy: and thus they continued two hundred years, as appears from authentic hiſtory, without any regular form of Government that deſerved the name of a Republic. The ſame difficulties and inconveniencies that occurred in that State, have ever been incident to all others, which had the like origin: and though ample authority has often been truſted in the hands of a few Citizens, to new model it by the free ſuffrages of the people, yet they never conſulted the good of the public in thoſe reformations, ſo much as their own private advantage: whence it came to paſs, that things grew worſe and worſe, inſtead of better, and their confuſion daily increaſed.

But to be ſtill more particular: Amongſt other things which ought to be conſidered by a Legiſlator, he ſhould take great care in whoſe hands he lodges the cognizance of capital cauſes, and the execution of penal laws *. This was well attended to at Rome,

* Lord Bacon, in a piece entitled, "A Propoſition to his Majeſty "for the compilement and amendment of our Laws," ſays, "It is "certain that our Laws, as they now ſtand are ſubject to great uncer- "tainty and variety of opinions, delays, and evaſions: from whence "it follows: 1. That the multiplicity and length of ſuits are great; "2 That the contentious perſon is armed, and the honeſt ſubject "wearied and oppreſſed; 3. That the judge is more abſolute, who "has a greater liberty in doubtful caſes; 4. That the Chancery "Courts are more filled, the remedy of the Law being often obſcure "and doubtful; 5. That the ignorant Lawyer ſhrouds his ignorance "of Law in this, that there are ſo many and ſo frequent doubts; 6. "That mens aſſurances of their lands and eſtates by Patents, Deeds, "and Wills, are often ſubject to queſtion and precarious; and many "inconveniencies of that nature." He then obſerves, "That if it "had not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports, the law by that time "would have been almoſt like a Ship without Ballaſt; ſince the Caſes "of modern experience are fled from thoſe that have been adjudged "and ruled in former times." "But the neceſſity of this work," continues he, "is yet greater in the Statute Law. For firſt, there is "a number of enſnaring penal laws, which lie upon the ſubject, and "if they ſhould be awaked, and put in execution in bad times, would "grind them to powder. There is a learned Civilian who expounds

an appeal to the people being allowed in moſt caſes: and in any matter where the neceſſity was preſſing, and it might be dangerous to delay the execution of juſtice by an appeal, they created a Dictator, who ſaw it immediately performed; they never had recourſe to this remedy however, except upon very urgent occaſions. But Florence, and other Cities of the ſame ſervile caſt, had a foreign officer ſent to reſide amongſt them by their Prince, who veſted this authority in him: which cuſtom they kept up after they became free, and continued the ſame power in a foreigner, whom they called their Captain; a dangerous practice indeed! conſidering how eaſily ſuch a perſon might be corrupted by the more powerful Citizens *. But other revolutions happening in that State, this cuſtom was afterwards changed, and eight of their own Citizens were appointed to execute the Office of Captain, which was ſtill worſe and worſe; becauſe, as I have ſaid elſewhere, where there are but few Magiſtrates, they are always liable to be made tools of by thoſe, that have the chief power in their hands. Againſt this inconvenience, they have made admirable proviſion at Venice, where there is a Council of Ten appointed, with power to puniſh any Citizen without appeal: and leſt their authority ſhould

" that paſſage in the Scripture, " Pluet laqueos ſuper eos; It ſhall " rain ſnares upon them," of a multitude of penal Laws, which are " worſe than ſhowers of hail and tempeſt upon Cattle, becauſe they " fall upon men. There are ſome penal laws fit to be retained, but " their penalty is too great; and it is ever a rule, that any over-great " penalty (beſides the acerbity of it) deadens the execution of the " Law. There is a further inconvenience of penal Laws, obſolete " and out of uſe; for that it brings a gangrene, neglect, and habit " of diſobedience upon other wholeſome Laws, that are fit to be con- " tinued in practice and execution: ſo that our Laws endure the tor- " ment of Mezentius, the living die in the arms of the dead. Laſt- " ly, there is ſuch an accumulation of Statutes concerning one mat- " ter, and they are ſo croſs and intricate, that the certainty of the " Law is loſt in the heap." If there was reaſon for ſuch a repreſentation at that time; ſurely there is much more at preſent. But we may thank Heaven, that " the cognizance of capital cauſes, and the " execution of penal Laws are lodged in ſuch hands as they are;" otherwiſe what would become of us?

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book II. towards the beginning, and alibi paſſim.

not

not be sufficient to controul persons of more than ordinary power or quality, there are two Councils of Forty *, and the Pregadi † besides, (which is the highest Court in that City) and all of them commissioned to take cognizance of capital offences, and to punish them: so that, if there is any body to accuse, there are always judges enough, and of sufficient authority to curb offenders of the highest rank. If Rome then, which was originally free, and governed by so many wise Citizens of its own, found daily occasion to make new laws for the maintenance of its liberties, according to the variety of unexpected contingencies; it is no wonder that other Cities, which stood upon so much weaker foundations, should meet with such difficulties and obstacles in their way, that they could never surmount them, and become perfectly free.

CHAP. L.

That no one Magistrate or Council should have it in their power to stop the course of public affairs in a Commonwealth.

TITUS Quintius Cincinnatus, and Caius Julius Mento, being Collegues in the Consulship at Rome, but disagreeing and thwarting each other in their measures, all public business was at a stand: upon which, the Senate advised them to create a Dictator to expedite those affairs, which their quarrels would not suffer them to dispatches. But the Consuls, though they differed in every thing else, unanimously agreed to oppose the creation of a Dictator: so that the Senators having no other remedy, were

* Le Quarantie are two Tribunals, each of which consists of forty judges, and has its particular jurisdiction, one taking cognizance of criminal, the other of civil causes.

† This Council is composed of two hundred Senators, and is called the Pregadi, or Court of Requests, because at its first institution it was prayed to charge itself with the care of the Commonwealth.

obliged to have recourſe to the Tribunes, who, with the aſſiſtance of the Senate, at laſt compelled them to ſubmit. From hence, in the firſt place, we may obſerve, of how great utility the Inſtitution of Tribunes was to that Republic, not only in curbing the ambition and inſolence of the Patricians to the Plebeians, but in moderating thoſe differences and emulations that happened amongſt themſelves: and in the next, that ſpecial care ſhould be taken in a Commonwealth, not to put it in the power of a few perſons to clog or impede the common courſe of affairs, particularly of things, the diſpatch whereof, is abſolutely neceſſary for the ſupport and welfare of the State. For example, if you lodge the power of diſtributing honours and emoluments in the hands of ſuch a Council, or appoint ſuch an officer to execute any other of your commands, you ought either to make ſome proviſion beforehand, that will force them to diſcharge thoſe functions, or in caſe they will not, to reſerve a power of appointing others that may and will: otherwiſe that Inſtitution will be both defective and dangerous; as it would have proved at Rome, in the inſtance juſt now quoted, if they had not had the authority of the Tribunes to quell the obſtinacy and perverſeneſs of the Conſuls.

In the Republic of Venice, where the majority of the great Council have the diſpoſal of all honours and employments, it once happened, either through diſguſt, or ſome other motive, that they would not appoint any new Magiſtrates to ſucceed the old ones in their ſeveral departments either at home or abroad, when their authority expired; which preſently occaſioned great confuſion and diſorder: for the towns that depended upon them, and indeed their own City itſelf, being left deſtitute of lawful judges, could obtain no redreſs in any injury, till either the majority of that council were appeaſed, or ſome other expedient found out. And certainly this would have been attended with fatal conſequences, if they had not been prevented by ſome of the moſt prudent Citizens, who took

took a favourable opportunity to get a law paſſed, that no office or employment whatſoever, either within the City or without it, ſhould ever be vacated till new officers were choſen to ſuperſede the old ones: and thus this defect was remedied, and the great Council deprived of a power to interrupt the courſe of juſtice and other public affairs, which otherwiſe muſt have ended in the total diſſolution of that State.

CHAP. LI.

That a Prince or Republic ſhould ſeem to do that out of favour and liberality, which they are forced to do by neceſſity.

WISE men make the beſt of all circumſtances, and though they find themſelves under an abſolute neceſſity of acting in a particular manner, yet they always contrive to do it with ſo good a grace, that it ſeems rather the effect of favour and liberality than neceſſity. Of this addreſs the Roman Senate availed itſelf, when it reſolved to pay the Soldiery out of the public treaſury, who before were obliged to maintain themſelves in time of war at their own expence. But the Senate perceiving that no war could be long ſupported upon this footing, and conſequently that they ſhould neither be able to carry on any ſiege of importance, nor tranſport their armies into diſtant countries, both which they thought muſt ſome time become neceſſary, reſolved to pay them out of the public ſtock: yet it was done in ſuch a manner, that they made a merit of what was entirely owing to neceſſity: by which they firmly ſecured the affections of the people, who were overjoyed at a favour ſo extraordinary, that they never had conceived any hopes of obtaining, nor even ſo much as thought of ſoliciting it. And though the Tribunes took great pains to perſuade them, that it was ſo far from being an Act of Grace as they imagined, that it would rather be a

very heavy burden than otherwiſe, as grievous taxes muſt be laid upon them to defray that expence, and conſequently that if the Senate was bountiful, it was out of other men's purſes; yet all their remonſtrances were to no purpoſe, for the people ſtill looked upon it as a great obligation, which they thought conſiderably enhanced by the manner of raiſing the taxes; much the heavier part of them and thoſe which were firſt collected being levied upon the nobility.

CHAP. LII.

The beſt, the ſafeſt, and leaſt offenſive way to repreſs the inſolence of a private perſon, who grows too powerful in a Commonwealth, is to be beforehand with him in the means he takes to advance himſelf.

WE have ſeen in the laſt Chapter how wonderfully the Senate ingratiated themſelves with the Plebeians, by their ſeeming bounty, in allowing them pay in their wars, and by their lenity in collecting the taxes: and if they had perſiſted in that courſe, they would not only have prevented all ſubſequent diſſenſions in Rome, but wholly deprived the Tribunes of their credit with the people, and conſequently of all authority in the City. For indeed there is no better method, nor eaſier, nor leſs apt to excite diſturbances in a Commonwealth, eſpecially a corrupt one, when an ambitious and overgrown Citizen is to be oppoſed, than to anticipate him in the ways and means by which he propoſes to accompliſh his deſigns. It is certain, if this method had been followed by Coſimo de' Medici's enemies, it would have been better for them than driving him out of Florence: for had they imitated his example in careſſing and cajoling the people, they might have diſarmed him of thoſe weapons which he moſt effectually availed himſelf of, without violence or diſguſt. Pietro Soderini acquired all the power he had in Florence

rence merely by favouring the people, which gave him the general reputation of their Protector and the Champion of the public liberty: and without doubt thoſe Citizens, who began to grow jealous of his authority, would have acted much more wiſely, more honourably, and ſecurely in foreſtalling him in the ways he took to aggrandize himſelf, than in oppoſing him with ſuch vehemence as to endanger their country at the ſame time: for, if they had deprived him of thoſe arms, in which his ſtrength chiefly conſiſted (as they eaſily might have done) they would have had it in their power to over-rule and defeat his meaſures in all Councils and public deliberations, without any violence or the leaſt apprehenſion of the people. But ſhould any one object, that if the Citizens, who oppoſed Pietro, were guilty of an error, in not being beforehand with him in the methods by which he gained ſuch a reputation amongſt the people; I anſwer, that Pietro likewiſe was wanting to himſelf in not guarding againſt the means which they took to make themſelves formidable to him. In this however, he was in ſome meaſure excuſable, becauſe, in the firſt place, it would have been exceeding difficult and dangerous; and the next, he did not think it conſiſtent with his honour: for the method they took to depoſe him, was to ſet up the Medici againſt him, by whoſe co-operation they ſucceeded in their deſigns, and at laſt effected his ruin. Pietro therefore, could not in honour deſert the people, whoſe liberties he had undertaken to defend, and go over to the Medici: nor, if he had ſo deſigned, could he have done it ſo ſecretly and ſuddenly, but the people would have been aware of it, which muſt have been of fatal conſequence to him; for then they would have perſecuted him as much as ever they had careſſed him before: ſo that it would have encreaſed the ſtrength of his enemies, and given them a fairer opportunity of ruining him.

It is neceſſary therefore, in all undertakings, to conſider every thing maturely beforehand, and not

to take a reſolution in which the danger is ſure to over-balance the advantage propoſed, how feaſible ſoever it may appear in ſome lights: otherwiſe, a man may expect to meet with the ſame fortune that Cicero did, who, inſtead of ruining Marc Anthony, as he deſigned, ſtill added to his reputation and greatneſs. For when Anthony had aſſembled a powerful army, conſiſting chiefly of the ſoldiers who had followed the fortune of Julius Cæſar, and was declared an enemy to his Country by the Senate, Cicero, in order to alienate the affections of his Soldiers from him, adviſed the Senate to put Octavius at the head of their army, and ſend him with the Conſuls againſt Anthony; alledging, that the very name of Octavius Cæſar (as he was Nephew to Julius) would bring over all his uncle's friends to him, by which Anthony muſt be ſo weakened, that it would be an eaſy matter to ſuppreſs him. But it happened quite contrary; for Octavius being corrupted by Anthony, deſerted the intereſts of Cicero and the Senate, and joined the enemy; by which alliance, both they and their whole party were utterly ruined. And this indeed might have eaſily been foreſeen: ſo that they ſhould by no means have liſtened to Cicero's advice, but have been jealous of the very name of a perſon, who had enſlaved his Country, and made himſelf abſolute lord over it: and not to have ſo fondly hoped that any of his family or followers would ever do any thing in favour of liberty.

CHAP. LIII.

That the People, deluded by a falſe appearance of advantage, often ſeek their own deſtruction: and that they are eaſily moved by magnificent hopes and promiſes.

AFTER the Romans had taken the City of Veii, the people became poſſeſſed with a conceit, that it would be much for the advantage of the State, if

if one half of them ſhould go to live there; for as the country was rich and well cultivated, it would ſupport them very well, and the City being ſo near Rome, it could not occaſion any confuſion or alteration in the government of the Commonwealth. But the Senate and wiſeſt of the other Citizens thought this would be of ſo pernicious conſequence, that they freely and publicly declared they would ſooner die, than ever conſent to it: ſo that when the thing came to be debated, the people were exaſperated at the Senate to ſuch a degree, that they would certainly have taken up arms, and great tumults and bloodſhed muſt have enſued, if ſome of the oldeſt and moſt reſpectable Citizens had not interpoſed their authority and checked the fury of the multitude.

From hence we may obſerve, in the firſt place, that the populace are often ſo far deceived with a falſe appearance of good, as to ſolicit their own ruin and bring infinite dangers and difficulties upon the Commonwealth, if they are not undeceived by ſome perſon whom they reverence and confide in, and convinced by him that they are in the wrong. But when it happens that they have been formerly deceived either by perſons, or in the appearance of things, and cannot repoſe that confidence in any one, then ruin muſt of neceſſity enſue. So true is what Dante tells us in his Canto upon Monarchy.

Il popolo molte volte grida
Viva la ſua morte, & muoia la ſua vita.

Strange caprice! oft the ſenſeleſs multitude
Chuſe death inſtead of life, and ill for good.

To this diffidence in the people it is ſometimes owing that a Commonwealth cannot come to any good reſolution, as we have obſerved before with regard to the Venetians, who, being attacked by many enemies at once, could not reſolve to make their peace with any one of them, by reſtoring what they uſurped; which

which was the cauſe * of the war wherein ſo many powers combined againſt them, that they were brought almoſt to the brink of ruin.

If we conſider therefore, to what things it is eaſy, and to what it is difficult to perſuade the multitude, we ſhall find, that if the meaſures propoſed to them appear at firſt ſight to be either magnanimous, or like to be attended with great profit, they come into them with much eagerneſs, though ever ſo deſtructive at the bottom: on the other hand, if they ſeem puſillanimous, or ſuch as may endanger their intereſt, it will be very difficult, if not impoſſible to make them go down, notwithſtanding others may be convinced, that they will really prove ſalutary and advantageous in the end. The truth of this may be confirmed by numberleſs examples out of the Roman, and other Hiſtories, both ancient and modern. From hence aroſe the bad opinion, which the people of Rome conceived of Fabius Maximus, who never could perſuade them that it was the ſafeſt way to act upon the defenſive againſt Hannibal, and to waſte his forces by ſlow meaſures, without hazarding an engagement with him: for they thought it looked like cowardice, and not being able to diſcern the expediency of proceeding in that manner, his arguments had not the leaſt effect upon them. Nay, ſo obſtinately do people ſometimes perſiſt in errors of this kind, that though they gave the officer who was next in command under Fabius, authority to fight the enemy, in ſpite of his General, and their army would certainly have been routed, if it had not been prevented by the prudence of Fabius; yet they were ſo far from being convinced of their error, that they afterwards made Varro Conſul upon no other account, but becauſe he had boaſted in every public place of the City, that if they would veſt him with proper authority, he would ſoon give a good account of Hannibal and his army. What was the conſequence? He fought him indeed,

* The famous league of Cambray.

but

but ſuffered ſo total a defeat at Cannæ, that Rome was never before in ſuch danger of utter ruin. Let me cite another inſtance out of the ſame Hiſtory. Hannibal having been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled that Province with the ſlaughter of the Romans, when Marcus Centenius Penula (a man of very mean extraction, but of ſome rank in the army) preſented himſelf one day to the Senate, and told them, that if they would give him a Commiſſion to raiſe an army of volunteers, he would engage to deliver Hannibal either dead or alive into their hands very ſoon. Now, though the Senators looked upon this only as a piece of fool-hardineſs, yet, conſidering, that if his requeſt ſhould be refuſed, and the people come to know of it, perhaps it might occaſion ill-blood and ſedition in the City, and they might be obliged to comply with his requeſt though againſt their inclinations; chuſing therefore rather to hazard the loſs of thoſe that were ſimple enough to follow him, than to run the riſque of exciting freſh diſcords at home; as they well knew how much ſuch a reſolution would be applauded by the people, and how impoſſible to convince them of its abſurdity. In conſequence of this Commiſſion, he marched with a diſorderly and undiſciplined body of men againſt Hannibal, whom he engaged, but failed of his promiſe; for he, and all the reſt of them were cut to pieces. If we look into the Grecian Hiſtory, we ſhall there find, that Nicias, one of the wiſeſt of the Athenians, could never make that people ſenſible of the pernicious conſequences that muſt proceed from their invading Sicily: ſo that in contempt of his opinion, and that of other prudent men, they perſiſted in an expedition which proved the ruin of their State. When Scipio was made Conſul, he deſired to have Africa for his province, and ſaid he would undertake to demoliſh Carthage; but as the Senate, by the advice of Fabius Maximus, refuſed him that favour, he threatened to propoſe it to the people, well knowing how fond they were of ſuch enterprizes. We might likewiſe produce ſeveral examples

examples in our own City, as when Hercules Bentivoglio, and Antonio Giacomini, generals of the Florentine forces, had routed Bartolomeo de' Alviano, at St. Vincenzo, and went to lay siege to Pisa. This undertaking was resolved on by the people, who were in a manner fascinated by the positive assurance of success they had from Bentivoglio, though most of the wisest Citizens opposed it: but the tide ran so strong against them, and the people were so dazzled with those promises, that it was all to no purpose.

I say then, that there is no surer way to ruin a Commonwealth, in which the people have any considerable share of authority, than to propose gallant, but dangerous enterprizes to them; for where they have the greatest weight, such undertakings will always be embraced as seem to carry an air of magnanimity with them; nor will any other person who dissents from them, how wise soever he may be, have it in his power to provide a remedy.

But let it be remembered, at the same time, that if these things most commonly end in the destruction of the State, the particular promoters and conductors of them very seldom escape ruin: for, as the people make not the least doubt of success, so they never impute any miscarriage to ill fortune, or want of power in the Commander, but to treachery or ignorance; for which, he is almost certainly either put to death, banished, or imprisoned: as it happened to many of the Carthaginian and Athenian Generals. Nor are their former successes and services in the least considered upon these occasions: their present misfortune cancels the memory of all past merits; as it fell out in the case of the abovementioned Antonio Giacomini, who, not taking Pisa as he had promised *, and the people expected, fell into such disgrace with them, that, notwithstanding the many great services he had formerly done the Republic, he was suffered

* Machiavel says a little before that it was Bentivoglio, that gave them assurance of success: so that he seems to have made a mistake here.

to

to live more through the lenity and gratitude of thoſe that were in authority, than from any conviction of his innocence, or deſire in the people to ſave him.

CHAP. LIV.

How greatly the preſence of a grave man in authority contributes to appeaſe an enraged multitude.

THE ſecond thing obſervable from the paſſage related in the beginning of the laſt Chapter, is, that nothing conduces more to bridle the rage of an angry multitude, than the preſence of ſome grave man in authority: for as Virgil ſays,

Tum pietate gravem ac meritis ſi forte virum quem
Conſpexêre, ſilent, arrectiſque auribus adſtant.
Æn. I. 154.

If then ſome grave and pious man appear,
They huſh their noiſe, and lend a liſt'ning ear.
Dryden.

Thoſe therefore that command armies or govern cities, ſhould always upon any mutiny or ſedition, take care to preſent themſelves (whether to their Soldiers or Citizens) in the moſt reſpectable and awful manner, clothed in all their enſigns of office and authority, to inſpire the greater veneration and reverence. Not many years ago Florence was divided into two factions, called the Frateſchi and Arrabiati, who at laſt fell together by the ears: but the former being worſted, and the mob on the other ſide going to plunder the houſe of Paolantonio Soderini, (one of the heads of the Frateſchi, and a Citizen of great reputation in the Republic at that time) his brother Franciſco, then Biſhop of Volterra, and now a Cardinal, happening to be there and hearing the uproar, immediately put on his richeſt robes and Epiſcopal Rochet, and went out to meet the armed multitude,

whom

whom he ſoon appeaſed by gentle language and the dignity of his perſon: a circumſtance that was much talked of, and applauded at that time. I conclude then, that there is no way ſo proper or neceſſary to compoſe a popular commotion, as the interpoſition of ſome perſon of a grave and reſpectable preſence.—To return therefore to the ſubject of the laſt chapter, we may ſee from the inſtance there cited, how obſtinately the Roman people were bent upon removing to Veii, becauſe they had taken it into their heads that it would be greatly for their advantage, without ever conſidering the diſadvantages that lay concealed under ſo ſpecious an appearance: and that from the tumults which aroſe upon that occaſion great miſchiefs muſt have enſued, if the Senate had not wiſely applied the authority and good offices of ſome grave and reſpectable perſons to prevent them.

CHAP. LV.

How eaſy a matter it is to govern a State where the People are not corrupted; how hard to erect a Principality where there is an equality amongſt them; and that where there is no equality, a Commonwealth cannot be eſtabliſhed.

THOUGH we have elſewhere already diſcourſed at large concerning what is to be hoped or feared from corrupted States, it may not appear altogether ſuperfluous however, to conſider a reſolution of the Roman Senate upon a vow made by Camillus to dedicate a tenth part of the ſpoils taken from the Veientes to Apollo. But this booty having fallen into the hands of the Commonalty and there being no other way of getting an exact account of it, the Senate publiſhed an edict, requiring every one to bring a tenth part of his plunder to the public Treaſury. Now though this edict was ſoon after revoked, and another method found of ſhewing their gratitude to Apollo, without

without diſguſting the people*, yet it ſhews the confidence which the Senate had in their honour, and that they made no doubt of their punctually fulfilling the purport of the edict as they were commanded: on the other hand, we ſee that the people did not take any indirect means to evade the force of it by delivering falſe accounts, but openly and honeſtly oppoſed it as an illegal exaction. This and many other examples which I have produced before upon other occaſions, may ſerve to demonſtrate the probity and devotion of that people, and what confidence was repoſed in them upon that account. Indeed no good at all is to be expected where theſe principles are not to be found, as we have ſufficient experience at preſent in thoſe States that are moſt corrupted; but above all in Italy, and even in France and Spain too, which are not without their ſhare of corruption: and if there are not altogether ſo many diſorders in the two laſt mentioned, as daily happen in Italy, it is not ſo much owing to the virtue of the people, who are much degenerated, as to the form of their government, which being Monarchical, keeps them united in the power of their Princes and the vigour of their laws, which are not yet totally corrupted. In Germany indeed there ſtill remain ſtrong traces of ancient goodneſs and virtue: to which it is owing that many Republics there retain their liberty, and keep up their laws and diſcipline in ſuch force, that no enemy, either foreign or domeſtic, dares to attack them†: and that this is really matter of fact, I ſhall prove from an example not altogether unlike that juſt now mentioned relating to the Senate and people

* As it was reſolved to ſend a golden veſſel to Delphos, and there was no gold to be had in the City, the Roman Ladies did a very generous thing upon this occaſion, which delivered the people out of their perplexity: for they met together, and agreed to conſecrate all their Jewels to this purpoſe. In acknowledgment of which ſacrifice, the Senate granted them the honour of funeral Orations, which the men only had been favoured with till that time.

† The great and rapid conqueſts which Charles V. made in this Country but a few years after, ſhew, either that our Author's Maxim does not always hold good; or that the Germans were become very corrupt, all on a ſudden as it were.

of

of Rome. When these Republics have occasion for money upon the public account, the Councils or Magistrates in whom the supreme authority is lodged, lay a tax of one, and sometimes perhaps of two per cent. according as the exigency requires, upon every man's property: after which, at the time and place appointed, the people having first taken an oath that they pay their respective proportions to the full of their property, throw their money into a chest provided for that purpose by the Collectors of the taxes, who never count it, or require any other proof or voucher, but their own consciences. From hence it appears, how much virtue and regard to Religion are left among this people: for we may be assured that every man pays his due; because if they did not, the whole would not amount to the sum it used to do at the same rate; in which case the fraud would have been long ago detected and another method taken. And this degree of honour and integrity is so much the more to be admired, as it is now so rare, and to speak truth, hardly any where else to be found; which I think is chiefly owing to two causes. In the first place, they never have had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them, and seldomer going abroad themselves; but living contented with the food and clothing which are the product of their own country, and thereby preventing all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners: thus they have kept themselves untainted by the example of the French, the Spaniards, and Italians, three nations that are wicked enough to debauch the whole world. In the next place those Commonwealths that have kept themselves free and uncorrupt, will not suffer any of their Subjects to live like gentlemen; on the contrary they always maintain as much equality amongst them as they can: and in Germany they hold such persons in so great abhorrence, that if by chance any of them fall under their lash, they certainly put them to death as the authors of all corruption and disorder. By Gentlemen, I mean such as live in idleness and luxury upon the

the income of their eſtates, without any profeſſion or employment; a ſort of Subjects that are very pernicious in every Republic and Province: though indeed thoſe are ſtill more ſo that are called Lords, and have Caſtles and Juriſdictions and Vaſſals of their own. With theſe two ſorts of men the Kingdom of Naples, the territories of Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy abound: from whence it comes to paſs that there is no ſuch thing as a free Sate in all thoſe Provinces, becauſe the Nobility are mortal enemies to that kind of Government, and indeed to all civil liberty; and therefore to attempt the eſtabliſhment of a free Republic in ſuch countries would be a fruitleſs labour. But if any one had it in his power to new model the Government of thoſe Countries, he muſt of neceſſity reduce them into Monarchies; for where the whole maſs is ſo corrupted that laws are not a ſufficient remedy, recourſe muſt be had to forcible meaſures and regal authority, to controul the ambition and correct the licentiouſneſs of the Nobility, with a high hand and arbitrary power. The neceſſity of proceeding in this manner is obvious from the example of Tuſcany, where three Commonwealths, Florence, Siena, and Lucca, have ſubſiſted a long time, though that Country is not a large one: and notwithſtanding the reſt of the Cities in that Province are dependent upon them, yet from their ſpirit and manner of government, it plainly appears that they are in ſome meaſure free, and would be ſo entirely if they could: the Reaſon of which is, that there are but very few Gentlemen there, and no Lords, with ſuch juriſdiction as I have beforementioned: but ſuch an equality amongſt the inhabitants, that an able man who was well acquainted with the political government of ancient Republics, might eaſily eſtabliſh a free Commonwealth there: yet ſo great has been their misfortune hitherto, that they never have had any perſon that either could, or knew how to go about ſo laudable an undertaking.

From what has been ſaid we may draw this concluſion, that whoſoever ſhall endeavour to found a Com-

monwealth where there are many Nobles and Gentlemen, will never effect his purpose, except he can first root them all out: on the other hand, whoever would establish a Kingdom or Principality where there is nearly an equality amongst the people, will not be able to succeed in that attempt, unless he ennobles several of the most ambitious and turbulent disposition amongst them; and that too not only in title but in fact, by giving them Castles and other possessions, by heaping favours and riches upon them, by exalting them to honour and preferments, and by granting them power and jurisdiction*; that so while they maintain the authority of the Prince, and he supports them in their ambition, the rest of the people must be obliged to wear a yoke, which nothing but downright force and necessity could ever make them submit to: and thus when the power of the Prince over-balances the strength of the people, things may be kept in good order, and every man within his proper bounds. But since no body but a man of great authority, and rare abilities, can constitute a Monarchy in a Country that is naturally disposed to a Republican form of Government, or erect a Republic in one that is calculated for a monarchy, many have attempted both, but few have succeeded in either; the greatness of the undertaking dismaying some, and the difficulty embarrassing others in such a manner, that most of them have failed in their first endeavours. The example of Venice may seem perhaps to refute my position, that a Commonwealth cannot be formed where Gentlemen abound; because none but such as are Noble Venetians (or Gentlemen, which is the same) can be admitted into any

* This is practised by the Kings of Spain in their Sicilian and Neapolitan dominions, where there are few Villages that are not erected into Principalities, Duchies, or Marquisates; those nations being wonderfully fond of great titles. This policy serves two ends in countries that are subject to revolutions. In the first place, it ruins the Nobility by making them spend their fortunes to support such titles in a sumptuous manner: and in the next, it secures the people who are thereby made slaves and enemies to the Nobility. So that they can never join to deliver their country from Tyranny; for if one side should endeavour to introduce a new Government, the other would be sure to oppose it.

office

office, or ſhare in the adminiſtration of that State. But this inſtance does not in the leaſt invalidate my aſſertion: for the Venetian Nobles are rather ſo in name than in fact; as they have no great poſſeſſions in land or eſtates, their riches chiefly conſiſting in moveable goods and merchandize. Beſides, none of them have any Signiories or juriſdiction over others: ſo that a Gentleman amongſt them is nothing more than a title of honour and pre-eminence, not founded upon any of thoſe circumſtances which make them ſo conſiderable in other places. And though in other Commonwealths the Citizens are diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral orders, yet at Venice they are divided into two only, the Nobility and the Commonalty; the former either actually enjoying or being qualified to enjoy all employments and poſts of honour, whilſt the latter are totally excluded from them*; which occaſions no diſturbance in the State for reaſons that have been elſewhere already aſſigned. Let him therefore who would eſtabliſh a government, form a Republic, if there either is, or he can make, an equality amongſt the inhabitants of the Country: on the contrary, if there is a great and manifeſt inequality, let him erect a Monarchy; otherwiſe his Government will not be duly poiſed, and conſequently of ſhort duration.

* There are ſeveral Employments in that Republic at preſent, however, peculiarly appropriated to the Cittadini or common Citizens, and to which the Nobles are never admitted; as the Chancellorſhip, the Offices of Secretary of State and Embaſſies, the function of Reſidents, &c. But properly ſpeaking, theſe Nobles and Citizens are all Merchants, ſome of whom have a ſhare in the adminiſtration, and others none at all: the firſt abuſing the power which they have over their dependents, from whom they exact great ſubmiſſion, and are ſtiled their Excellencies, as if they were Princes.

CHAP. LVI.

Before any great misfortune befals a State, it is generally either prognosticated by some Portent, or foretold by some Person or other.

WE see from many instances, both in ancient and modern History, that before any great misfortune happens to a State, it is commonly foretold either by soothsayers, or revelation, or signs in the heavens, or some other prodigy. How this comes to pass I know not: but not to go far for a proof, every one knows that friar Girolamo Savonarola foretold the return of King Charles VIII. of France into Italy before it happened *; and that, besides this prediction, it was reported all over Tuscany, that armed men were seen fighting in the air over the town of Arezzo, and the clashing of their arms heard by the people there †. It is likewise generally known, that

* See what is said of this Prophet in chap. vi. of the Prince; chap. xi. and xlv. book I. of the Political Discourses. Savonarola foretold the return of that Prince into Italy indeed, but it did not happen; as Mr. Bayle has proved at large in his Notes upon the word *Savonarola*, in his Dictionary: where likewise the Reader will find sufficient argument to convince him, that notwithstanding the extraordinary austerity of his life, the fervour and eloquence of his Sermons, and his pretension to Divine Revelations, he was certainly an impostor, a false Prophet, and influenced by worldly considerations, to act the part he did. The whole, though very curious, is much too long to be inserted here. See likewise General Dictionary, vol. ix. p. 83, & seq.

† It grieves one to find such stories as these, scattered in great abundance, not only through the works of Pagan Authors, but even through those of the greatest and best of the Jewish and Christian Historians.—To give but two or three instances. The writer of the History of the Maccabees, book II. chap. v. says, "About the same time Antiochus prepared for his second voyage into Egypt. And then it happened, that through all the City, for the space of almost forty days, there were seen Horsemen running in the air in cloth of gold, and armed with lances, like a band of Soldiers: and troops of horsemen in array, encountering and running against one another, with shaking of shields, and multitudes of pikes, and drawing of swords, and casting of darts, and glittering of golden ornaments, and harness of all sorts. Wherefore, every man prayed that Apparition might turn to good." Thus likewise, d'Avila tells us, in the tenth Book of his History of the Civil Wars of France, "That there was a Prophecy

before

before the death of Lorenzo de' Medici, the Dome and moſt part of the Church of St. Reparata in Flo-

current, not only in the camp, but through the whole Kingdom, that Henry III. ſhould be killed by a Friar." See vol. II. p. 52. of the laſt Tranſlation. And in the eleventh book he ſays, "That before the battle of Yvry, a heavy ſtorm of rain falling from the Heavens, with dreadful thunder and lightning, threw the whole army into a terrible panic: not only becauſe retreats have an ill aſpect to thoſe that are not acquainted with the ſecret motives of their Commanders, but on account of the fame that was ſpread abroad of the prodigious ſtrength of the enemy's forces, and becauſe both fortune and the weather ſeemed to conſpire againſt their own army, which was almoſt half drowned, and marched as if it was flying under favour of the night, though cloſe drawn up, and in good order. The terror of the rawer men was increaſed by a frightful Phænomenon, which, as the rain ceaſed, appeared in the middle of the ſky: for there were ſeen two large armies of a blood-red colour, which viſibly ruſhed together in the air, amidſt horrible claps of thunder, and ſoon after diſappeared, leaving the event uncertain, and were covered again with exceeding thick and dark clouds. This ſpectacle, though diverſely interpreted by many, ſeemed moſt probably, as they thought, to portend the ruin and deſtruction of their army, which being inferior in ſtrength, and entirely deſtitute of any other aſſiſtance than their own forces, retired, as if it was already conquered, whilſt the Enemy kept advancing; and the rather, becauſe theſe were the very places where the king's predeceſſors and his faction of the Hugonots loſt the firſt battle againſt the Duke of Guiſe, in the late Civil wars, and in which, the prince of Condé was both wounded and taken priſoner amidſt a terrible ſlaughter of his men." p. 116, 117.

The ſtory of the Apparition of St. James of Compoſtella mounted upon a white Horſe, and fighting like a Dragon for the Spaniards, againſt the Moors, might likewiſe here be recited out of the Spaniſh Hiſtorians, and a thouſand more out of our own, if ſuch traſh was worth tranſcribing —Montaigne, however, ſeems to approve of theſe things; for ſpeaking of Tacitus, book III. chap. viii. he ſays, "A man may think him bold in his ſtories, as where he ſays, that a ſoldier carrying a burden of wood had his hands ſo frozen to it, that they were ſevered from his arms. Annal. XIII. cap. xxxv. I always ſubmit to ſo great authorities in ſuch things. In what he ſays alſo of Veſpaſian, Hiſt. lib. IV. cap. lxxxi. that by the favour of the God Serapis, he cured a blind woman by anointing her eyes with his ſpittle, and I know not what other miracles, he follows the example and duty of all good Hiſtorians, who keep Regiſters of ſuch events as are of importance. Amongſt public accidents are alſo common rumours and opinions; for it is their part to relate the things commonly believed, not to regulate them: that is the province of Divines and Philoſophers, who are the guides of men's conſciences. Quintus Curtius therefore, wiſely ſays, lib. IX. cap. i. "Equidem plura tranſcribo quam credo: nam nec affirmare ſuſtineo de quibus dubito, nec ſubducere quæ accepi, i. e. Indeed I relate more things than I believe, for as I will not take upon me to affirm things whereof I doubt, ſo I cannot ſmother what I have heard." We might likewiſe quote the authority of Livy in this reſpect, lib. I. in the preface, and lib. VIII. cap. vi. "Hæc neque affirmare neque refellere operæ pretium eſt . . . . . famæ rerum

rence, were beat down by lightning *; that before the diſgrace and baniſhment of Pietro Soderini (who had been appointed Gonfalonier for life by the Florentines) the Palace was demoliſhed in the ſame manner. Many other examples of this kind might be produced; but for the ſake of brevity, I ſhall mention only one more, and that out of Livy, who tells us, that one Marcus Cædicius, a Plebeian, reported to the Senate, that as he was paſſing along the Via Nova at midnight, he heard a voice, much louder than that of any man, which commanded him to go and tell the Magiſtrates, that the Gauls were upon their march to Rome †. The cauſe of theſe things, I think, is not unworthy of diſcuſſion by ſuch as are better verſed in the knowledge of natural and ſupernatural matters than I pretend to be. Perhaps, (as ſome Philoſophers are of opinion) the air may be full of intelligent Beings, which foreſeeing future events and compaſſionating mankind, give them timely warning by theſe notices, to provide againſt the calamities that are to befal them ‡. However that may be, no-

ſtandum eſt, i. e. It is not worth while either to affirm, or to refute theſe matters; we muſt ſtand to report." And as Tacitus wrote in a century, when the belief of Prodigies began to decline, he ſays, he ſhould not omit giving a place to things, however, received by ſo many worthy men, and with ſo great reverence to Antiquity. This was well ſaid: let them deliver Hiſtory to us, more as they receive, than as they believe it.—If ſuch Hiſtorians are to be commended, certainly our good Sir Richard Baker, and ſome others, of more recent dates, deſerve the higheſt applauſe.

* See the end of the laſt book of the Hiſtory of Florence.

† See lib. V. cap. xxxii.

‡ The Philoſophers here meant, are probably the Cabbaliſts, or Roſicrucians, who ſuppoſe there are elementary Beings called Sylphs, Gnomes, Salamanders, &c. and that this Science introduces people into the ſanctuary of nature. They pretend that the Hebrews knew theſe aereal ſubſtances; that they borrowed their Cabbaliſtic knowledge from the Egyptians; and that they have not yet forgot the art of converſing with the inhabitants of the air. The Abbé de Villars pleaſantly expoſes the ridiculous ſecrets of theſe Roſicrucians in his Compte de Gabalis. It is certain, however, that the notion of good and bad Angels, Genii, Dæmons, Intelligences, Spirits, or by what other name any one has a mind to call them, was ſpread all over the Eaſt long before the promulgation of Chriſtianity, both the Jews and Heathens believing that, not only every nation, but every particular perſon, had one of each ſort of theſe Beings, that was continually endeavouring to do him either good or harm, according to the degree of

thing

thing is more certain than that ſuch preſages have been obſerved. and that ſome great and heavy misfortune has always attended them.

their reſpective powers; as might be ſhewn at large from a thouſand paſſages both in ſacred and profane hiſtory. Every one remembers the Dæmons of Socrates, Plotinus, Brutus, &c. Indeed all the Chriſtian Churches countenance it: in the Liturgy of our own we pray, "That God, who has ordained and conſtituted the ſervices of Angels and men in a wonderful order, would mercifully grant, that as his holy Angels always do him ſervice in Heaven; ſo, by his appointment, they may ſuccour and defend us on earth, &c." The Calviniſts admit of it; and the Romiſh Church makes it a practical Doctrine. "No ſyſtem is better adapted, ſays a great Modern, to bring the Doctrine of the Platoniſts (duly rectified) into repute, than the Doctrine of occaſional cauſes. I know not what may happen, but it is my opinion, that mankind will be forced, one time or other, to abandon mechanical Principles, unleſs they aſſociate to them the wills of intelligent Beings or Spirits: and to ſay the truth, no Hypotheſis is better fitted to account for events, than that which admits of ſuch an aſſociation; I mean ſuch events eſpecially as go by the name of caſualty, fortune, good luck, ill luck, dreams, &c. the cauſes of which are certainly regulated and determined by general laws, that are unknown to us; but which are probably only occaſional cauſes, like thoſe that make our ſouls act upon our bodies." Some have taught that the whole world is filled and animated by Genii; others have compared the nature of theſe Intelligences with triangles. For, according to them, the Divine nature is like that of an equilateral triangle; that of Dæmons to a triangle, two ſides of which are equal, and the other unequal; whilſt that of man is like one, all ſides of which are uneven. —But as the field is large, thoſe that are deſirous of making further diſcurſions into it are referred to the learned Dr. Dodwell's Diſſertation on the Genius or Fortune of the Emperors. Prælect. 2. ad Spartiani Hadrianum, p. 174, & ſeq. To vol. I. p. 192. IV. p. 19. VII. p. 336. VIII. p. 436. IX. p. 527. X. p. 221. of the General Dictionary; to vol. I. No. 12. of the Spectator; and to vol. I. No. 13. and 48. of the Tatler, where this Subject is much better handled.

"Milton, (ſays Mr. Addiſon) has finely deſcribed this mixed communion of men and Spirits in the earthly Paradiſe; and had doubtleſs his eye upon a verſe in old Heſiod, which is almoſt word for word the ſame with his third line, in the following paſſage."

——— Nor think though men were none,
That Heav'n wou'd want Spectators, God want praiſe:
Millions of ſpiritual creatures walk the Earth
Unſeen, both when we wake and when we ſleep.
All theſe with ceaſeleſs praiſe his works behold
Both day and night. How often from the ſteep
Of echoing hill or thicket, have we heard
Celeſtial voices to the midnight air,
Sole, or reſponſive to each other's note,
Singing their great Creator? Oft in bands
Whilſt they keep watch, or nightly rounding walk,
With heav'nly touch of inſtrumental ſounds
In full harmonic number join'd, their Songs
Divide the night, and lift our Soul to Heaven.

CHAP. LVII.

The Multitude united is ſtrong and formidable; but ſeparated, it is weak and contemptible.

MANY of the Romans, after their country had been plundered and laid waſte by the Gauls, left Rome, and went to live at Veii, contrary to the expreſs injunctions of the Senate. Upon which, another Edict was publiſhed, to remedy this diſorder, commanding every one, upon very ſevere penalties to return to his former habitation before a certain time: and though every body made a joke of this Edict at firſt; yet, when the day appointed drew near, they all thought fit to obey it; for as Livy ſays, "Ex fe-"rocibus univerſis, ſinguli, metu ſuo, obedientes "fuêre: though they were ſo ſtubborn and contu-"macious all together; yet ſingly, every man began "to be afraid of himſelf, and that made them all at "laſt become tractable and obedient". And certainly nothing can give us a more juſt idea of the populace in ſuch caſes than this inſtance: for they are always refractory and bold at firſt, and ſpeak freely againſt the decrees of their Sovereign; but when they ſee the rod ſhaken over their backs, they begin to diſtruſt each other, and every one takes care of himſelf.

From hence it appears, how little account is to be made of what the multitude ſays, either for or againſt the government of their Prince; provided he is in a condition to keep them in a good humour, when they are ſo, and to prevent them from doing him any hurt when they are in a bad one. By a bad humour, I mean ſuch as proceeds from any common occurrence, and muſt except that regret which is owing either to the loſs of their liberties, or of ſome Prince that was much beloved by them, and is ſtill living; for, upon ſuch occaſions, their reſentment is always very

very ſharp, and cannot be kept under without rigorous meaſures But as to diſguſts which ariſe from other cauſes, they are eaſily diſſipated; eſpecially when they have no body to head them: for as there is nothing ſo terrible as their fury in one caſe, ſo nothing is more weak and contemptible in the other; becauſe, though they may have arms in their hands, they are preſently reduced, if one can ſtand their firſt ſhock: ſince when their ardour begins to cool, they muſt naturally be ſenſible they are doing wrong; and therefore, every man beginning to be afraid for himſelf, will endeavour to provide for his own ſafety, either by flight, or making his peace ſome other way. When the populace therefore are once in motion, it is their beſt way, in order to ſecure themſelves, to chuſe ſome leader, who may not only regulate their proceedings, but keep them firm together, and take proper meaſures for their ſecurity; as the Roman people did when they left the city upon the death of Virginia, and appointed twenty Tribunes to protect them: otherwiſe it will always happen, as Livy obſerves, that when they are united, they will be ſtrong and reſolute; but when divided, and every man thinks only for himſelf, they will become feeble and abject.

CHAP. LVIII.

That the multitude are wiſer and more conſtant in general than a Prince.

LIVY, and all other Hiſtorians agree, that nothing is more changeable than the multitude: they often condemn a man to death, and afterwards bitterly lament the loſs of him; as it happened in the caſe of Manlius Capitolinus, whom the Roman people firſt ſentenced to die, and then bewailed his death: "populum brevi," ſays Livy, "Poſteaquam ab eo "periculum nullum erat, deſiderium ejus tenuit; "after the people were out of all danger from him, they

" they heartily wiſhed him alive again *." And in another place, where he is ſpeaking of what happened at Syracuſe, after the death of Hieronymus, nephew to Hiero, he ſays, " Hæc natura multitudinis " eſt, aut humiliter ſervit, aut ſuperbè dominatur ; " ſuch is the nature of the multitude, they either ſervilely obey, or inſolently domineer."

I know not therefore, whether in endeavouring to defend a notion that is exploded by all other authors, I may not have taken a taſk in hand, which I ſhall either be obliged to abandon with diſgrace, or find very difficult to acquit myſelf of with reputation : but however that may be, I think, and always ſhall think, there can be no harm in maintaining an opinion by arguments and reaſoning alone, where no violence is offered to enforce it. I ſay then, in regard to the fault with which writers in general reproach the multitude, that particular men, and Princes eſpecially, are as liable, or more ſo perhaps, to be accuſed of it : for every one that does not regulate his conduct by laws, will behave himſelf as ill as a multitude that has broke looſe from all reſtraint. This may plainly appear, if we conſider how few good and wiſe Princes there are, or ever have been in the world ; I mean ſuch Princes as have had it in their power to violate the laws, and break down the barriers that were oppoſed to their licentiouſneſs or ambition †. Amongſt ſuch indeed, we may number the Kings of Egypt, who reigned in the moſt early times, when that country was governed

* Thus likewiſe the ſame Hiſtorian ſays, in the caſe of Appius Claudius (not the Decemvir) lib. II. cap. lxii. " Haud ita multum interim temporis fuit : ante tamen quam prodicta dies veniret, morbo moritur : cujus laudationem cum Tribuni plebis impedire conarentur, plebs fraudari ſolenni honore ſupremum diem tanti viri noluit : & laudationem tam æquis auribus mortui audivit, quam vivia ccuſationem audierat, & exequias frequens celebravit."

† Diocleſian uſed to ſay, " That nothing was more difficult than than to govern well ;" and he perfectly knew the reaſons of that difficulty. They are recited by Vopiſcus, an author who remarks, that in the great number of Roman Emperors, there were reckoned but very few good Princes, and commends the expreſſion of a Jeſter, who uſed to ſay, " That all the good Princes might be painted in a ring." Vopiſc. cap. xliv.

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by laws; to whom we might add thoſe of Sparta, and in our own age thoſe of France alſo, which Kingdom is ruled with more lenity and veneration for the laws, than any other that we know of at preſent *. But Princes that live in ſuch governments as theſe and are reſtrained by laws, are not to be compared with a diſſolute and unbridled rabble, or ranked amongſt thoſe whoſe natural diſpoſition we are to examine in common with that of other men, to ſee whether it reſembles the diſpoſition of the united body of the people; becauſe, in that caſe, we ought likewiſe, on the other hand, to compare them with thoſe common people who are under the ſame reſtrictions as themſelves, and then we ſhall find full as much goodneſs in one as the other, and that the populace are neither apt to be too inſolent when in power, nor too abject in ſubjection; but like the Roman people, who whilſt the Republic continued incorrupt, ſhewed no ſigns either of one or the other, but kept up their proper dignity with honour, and lived like free men, in due obedience to the laws and authority of their Magiſtrates. If it became neceſſary indeed, at any time, to make a ſtand againſt ſome deſigning and over-powerful Citizen, they did it effectually; as in the caſe of Manlius Capitolinus, the Decemviri, and ſeveral others, who were taking meaſures to oppreſs and enſlave them. On the contrary, when the intereſt of the public required it, they were no leſs obedient to their Conſuls and Dictators, than they had been ſtubborn and inflexible in maintaining their rights and liberties at other times. Nor was their regret for the death of Manlius at all to be wondered at, ſince it was the memory of his virtues that occaſioned it, which were ſuch as made every one lament the loſs of him, and might have made a Prince behave as they did, in the ſame circumſtances; for nobody can deny that it is natural for all men to praiſe and admire virtue, even in their enemies; and it is my opinion, that if Man-

* Some exceptions might be made in theſe times.

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lius could have been raiſed from the dead, in the midſt of their lamentations for him, the people would have paſſed the very ſame ſentence upon him again. In like manner we read of ſeveral Princes, and ſuch as have been accounted wiſe ones too, that have put people to death whom they heartily wiſhed alive again; as Alexander did in the caſe of Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod with regard to Mariamne. But what Livy ſays concerning the nature of the multitude, is not meant of ſuch a one as is reſtrained by a regard to Laws, like the Roman people; but of a ſeditious unbridled rabble, like that of Syracuſe, which have broke their reins, and behave like madmen; committing a thouſand irregularities and extravagancies, like Alexander and Herod in the inſtances juſt now cited.

The multitude therefore is no more to be accuſed of fury and inconſtancy than a Prince: for they are both ſubject to caprice and enormities when they are above the Laws, and can tranſgreſs with impunity: of which ſeveral examples might be produced (beſides thoſe already quoted) from amongſt the Roman Emperors and other Princes and Tyrants, who were guilty of as much levity and inconſiſtency in their conduct as ever any multitude was. I muſt beg leave then to differ from the common opinion, that the people when maſters are more light, changeable, and ungrateful than particular Princes: indeed if any one ſays they are both ſo, he will be pretty near the mark; but if he declares in favour of the latter, he is very much miſtaken. For the people that have the authority wholly in their own hands, and conduct themſelves according to the Laws, will act with as much, or perhaps more ſteadineſs, prudence, and gratitude than any Prince, be he accounted ever ſo wiſe: on the contrary, a Prince that has got above the power of the Laws, will be more fickle, imprudent, and ungrateful than any multitude whatſoever; which does not proceed ſo much from any diverſity in their natures, (for they are pretty much the ſame; or if there be

be any ſuperiority in this caſe, it is on the ſide of the people) as from the difference of the veneration which they reſpectively have for the laws of their country. If we examine the conduct of the Roman people, we ſhall find that for the ſpace of four hundred years they hated the very name of King, as much as they were fond of glory, and ſtudious for the good of the Commonwealth, which plainly appears from numberleſs inſtances. But if any one ſhould object that they were ſhamefully ungrateful to Scipio, a former diſcourſe, wherein I have proved at large that the people are not ſo ungrateful as Princes, may ſerve for a ſufficient anſwer *. As to prudence, ſtability, and judgment, I maintain that they far exceed Princes in thoſe qualifications: and there is much reaſon in that ſaying, "Vox populi vox Dei: the voice of the people is the "voice of God:" for it is certain that the united body of the people ſeldom err in their prognoſtications; ſo that it ſeems as if they foreſaw the good or evil that was to befal them by ſome ſecret inſtinct or inſpiration. In judging of doubtful matters they are very rarely miſtaken: when two Orators for inſtance, equally eminent in their profeſſion, have harangued them upon different ſides of a queſtion, they hardly ever fail to incline to what is moſt rational; which ſhews that they are capable both of diſcovering truth and embracing it: and if they ſometimes err in their judgment concerning ſuch actions as appear either magnanimous, or highly for their advantage, (which we have allowed before) † are not Princes oftener miſled by a variety of paſſions, to which they are much more ſubject, and greater ſlaves than the people? In the election of Magiſtrates they make a more judicious choice than Princes; for it is a very difficult matter to perſuade them to advance a man of corrupt morals or infamous character; which yet is an eaſy and common thing with Princes. If they take a diſguſt to any thing they retain it for ages; but Princes

* See Chap. xxix. of this Book.
† See Chapters xlvii. and liii. of this Book.

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ſoon change their opinions: of both which things, I will give an inſtance in the Roman people, who during the courſe of ſo many hundred years, and in the choice of ſo many Conſuls and Tribunes, did not make above four elections of which they had any cauſe to repent; and held the name of King in ſuch deteſtation, as I have obſerved before, that no Citizen, how much ſoever they were obliged to him, ever affected that name or power, who did not feel the weight of their reſentment. It is evident likewiſe that thoſe States where the people have had the chief authority, have always extended their dominion further, and in a ſhorter time, than ever they were able to do under the government of any Prince; as the Romans did after the expulſion of Kings, and the Athenians when they had ſhook off the yoke of Piſiſtratus: for which no other reaſon can be aſſigned, than that a popular Government is better than a Regal one. Nor can the paſſages quoted out of Livy at the beginning of this chapter, or elſewhere, in any wiſe ſerve to invalidate this aſſertion: for when all the good and ill qualities are duly ſtated betwixt a Prince and a popular Government, it will plainly appear that the balance will be greatly in favour of the latter, eſpecially in point of probity and true glory *. But if a Prince ſeems to

* "I know ſome men of parts, ſays Mr. Bayle, who are ſurpriſed, that in Kingdoms where the Prince's authority is unlimited, the inſtructors of youth are allowed to read the books of the ancient Greeks and Romans to them, in which we find ſo many examples of the love of liberty, and ſo many antimonarchical Maxims." But this is not more ſurpriſing than to ſee Republican States permit their Law-Profeſſors to explain the Code and Digeſt, in which there are ſo many principles which ſuppoſe the Supreme and inviolable authority of the Emperor. Here we ſee two things which ſeem equally ſurpriſing, but in reality ought not to ſurpriſe any body: for omitting ſeveral reaſons which might be urged, may we not ſay, that the ſame books which contain the poiſon with regard either to Monarchs or Republics, contain likewiſe the Antidote? If we ſee on one hand the great Maxims of liberty, and the noble examples of courage, with which it has been maintained or recovered; we ſee on the other, factions, ſeditions, and tumultuous humours, which diſturbed, and at laſt ruined that infinite number of little States, which ſhewed themſelves ſuch zealous enemies to tyranny in ancient Greece. Does not this picture ſeem to be a leſſon very capable of diſabuſing thoſe that are terrified

have the advantage in enacting good laws, and eſtabliſhing new Statutes and inſtitutions for the benefit

at Monarchy? Mr. Hobbes thought ſo; for he publiſhed a Tranſlation of Thucydides with this view. Turn the tables, and you will find that this picture will be very proper to give an inſtruction different from the former, and to ſtrengthen the horror againſt Monarchy: for whence came it (ſome one may ſay) that the Greeks and Romans choſe rather to be expoſed to theſe confuſions than to live under a Monarchy? Did not this ariſe from the hard condition to which Tyrants had reduced them? And muſt not an evil be very grievous, inſufferable, and deplorable, when people chuſe to deliver themſelves from it at ſo dear a rate? It is certain that the deſcription which Hiſtory has left us of the conduct of ſeveral Monarchs gives us horror, and makes our hair ſtand of an end. It is to no purpoſe to object, that, generally ſpeaking, more diſorders have been occaſioned by the conſpiracies which have put an end to Tyranny, than there would have been by ſuffering it; or to urge what happened upon the death of Hiero the Syracuſan. The people of Syracuſe, who had enjoyed great happineſs under the long reign of that Prince, immediately loſt their patience under his Succeſſor, who governed in a tyrannical manner, and not only killed him in the very beginning of the ſecond year of his reign, but ſoon after put two of Hiero's daughters, and three of his grand-daughters, to death alſo. Of theſe five Princeſſes, there were three againſt whom no complaint had been made, and who had fled as it were to the foot of the altar. Was not this removing one Tyranny to eſtabliſh a greater, "ut tyrannos ulciſcendo, quæ odiſſent ſcelera ipſi imitarentur," as Heraclea, one of Hiero's daughters, repreſented to her murderers? Was Livy in the wrong to remark upon this occaſion, "that the people are incapable of keeping within due bounds, and that they are humble even to baſeneſs when they obey, but inſolent to the laſt degree when they command?" The maſſacre of theſe five Princeſſes was not the raſh action of ſome private perſons only: it was commanded by the Senate and people of Syracuſe, and this too whilſt the memory of Hiero was ſtill freſh amongſt them, a Prince whom they had loved ſo tenderly and juſtly. But the injuſtice of their barbarous decree was ſo manifeſt, that they immediately perceived it and revoked it; which ſignified nothing, for it was already executed. The factions however were not extinguiſhed by the entire extirpation of that family; they increaſed daily, and in a ſhort time overturned the liberty of the country; for they expoſed Syracuſe to the Romans, who beſieged and conquered it. Silius Italicus finely deſcribes the confuſion into which that City fell after the Tyrant Hieronymus and his relations were killed.

Sævos namque pati faſtus, Juvenemque cruento
Flagrantem luxu, & miſcentem turpia duris,
Haud ultra faciles, quos ira metuſque coquebant
Jurati obtruncant, nec jam modus enſibus, addunt
Fæmineam cædem, atque inſontum rapta ſororum
Corpora proſternunt ferro, nova ſævit in armis
Libertas, jactatque jugum, pars Punica caſtra,
Pars Italos & nota volunt: nec turba furentum
Deſit, quæ neutro ſociari fœdere malit. Lib. XIV. l. 102.

of

of civil ſociety; the other without doubt have ſo much the ſuperiority in maintaining and improving what is already eſtabliſhed, that they deſerve more glory than the founder.

To cut this matter ſhort, I ſay that if ſome Principalities have ſubſiſted for a long courſe of years, there are inſtances of Republics of no leſs antiquity, and that both have owed the length of their duration to the obſervation of their laws: for a Prince that follows no other rule but the dictates of his own will, if he has it in his power ſo to do, is unwiſe and counteracts himſelf; and a people that proceed in the ſame manner deſerve no better title *. Since the compariſon therefore is betwixt a Prince that is reſtrained by laws, and a people in the ſame circumſtances, I am convinced there will be no more virtue found in the latter than in the former: but if we are to compare them as equally free from all ties and reſtrictions of that kind, and perfectly at their own liberty, we ſhall ſtill find fewer and leſs pernicious errors in the people than in the Prince, and thoſe too much eaſier to be remedied. For a licentious and tumultuous

A man may repreſent this as long as he pleaſes, he will not convince thoſe that are prejudiced againſt Monarchy: they will anſwer him, that from the very conſideration, that the diſorders of it cannot be remedied but by ſuch ſhocking miſeries, he ought to conclude that it is a very great evil.

* The following reflection made by Oernhielm, in his Life of Pontus de la Gardie, a Swediſh General, is a very good one, viz. that a Prince who hearkens only to his paſſions without regarding what is due to God, his ſubjects, and the laws of his country, deprives himſelf of the moſt neceſſary ſupports of his power; for he cannot expect to find that fidelity in his ſubjects, which is ſufficient to oppoſe an enemy that ſhall attack him. This he exemplifies in the caſe of Eric, King of Sweden, "Prævenit adventum ducum fama collecti in regem exercitus: ad quam excitus, implorat opem civium, quorum plerique pertæſi acerbi regiminis, ſurdas obvertunt aures precanti, hilares adveniſſe tempus quo jugi indies ingraveſcentis leventur onere, antequam ſuccumbant penitus interituri. Itaque ſubnixus ope paucorum in quorum animis nondum obſoleverat majeſtas ſui principis, congreſſuſque cum pluribus ac fortioribus, non poterat non redigi ad anguſtias. Atque tum præferoci regi adparuit, & favore civium & ſucceſſu fulciendæ potentiæ deſtitui potentes rerum, cum exutâ reverentiâ numinis & legum, examplâ poteſtate uſurpant nil præter trucem quidvis in ſubjectos agendi licentiam. Id Erico regi accidit, quem ſolio ſublimem vidit, ſol oriens, eundum occidens vidit provolutum ad aliena genua"

people are ſoon appeaſed and reduced to right reaſon by the interpoſition of ſome grave and reſpectable perſon *: but who can plead againſt a Tyrannical Prince, or what redreſs is there but the ſword? From hence we may eaſily come to a determination betwixt them, and conclude that evils and diſorders which require the ſharpeſt remedies, are certainly more dangerous than thoſe that may be cured by gentle means. Beſides, when the people are in a ferment, and have thrown off all reſtraint, there is not ſo much to be immediately apprehended from any preſent miſchief they are likely to commit, as from what may afterwards enſue; for ſuch a State of confuſion may chance to end in tyranny: but with regard to a Prince the caſe is quite different; becauſe the preſent evils are moſt grievous, and it is hoped that his enormities will at laſt make him ſo odious, that the people will ſhake off his yoke and reſume their liberties. We ſee the difference then; in one caſe the calamity is actually preſent, and in the other there is only a probability at moſt of its happening: the ſeverity of the people extends only to ſuch as they think are conſpiring againſt the public good; whilſt that of a Prince is chiefly exerted upon thoſe that he imagines may injure his particular intereſts. But the tide of prejudice I know runs high againſt the people: becauſe every body is at liberty to ſpeak ill with impunity of them, even when they have the government in their hands; but againſt a Prince no man dares to open his mouth without much caution and reſerve. Now ſince the ſubject ſeems naturally to lead me to it, it may not be amiſs perhaps to ſay ſomething in the next chapter concerning leagues and confederacies made with Princes or Commonwealths; and to conſider which of them are moſt to be depended upon.

* See Chap. liv. of this Book.

CHAP. LIX.

Whether an Alliance made with a Prince or a Commonwealth is moſt to be confided in.

SINCE it daily happens that Treaties and Alliances are made either betwixt two Princes, or two Commonwealths, or betwixt a Commonwealth and a Prince, it ſeems neceſſary to examine whether the fidelity of a Prince or a Commonwealth be the more ſtable, and to conſider which of them is moſt to relied on; and upon enquiry it appears that in moſt caſes they are much alike, though they differ in ſome. I am perſuaded however, that when either a Prince or a Commonwealth is forced to enter into a treaty by downright neceſſity, neither of them will obſerve the conditions of it; eſpecially if their State ſhould be endangered by it; for in ſuch a caſe, both one and the other would preſently break it, how kindly ſoever they may have been uſed. Demetrius, ſurnamed Poliorcetes, had ſhewn the Athenians many great favours: but happening to be defeated by his enemies, and flying to Athens for refuge, as a people that were his allies, and under conſiderable obligations to him, he was refuſed ſhelter there; a circumſtance that mortified him much more than the loſs of his army *. After Pompey was routed by Cæſar at Pharſalia, he fled into Egypt to Ptolemy, in hopes of finding pro-

* Though he had ſhewn them many great favours, yet he had been guilty of ſuch oppreſſion that they could never forget it. Among other inſtances which might be quoted, he exacted two hundred and fifty talents of them at one time, which he ſaid was for pin-money for his concubine Lamia, a ſaying that galled them more than the loſs of their money: after which he upbraided them with their meanneſs, and told them there was not ſo much as one man amongſt them that had the leaſt ſpark of courage: like the taunt of Tiberius to the Roman Senate mentioned by Tacitus, Annal. lib. III. cap. lxv. "Memoriæ proditur Tiberium quoties curiâ egrederetur Græcis verbis in hunc modum eloqui ſolitum, *O homines ad Servitutem paratos!* Scilicet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tam projectæ Servientium patientiæ tædebat."

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tection there, as he had formerly reſtored that Prince to his Kingdom: but Ptolemy, inſtead of protecting him, baſely cauſed him to be murdered. In both theſe caſes the ingratitude was owing to the ſame cauſe; yet the humanity of a Commonwealth we ſee was greater than that of a Prince *. But whenſoever either one or the other is afraid of ſuffering any great damage, they will both act in the ſame manner.

It muſt be obſerved likewiſe, that if any Prince or Commonwealth ſhould ſo punctually adhere to their engagements as to run the riſque of being ruined by it, their motives for ſo doing may proceed from the ſame cauſes: for as to a Prince, it may probably happen that he is confederated with ſome other great Potentate, who though he cannot protect him at that time, may (as the other is perſuaded) be able to reſtore him to his dominions afterwards, if he ſhould chance to loſe them; or if he has always firmly ſupported his intereſts, he may either think an accommodation with the enemy impoſſible, or that he cannot depend upon his word: which was the caſe of all the Neapolitan Princes who took part with the French when they invaded the Kingdom of Naples. And as to Republics, it was exactly the ſame with Saguntum, which was ruined by continuing firm to its alliance with the Romans; and with Florence in the year 1512, when it ſided with the French.

All things being duly conſidered however, I am of opinion, that where the danger is imminent, it is bet-

* A certain modern ſays, "that Kings do not look upon any one as naturally either their friend or their enemy; but that their private intereſt is the only conſideration by which they judge with whom they are to enter into an alliance. None but the ignorant would rely on the friendſhip of Sovereigns, even towards one another. To ſee the preſents which they exchange, and the intercourſe of reſpectful letters betwixt them in time of peace, would make one believe they are the moſt ſincere friends, and will love each other as long they live; but it is very often true that they are at the ſame time negociating a treaty in order to a rupture, and intend to ſerve one another no longer, than till they have an opportunity of commencing hoſtilities with advantage."

ter to truſt to a Republic than a Prince: for though they ſhould both be diſpoſed to act in the ſame manner, yet the former being ſlow in its motions, will be longer than a Prince before it comes to any reſolution, and conſequently before it determines to violate its engagements. Treaties are generally broken for the ſake of ſome advantage: and in this reſpect, Republics always behave with much more honour than Princes; for we might produce many examples, where a very ſmall matter of gain has tempted a Prince to forfeit his honour, when a proſpect of the greateſt advantage could not corrupt a Commonwealth. Themiſtocles, in an harangue to the Athenians, ſaid he had ſomething to propoſe, which would be of infinite advantage to their country; but that he durſt not make it public to every one, becauſe that would prevent its being put into execution. Upon this, the Athenians deputed Ariſtides to hear his propoſals, and to take ſuch reſolutions upon them as he ſhould think moſt proper. Themiſtocles therefore repreſented to him in private, that the whole Navy of Greece lay in a place (though indeed under the protection of their good faith) where they might eaſily either take or deſtroy every Ship, which would make them abſolute maſters of all the other States in Greece. But when Ariſtides came to make his report to the people, he told them that Themiſtocles had imparted ſomething to him which indeed would be of exceeding great advantage, but highly diſhonourable to the Commonwealth; upon which account it was unanimouſly rejected, without any further enquiry into the nature of it. Now Philip of Macedon and many other Princes, who were governed by ſelf-intereſt in every thing, would not have been ſo ſcrupulous and delicate upon ſuch an occaſion; eſpecially Philip, who gained more by violating his faith than any other method whatſoever. As to breaking a treaty, by not punctually obſerving every article of it, it is ſo common a thing, that I ſhall ſay nothing of it here: I ſpeak only of outrageous and extravagant infractions; of which,

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I am of opinion, a Republic will always be more tender than a Prince, and consequently is more to be confided in.

CHAP. LX.

That the Consulship and all other Dignities in Rome were conferred without respect of age.

IT appears from the History of the Roman Commonwealth, that after the Plebeians obtained the Honour of the Consulship, they admitted any Citizen to it without the least respect either of age or extraction: indeed the Romans at no time ever regarded age, but constantly preferred men of merit and virtue whether they were old or young; as is manifest from the instance of Valerius Corvinus, who was made Consul when he was but twenty-three years of age; which gave him occasion to say (a little ostentatiously indeed) in one of his harangues to his Soldiers, that the Consulship was "præmium virtutis, non sanguinis; the "reward of virtue, not a privilege of high birth." Now whether they acted wisely in this, or not, would bear some debate. As to Nobility of blood, they were under a necessity indeed of dispensing with that; and the same necessity that operated at Rome, must likewise have its weight in any other State that aspires to the grandeur which Rome attained to, as we have elsewhere observed: for men will not expose themselves to all manner of hardships and perils without some hope of reward: nor can they be deprived of the hope of ever obtaining that reward, without manifest danger. It soon became expedient therefore to inspire the Plebeians with the hope of being admitted to the Consulship; with which they were amused a considerable time without obtaining that honour: but afterwards being resolved to live upon expectation no longer, it was found necessary to admit them to it. A State however that has no occasion to employ the

Plebeians in any great and glorious undertaking, may treat them in another manner if it pleaſes, as I ſaid before; but if it affects to emulate the Romans, it muſt make no diſtinction amongſt its ſubjects. So much for this part of the queſtion.

As to the matter of age, it ſeems clear that it is abſolutely neceſſary to make no difference in this point: for in advancing a young man to ſome dignity which requires the prudence of maturer age, we may be aſſured (if the power of electing is in the people) they will never prefer any one that has not highly merited it by his virtue and extraordinary ſervices: and if a young man has diſtinguiſhed himſelf in that manner, it would not only be very ungrateful, but of bad conſequence, if a Commonwealth, inſtead of availing itſelf of ſuch abilities, ſhould wait till he was grown old, and had loſt that vigour of body, that courage and activity which might have been of eminent ſervice to his country *: accordingly we ſee the Romans ad-

* Our laws, ſays Montaigne, book I. chap. lvii. abſurdly determine that a man is not capable of managing his eſtate till he is twenty-five years of age. Auguſtus cut off five years from the ancient Roman Standard, and declared that a man was old enough at thirty to be a Judge. Servius Tullius excuſed Gentlemen of above forty-ſeven years of age from the fatigues of war; Auguſtus diſmiſſed them at forty-five; though methinks it ſeems a little unreaſonable that men ſhould be ſent home to their fire-ſides, till they are fifty-five or ſixty. I am of opinion that our vocation and employment ſhould be extended as far as poſſible for the public good; but I think it a fault on the other hand that we are not employed ſoon enough. This Emperor was Arbiter of the whole World at nineteen, and yet would have a man to be thirty before he could bear the loweſt office. For my part, I believe our underſtandings are as ripe at twenty as they ever will be, or are capable of being. A mind that did not give evident proof of its force by that time, never gave proof of it afterwards. Natural parts and Genius exert themſelves at that term or never. They ſay in Dauphiny

Si l' eſpino no picquo quan nai
A pena que picquo giamai. i. e.

"If the thorn does not prick then, it will ſcarce ever prick."

Of all the great actions I ever heard or read of, I have obſerved both in former ages and in our own, that more have been performed by men before the age of thirty than after; and often too in the lives of the very ſame perſons. May I not ſafely inſtance in thoſe of Hannibal

vanced

vanced Valerius Corvinus, Scipio, Pompey, and many others of that age; and to ſo good purpoſe,

and Scipio? The better half of their lives they lived upon the glory they had acquired in their youth: they were great men after, it is true, in compariſon of others; but by no means in compariſon of themſelves. As to my own part, I do certainly believe, that ſince that age, both my underſtanding and my conſtitution have rather decayed than improved, and retired rather than advanced. It is poſſible that with thoſe who make the beſt uſe of their time, knowledge and experience may increaſe with their years; but the vivacity, quickneſs, ſteadineſs, and other parts of much greater importance, and more eſſentially our own, languiſh and decay

—— ubi jam validis quaſſatum eſt viribus ævi
Corpus, & obtuſis ceciderunt viribus artus,
Claudicat ingenium, delirant linguaque menſque.
Lucret. lib. III. 452.

Sometimes the body firſt ſubmits to age, ſometimes the mind, and I have ſeen enow whoſe brains have failed them and grown weak, before their ſtomach and their legs: and as it is a diſeaſe of no great pain to the Patient, and of obſcure Symptoms, the danger is ſo much the greater. For this reaſon it is that I complain of our Laws; not that they keep us too long to our work, but that they employ us too late. For conſidering the frailty and ſhortneſs of life, and to how many common and natural ſhocks it is expoſed, methinks we ſhould not ſpend ſo great a part of it in ſquabbles about maturity, in idleneſs and education."—Philip de Comines ſays, "it is obſervable that all men whoever became illuſtrious, or performed great actions, began very young; and that this is owing either to education or the grace of God." Lib. I. chap. x. And Sir William Temple ſeems to be of the ſame opinion, though indeed he allows a longer ſpace for it. "When I was younger than I am, ſays he, and thereby a worſe Judge of age, I have often ſaid that what great thing ſoever a man propoſed to do in his life, he ſhould think of atchieving it by that time he is fifty years old. Now I am approaching that age I am ſtill more of that opinion than I was before, and that no man rides to the end of that Stage without feeling his journey in all parts, whatever diſtinctions are made betwixt the mind and the body, or betwixt judgment and memory. And though I have known ſome few, who perhaps might be of uſe in council upon great occaſions till after threeſcore and ten, and have heard that the two late Miniſters in Spain, the Counts of Caſtriglio and Pignoranda, were ſo till fourſcore; yet I will not anſwer that the conduct of public affairs under their Miniſtry has not ſometimes taſted of the lees of old age. I obſerve in this Aſſembly at Nimeguen from ſo many ſeveral parts of Chriſtendom, that of one and twenty Ambaſſadors, there are but three above fifty years old; which ſeems an argument of my opinion being in a manner general. Nor can I think the period ill calculated, at leaſt for a General of Armies, or Miniſter of State in times or ſcenes of great action, when the care of a State or an Army ought to be as conſtant as the Chymiſt's fire to make any great production; for if it goes out, but for an hour, perhaps the whole operation fails. Now I doubt whether any man after fifty be capable of ſuch conſtant application of thought,

that they decreed them the honour of a triumph in the flower of their youth.

any more than of long and violent labour and exercise, which that certainly is, and of the finest parts. Besides, no man that sensibly feels the decays of age and his life wearing off, can figure to himself those imaginary charms in riches and praise, that men are apt to do in the warmth of their blood; and those are the usual incentives towards the attempt of great dangers, and support of great trouble and pains. To confirm this by examples, I have heard that Cardinal Mazarine, about five and fifty, found it was time to give over; that the present Grand Vizier, who passes for one of the greatest men of that Empire, or of this age, began his Ministry about eight and twenty; and the greatest which I have observed, was that of Mr. de Witt, who began at three and thirty and lasted to forty-eight, and could not, I believe, have gone on many years longer at that height, even if he had not come to that fatal end." See the Essay upon curing the Gout by Moxa.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK II.

THE PREFACE.

MEN generally praiſe former ages, and find fault with the preſent, though ſometimes without reaſon: nay, ſo partial are they to Antiquity, that they not only admire things long ſince paſt, the knowledge of which, has been handed down to them by Hiſtory, but fondly prefer the times they remember themſelves in their youth, to thoſe they live in when they are grown old *. Now when they happen to be miſtaken in this point (as they often are) I think the deception may be accounted for ſeveral ways.

In the firſt place, the truth of things ſo very remote cannot be certainly and preciſely known, ſince many events which might entail infamy upon thoſe times are almoſt buried in ſilence, whilſt others, that may contribute to immortalize their glory, are ſet in the faireſt and fulleſt light. For ſo obſequious are

* See the Note upon Zanobi del Pino, Hiſt. Flor. book IV. See alſo the fourth of Sir Thomas Pope Blount's Eſſays, "concerning the Antients, the reſpect that is due to them; and that we ſhould not too much enſlave ourſelves to their opinions:" and his fifth Eſſay, the ſubject of which is, "whether the men of this preſent age are any way inferior to thoſe of former ages, either in reſpect of virtue, learning, or long life."

moſt

moſt writers to the fortune of a Conqueror, that in order to render his victories more glorious, they not only exaggerate his own exploits, but magnify even the conduct and bravery of his enemies in ſuch a manner, that whoever ſhall chance to read the hiſtory either of the Conqueror or the Conquered, in ſucceeding times, cannot help being filled with wonder at ſuch men and ſuch times, and therefore muſt naturally be led to praiſe and admire them. Beſides, as either envy or fear are the common motives of hatred amongſt mankind, thoſe two powerful cauſes being extinguiſhed by time, cannot affect ancient tranſactions, which no longer excite either jealouſy or apprehenſion in any one.—On the contrary, in affairs that we ſee and tranſact ourſelves, of which we have ſo intimate and perfect a knowledge, that no circumſtance can be concealed from us, and wherein we find many things that either hurt or diſguſt, as well as ſome that pleaſe us, we are forced to give the preference to Antiquity, even when, in reality, it deſerves not the ſame degree of glory and praiſe. I would not here be underſtood to ſpeak of arts and ſciences, the progreſs or ſtandard of which is ſo well known, that it is not in the power of time either to add to, or detract any thing from their due credit: I ſpeak only of things that relate to the lives and actions of men, the evidence of whoſe merit is not ſo clear.

I ſay then, that nothing is more common than this cuſtom of praiſing the paſt, and finding fault with the preſent times. It cannot be ſaid, however, that thoſe who do ſo are always in the wrong; nay, they muſt of neceſſity ſometimes have reaſon on their ſide: for, ſince the affairs of this world are perpetually ebbing and flowing, every thing muſt have its viciſſitude of better and worſe. A City, or State, for inſtance, which has been reformed and new modelled upon good Principles, by ſome wiſe and able Legiſlator, will continue to flouriſh and increaſe for a conſiderable

ſiderable time under theſe ſalutary inſtitutions. Thoſe then, that happen to be born there during that period, and yet cannot help giving the preference to former times, are certainly guilty of an error: and that error is owing to the cauſes I have juſt now aſſigned. But others who live afterwards in the ſame City or State, when it is upon the decline, and things grow worſe and worſe every day, cannot juſtly be accuſed of an error in paſſing ſuch a judgment.

When I conſider the courſe of theſe things with myſelf, I am apt to think the world has always been pretty much the ſame, and that there hath at all times been nearly the ſame portion of good and evil in it; but that this good and evil have ſometimes changed their ſtations, and paſſed from one City or Province to another; as we may ſee from the hiſtory of thoſe ancient Kingdoms and Empires, the dominion of which has been transferred from one to another according to the variation of their manners and cuſtoms, whilſt the face of the world in general has ſtill continued the ſame. Thus virtue, which once ſeemed to have fixed itſelf in Aſſyria, afterwards removed its ſeat into Media, from thence into Perſia, and at laſt came and ſettled amongſt the Romans: and if there has been no other Empire ſince the Roman of ſo long duration, or where the virtue of the whole world ſeems to have been collected into one maſs, it has nevertheleſs been diſtributed and parcelled out amongſt ſeveral nations, as France, Turkey, Egypt, ſome time ago, and Germany at preſent; but firſt and above all amongſt the Saracens, who performed ſuch wonderful exploits, and conquered ſo many States, that they utterly deſtroyed the Empire of the Romans in the Eaſt. In all theſe nations then, after the ruin of the Roman Empire, there was, and ſtill is in ſome of them, that portion of virtue which I have been ſpeaking of, and in ſuch a degree as juſtly merits praiſe and admiration. So that the man who

happens to be born there, and takes upon him to prefer paſt times to the preſent, is ſurely miſtaken in his computation: but another that lives in Italy, and is not a Tramontane in his heart, or in Greece, and is not a Turk, has ſufficient reaſon to bewail his lot in falling into ſuch times, and to extol thoſe of his Anceſtors, in which, indeed, he will find many things truly enviable; whilſt in the preſent he meets with nothing but extreme miſery, infamy, and contempt; no regard to religion, laws, good order or diſcipline; but every thing corrupted and polluted to the laſt degree of abomination: and ſo much the ſharper will be his regret and the higher his deteſtation, when he ſees thoſe that ſit "pro tribunali, in the judgment "Seats," who demand nothing leſs than adoration, and who are cloathed with power and authority to correct vice in others, the moſt profligate and abandoned members of the ſtate*.

But to return to my diſcourſe; I ſay that though human judgment is frail, and may err in determining whether the paſt or preſent times are the better, eſpecially in things of which it cannot have ſo perfect a knowledge on account of their great antiquity, as of others that have fallen under their immediate notice; yet that will not excuſe men who deceive themſelves, and indiſcriminately prefer the times and tranſactions that happened when they were young, to thoſe which they experience when they are grown old, ſince they have ſeen both one and the other with their own eyes: nor would they be of that opinion, if the judgment, appetites, and paſſions of men, continued the ſame all their life long. But as theſe vary, though the times may not, it is impoſſible they ſhould ſee the ſame things in the ſame light in their old age that they did in their youth, when their views and inclinations are in a manner totally changed. For ſince our judgment

* The Popes and Cardinals are here meant, it is ſuppoſed.

and

and prudence uſually increaſe as our bodily vigour declines, thoſe things which ſeemed tolerable, or perhaps good, when we were young, muſt neceſſarily appear evil, and probably inſupportable, when we are grown old: ſo that inſtead of carping at the times, we ought to lay the fault upon our own judgment. Beſides, our deſires being inſatiable (as nature ſuffers us to wiſh for every thing, tho' fortune allows us to obtain but few things) the mind of man is continually diſſatisfied, and apt to grow weary of what it poſſeſſes: from whence it comes to paſs that we deſpiſe the preſent times, whilſt we commend the paſt, and wiſh for the future, though we have no reaſonable motive for ſo doing. I know not therefore, whether I may not deſerve to be numbered amongſt thoſe who deceive themſelves in this manner, for having been too liberal in my panegyrics in theſe Diſcourſes, upon the antient times and exploits of the Romans, whilſt I have ſpoke ſo harſhly of our own *: and indeed if the virtue of the one as well as the wickedneſs of the other, had not been as clear as the ſun, I ſhould have been more ſparing both of my praiſe and cenſure, that ſo I might not ſeem to have fallen into that error myſelf which I ſo freely condemn in others. But the caſe being ſo plain that nobody can deny it, I ſhall make ſo ſcruple of declaring my opinion without any reſerve concerning both the paſt and preſent times, in order to excite ſuch young men as may chance to read my works, to imitate the virtues of the one, and avoid the vices of the other, whenever their fortune ſhall call them out into action: for certainly it is the duty of a good man to point out what is great, virtuous, and praiſe-worthy to others, though perhaps either the adverſity of his fortune, or the malignity of the times, will not ſuffer him to execute it himſelf: that ſo when many are inſtructed in what they ought to do, ſome of them per-

* Eſpecially in the Art of War.

haps,

haps, to whom Heaven is more propitious, may be bleſſed with an opportunity of bringing it to effect. Having therefore ſhewn in the firſt book, how the Romans proceeded in their interior eſtabliſhments, I ſhall in the next, conſider the meaſures they took to augment and extend their dominion abroad.

POLI-

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Whether the grandeur of the Roman Empire may be aſcribed to the Virtue, or good Fortune of that people.

PLUTARCH, a very grave author, and many others, are of opinion, that the Romans were more indebted to their good Fortune than their Virtue for the extenſiveneſs of their Empire: and amongſt other reaſons which he aſſigns to confirm the truth of this, he ſays they plainly acknowledge it themſelves, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any other of their Deities. Livy himſelf ſeems to incline to this way of thinking: ſince he very ſeldom introduces any Roman ſpeaking of virtue, but he makes him ſay ſomething of Fortune alſo. But I confeſs I am not of that opinion myſelf; nor do I think it can be properly ſupported: becauſe if no other Commonwealth ever made ſo great a progreſs as the Roman, it is well known that no other Commonwealth was ſo well conſtituted for that purpoſe: for as the valour and excellent diſcipline of their Soldiery were the chief cauſes of their acquiring

ſo extenſive a dominion; ſo their wiſe conduct and the inſtitutions eſtabliſhed by their firſt Lawgivers, were means of preſerving what they got, as we ſhall ſhew more at large in the following Diſcourſes. It is objected indeed by ſuch as take the other ſide of the queſtion, that it muſt neceſſarily be owing to the influence of Fortune, rather than the effect of Wiſdom or Virtue, that the Romans never had two wars of any great importance upon their hands at the ſame time. For they had no quarrel with the Latins, till they had ſo thoroughly ſubdued the Samnites, that they were obliged to enter into a war for the defence and protection of that people: nor were they engaged with the Tuſcans till they had conquered the Latins, and reduced the Samnites to the laſt extremity, by the frequent victories they had gained over them: whereas if any two of theſe States had confederated againſt them at firſt, whilſt thoſe States were yet firm and unbroken, without doubt the Romans muſt have been in great danger of being utterly ruined in the very infancy of their State.

To what cauſe ſoever it might be owing, it is certain, that the Romans were never involved in two wars of any conſequence at once: on the contrary it appears, that when a freſh war broke out, they always put an end to any they happened to be engaged in at that time, and never began one till they had concluded another. This may be particularly obſerved throughout the whole ſeries of their diſputes with other nations; for not to mention thoſe they were concerned in before Rome was taken by the Gauls, we do not find they had any other enemies to deal with but the Æqui and Volſci, whilſt thoſe two nations were in a condition to cope with them. When they were vanquiſhed, a war was commenced with the Samnites; and though it is true the Latins revolted from the Romans before that war was entirely concluded, yet before any hoſtilities were committed, the Samnites had entered into a confederacy with the Romans, and aſſiſted them with their forces to chaſtiſe

tiſe the inſolence of the Latins. After they were reduced, the war with the Samnites was revived, in which they were defeated in many battles. That being concluded, a quarrel enſued with the Tuſcans; at the end of which, the Samnites were encouraged to try their fortune once more with the Romans, by the arrival of Pyrrhus with an army in Italy; but he being driven back again into Greece, the firſt Punic war begun, which was hardly ended when the Gauls on both ſides of the Alps combined againſt the Romans, and coming to an engagement with them were routed with very great ſlaughter betwixt Popolonia and Piſa, in the place where the Tower of St. Vincenzo now ſtands. When this was over, they had no war of any great importance during the next twenty years; as they had no enemies to give them any trouble except the Ligures *, and ſome few of the Gauls that were left in Lombardy: ſo that they were in a great meaſure at peace till the ſecond Punic war, in which Italy was engaged for the ſpace of ſixteen years. This being concluded with great glory, the Macedonian war broke out; at the end of which, another happened with Antiochus in Aſia; who being ſubdued, there was no Prince nor Republic left in the whole world that was able either ſeparately, or in conjunction with others, to make head againſt the Romans. But whoever conſiders their conduct and manner of proceeding in their wars, even before this laſt deciſive ſtroke, will find great virtue and conſummate prudence mixed with their good fortune; ſo that the cauſe of their ſucceſs is eaſily diſcovered. For it is moſt certain that when any State has acquired ſo high a degree of reputation, that all its neighbours ſtand in awe of it, no one will venture to attack it ſingly, except compelled by downright neceſſity: from whence it muſt come to paſs, that it will always have it in its choice to be at war with which ſoever it pleaſes, and to keep fair with the reſt by proper means, who

* Now called the Genoeſe.

being partly afraid of its power, and partly lulled into ſecurity by the methods it may take to amuſe them, will eaſily be prevailed upon to ſit quiet and contented. As to others that are more powerful, but at ſuch a diſtance that they have little or no commerce with it, they will not give themſelves much trouble about people that are ſo remote, and in whoſe concerns they ſeem to be in no wiſe intereſted: in which error they generally continue till the next houſe to them is in flames, and then they have no reſource left to truſt to but their own forces, which will not be ſufficient to oppoſe an enemy who by that time is become irreſiſtible.

I might here obſerve how the Samnites ſtood by like unconcerned Spectators, whilſt the Romans ſubdued the Æqui and Volſci: but for the ſake of brevity I ſhall confine myſelf to the example of the Carthaginians alone, who were in very great power when the Romans were engaged in the war with the Samnites and Tuſcans, as they were then in poſſeſſion of all Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and part of Spain. But truſting in their own ſtrength, and ſecure, as they imagined, by their great diſtance from the Romans, they never thought either of attacking them at that time, or of ſending any ſuccours to the Samnites or Tuſcans: on the contrary (as it uſually happens to growing States) they rather ſeemed to favour their enterprizes by courting their friendſhip and entering into an alliance with them; not perceiving their error till the Romans had conquered all the people betwixt Rome and Carthage, and were grown ſtrong enough to diſpute the poſſeſſion of Sicily and Spain too with the Carthaginians themſelves. What happened to the Carthaginians, happened likewiſe to the Gauls, to Philip of Macedon, and to Antiochus, every one of them being fully perſuaded, that as the Romans were ſo embroiled in wars with other nations, they would certainly be ſubdued by thoſe nations at laſt, or if they were not, that they ſhould have time enough to make ſufficient proviſion for their ſafety, by war at leaſt, if not by other means. I am of opinion therefore,

fore, that any other Prince or people endued with the ſame degree of Virtue or Courage, and obſerving the ſame wiſe meaſures, would likewiſe have the ſame good fortune that the Romans had.

I ſhould here have taken notice of the methods which that Commonwealth uſed, in order to get footing in thoſe nations which they invaded, if I had not already diſcuſſed that point at large in a Treatiſe called *the Prince*; yet I cannot help briefly obſerving, that they always took care to gain over ſome powerful friend in thoſe States to their intereſt, whoſe aſſiſtance they made uſe of not only to open a paſſage into them at firſt, but to keep poſſeſſion of them after they were conquered. Thus they availed themſelves of the Capuans in the territories of the Samnites, of the people of Camerino in Tuſcany, of the Mamertines in Sicily, of the Saguntines in Spain, of Maſſiniſſa in Africa, of the Etolians in Greece, of Eumenes and other Princes in Aſia, and of the Maſſilians and Edui in Gaul: and ſo dexterous were they both in forming and conducting ſuch alliances, that they never were at a loſs for friends of that kind, who greatly contributed to facilitate all their enterprizes, and enabled them both to conquer other nations and afterwards to retain the dominion over them. Thoſe then that carefully follow the ſame Maxims, will always have much leſs occaſion for the aſſiſtance of Fortune than others that do not: and that there may be no further room left to doubt that their own Wiſdom and Virtue conduced much more than Fortune to the aggrandizement of that Empire, we ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter, what ſort of people they were whom the Romans ſubdued, and how obſtinately they defended their liberties.

CHAP. II.

With what Nations the Romans were engaged in their wars; and how obſtinately thoſe Nations defended their liberties againſt them.

THE exceſſive love of liberty, and the obſtinacy with which both the neighbouring nations, and ſome of thoſe that lay at a great diſtance from the Romans, defended it, made it ſo difficult to conquer them, that it never could have been effected, without an uncommon degree of virtue and courage. This is evident from the many and great dangers to which they expoſed themſelves, ſometimes to preſerve, and ſometimes to recover it; as well as from the ſevere revenge they took, when an opportunity offered, upon thoſe that had uſurped it. It likewiſe ſufficiently appears from Hiſtory what grievous evils and miſeries were the conſequence of ſervitude in many Nations and States. And though there is but one nation at preſent that can boaſt of having free Cities in it *, yet, in ancient times, there was no inſtance of any which had not ſeveral. We ſee for example, how many free people there were then in one angle of Italy alone, as the Tuſcans, the Romans, and the Samnites; not to mention many others in all the different parts of it: but there is nothing at all ſaid of any Kings, except thoſe that reigned at Rome, and Porſena, King of Tuſcany; concerning the extinction of whoſe family, though Hiſtory is altogether ſilent, it is certain, however, that when the Romans laid ſiege to Veii, Tuſcany was not only entirely free itſelf, but abhorred the name of King to ſuch a degree, that the people of Veii having elected one for their defence, and demanding the aſſiſtance of the Tuſcans againſt the Romans, the former, after much deliberation,

* The German Empire.

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abſolutely refuſed to ſend them away, whilſt they continued under Kingly Government, and ſaid, they ſhould not concern themſelves in ſupporting a Country that had already forfeited its liberties.

Now it is eaſy to diſcern from what cauſe this fondneſs for liberty in mankind is derived: for experience ſhews us, that no ſtate ever extended its dominion, or increaſed its revenues any longer than it continued free. On the contrary, if it ſeems wonderful to ſome, how the Athenians arrived at ſuch a height of grandeur, in the ſpace of an hundred years only, after they had ſhaken off the yoke of Piſiſtratus; and much more amazing, perhaps, that the Roman Empire ſhould increaſe in ſo prodigious a manner after the expulſion of Kings, yet it may readily be accounted for; ſince it is not a regard for the good of one particular man, but for that of the public, which makes a State great and powerful; and it is paſt doubt, that the good of the public is not ſo much conſidered in any other form of Government, as in a Commonwealth; for there every meaſure is purſued, that may conduce to the benefit of the whole, how prejudicial ſoever it may prove to the intereſt of any private perſon; and there is always ſuch a majority of thoſe that are advantaged by this manner of proceeding, as will be ſufficiently able to carry their point, in ſpite of any oppoſition from others that muſt ſuffer by it. But the caſe is quite different in States that are under the Government of a Prince; for there it generally happens, that what makes for the advantage of the Sovereign, tends to the prejudice of the Public, and vice verſâ *: ſo that whenever free States degenerate into

* "How this will hold, ſays E. Dacres, with the general, and almoſt received tenet, I cannot ſee; being, that the Prince and People are ſaid to make only one politique body, and the welfare of the part cannot be ſeparated from the whole." Famous is that Fable of Æſop, concerning the Belly, and the reſt of the members, which Menenius Agrippa made uſe of to reconcile the Commons of Rome, who upon a quarrel with the Senate retired into the holy mount. Whereby it came to appear, that the Belly afforded its ſervice too, and as well gave as received nouriſhment, diſtributing by the veins, throughout

Tyranny, the leaſt evil they muſt expect is to make no further progreſs in riches, power, or dominion: and it is pretty well if that be the worſt, ſince they commonly, nay almoſt always indeed, from that time begin to decline and fall to decay. For, if the Tyrant ſhould chance to be a ſpirited enterprizing man, and extend his Empire by war, the Public would not be at all advantaged by that, nor any body benefitted but himſelf; becauſe he dares not advance any of his ſubjects, how worthy and virtuous ſoever they may be, leſt he ſhould make them ſo powerful that he might afterwards grow jealous of them: nor will he venture to make thoſe States which he conquers, either tributary and dependant upon that which he has uſurped, becauſe he will not think it for his intereſt to let his ſubjects grow ſtrong and united, but to keep every Town and Province divided, and wholly dependent upon himſelf: ſo that he alone, and not his country, is the better for thoſe acquiſitions; for a further confirmation of which (if there can ſtill remain any ſort of doubt) let any one read Xenophon's Treatiſe upon Tyranny, wherein he will find ſufficient matter for his conviction.

Theſe things being conſidered, it is no wonder that people in ancient times abhorred Tyranny, and were ſo paſſionately fond of Liberty, that they adored the very name of it; a remarkable inſtance of which,

the whole body out of the meat which it had digeſted, the blood well concocted, whereby each part was nouriſhed. Who is it that feels not, when any part fails, that the whole is in diſorder? And who ſees not likewiſe, when any part of the body draws into it more than its proportionable nouriture, that the whole pines thereupon? As from the ſwelling of the ſpleen, the health of the whole body is diſturbed, and therefore, by ſome Politiques, not unfitly compared to a Prince's Exchequer, which, when it exceſſively abounds, beggars the whole country. "It is a folly to think, (ſays a Spaniſh Author) that the poverty of the Commonalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies, nor can great revenues continue where the Commonwealth is raked to the very bones." All theſe things ſerve to argue the mutual ſympathy, as between the head and the members, ſo between the Prince and his ſubjects; and to divide the intereſt of the Prince from that of the people cannot agree with good policy; for, as in the natural body it breeds diſeaſes, ſo in the politique it produces diſorders and deſtruction.

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we have in the caſe of Hieronymus, Nephew to Hiero the Syracuſan; for, upon the news of his death, the army, which at that time lay encamped not far from the City, at firſt took up arms againſt the Conſpirators, who had aſſaſſinated the Tyrant; but, when they were informed that the people in the City declared for Liberty, they were ſo charmed with that name, that they ſoon laid them down again, and began to take meaſures for the re-eſtabliſhment of the Commonwealth. Nor can it ſeem ſtrange, that the people ſhould ſhew but little mercy to thoſe that have deprived them of their freedom, ſince there have been ſo many examples of their rage upon ſuch occaſions. I ſhall, however, content myſelf with one, which happened at Corcyra, a City in Greece, during the courſe of the Peloponeſian war: for Greece being divided into two factions, one of which adhered to the Athenians, and the other to the Spartans; many towns had partizans of each ſide within the ſame walls. But the Nobility having got the upper hand at Corcyra, and depriving the people of their liberties, the latter, by the aſſiſtance of the Athenians, were enabled to take up arms, and riſing upon the Nobility ſoon overpowered them: after which, they ſhut them all up in one priſon, from whence they took them out by eight or ten at a time, under a pretence of baniſhing them into different parts, but afterwards put them to the moſt cruel kinds of death. Of which, the reſt, being at laſt informed, reſolved to behave themſelves like men in that extremity, and exert their utmoſt efforts to avoid ſo ignominious a fate. For this purpoſe, having armed themſelves as well as their circumſtances would admit of, they reſolutely defended the entrance of the priſon, and would let nobody come in, till the people ran tumultuouſly together, and got to the top of the building, which they uncovered, and throwing down the roof and walls of it upon their heads, ſoon buried them in their ruins. Many other inſtances of the like terrible nature happened in that country; from whence the truth

truth of the old obſervation is ſufficiently evinced, that people generally run greater lengths in revenging the loſs of their liberty, than in defending it.

Conſidering therefore ſometimes with myſelf, what ſhould be the reaſon, that people are not ſo zealous in aſſerting their liberties at preſent, as they were in former times, I think it is owing to the ſame cauſe, that makes them not ſo bold and courageous as they uſed to be; namely, the difference betwixt their Education and ours, occaſioned by the difference betwixt the Chriſtian and Pagan Religion. For our religion having ſhewn us the true way to real happineſs, inſpires us with a contempt of worldly glory: which being the chief end of the Pagans, and the object wherein they placed their *Summum bonum*, made them more fierce and daring in their actions. This may appear from many of their Inſtitutions, particularly their Sacrifices, which were very magnificent indeed, when compared with the ſimplicity of ours, in which the ceremonies are rather delicate than pompous or ſtriking, and not attended with any circumſtances of ferocity or *Eclat*. In thoſe of the Pagans, beſides the ſplendour of the ſolemnity, the very action of the Sacrifice was full of blood and cruelty, as great numbers of victims were butchered upon thoſe occaſions: which inured men to horrid ſpectacles, and made them ſanguinary and cruel. Beſides which, they deified none but men full of worldly glory, ſuch as great Commanders and illuſtrious Governors of States. But our Religion, inſtead of Heroes, canonizes thoſe only that are meek and lowly, and given to the contemplation of heavenly things, rather than to an active and buſy life; and that happineſs which the Pagans ſought from courage, bodily ſtrength, and other qualifications that conduced to make them hardy and fierce, we look for in humility, ſelf-denial, and a contempt of the world; ſo that if our religion ever requires us to ſhew any degree of fortitude, it is to be manifeſted in our ſufferings, rather than in any thing elſe. This inſtitution therefore ſeems to have enervated mankind,

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and given up ſome as a prey, tied and bound into the hands of others that are more wicked, who may diſpoſe of them as they pleaſe; ſince, in order to obtain Paradiſe, they perceive the generality of them more ready to ſuffer injuries than to revenge them. Now that the world is thus crippled and hamſtrung, and heaven itſelf appears to be in a manner diſarmed, is owing to the pitiful and erroneous explication, which ſome have taken upon them to give of our religion, as if it enjoined ſolitude and indolence, and forbad an active and ſerviceable life: for if they had conſidered that it allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it certainly allows us alſo to love and honour it, and to qualify ourſelves for its defence *. This ſort

* Upon this Paragraph, the abovementioned E. Dacres ſays as follows, "Here Machiavel falſely imputes the cauſe of mens cowardlineſs to the Chriſtian Religion. I neede not alleadge any battells foughten by Chriſtians, to prove him a Lyar: hiſtories frequently affoarde us examples, as well ancient as modern, where they have been as reſolutely foughten by the Chriſtians, as ever were any by the Pagans: nay, our own memories may well ſupply us with ſome if we want. If we marke from whence Machiavel takes his argument, it is from that the Pagans ſlew a multitude of ſacrifices, the ſight of which being terrible, made men of the ſame diſpoſition. By the ſame reaſon it muſt follow, that our Butchers and Surgeons are more valiant than other men, as who cuſtomarily have their hands imbrued in bloud. I may well allow them to be more cruel; and therefore our laws exclude them from being upon a jury of Life and Death; but of being more valiant, I never heard they had the reputation." Let us hear alſo what a great Prelate of our Church ſays upon this paſſage, which is much more to the purpoſe. "It is objected (ſays he) that the Chriſtian Religion is apt to diſpirit men, and to break the courage and vigour of their minds by the precepts of patience, humility, meekneſs, forgiving injuries, and the like. This objection hath made a great noiſe in the world, and hath been urged by men of great reputation and inſight into the tempers of men and the affairs of the world. It is *ſaid* to be particularly inſiſted upon by Machiavel, and very likely it may; though I think that elſewhere he is pleaſed to ſpeak in terms of great reſpect, not only of Religion in general, but likewiſe of the Chriſtian Religion ..... But howſoever this objection may be, I dare appeal both to reaſon and experience for the confutation of it. 1. To reaſon, and that as to theſe two things. 1. That the Chriſtian Religion is apt to plant in the minds of men principles of the greateſt reſolution and trueſt courage. It teacheth men upon the beſt and moſt rational grounds to deſpiſe dangers, yea and death itſelf, the greateſt and moſt formidable evil in this world; and this principle is likely to inſpire men with the greateſt courage: for what need he fear any thing in this world, who fears not death, after which, there is nothing in this world to be feared? And this the Chriſtian Religion does, by

of

ſort of Education then, and theſe falſe Interpretations, have been one great cauſe, that there are not now ſo

giving men the aſſurance of another life, and a happineſs infinitely greater than any that is to be enjoyed in this world. And, in order to the ſecuring of this happineſs, it teacheth men to be holy, juſt, and to exerciſe a good conſcience, both towards God and man; which is the only way to free a man from all inward tormenting fears of what may happen to him after death. "This makes the righteous man, ſays Solomon, as bold as a Lion." Nothing renders a man more undaunted, as to death and the conſequences of it, than the peace of his own mind; that is, not to be conſcious to himſelf of having wilfully diſpleaſed him, who alone can make us happy or miſerable in the other world. So that a good man being ſecure of the favour of God, may, upon that account, reaſonably hope for greater happineſs after death, than other men: whereas a bad man, if he be ſober, and hath his ſenſes awaked to a ſerious conſideration of things, cannot but be afraid to die, and to be extremely anxious and ſolicitous about what will become of him in another world: for ſurely it would make the ſtouteſt man breathing afraid to venture upon death, when he ſees hell beyond it. Poſſibly there may be ſome monſters of men, who have ſo far ſuppreſſed the ſenſe of Religion and ſtupified their own conſciences, as in a good meaſure to have conquered the fears of death and the conſequences of it: but this happens to very few, and at ſometimes only. So that if vice and wickedneſs do generally break the firmneſs of mens ſpirits, it follows, that nothing but Religion can generally give men courage againſt death. And this the Chriſtian Religion does in a moſt eminent manner, to thoſe that live according to it; our bleſſed Saviour having delivered us from the fear of death, by conquering death for us, and giving us aſſurance of the glorious rewards of another life. 2. Meekneſs, patience, humility, modeſty, and ſuch virtues of Chriſtianity, do not in reaſon tend to diſpirit men, and break their courage, but only to regulate it, and take away the fierceneſs and brutiſhneſs of it. This we ſee in experience, that men of the trueſt courage have many times the leaſt of pride and inſolence, of paſſion and fierceneſs. Thoſe who are better bred, are commonly of more gentle and civil diſpoſitions: but therefore they do not want true courage, though they have not the roughneſs and foolhardineſs of men of ruder breeding. So that in a true Chriſtian, courage and greatneſs of mind are very conſiſtent with meekneſs, patience, and humility. Not that all good men are very couragious: there is much of this in the natural temper of men, which Religion does not quite alter. But that which I am concerned to maintain is, that Chriſtianity is no hindrance to any man's courage, and that, *cæteris paribus*, ſuppoſing men of equal tempers, no man hath ſo much reaſon to be valiant, as he that hath a good conſcience; I do not mean a bluſtering, and boiſterous, and raſh courage, but a ſober, calm, and fixed valour. 2. I appeal to experience for the truth of this. Did ever greater courage and contempt of death appear in all ages, ſexes, and conditions of men than in the primitive Martyrs? Were any of the heathen Soldiers comparable to the *Chriſtian Legion* for reſolution and courage, even the Heathens themſelves being judges? The Religion of Mahomet ſeems to be contrived to inſpire men with fierceneſs and deſperateneſs of reſolution; and yet I do not find, but that generally where there hath been any equality in numbers, the Chriſtians have

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many Republics in the world as there were formerly; and consequently that the love of Liberty is not so strong and operative in mankind, as it used to be in ancient times: but yet I am inclined to believe, that

been superior to them in valour, and given greater instances of resolution and courage than the Turks have done. So that I wonder upon what grounds this objection hath been taken up against Christianity, when there is nothing either in the nature of this Religion, or from the experience of the world, to give any tolerable countenance to it. And surely the best way to know what effect any Religion is likely to have upon the minds of men, is to consider what effects it hath had in the constant experience of mankind." See Archbishop Tillotson's Sermon upon Matth. xi. 6. entitled the prejudices against Christianity considered, vol. II. p. 411, 412. fol. Edit. of his works, printed at London, 1735. See also vol. II. p. 61, & seq. of Mr. Bayle's Theological Works epitomized, by R. Boulton, where it is shewn how much true greatness of mind is promoted by Christianity.

Upon the whole, Machiavel seems not so much to be blamed for what he has said in this Chapter as many people have thought: for it is plain from what he says elsewhere in many places, that he does not here speak of pure and undefiled Christianity as it was delivered to us by its Divine Author; but degenerated, as it was in his time, into the most abominable degree of corruption and adulteration. The Romish Religion in that age was no more like true Christianity, than a common Strumpet can be said to be like a chaste Matron: and as it is generally observed, that the best things when corrupted are apt to become the worst, so it fared with the doctrine of Jesus Christ; which from being the purest and most noble of all others that ever existed, was then polluted to such a degree by the heads of it and other wicked men, that instead of answering the divine ends which it was designed to promote, it was perverted to the saddest purposes by vile interpretations of its generous and heavenly precepts, and the pitiful education of youth which a parcel of lazy, ignorant, and unchristian Monks had introduced in consequence of such interpretations. When men speak of vinegar, they do not mean wine in its pure and uncorrupted state: and when Machiavel speaks of the effects of the Romish Religion, it is evident from many other passages in his writings, that he does not design to reflect upon true and genuine Christianity. On the contrary, he speaks of it with the highest respect, and always recommends the practice of it. For instance, he says, chap. xii. book I. of these Discourses, "that if Christian Princes had taken care to preserve their Religion in the purity it was delivered to them by its Author, it is certain Christendom would have been much more happy and united than it is at present: but it is the surest sign of its declension, to see that those who live nearest the Church of Rome, which is the head of our Religion, have the least devotion: for whoever will examine its first principles, and compare them with the practice of these times, will find it no difficult matter to persuade himself that either some dreadful scourge, or perhaps utter destruction is hanging over our heads." See the rest of that chapter: see also chap. xi. and xiii. of the same book. Many other strokes there are of this kind in different parts of Machiavel's works; but let these suffice, to prevent further prolixity.

the overgrown power of the Roman Empire contributed ſtill more to this; for it was ſo great that it conquered and extinguiſhed all other Republics and free States.

However that may be, it is certain, that when the Roman Empire was broke up and diſſolved, very few of thoſe States ever joined together again, and recovered their freedom: though when it firſt began to increaſe and extend itſelf, the Romans in every corner of the world found numbers of Commonwealths not only ready armed and confederated againſt them, but exceeding obſtinate in the defence of their liberties: which ſhews, that without a very uncommon degree of courage and virtue, they could not have ſubdued thoſe people. Of this I ſhall give but one inſtance in the caſe of the Samnites; but it is a remarkable one. They were ſo ſtrong and reſolute (according to Livy) that though they had been defeated in numberleſs battles, their towns plundered, and their territories laid waſte; yet they made head againſt the Romans till the Conſulate of Papirius Curſor, Son to the firſt Papirius; a period of forty-ſix years. But now that Country, which was formerly ſo populous and full of towns, and where the inhabitants were ſo brave and well diſciplined, that nothing but the Roman valour could have ſubdued them, is in a manner deſolate and uninhabited. This may be eaſily accounted for, when we conſider that it was then free, and at preſent is in a ſtate of ſervitude: for all States that have the full enjoyment of Liberty make a ſurpriſing progreſs, and are enabled to do very great things, as I ſaid before: becauſe the inhabitants muſt naturally increaſe very faſt, where matrimony becomes deſirable, by the conſideration that they ſhall not only be able to ſupport themſelves and their families, but that their children will inherit what they get without any fear of having it taken from them by force; and further, that thoſe children, inſtead of being born ſlaves, may become great men and governors of the State, if they behave themſelves virtuouſly. Wealth of all kinds, whether

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ſuch as reſults from Agriculture or Manufactures, increaſes likewiſe very faſt in a Republic: for every one cheerfully endeavours to enrich himſelf by ſome means or other, when he is aſſured he ſhall be ſuffered to enjoy the fruit of his labours in peace: ſo that men vie with each other in providing for the public, as well as their own particular intereſt, to the great advancement and emolument of both.

Very different is the condition of thoſe that do not live under a free Government; and the leſs liberty they have, the fewer of thoſe advantages will they experience which we have been ſpeaking of. But of all yokes, that of living in ſubjection to a Commonwealth is the heavieſt and moſt miſerable; for, in the firſt place, it generally endures the longeſt, and there is the leſs hope of ever being able to ſhake it off; and, in the next, it is the policy of all Republics to weaken and exhauſt other States that are dependent upon them, in order to ſtrengthen and invigorate their own: which is a maxim not practiſed by Princes, except they be Barbarians, depopulators of Provinces, and ſcourgers of mankind, like the eaſtern Tyrants, who endeavour to extinguiſh all civil order and Liberty. But a Prince of any benevolence or humanity, for the moſt part, loves and cheriſhes the people that are fallen under his dominion, in common with the reſt of his Subjects, and leaves them in quiet poſſeſſion of their former cuſtoms and privileges: ſo that if they cannot thrive and flouriſh like thoſe that are perfectly free, yet they do not abſolutely ſink into ruin, like others that are in downright ſlavery; I mean ſuch ſort of ſlavery as thoſe fall into, who become ſubject to a foreigner; for, concerning the ſervitude which is the conſequence of being oppreſſed by one of their own Citizens, I have already ſpoken elſewhere *.

* See book I chap. xvi. xvii. xviii. of theſe Diſcourſes. The Prince, cap. viii. & alibi paſſim.

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Whoever then maturely conſiders the whole of what I have ſaid above, will not be ſurpriſed either at the power and ſtrength of the Samnites whilſt they continued free, or at their weakneſs and abject condition after they had loſt their liberty. Livy takes notice of this in many paſſages of his Hiſtory; particularly, in his account of the war with Hannibal: where he tells us, that the Samnites being grievouſly harraſſed by a Roman Legion which then lay at Nola, ſent to ſupplicate the aſſiſtance of that Commander: and that their Deputies repreſented to him amongſt other things, "That though they had held the Romans at bay for the ſpace of an hundred years, with their own forces only, and commanded by their own Generals, and had often made head againſt two Conſular armies, under two Conſuls at the ſame time; yet they were then reduced to ſo low an ebb of fortune and ſpirits, that they could hardly defend themſelves againſt one Legion only that was quartered at Nola."

CHAP. III.

That Rome made itſelf ſtrong and powerful by deſtroying the States round about it, and incorporating ſtrangers with its own Citizens.

"CRESCIT interea Roma, Albæ ruinis. In the mean time Rome eſtabliſhed itſelf upon the ruins of Alba," ſays Livy very juſtly. For thoſe that would aggrandize and extend a State, ſhould endeavour by all means to make it exceeding populous, ſince it will be impoſſible ever to accompliſh that purpoſe, without a vaſt number of men. Now this may be done two ways; either by ſoft and gentle methods, or by force and violence. In the former caſe, you are to encourage Foreigners to ſettle with you, and to make their reſidence ſecure and comfortable, that they may ſtay there with ſatisfaction: in the latter, you muſt ruin the neighbouring States, and compel their inha-

inhabitants to come and live with you: both which rules were so well observed by the Romans, that in the time of their Sixth King, they mustered eighty thousand men in their City, that were fit to carry arms *, imitating in this respect the practice of a skilful planter, who, in order to strengthen a tree, and enable it to thrive and bear plenty of good fruit, prunes off its first shoots, that the sap, which otherwise would dilate itself in the branches, being confined wholly to the trunk, may exert itself in time with more vigour, and make the tree more flourishing and fruitful. That this policy is not only expedient, but absolutely necessary to establish and enlarge Dominion, plainly appears from the neglect of Athens and Sparta in this respect; which two Republics, though very warlike indeed, and happy in their Laws, could never arrive at that height of grandeur which Rome attained to; notwithstanding Rome seems to have been a more tumultuous state, and not so well governed as they were. For which there can be no other reasons than what have been just now assigned. For Rome strengthened itself to such a degree by pursuing these maxims, that it was able to send out armies consisting of two hundred and eighty thousand effective men at one time: whereas, neither of the other could ever raise above twenty thousand. This was not the effect of an advantageous situation (because that of Rome was neither better nor more benign, than those of Athens and Sparta) but to the difference of their conduct: for Lycurgus, the Founder of the Spartan Commonwealth, apprehending that the admission and conversation of the new inhabitants would naturally tend to the corruption and dissolution of his Laws, took all possible care to prevent his Citizens from having any

* We must reckon the forces of their neighbours, the Campanians, in this number, because they were always accounted Roman citizens: accordingly, our author says in another place, that when the Decemviri had disgusted their fellow-citizens, they had nothing to hope from the Campanians, as they were reckoned the same with the Roman people.

manner of commerce with ſtrangers: for which purpoſe he not only would not ſuffer intermarriages with Foreigners, or that they ſhould be admitted to the freedom of the City, or have any ſuch connexions or correſpondence with them as uſually drew men together, and unite them; but likewiſe cauſed the current money of that Commonwealth to be made of Leather, that nobody might be tempted to come thither to traffic or introduce any new kind of manufacture: ſo that it was not poſſible that City ſhould ever be very full of inhabitants.

Now, as natural and politic bodies may often be very fitly compared together, and it is impoſſible that a feeble trunk ſhould ſuſtain vaſt and ponderous branches: ſo it is equally impoſſible that a weak Commonwealth ſhould ever ſubdue another Commonwealth or Kingdom, that is much ſtronger or fuller of armed men than itſelf: or if it ſhould by chance happen to ſubdue them, it muſt neceſſarily very ſoon reſemble a tree, the branches of which are too large and heavy for its trunk to ſupport, and conſequently will be torn from it by the leaſt blaſt of wind. This was actually the caſe of Sparta; though it had the good fortune to conquer all Greece: for, upon the rebellion of the Thebans, all the reſt of the States revolted alſo, and left that Republic like a tree, ſtripped of its branches: a misfortune that never could happen to Rome, as its trunk was ſtrong enough to ſuſtain any weight. The ſtrict practice therefore of the aforeſaid rules, and ſome others that we ſhall mention hereafter, made the Romans ſo ſtrong and powerful: ſo that Livy's obſervation, "Creſcit interea Roma Albæ "ruinis," contains a great deal in a few words.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning the three ways which Republics have taken to extend their Dominion.

WHOEVER is converſant in ancient Hiſtory muſt have obſerved, that Republics have taken three methods to extend themſelves. One of which was formerly purſued by the Tuſcans, who entered into a confederacy with ſeveral Republics upon an equal footing; that is, it was agreed, that none of them ſhould pretend to aſſume any degree of pre-eminence or authority over the reſt, and that they ſhould likewiſe admit ſuch ſtates as they conquered into the confederacy; as the Swiſs do at preſent, and the Achaians and Etolians did of old in Greece: and ſince the Romans had many wars with the Tuſcans, I ſhall be the more particular in what I have to ſay, concerning the conduct of that people, in order to explain the nature and tendency of this firſt method as clearly as I can.

Before the foundation of the Roman Empire in Italy, the Tuſcans were very powerful both by ſea and land; and though we have now no particular Hiſtory left of their tranſactions and exploits, yet there are ſome few traces and monuments of their grandeur ſtill remaining, and we know for certain, that they ſent a Colony to ſettle upon the coaſt of the *higher ſea*, the inhabitants whereof built the town of Adria, afterwards ſo famous, that it gave name to that Sea, which is called the *Adriatic* to this day. We likewiſe know, that their dominion extended from the Tiber to the foot of the Alps (a tract of territory which includes the greater part of Italy), though indeed they loſt that Country, which is now called Lombardy; two hundred years before the Romans had acquired any conſiderable degree of power: for it had been ſeized upon by the Gauls, who being either compelled

by neceſſity, or allured by the deliciouſneſs of the fruits, but particularly of the wines which abounded there, invaded that part of Italy, under the conduct of Belloveſus, and having vanquiſhed and extirpated the natives, eſtabliſhed themſelves in thoſe parts, where they built many towns, and not only called the Province *Ciſalpine Gaul*, from their own name, but kept poſſeſſion of it till they were conquered by the Romans. The Tuſcans therefore proceeded in the method above mentioned, and enlarged their Dominion by acting jointly, and upon an equal footing with their Confederates, who were the people of twelve States, namely, of Cluſium, Veii, Feſulæ, Aretinum, Volaterræ, and ſeven others, each of them having the ſame ſhare in the Government of the whole. They never were able, however, to extend their conqueſts beyond the boundaries of Italy, nor ever could ſubdue ſeveral parts of that country, for reaſons which we ſhall mention hereafter.

The ſecond method that has been taken by Republics to enlarge their Dominion, was likewiſe to enter into a League with others; but in ſuch a manner, that one Republic alone took upon itſelf to be the Principal of the Confederacy as well as the capital City, and to carry on all enterprizes in its own name: and this is what the Romans did. The third method was to make downright ſlaves and not allies of ſuch States as were conquered, as the Spartans and Athenians did. But of all theſe three ways, the laſt is certainly the worſt; as plainly appears from the fate of thoſe two Republics, which were ruined by conquering more than they were able to maintain poſſeſſion of: for it is ſo very difficult to keep conquered States in ſubjection by violence, eſpecially ſuch have been uſed to Liberty before, that it is almoſt impoſſible to ſupport any ſort of command over them, without an exceeding ſtrong force: to raiſe which, it is abſolutely neceſſary to confederate with others, and to make uſe of all means to fill your ſtate with inhabitants; but, as the two Republics juſt now mentioned neglected both

both theſe expedients, they never could make any laſting acquiſitions. The Roman Commonwealth, on the contrary, taking the ſecond method, but not entirely neglecting the others, raiſed their Empire to a ſurpriſing pitch of glory and grandeur: and as that Republic was the only one that ever did ſo, ſo it was the only one that ever arrived at that degree of power. For though it aſſociated equally in many things with ſeveral other States in Italy, it ſtill maintained the ſuperiority, and reſerved to itſelf the title and honour of commanding in chief: by which means it came to paſs, that thoſe Aſſociates became entirely ſubject to it before they were well aware, at the expence of their own blood and treaſure. For when they began to carry their arms out of Italy, and reduced Kingdoms into Provinces dependent upon themſelves, the inhabitants of thoſe Provinces having been uſed to live under Kingly Government, did not much trouble themſelves about ſuch a change: and ſince they had Roman Governors, and were conquered by armies under Roman colours, and knew nothing of their Allies, they would acknowledge no other Sovereign but the Republic of Rome: ſo that its Italian Confederates finding themſelves ſurrounded on a ſudden, as it were by people who were all ſubject to the Romans, and therefore unable to contend with ſo powerful a head, at laſt perceived their error, when it was too late to remedy it: ſo great was the authority it had obtained amongſt foreign nations, and ſo formidable of itſelf from the vaſt number of its inhabitants and military ſtrength. It is true indeed, thoſe allies endeavoured to revenge themſelves by afterwards rebelling againſt the Romans; but, being ſubdued, they made their condition worſe, for, inſtead of being treated any longer as Allies, they were reduced to the level of Subjects.

This manner of proceeding was peculiar to the Romans, as I have ſaid before: but it ought to be purſued by every other Republic that would extend its Empire; ſince experience has ſufficiently proved it is the beſt. The next to this, is the method formerly

taken by the Tuſcans, Achaians, and Etolians, and by the Swiſs at preſent: for tho' very great things cannot be done by it, yet it is attended with two conveniencies; the one, that it generally prevents wars, and the other, that if any acquiſition is made, it will be eaſy to maintain it. The reaſon that ſuch a Confederacy cannot effect any very great things, is that it conſiſts of members which are in a manner disjoined and placed at a diſtance from each other, ſo that their conſultations and reſolutions muſt be ſlow and tedious: beſides they are not ſo eager to make conqueſts where the prize is to be divided amongſt many, as a ſingle Republic that is to enjoy the whole itſelf. It has likewiſe been obſerved, that Confederacies have their certain bounds, which are never exceeded; that is, when the Confederates amount to twelve or fourteen, they admit no more: for being then powerful enough, as they conceive, to defend themſelves againſt every one elſe, they never think of making any further acquiſitions; becauſe, in the firſt place, they are under no neceſſity of ſo doing; and, in the next, they will reap little or no advantage from it, as we have juſt obſerved: and further, they would be reduced to the dilemma, either of admitting the conquered States into the Confederacy, which would create confuſion from their number; or to reduce them to Subjects, which, being attended with great difficulty and ſmall profit, makes them indifferent about the matter, or rather averſe to it. When the Aſſociates therefore, are once become ſo numerous, and have fortified themſelves in ſuch a manner on every ſide, as to live in perfect ſecurity from all danger, they chiefly attend to two things: the firſt, is to take other people under their protection, for which they are paid certain ſums of money, and divide it amongſt themſelves, without any further trouble; and the next, to hire out their forces to ſuch States as have occaſion for them, as the Swiſs do at preſent, and the above-mentioned people did in former times, according to Livy; who ſays, that a conference betwixt Philip of Macedon

don and Titus Quintus Flaminius, Philip upbraided an Etolian Commander, who was likwiſe preſent, with the avarice and double-dealing of his countrymen, as people that were not aſhamed to confederate with one State, and to ſend aſſiſtance to another that was at war with it; ſo that it was not unuſual to ſee their colours diſplayed in both armies at the ſame time.

We ſee then that this manner of confederating has always produced the ſame effects, and been attended with ſimilar conſequences. It appears likewiſe, that ſuch Republics as reduced their conqueſts to a ſtate of ſubjection, were always debilitated by it themſelves to ſuch a degree, that they very ſeldom could make any further progreſs in extending their Dominion; and that if they afterwards met with any little ſucceſs of that kind, it was ſo far from being a laſting advantage to them, that it commonly occaſioned their ruin in a very ſhort time. If this manner of proceeding, therefore, is pernicious to Commonwealths that are powerful and warlike, it muſt be ſpeedy and utter deſtruction to thoſe that are not ſo; of which, we have lately ſeen many examples in Italy.

From all theſe conſiderations, the Roman method ſeems much the beſt, and it is wonderful that it was never adopted by any people before them, nor has been imitated ſince. As for the other way of confederating, there is now no inſtance of it except amongſt the Swiſs, and in the Circle of Swabia. We might add, by way of concluſion to this Chapter, that many other excellent rules and inſtitutions which the Romans obſerved in conducting their affairs, both at home and abroad, are only not imitated in theſe days, but in a manner deſpiſed; ſome of them being looked upon as fictions and idle Stories, others as impoſſible, and others again, as either not ſuitable to the preſent times and circumſtances of the world, or as trifling and of no importance: and to this it is owing, that our poor Country of late has been a prey to every Invader. But, if it ſeems a matter of too much difficulty to tread in the ſteps of the Romans, ſurely the

preſent race of Tuſcans are as capable as any other people whatſoever of imitating their forefathers: for though their Anceſtors indeed never equalled the Romans in extending their Dominion far abroad, for the reaſons which we have given above, yet they acquired as much authority in Italy, as could poſſibly be expected from their conduct and manner of proceeding; enjoying themſelves in profound peace and ſecurity for a long courſe of time, and in the higheſt reputation for their wiſdom, Religion, and power: which power was at firſt ſhaken by the Gauls, and afterwards ſo totally deſtroyed by the Romans, that though it was very great about two thouſand years ago, there are but few or no traces of it left at preſent: which naturally leads me to conſider whence it comes to paſs, that the memory of ſuch things is ſo ſoon buried in oblivion.

CHAP. V.

That Deluges, Peſtilences, the change of Religion and Languages, and other accidents, in a manner extinguiſh the memory of many things.

IT might be objected, I think, to thoſe who ſay the world has exiſted from Eternity, that if it was ſo, we might reaſonably expect to have ſome records of things that happened much above five thouſand years ago; if we did not know that the remembrance of them muſt inevitably have periſhed from cauſes, part of which are owing to the nature of mankind, and part to the influence of Heaven. The oblivion occaſioned by mankind proceeds from the variation of Religion and language; for, upon the introduction of a new Religion, the firſt care of thoſe that endeavour to eſtabliſh it, is to aboliſh the old one, in order to give the greater reputation to their own: and when it happens that the propagators of the new one ſpeak a different language from thoſe that were of the perſuaſion that prevailed before, they ſo much the ſooner extinguiſh

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the memory of it. This may appear from conſidering the courſe taken by the Chriſtians with regard to Paganiſm: for they totally aboliſhed all the inſtitutions, ceremonies, and monuments of the Pagan Theology. It is true, they could not ſo utterly extinguiſh the memory of ſeveral actions performed by ſome great and illuſtrious men of that religion, being forced to retain the uſe of the Latin Tongue, though much againſt their will; becauſe they were under a neceſſity of publiſhing the principles and Doctrine of their own in that language. But if they could have wrote in another, we may be aſſured from the reſt of their proceedings, they would not have left the leaſt traces of any Hiſtory relating to them: for whoever reads the life and actions of St. Gregory, and other heads of the Chriſtian Religion, will ſee what a cruel perſecution they carried on againſt all Monuments of Antiquity, burning the works of Poets and Hiſtorians, defacing images and ſtatues, and demoliſhing every thing that might in any wiſe contribute to keep the memory of Paganiſm alive: ſo that if they had likewiſe introduced a new language at the ſame time, all footſteps of that people and their worſhip would have been entirely obliterated *. It is very probable therefore, that thoſe

* Montaigne ſays, book II. chap. xix. of his Eſſays, "That when the Chriſtian Religion began to gain authority with the Laws, zeal armed many againſt all ſorts of Pagan books, by which the learned ſuffered an exceeding great loſs; which I conceive did more prejudice to Letters, than all the flames kindled by the Barbarians. Of this, Cornelius Tacitus is a very good witneſs; for though the Emperor Tacitus, his Kinſman, had by expreſs order furniſhed all the Libraries in the world with his book, nevertheleſs, one entire copy could not eſcape the curious ſearch of thoſe who were deſirous to aboliſh it, only on account of five or ſix idle paſſages in it, which ſeemed to oppugn our Belief."

Petrus Alcyonius in Medicè Legato priore beſtows a noble eulogy upon St. Gregory, here mentioned by Machiavel, but it ends thus. "Utinam incorruptam Græcæ linguæ integritatem ſervaſſet in tantâ rerum Silvâ & tam magnâ librorum vi; certe ſanctiſſimum illum Pontificem omni laudi cumulatum judicarem. . . . . ex illius maxime ſcriptis barbariem irrepſiſſe in Theologiam Latinam arbitror. Nam veteres noſtri interpretes, mediocris literaturæ & nullius fere judicii homines, cum animadverterent Theologum hunc frequenter uſurpare voces quaſdam novas, eaſque non ſatis apte fictas, neceſſe ſibi eſſe cre-

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Pagans had treated others who went before them, in the ſame manner that they themſelves were ſerved in their turn by the Chriſtians: and as there have been two or three revolutions of this kind, during the courſe of five or ſix thouſand years, it cannot ſeem ſtrange that the memory of things, which happened before that time, ſhould have now become utterly extinct, or ſo fabulous that nobody regards it; as in fact it has fared with the Hiſtory of Diodorus Siculus, which though it pretends to give an account of forty or fifty thouſand years, is looked upon (and juſtly I think) as nothing more than a heap of trumpery and lies.

As for other cauſes immediately owing to the influence of Heaven, which occaſion this oblivion of things,

diderunt illos latine reddere, atque hunc in modum ſordidâ barbarie eſt lingua latina infuſcata."

He ſays further, in the perſon of Cardinal de' Medici, "Audiebam etiam puer ex Demetrio Chalcondyla, Græcarum rerum peritiſſimo, ſacerdotes Græcos tantâ floruiſſe auctoritate apud Cæſares Byzantios, ut integrâ illorum gratiâ complura de veteribus Græcis poemata combuſſerint, in primiſque ea ubi amores, turpes luſus, & nequitiæ amantium continebantur; ita Menandri, Diphili, Apollodori, Philemonis, Alexis fabellas, & Sappûs, Erinnæ, Anacreontis, Mimnermi, Bionis, Alcmanis, Alcæi carmina intercidiſſe. Tum pro his ſubſtituta Naziazeni noſtri poemata, quæ etſi excitant animos noſtrorum hominum ad flagrantiorum religionis cultum, non tamen verborum Atticorum proprietatem & Græcæ linguæ elegantiam edocent. Turpiter quidem ſacerdotes iſti in ceteres Græcos malevoli fuerunt; ſed integritatis, probitatis & religionis maximum dedêre teſtimonium." But Alcyonius is not a credible witneſs, with regard to the incident here related; nor is the teſtimony of Demetrius Chalcondylas much better.

E. Dacres has the following Note upon this paſſage. "This is all calumny: for we find not that any have preſerved the records of learning more than the Chriſtians, however much intermixed with Paganiſm. I take it, that thoſe memorials were loſt in the vaſt deluges of the Vandals, Goths, and Hunns, who themſelves being barbarous and ignorant, envyed others learning, and therefore deſtroyed all the regiſters of Antiquity they could find; which our author injuriouſly imputes to the Chriſtians; being that they, time out of minde, have cauſed thoſe books to be taught the youth in their ſchooles: and we find that the moſt eſteemed Fathers of the Church were adorned with that learning, which they are taxed to have perſecuted; which ſerves alſo for the better underſtanding and illuſtrating of Theology, and affords good arguments many times to our Divines, for the conviction of the Gentiles, out of their own writers. Nor do I find there was any other reſtraint in thoſe ſtudies, than that men were adviſed to apply themſelves ſoberly thereunto, as not being ſtudies to dwell in, but tending rather to the ſervice of Theology."

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we may reckon thoſe that extinguiſh mankind, and ſweep away moſt of the inhabitants in ſome particular part of the world; ſuch as Peſtilence, Famine, and inundations; the laſt of which ſeems to be the moſt fatal, not only becauſe the calamity is uſually more general, but becauſe thoſe that eſcape its rage are for the moſt part mountaineers and ignorant men, who having no knowledge of ancient times themſelves, cannot therefore be ſuppoſed to tranſmit any memorials of them to their deſcendants: and though ſome one ſhould chance to ſurvive, who may poſſibly be verſed in Antiquity; yet, it is very probable that he will ſuppreſs many things, and garble others in ſuch a manner, as will tend chiefly to render himſelf and his own family famous among poſterity; leaving juſt as much upon record, as he thinks will ſerve that purpoſe, and no more. That ſuch inundations, peſtilence, and famine have actually happened, there is no room to doubt; ſince it plainly appears, not only from the teſtimony of many Hiſtories, but from this very conſequence of them, the oblivion into which ſo many ſtates and nations are fallen; the abſolute neceſſity of ſuch events renders them alſo ſufficiently evident; for, as nature acts in the bodies of individuals, and cauſes a purgation, that tends to preſerve them, when there is too much ſuperfluous matter collected; ſo likewiſe it happens in the united body of mankind; when either the ſeveral Provinces of the world are ſo full of inhabitants that they can neither ſupport themſelves where they are, nor find room in any other place; or when the wickedneſs of mankind is arrived at the higheſt pitch it can attain to; then it becomes abſolutely neeeſſary that the earth ſhould be purged by one of theſe three ways, that ſo mankind being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under a ſenſe of their mortality may become more righteous and live with greater convenience. Theſe things being conſidered then, it is no wonder that Tuſcany, which, as we ſaid before, was ſo powerful in former times, ſo renowned for its virtue, manners, and religion, and had

had a language and laws of its own, being overwhelmed by the exceſſive power of the Romans, ſhould now retain no other mark of its ancient grandeur, than the name alone.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning the conduct obſerved by the Romans in their Wars.

HAVING already ſhewn what means the Romans took to extend their Dominion, I ſhall now ſay ſomething concerning the rules they followed in the proſecution of their wars; and in this as well as all the reſt of their actions, we ſhall ſee how wiſely they deviated in many reſpects from the common practice of all other nations, in order to pave their way to univerſal Empire. The end and deſign of all thoſe that make war either out of choice, or, to ſpeak more properly, out of motives of ambition, is to get what they can and keep what they have got, in ſuch a manner as neither to endanger nor impoveriſh their own dominions; for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary in both caſes, to purſue all methods that can be taken, not only to ſave expences, but to enrich and benefit themſelves. Whoever then would accompliſh theſe ends muſt imitate the conduct of the Romans, with whom it was a general maxim to make their wars *ſhort and ſharp*, as the French ſay: for by taking the field early and with powerful armies, they very ſoon brought thoſe wars to a concluſion, in which they were engaged with the Latins, Samnites, and Tuſcans: and if we conſider all the reſt that happened from the foundation of Rome to the Siege of Veii, it will be found that ſome of them were ended in ſix days, ſome in ten, and others in twenty at moſt. For no ſooner was war declared, but they led out their forces to ſeek the enemy and bring them to an engagement: after which, if they

they gained the victory, as they generally did, they forced them to cede that part of their territory which lay upon their confines, to prevent the reſt being laid waſte; and this was either appropriated to their own particular uſe, or given to a Colony, which was ſettled there for the ſecurity of their frontiers, to the great advantage of the Coloniſts, as well as of the Commonwealth, which was thereby enabled to keep a good garriſon in thoſe parts without any expence to itſelf. Nor could any method be taken more ſafe and beneficial than this; for whilſt the other State continued quiet, that garriſon was a ſufficient ſecurity from any ſudden invaſion; but if it offered to make any attempt upon their Colony, the Romans were preſently in the field again with a powerful army, and having cruſhed the enemy, made them ſubmit to ſtill heavier terms; thus by degrees continually increaſing their power and reputation abroad, and their ſtrength at home.

This method they ſtrictly obſerved till after they had made themſelves Maſters of Veii; after which they changed it in ſome meaſure, and gave pay to their Soldiers, as they began to be engaged in wars that laſted longer, which was unneceſſary before, becauſe their campaigns had always been of ſhort continuance. Nevertheleſs, though they paid their forces from that time in order to ſupport a war the longer, and to carry their arms into more remote parts, where they were obliged to keep the field a conſiderable time, yet they never loſt ſight of their old maxim, but conſtantly put an end to a war as ſoon as ever the circumſtances of the time and place would admit of it, and always ſent Colonies into the countries which they had conquered: for, beſides the utility that naturally reſulted from the obſervation of this rule, they were likewiſe prompted to it by ambition; becauſe the two Conſuls continuing in office but one year, and neither of them commanding the army any longer than Six months, they both were deſirous to put an end to a war as ſoon as poſſible, in order

order to obtain the honour of a triumph: and as for Colonies, they were too ſenſible of the advantages they had reaped from ſuch eſtabliſhments ever to forego them. Indeed they made ſome alteration in their method of diſtributing the ſpoil taken from an Enemy, in which they were not ſo liberal as they had been before; ſince in the firſt place it did not ſeem neceſſary after they had given their Soldiers certain pay, and in the next, the ſpoil increaſing conſiderably, they thought proper to conſign a good part of it to the uſe of the Commonwealth; that ſo they might not be obliged to lay any freſh taxes upon their own Subjects for the proſecution of any future enterprize: by which means they ſoon enriched the Public to a prodigious degree.

By a ſtrict adherence to theſe two methods, viz. of diſtributing their Spoils, and of ſending out Colonies, the Romans grew rich by their wars, whereas other Princes and Republics, leſs wiſe, are impoveriſhed by them; nay the matter was carried ſo far at laſt, that no Conſul was allowed a triumph except he came home loaded with gold, ſilver, and other ſpoils for the uſe of the public Treaſury: and thus bringing their wars to a ſpeedy concluſion, either by forcing the enemy to an engagement as ſoon as poſſible, or by harraſſing their country with continual incurſions and devaſtations till they were obliged to ſue for peace upon any terms, this people became richer and more powerful every day.

CHAP. VII.

What proportion of land the Romans gave to every inhabitant of their Colonies.

IT is not an eaſy matter to know with any certainty how much land the Romans gave each Coloniſt; but it ſeems reaſonable to ſuppoſe that it was more or leſs according to the barrenneſs or fertility of the place.

We may conclude however, that they were always very ſparing in this point, that ſo their Colonies might ſupport a great number of men, and conſequently be well ſecured; and in the next place, as they themſelves lived very frugally at home, we can hardly imagine they would ſuffer their Subjects to wanton in riot and luxury abroad. Livy informs us that after they had taken Veii, they ſent a Colony thither, and gave each inhabitant a little more than three acres and a half of land *. They might conſider likewiſe that their wants would be better ſupplied by the improvement and cultivation of their land, than by the quantity of it. But we may ſuppoſe they had alſo Common fields to feed their Cattle, and woods to ſupply them with firing and other neceſſaries, without which no Colony could ſupport itſelf.

CHAP. VIII.

What are the reaſons that induce a people to abandon their own Country and force themſelves into that of others.

NOW we have ſpoken of the manner in which the Romans conducted their wars, and made ſome mention of the invaſion of Tuſcany by the Gauls, it may not perhaps appear foreign to our purpoſe, if we obſerve that there are two ſorts of war: one occaſioned by the ambition of Princes or Republics that invade others to enlarge their own Empire, like Alexander the Great and the Romans. Theſe wars, though very ruinous indeed, do not utterly extirpate the natives of conquered Provinces, ſince the Conqueror is generally content with reducing them to obedience, often leaving them in poſſeſſion of their own laws, and almoſt always of their eſtates and properties. The other ſort of war is when a whole people, man, woman, and child, are compelled to quit

* Terna jugera & ſeptunces deviſerant.

their

their own country either by Famine or Sword, and go in ſearch of new habitations in another; not with a deſign merely to reduce it to Subjection, like the others juſt now mentioned, but firmly to eſtabliſh themſelves there, either by the entire deſtruction or extermination of the former inhabitants. Now this is always attended with much blood-ſhed, cruelty, and devaſtation, as may appear from what Salluſt tells us in the end of his Hiſtory of the Jugurthine war, when it was reported that the Gauls were upon their march to invade Italy. "Cum cæteris gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuiſſe dimicatum, cum Gallis de Singulorum hominum Salute. The Romans contended with other nations for glory and dominion only; but with the Gauls they fought to preſerve their own lives and their Country." For when a Prince or Republic ſubdues another country, they think it ſufficient to rid themſelves of thoſe alone who bore rule over it before; but in irruptions of a whole people at once, the invaders find it neceſſary to extirpate the whole nation which they conquer, in order to ſupport themſelves upon the product of their lands.

Three wars of this dreadful kind the Romans ſuſtained; the firſt, when Rome was taken by the Gauls who had driven the Tuſcans out of Lombardy and ſettled there themſelves: and this invaſion Livy accounts for two ways; in the firſt place, from the deliciouſneſs of the Italian fruits and wines which tempted the Gauls, who had none ſuch at home, to come thither for them, as has been ſaid before: and in the next, their own country being grown ſo full of inhabitants that it could no longer ſupport them all, the leading men of that nation perceived it abſolutely neceſſary that ſome part of them ſhould leave it and endeavour to eſtabliſh themſelves elſewhere: which being accordingly reſolved upon, the people upon whom the lot fell to quit their native country chuſing Bellovеſus and Sigoveſus, two of their Princes, to conduct them, the former penetrated into Italy, and making himſelf

himſelf maſter of Lombardy, ſoon after fell upon the Romans: the latter forced his way into Spain. The ſecond war of this ſort that the Romans had upon their hands, happened to be with the ſame nation at the end of the firſt Punic war; and in this they killed above two hundred thouſand of them in a battle betwixt Piſa and Piombino; and the laſt was when the Cimbri and Germans poured themſelves into Italy; who, after they had often routed the Roman armies, were totally conquered and driven back again by Marius *. Now if the Romans not only ſupported themſelves, but came off with great glory and reputation at laſt in all theſe three terrible wars, it is an indiſputable proof of their extraordinary valour and conſtancy in thoſe times: for afterwards, when they began degenerate, and had in ſome meaſure loſt their ancient virtue and courage, their dominions were overrun by the very ſame people, that is, by the Goths, Vandals, and others, who wreſted the Empire of the Weſt entirely out of their hands.

Theſe Emigrations are the effect of Neceſſity (as I ſaid before) and this Neceſſity is occaſioned by famine, or war, and diſtreſs at home, which obliges the people to ſeek new habitations; and when the number of thoſe that are thus forced abroad is great, their irruptions into other parts are exceeding fierce and bloody: for they always kill the natives, ſeize upon their lands, turn every thing upſide down, and give the Country a new name; as Moſes did, and the nations that over-ran the Roman Empire. Thus the names by which the ſeveral Provinces of Italy and other nations are now called, were given them by their ſeveral Conquerors: for Lombardy was formerly called Gallia Ciſalpina, and France Gallia Tranſalpina; which laſt now takes its name from the Franks who diſpoſſeſſed the Romans of it. So likewiſe Sclavonia

* It is ſaid that a town has been lately diſcovered in the faſtneſſes of the Alps, which has been inhabited by the deſcendents of this people ever ſince that time, who have ſtill preſerved their ancient language and manners.

was anciently called Illyria, Hungary Pannonia, England Britain; thus Moſes changed the name of that part of Syria, which he took poſſeſſion of, into Judea; and in this manner many other countries, which it would be tedious to enumerate, have had new names given them very different from their old ones. And ſince I have obſerved above, that people are ſometimes driven out of their own country by war, and forced to ſeek new habitations, I ſhall give one example of it in the caſe of the Mauruſians, formerly a people of Syria, who, upon the approach of the Iſraelites under the conduct of Joſhua, not being able to oppoſe him, thought it better to ſave their lives by leaving their country, than to loſe both by waiting for his arrival: for which purpoſe, they marched away with their wives and children into Africa, where they ſettled themſelves after they had driven the inhabitants out of that part of the country, though they could not defend their own. Procopius, in his Hiſtory of the war which Beliſarius conducted againſt the Vandals who had got poſſeſſion of Africa, ſays that he himſelf had read inſcriptions upon certain pillars in thoſe parts, that were formerly occupied by the Mauruſians, to this effect, "Theſe pillars were erected by us when we fled from the face of Joſhua the Robber, the Son of Nun *:" from whence the reaſon of their abandoning Syria plainly appears. Such multitudes therefore becoming deſperate, and urged forwards by extreme neceſſity are very formidable: and ſo great indeed is their fury, that it is not to be ſuſtained except by the moſt warlike and courageous nations.

But when thoſe that are obliged to leave their country are few in number they are not ſo much to be dreaded, as the people of whom we have been ſpeaking; becauſe when they find they cannot ſucceed by downright force and violence, they are under a neceſ-

* Ημεῖς εσμεν οι φυγοντες απο προσωπυ Ιησυ τῦ λῃςυ υιυ Ναυῆ. Nos fugimus a facie Jeſu latronis filii Navæ. Procop. de bello Vandalico, lib. II. p. 258, cap. x. de Maurorum origine. Paris Edit. 1662.

ſity

ſity of having recourſe to artifice and gentle means, in order to gain a ſettlement ſomewhere or other, and afterwards to ſupport themſelves by alliances and confederacies, like Æneas, Dido, the Maſſilians, and many others, who found means to maintain their ground in thoſe parts where they had got footing with the conſent and good will of the neighbouring States. The moſt numerous emigrations have been chiefly out of Scythia *, a cold and barren climate, where the inhabitants were generally ſo numerous, and the Country ſo ſterile, that it was not able to ſuſtain them: ſo that multitudes of them having many reaſons to leave it, and none that could induce them to ſtay there, were in a manner compelled to ſeek more plentiful and comfortable habitations: and if there have been none of theſe inundations from thoſe parts during the courſe of theſe laſt five hundred years and upwards, I think it may be accounted for ſeveral ways †. In the firſt place, from the prodigious ſwarms of people, that iſſued out from thence in the declenſion of the Roman Empire, which muſt have drained and exhauſted them to the laſt degree; as there were above thirty emigrations at that time. In the next, Germany and Hungary, which likewiſe ſent out legions of theſe adventurers, are now cultivated and improved in ſuch a manner, that all the inhabitants live in plenty and ſatisfaction, and conſequently are under no temptation or neceſſity of removing into any other country: and in the laſt place, theſe two nations and the Poles, who alſo border upon the Scythians, being very warlike and inured to arms, make ſo ſtrong a bulwark againſt them, that there is no likelihood of their ever being able either to conquer, or even to force a paſſage through them; and indeed they have actually repelled many formidable invaſions of theſe Barbarians: it is not without reaſon

* Now called Tartary.

† Since Machiavel's time, the Tartars have made terrible irruptions into China, and entirely ſubdued that Empire.

therefore, if they ſometimes boaſt that it is owing to their valour, that Italy has been ſo long ſecured from ſuch irruptions, and that the Church of Rome is obliged to them for its very exiſtence *.

* For a further account of theſe emigrations, ſee Hiſt. Flor. book I. at the beginning. Davilla's Hiſtory of the Civil wars of France, at the beginning. Examen du Prince, chap. xxi. Sir William Temple, in the firſt Chapter of his obſervations upon the united provinces of the Netherlands, aſſigns another reaſon why they have long ceaſed. "I have ſometimes thought (ſays he) how it ſhould have come to paſs that the infinite ſwarm of that vaſt northern hive, which ſo often ſhook the world like a great tempeſt, and overflow'd it like a torrent; changing names, and cuſtoms, and government, and language, and the very face of nature, wherever they ſeated themſelves; which upon record of Story, under the name of Gauls, pierced into Greece and Italy, ſacking Rome, and beſieging the Capitol in Camillus's time; under that of the Cimbers, marched through France to the very confines of Italy, defended by Marius; under that of Huns or Lombards, Viſigoths, Goths, and Vandals, conquered the whole force of the Roman Empire, ſacked Rome thrice in a ſmall compaſs of years, ſeated three Kingdoms in Spain and Africa, as well as Lombardy; and under that of Danes and Normans poſſeſſed themſelves of England, a great part of France, and even of Naples and Sicily: how (I ſay) theſe nations which ſeemed to ſpawn in every age, and at ſome intervals of time diſcharged their own native countries of ſo vaſt numbers, and with ſuch terror to the world, ſhould about ſeven or eight hundred years ago leave off the uſe of theſe furious expeditions, as if on a ſudden they ſhould have grown barren, or tame, or better contented with their own ill climates. But I ſuppoſe we owe this benefit wholly to the growth and progreſs of Chriſtianity in the North; by which, early and undiſtinguiſhed copulation, or multitude of wives, were reſtrained or abrogated. By the ſame means learning and civility got footing amongſt them in ſome degree, and encloſed certain circuits of thoſe vaſt regions, by the diſtinctions and bounds of Kingdoms, Principalities, or Commonalties. Men began to leave their wilder lives, ſpent without other cares or pleaſures than of food or of luſt, and betook themſelves to the eaſe and entertainment of ſocieties; with order and labour, riches began and trade followed, and theſe made way for luxury, and that for many diſeaſes or ill habits of body unknown to former and ſimpler ages, which began to ſhorten and weaken both life and procreation. Beſides, the diviſions and circles of dominion occaſioned wars betwixt the ſeveral nations though of the ſame faith: and thoſe of the Poles, Hungarians, and Muſcovites, with the Turks and Tartars made greater ſlaughters: and by theſe accidents, I ſuppoſe, the numbers of thoſe fertile broods have been leſſened, and their limits in a meaſure confined; and we have had thereby for ſo long together in theſe parts of the world the honour and liberty of drawing our own blood upon the quarrels of humour or avarice, ambition, or pride, without the aſſiſtance or need of any barbarian nations to deſtroy us."

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

What often gives rise to a war betwixt different Powers.

THE war betwixt the Romans and Samnites, after they had long been friends and confederates, was owing to a circumstance which often proves the cause of war between two powerful States: and this circumstance is occasioned either by accident or design. The abovementioned quarrel was the effect of accident; for when the Samnites first made war upon the Sidicines, and afterwards upon the Campanians, they had no design to break with the Romans. But the Campanians being distressed, and having no other resource, threw themselves into the arms of the Romans, and submitted to their government, contrary to the expectation both of the Romans and Samnites: after which, the Romans were forced to defend them as their own Subjects, and to engage in a war which they could not decline with honour. For though they did not think themselves obliged to support them before, when they were only in common amity with them, against the Samnites, who were their allies, yet they thought it would be shameful not to protect them after they were become their Subjects; rightly judging that if they did not, it would discourage others who possibly might afterwards be inclinable to do the same, and acknowledge their dominion; which would be acting contrary to the great end they always had in view of extending their glory and Empire. An accident of the same nature occasioned the first Punic war; that is, the protection which the Romans gave to the people of Messina in Sicily: but the second was owing to another cause. For Hannibal the Carthaginian General fell upon the Saguntines in Spain, a people in alliance with the Romans; not so much out of any particular enmity he had to that State, as to force the Romans to engage

in its defence; that ſo he might have a fair pretence to quarrel with them and invade Italy. This method of exciting a war is very common with ſuch Princes and States as are deſirous to keep up ſome appearance, at leaſt, of honour and good faith; for when they want to make war upon another Prince with whom they have been long in friendſhip and alliance, they generally find ſome excuſe to fall upon one State or other that is dependent upon him, and not directly upon him himſelf; well knowing that by ſo doing, he will either be provoked to reſent it, and then a war enſues according to their wiſh; or if he is not, he muſt ſhew either great weakneſs or baſeneſs in not defending thoſe that are under his protection: in either of which caſes he muſt loſe his reputation, and facilitate the deſigns of his adverſary.

We may obſerve therefore from what has been ſaid above, concerning the Campanians and Carthaginians, how wars are excited in ſuch caſes ſometimes by accident, ſometimes by deſign: and further, what remedy a State may have recourſe to that is not able to defend itſelf, and yet reſolved not to ſubmit to the enemy that invades it; which is to throw itſelf voluntarily into the arms of another that is powerful enough to afford it protection, as the Romans did to the Campanians, and Robert King of Naples to the Florentines; for though that Prince would not undertake to defend them againſt the incurſions of Caſtruccio Caſtracani, whilſt they were only upon the footing of common friendſhip with him, yet he took them under his protection when they ſubmitted to him as their Sovereign *.

* This ſeems likely enough to be the caſe of the Dutch ſome time or other. Sir William Temple ſomewhere ſays, that when they were reduced almoſt to the brink of ruin by the French in the laſt century, they actually began to talk of putting themſelves, as a circle, under the protection of the Empire.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

That Money is not the Sinews of War, as it is commonly thought to be.

SINCE it is a much eaſier matter to begin than to conclude a war, a Prince who has any deſign of that kind in hand, ought not only maturely to conſider his own ſtrength, and to regulate his conduct according to it; but alſo to take great care that he does not impoſe upon himſelf in making that eſtimate, as he certainly will do if he altogether depends either upon his coffers (be they ever ſo full) or the ſituation of his dominions, or the affection of his Subjects; all which will ſignify nothing, if he has not a good and faithful army of his own. Theſe things indeed may increaſe his ſtrength, but none of them alone can make him ſtrong: for without a powerful body of troops, what can money do, of what account is an advantageous ſituation, or the affection of Subjects, who will quickly deſert him when they find he is not able to protect them? Every Mountain, every Lake or Sea, is paſſable, and every Fortreſs (however impregnable ſoever it may be thought) is acceſſible where there are not proper forces to defend it: and as for plenty of money and treaſure, inſtead of ſecuring a State, it often expoſes it to great danger, and ſometimes proves the cauſe of its ruin, by tempting others to invade it: ſo that nothing can be more falſe and abſurd than the common ſaying, that *money is the ſinews of war.* Quintus Curtius has however advanced this opinion, in the account which he gives of the war betwixt Antipater the Macedonian, and the King of Sparta; where he tells us that the latter was in ſo great want of money that he was forced to come to an engagement with the enemy upon ſuch unequal terms, that he was utterly routed: whereas, if he could have avoided fighting but a few days, he would

have received news of Alexander's death, and might have gained a victory without ſtriking a ſtroke: but as he had no money, and was afraid his troops would deſert for want of pay, he was under a neceſſity of trying the fortune of a battle; from whence the above-mentioned Author infers, *that money is the ſinews of war.* This Maxim, though founded neither upon truth nor reaſon, is nevertheleſs in ſuch general vogue at preſent, that ſeveral Princes (not very wiſe ones indeed) regulate their proceedings according to it; not conſidering that if money alone could ſupport and defend them againſt all enemies and dangers, Darius would not formerly have been conquered by Alexander, nor the Greeks by the Romans, nor Duke Charles * by the Swiſs a little while ago; nor would the Pope and the Florentines have met with any difficulty in reducing Franciſco Maria, Nephew to Julius II. in the war of Urbino, which happened but the other day. Yet all the above mentioned Princes and States were fairly beaten by others who thought good troops and not money were the Sinews of war. Cræſus King of Lydia having entertained Solon, the Athenian Lawgiver, with many other ſplendid and magnificent ſights, at laſt took him to ſee his Treaſury, which was full of ſilver and gold; and aſking him, "if he did not think him exceeding powerful," Solon anſwered, "he did not look upon him to be at all the more powerful upon that account, becauſe war was made with iron, and not with ſilver and gold; and if he ſhould be invaded by any one that had more of the former, he would ſoon be ſtripped of the latter." Every body likewiſe knows that when a vaſt inundation of the Gauls poured themſelves into Greece and other parts of Aſia, after the death of Alexander the Great, and ſent Ambaſſadors to conclude a treaty of agreement with the King of Macedon, that Prince was ſo imprudent to ſhew them the immenſe treaſures he was poſſeſſed of, in order to diſplay his great power,

* Of Milan.

and

and to diſcourage them from attacking him: upon which, the Gauls were ſo impatient to enrich themſelves with thoſe ſpoils, that they declined any treaty with him, and immediately fell upon his dominions with ſuch fury, that what he had principally confided in for his ſecurity and defence, proved the chief cauſe of his ruin. We might alſo mention the more recent example of the Venetians, who having accumulated a vaſt quantity of money, found ſo little benefit from it when they had moſt occaſion for aſſiſtance, that being attacked not long ago by the Emperor and Lewis XII. of France, they preſently loſt all their dominions upon the Terra firma.

I ſay then, that good Soldiers, and not money (according to the vulgar opinion) are the Sinews of war: for money alone is not ſufficient to provide a good army; but a good army will always provide itſelf with money. If the Romans had been ſimple enough to depend upon money only in their wars, the treaſure of the whole world would not have ſufficed to carry them through their vaſt enterprizes abroad, and the difficulties they met with at home: but as they availed themſelves chiefly of iron, they were ſo far from wanting gold, that people who ſtood in awe of their arms, brought it in abundance to their own doors: and if the above mentioned King of Sparta was neceſſitated by ſcarcity of money to riſque a Battle, it was no more than what has happened to ſeveral other Commanders from different cauſes. For it has often chanced that an army has been ſo ſtraitened for proviſions, that it muſt either periſh by hunger or come to an engagement: in which caſe the latter reſolution has conſtantly been taken, as the moſt honourable, and in which a general may poſſibly be in ſome meaſure befriended by Fortune. Again, it frequently happens that when a Commander has intelligence that the enemy is going to be reinforced, he muſt either engage them immediately, or wait till their ſuccours arrive, and then be obliged fight them at a very great diſadvantage. Or laſtly, it might fare with him as it did

did with Aſdrubal, when he was ſurpriſed by Claudius Nero in the Country of the Piceni: in which circumſtances, he muſt either retreat and be ruined without any poſſibility of retrieve, or hazard a Battle as Aſdrubal did at all events, though with little probability of ſucceſs.

There are ſeveral cauſes we ſee which may force a General to fight contrary to his deſire and intention; and if want of money ſometimes happens to be one, it is not reaſonable upon that account merely, to ſay that money alone is the ſinews of war, when ſo many other circumſtances and wants may reduce him to the ſame neceſſity. I muſt therefore repeat what I ſaid above, that money is not the ſinews of war, but good forces: it is a neceſſary article to be ſure, but yet an army will eaſily find means to ſurmount the want of it; for it is as impoſſible that good Soldiers ſhould want money, as that money only ſhould either make or procure good Soldiers. The truth of this is evident from a thouſand paſſages in Hiſtory, notwithſtanding ſome one may object perhaps, that Pericles encouraged the Athenians to engage in a war againſt the united forces of all Peloponeſus, by telling them they were ſo rich and powerful, they could not fail of ſucceſs. The Athenians accordingly liſtened to his advice: but though their arms proſpered for a while, they came off with the worſt at laſt, and found to their coſt that all their money and power were not a match for the valour and diſcipline of the Spartan Veterans. A remarkable paſſage in Livy might ſerve as a further proof of my poſition, if any was yet wanting: for propoſing it as a queſtion whether Alexander the Great would have been able to conquer the Romans if he had turned his arms upon Italy, he ſays, there are three things abſolutely neceſſary to carry on a war with vigour, good Soldiers, good Commanders, and good fortune; and then having conſidered which ſide was the more powerful in thoſe three points, he concludes his compariſon without ſaying ſo much as one word concerning money. It is probable that the Cam-

Campanians of whom we ſpake in the laſt chapter, computed their ſtrength by their riches, and not by the goodneſs of their troops, when at the ſolicitation of the Sidicines, they took up arms in their favour againſt the Samnites: for after they had ſo done they were twice routed, and at laſt forced to ſubmit and become tributary to the Romans, in order to ſave themſelves from utter ruin and ſlavery.

CHAP. XI.

That it is imprudent to enter into an Alliance with a Prince, whoſe Reputation is greater than his Strength.

LIVY has well expreſſed the error of the Sidicines in truſting to the aſſiſtance of the Campanians, and that of the Campanians in thinking themſelves able to defend them, "Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, ſays he, quam vires ad præſidium attulerunt. The Campanians brought more reputation than ſtrength to the relief of the Sidicines." From whence we may obſerve that Alliances contracted with Princes who are either at too great a diſtance, or too weak, or embarraſſed in their own affairs, are rather honourable than ſafe to thoſe that confide in them. Of this we have an example in the caſe of the Florentines, when they were invaded in the year 1479 by the Pope and the King of Naples: for though they were at that time in alliance with the King of France, it was rather a credit than any material ſervice to them: and the very ſame that happened to the Florentines and Campanians, would happen to any other Italian State that ſhould truſt to the Emperor for ſuccour upon any emergency. The Campanians therefore were guilty of a great error, in thinking their ſtrength more conſiderable than it really was: but ſuch is the folly of mankind, that they often undertake to protect others, when they are not able to defend themſelves: as the Tarentines likewiſe did, who, when the Roman

Roman army had taken the field againſt the Samnites, ſent Ambaſſadors to acquaint the Roman General it was their pleaſure there ſhould a peace betwixt the two States, and that they would turn their arms againſt which ſide ſoever ſhould refuſe their mediation. But that General laughing at the impertinence of the Embaſſy, commanded a charge to be ſounded immediately in the preſence of the Ambaſſadors, and led on his troops to engage the enemy, ſhewing them by deeds and not by words, what ſort of anſwer he thought they deſerved. Having now pointed out ſome errors which States fall into in defending others, I ſhall ſay ſomething in the next chapter, concerning the meaſures they ought to purſue for their own defence.

CHAP. XII.

Whether, upon the expectation of a war, it is better to invade the Enemy, or to ſuſtain an Invaſion.

I HAVE heard it debated ſometimes amongſt able and experienced Commanders, whether (when one Prince has declared war againſt another, and they are both nearly equal in ſtrength) it is better for him that has received ſuch a declaration, to wait till he is attacked, or to be beforehand with the enemy and carry the war into his country. And indeed there is much to be ſaid in ſupport of both opinions. Thoſe that are for carrying the war into the Enemy's country, quote the advice which Cræſus gave Cyrus, when he arrived upon the confines of the Meſſagetæ with a deſign to make war upon them, and Thomyris their Queen ſent to let him know, "that if he pleaſed he might enter her dominions, and ſhe would be ready with her forces to receive him there; or if he did not like that, ſhe would advance to attack him where he then was." Upon which, a Council being called, Cræſus, in oppoſition to all the reſt of the Counſellors,

lors, adviſed him to march directly againſt her; for if he ſhould defeat her at a diſtance from home, he muſt not in that caſe hope to make himſelf Maſter of her kingdom, becauſe ſhe would have time to recruit her broken forces and make freſh head againſt him there: but if he beat her in her own territories, they muſt certainly fall into his hands; ſince he might purſue his victory in ſuch a manner as to prevent her from ever repairing the loſs. The Advocates on this ſide likewiſe alledge the counſel that Hannibal gave Antiochus, when that Prince had reſolved to engage in a war with the Romans, aſſuring him, that if they ever could be beaten it muſt be in Italy; becauſe there an Invader might avail himſelf of their own arms, their own money, and their own allies; but if he entered the liſts with them any where elſe, and ſuffered them to continue unmoleſted in Italy, he would leave them a ſource of ſupplies that would never fail them upon any occaſion whatſoever; and concluded with telling him, that he might ſooner diſpoſſeſs them of Rome itſelf, than of any other City, and of Italy more eaſily than any other Province in their Empire *. The conduct of Agathocles the Sicilian, is alſo inſtanced upon this occaſion, who being at war with the Carthaginians, and not able to cope with them at home, tranſported an army into Africa, where he ſucceeded ſo well, that he forced them to ſue for peace: and laſtly, that of Scipio, who, to ſave Italy, attacked the ſame people in their own country.

Thoſe that take the other ſide of the queſtion, maintain, on the contrary, that it is the beſt way to draw the enemy to a diſtance from his own dominions: in ſupport of which, they adduce the example of the Athenians, who were always victorious when the ſeat of war lay in their own country, but ſoon loſt their liberties after they removed it into Sicily. They likewiſe avail themſelves of the ſtory of Antæus the Egyp-

* See this queſtion fully diſcuſſed in Paolo Paruta's Political Diſcourſes, book I. diſc. v.

tian, who being invaded by Hercules, King of Libya, was invincible whilſt he oppoſed him at home; but being drawn abroad by the artifice of his enemy, he loſt both his Kingdom and his life together. From hence aroſe the Fable of Antæus, who being born of the earth, received freſh vigour from his mother every time he was thrown down in the conflict he had with Hercules; but the latter being aware of that at laſt, lifted him up from the ground, and ſqueezed him to death betwixt his arms. As to modern inſtances, ſay they, every one knows, that Ferdinand, King of Naples, who was eſteemed a very wiſe Prince, being informed about two years before he died, that Charles the VIIIth of France deſigned to invade his dominions, made all neceſſary diſpoſitions to receive him there: but falling ſick, he adviſed his ſon Alphonſo upon his death-bed, to wait the arrival of the French in his own Kingdom, and not be tempted to let his forces go out of it upon any account whatſoever. The Son, however, paying no regard to this advice, ſent an army into Romagna, which being ruined there without ſtriking a ſtroke, his Kingdom fell a Sacrifice to the French.

But there are other arguments beſides theſe, which might be urged on each ſide. For, it may be ſaid in favour of the Invader, that he ſhews more reſolution than he that ſtays till he is attacked at home; which certainly muſt inſpire his forces with great confidence: that he deprives the enemy of many ſuccours and advantages, which he might otherwiſe make uſe of to his prejudice; for when his country is laid waſte, and his ſubjects ſo plundered and harraſſed, that he cannot tell how to exact any freſh ſupplies, all reſources are cut off, the Magazines are exhauſted, and the fountain being dried up (as Hannibal ſaid) the ſtreams muſt of courſe ſoon fail, ſo that he will not be able to ſupport the war for want of proviſions: and laſtly, that the Invaders being in an enemy's country, and under a neceſſity of fighting for their daily ſuſtenance, that neceſſity, (if there were no other motives) will make

make them not only resolute and courageous, but desperate, as we have said elsewhere. On the other hand it may be said, that he who is invaded has these advantages: in the first place, he has it in his power to distress the enemy greatly in point of provisions, and many other things without which an army cannot subsist: in the next, he may often frustrate his designs by being so much better acquainted with the nature of the country: he may likewise bring more forces into the field, as he will be able to collect all that he has into one body there if he pleases, though he could not transport them all into another country; and that if he should chance to lose a battle, he may soon repair the loss and face his enemy again, as many of his troops will find means to escape to places of safety not far off, and other recruits may presently be drawn together from the neighbouring towns: so that in this case you venture but part of your fortune, upon the whole of your force: whereas in the other, you hazard your whole fortune upon part of your strength only. Some have suffered an enemy not only to advance two or three days march into their country, but to take several towns, that so when their army was weakened by leaving garrisons in them all, they might be engaged with more probability of success.

But to speak my own opinion of the matter, I think this distinction ought to be made. Your people are either warlike and well disciplined, as the Romans were formerly and the Swiss are at present; or they are otherwise, like the Carthaginians of old, and the French and Italians in these times. In the latter case endeavour by all means to keep an enemy at a distance: because your strength consisting chiefly in your revenues, and not in the confidence you have in your Subjects, whenever your revenues are interrupted or cut off, you are certainly undone: and nothing contributes more speedily and effectually to this, than a war in your own country. In proof of this, we might produce the example of the Carthaginians, who were strong enough to cope with the Romans whilst their

revenues continued entire and undiſturbed; but when they were attacked at home, they could not make head even againſt Agathocles. The Florentines, likewiſe, though they could not ſecure themſelves againſt Caſtruccio Caſtracani, Lord of Lucca, when he carried the war into their country, by any other means than becoming ſubject to Robert, King of Naples; yet had courage enough after Caſtruccio was dead, to attack the Duke of Milan in his own dominions, with a deſign to have deprived him of them; ſo courageous were they when they made war abroad, and ſo puſillanimous when it was brought to their own doors. But if your country is in a good poſture of defence, and your people warlike and well armed, like the Romans in former times, and the Swiſs at this day, the nearer an enemy approaches, the harder he muſt find it to ſubdue you: for in ſuch a caſe, you will be able to raiſe more forces to defend yourſelf, than you poſſibly could have done to invade others. The advice therefore which Hannibal gave Antiochus upon the like occaſion is not much to be regarded, as it proceeded from reſentment and ſelf-intereſt: for if the Romans had received three ſuch defeats in Gaul, and in ſo ſhort a time as they did from Hannibal in Italy, without doubt they would have been utterly ruined; ſince they could neither have availed themſelves of the remainder of their forces, nor had an opportunity of repairing their loſſes, nor of exerting their utmoſt ſtrength and reſources, as they did at home. For we do not find that they ever ſent out an army that conſiſted of above fifty thouſand men to conquer any State abroad; but when they were invaded by the Gauls after the concluſion of the firſt Punic war, the forces they raiſed amounted to eighteen hundred thouſand: nor could they have beaten the ſame people afterwards whilſt they remained in Lombardy, as they did when they had advanced into Tuſcany: becauſe they would not have been able to oppoſe them with the ſame force or the ſame advantages at ſuch a diſtance.

diſtance *. The Cimbri gave the Romans ſuch an overthrow in Germany, that they never could make head againſt them in that country afterwards: but when they penetrated into Italy, where the Romans were enabled to employ their whole force againſt them, they were ſoon vanquiſhed and driven back again. The Swiſs may eaſily be conquered abroad, becauſe they cannot ſend an army of above thirty or forty thouſand men at moſt into a foreign country; but it is no eaſy matter to get the better of them at home, where they can aſſemble at leaſt an hundred thouſand effective men. I ſay again therefore, that a Prince whoſe country is in a good poſture of defence, and his ſubjects well armed and inured to war, ſhould always receive a powerful and dangerous enemy at home; and never ſtir out of his own dominions to meet him. But if his country is open, and his ſubjects unacquainted with arms, let him endeavour by all means to keep his enemy as far off as he poſſibly can. And thus by acting according to theſe circumſtances, he will be beſt able to defend himſelf in either caſe.

CHAP. XIII.

That men more frequently advance themſelves by guile and artifice than by force.

IT very ſeldom or never happens that men of low condition advance themſelves to any conſiderable height of grandeur, without having recourſe both to fraud and violence; unleſs they ſucceed to it by donation, or right of inheritance. Nor do I know of any inſtance in which violence alone has been ſufficient for that purpoſe; though many might be enumerated wherein it has been effected ſolely by fraud and deceit, as will plainly appear to any one that reads the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles the Si-

* See Chap. viii. of this book.

cilian, and others like them, who raiſed themſelves from a private, or rather baſe and abject condition, to rule over great Kingdoms and Empires. Xenophon in the life of Cyrus ſhews the neceſſity of artifice; for the firſt expedition which that Prince is there ſuppoſed to make againſt the King of Armenia is full of wiles, and the ſucceſs of it entirely owing to fraud and cunning without any mixture of force. From whence one may reaſonably conclude that he thinks it neceſſary for a Prince who would effect great things, that he ſhould learn to deceive. Beſides which, he repreſents him as deceiving Cyaxares, King of Media, his Uncle by the mother's ſide, in many inſtances; and inſinuates that without ſo doing, he never could have attained to that height of greatneſs which he afterwards did *. In ſhort, I am firmly perſuaded that

* Upon this paſſage Daeres ſays, "becauſe this whole chapter tends to ſhew how neceſſary guile is for a Prince's advantage, and it is again recommended by precept in Machiavel's treatiſe of a Prince, I cannot but take notice that here he is blameable. "Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoſte requirat?" is not meant "de dolo malo," ſuppoſed by Machiavel in his Prince, chap. xix. where he perſwades a Prince to uſe the Lyon's force and the Foxe's crafte. To bee able in all military ſtratagems and ſleights to circumvent an enemy is one of the moſt requiſite and notable parts in a commander; provided there be no breach of faith nor oath violated: for as Tully ſays, "eſt jus jurandum affirmatio religioſa: quod autem affirmare, quaſi Deo teſte, promiſeris, id tenendum eſt." It is much unworthy of a Prince (ſays a worthy late author) to falſify his word either to an enemy or ſubject; and the more villanie is it to uſe covert fraud than open violence, becauſe the enemy lyes more open by giving credit to his faith; "& fraus diſtringit, non diſolvit, perjurium." And with how much more ſolemnity Princes oaths are ordinarily taken, methinks ſo much the more ſinceritie ought they to carry with them, having drawn together many eyes and ears as witneſſes of their truth or falſhood. I ſhall conclude then with Tacitus in the fourth of his Annals. "Cæteris mortalibus in eo ſtant conſilia, quod ſibi conducere putant; principum diverſa ſors eſt, quibus præcipua rerum ad famam dirigenda." Let us hear honeſt Montaigne upon this matter. "As to this virtue of hypocriſy and diſſimulation, which is now ſo much in requeſt, (ſays he, book II. chap. xvii. of his Eſſays, I mortally hate it; and of all vices find none that ſhews ſo much baſeneſs and meanneſs of Spirit. 'Tis a cowardly and ſervile humour for a man to hide and diſguiſe himſelf under a vizard, and not dare to ſhew himſelf what he is. By this our followers are trained up to treachery; for being brought up to ſpeak what is not true, they make no conſcience of a lye. A generous heart ought not to give the lye to its own thoughts, but will make itſelf ſeen within, where all is good, or at leaſt humane. Ariſtotle reputes it

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no man of mean condition ever arrived at any remarkable degree of power and dominion merely by open and downright force; but that many have by fraud

the office of Magnanimity, openly and profeſſedly to love and hate, to judge and ſpeak with all freedom; and not to value the approbation or diſlike of others at the expence of truth. Apollonius ſaid it was for ſlaves to lie, and freemen to ſpeak truth. It is the chief and fundamental part of virtue; we muſt love it for its own ſake: he that ſpeaks the truth becauſe he is otherwiſe obliged ſo to do, and becauſe he ſerves, and that is not afraid to lie, when it ſignifies nothing to any body, is not ſufficiently true. My Soul naturally abominates lying, and hates the very thought of it: I have an inward baſhfulneſs and ſmart remorſe if ever a lie eſcapes me, as ſometimes it does, when I am ſurprized and hurried by occaſions that allow me no premeditation. A man muſt not always tell all, for that would be folly; but what a man ſays ſhould be what he thinks, otherwiſe it is knavery. I do not know what advantage men pretend to by eternally counterfeiting and diſſembling, except it is never to be believed, even when they ſpeak truth. This may paſs once or twice perhaps upon men; but to profeſs concealing their thoughts, and to boaſt, as ſome of our Princes have done, "that they would burn their ſhirts if they thought they knew their true intentions, (which was a ſaying of Metellus of Macedon) and that he who knows not how to diſſemble, knows not how to rule;" is giving warning to all who have any thing to do with them, that whatever they ſay is nothing but lies and deceit. "Quo quis verſutior & callidior eſt (ſays Tully) hoc inviſior & ſuſpectior, detractâ opinione probitatis." It would be great ſimplicity in any one to confide either in the countenance or word of a man, that has put on a reſolution to be always another thing without than he is within, as Tiberius did: and I cannot conceive what intereſt ſuch can have in their converſation with men, ſeeing they produce nothing that is admitted for truth; whoever is diſloyal to truth, is the ſame to falſhood alſo.—Thoſe of our times, who have conſidered, in the eſtabliſhment of the Duty of a Prince, the welfare of his affairs only, and have preferred that to the care of his faith and conſcience, might ſay ſomething to a Prince, whoſe affairs Fortune had put into ſuch a poſture that he might for ever eſtabliſh them by only once breaking his word. But it will not go ſo: they often come again to the ſame market, they make more than one peace, and enter into more than one treaty in their lives. Gain tempts them to the firſt breach of faith, and almoſt always preſents itſelf, as in favour of all other evil actions: Sacrileges, murders, rebellions, and treaſons, are undertaken for ſome kind of advantage; but the firſt gain has ſuch conſequences as throw this Prince out of all correſpondence and negociation by this example of his perfidy. Soliman of the Ottoman race (a race not very careful in keeping their promiſes and articles) when his army made a deſcent on Otranto in my infancy, being informed that Mercurino de Gratinare and the inhabitants of Caſtro were detained priſoners, after having ſurrendered the place, contrary to the articles of capitulation with his forces, ſent an order to have them ſet at liberty, ſaying, "that as he had other great enterprizes in hand in thoſe parts, this breach of faith, though it carried a ſhew of preſent utility, would afterwards bring him into diſrepute, and occaſion a diffidence in his word that might be of infinite prejudice to his affairs."

alone; as Giovanni Galeazzo in particular, who by that means only deprived his Uncle Bernabo of the State of Milan*. Now if Princes are obliged to act in this manner in order to found or increaſe their Empire, Republics are under an equal neceſſity of doing the ſame, till they are become powerful enough to truſt to their ſtrength: and as Rome took all other means (either by good fortune or deſign) that were neceſſary to eſtabliſh its future grandeur; ſo it did not fail to avail itſelf of this alſo; nor was it poſſible to have proceeded more craftily than it did in taking the method we have mentioned before, namely, of cajoling the Latins and other neighbouring States into ſuch a confederacy as inſenſibly made them its Subjects inſtead of Allies. For in the firſt place, it made uſe of their arms to conquer the other neighbouring powers, and had the chief ſhare of honour by aſſuming the name of Principal in that confederacy: and having thus ſubdued ſome of them, it afterwards employed its own ſtrength, and the authority which it had thereby acquired to reduce all the others: for the Latins were not aware, that in fact they themſelves were no better than Slaves, till they had ſeen the Samnites twice defeated and forced to accept of terms from the Romans. Theſe Victories which gained the Romans great reputation amongſt the States that were further off and rather admired their valour than felt the weight of it, likewiſe excited the envy and jealouſy of thoſe that were nearer home and more immediately ſenſible of the effects of their arms, particularly the Latins: and ſo great was this apprehenſion, that not only the Latins themſelves, but the Colonies which the Romans had ſent into Latium, and the Campanians, who not long before had taken ſhelter under the protection of Rome, conſpired againſt them. In conſequence of which, the Latins provoked them to a war, (in the manner which I have ſaid before is often practiſed upon thoſe occaſions) not by falling directly upon the

* Theſe two Princes were of the houſe of Viſconti, and Dukes of Milan before the Sfozi's. See Hiſt. Flor.

Romans

Romans themſelves, but by ſupporting the Sidicines, againſt the Samnites, who had made war upon them, by permiſſion from the Romans. Nor was there any other reaſon for this conſpiracy, but becauſe the confederates began to be aware how much they had been impoſed upon under the ſpecious name of Allies: accordingly Livy makes Annius Setinus, a Latin Prætor, ſay in a ſpeech which he made in their Council: "Nam ſi etiam nunc ſub umbrâ æqui fœderis, ſervitutem pati poſſumus, quid obeſt quin proditis Sidicinis, non Romanorum Solum, ſed Samnitium dictis pareamus? For if we can even now endure ſervitude, under the pretence of an equal confederacy; might we not as well give up the Sidicines, and ſubmit not only to the Romans, but to the Samnites alſo?"

We ſee then, that even the Romans, in the infancy of their State, availed themſelves of that artifice and deceit to extend their dominion, which every one muſt of neceſſity have recourſe to, that is ambitious of raiſing himſelf from a low eſtate to any conſiderable height of grandeur: and the more cunningly it is diſguiſed and concealed, the leſs diſhonourable it will ſeem, as appears from the example of that people.

CHAP. XIV.

That people are often miſtaken, who think to work upon the proud and arrogant by moderation and courteſy.

IT frequently happens that mildneſs and condeſcenſion, inſtead of being of advantage, are of great diſſervice to people; eſpecially when thoſe that have conceived any prejudice againſt them, either out of envy or any other motive, are of a haughty and inſolent diſpoſition: of which we have a remarkable proof in what Livy tells us concerning the occaſion of the war betwixt the Romans and the Latins. For the Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had invaded them, the Romans, being unwilling to

exaſperate the latter ſtill more, did not offer to put a ſtop to their hoſtilities: which behaviour however was ſo far from ſoothing the jealouſy of the Latins, that it only ſerved to encourage them, and made them declare their enmity the ſooner, as appears from the ſame ſpeech of the above-mentioned Annius Setinus, in which he further tells the Council: "Tentaſtis patientiam negando militem. Quis dubitat exarſiſſe eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parare adverſus Samnites fœderatos ſuos audierunt, nec moverunt ſe ab urbe. Unde hæc illis modeſtia, niſi a conſcientiâ virium & noſtrarum & ſuarum? You have already ſeen how much they will bear, by refuſing to ſupply them with your contingent of forces. There is no doubt but they were ſufficiently nettled at it; yet they ſwallowed the affront. They knew of our preparations againſt their allies the Samnites: yet they never ſtirred a foot to ſupport them. Whence proceeds this wonderful moderation think you, but from a conſciouſneſs of their own weakneſs and our ſtrength?" It appears plainly then, from this example, how much this moderation in the Romans increaſed the arrogance of the Latins.

A Prince therefore ought never to deſcend from his dignity, nor voluntarily give up any point, (if he has a mind to ſupport his reputation) except when he either knows or thinks he is able to maintain it. For when a prince cannot give up a thing with a good grace and in an honourable manner, it is almoſt always better to ſuffer it to be extorted by force, than tamely ſubmit to the loſs, without any ſtruggle to preſerve it; becauſe if he parts with it in that puſillanimous manner, he does it to prevent a war; in which the odds are great that his expectation is diſappointed, for thoſe to whom he has ſo meanly ſubmitted, perceiving his weakneſs and apprehenſions, will be ſo far from being ſatisfied with his conceſſion, that they will conſtantly be making freſh demands, and grow bolder and more unreaſonable every time, as they ſee he is the leſs to be feared: beſides which, he will find his

his friends cooler and more backward in assisting him, as they must naturally be induced to think he is either very weak or very dastardly. But if, on the contrary, he immediately begins to raise forces, and take all other necessary measures to face the enemy, as soon as he discovers his designs, they will not be so forward to attack him, even though they find him inferior to them: and those friends will not only honour him for it, but come in with alacrity to his assistance, when they see him so resolute in his defence, who would not have made the least effort to succour him if he had been wanting to himself. This is to be understood however, when he has but one enemy to deal with: but if he should chance to have several upon his hands at the same time, it will always be the best way to give up something to one of them; by which he may probably either make him his friend, even after war is commenced, or at least detach him from the rest that are confederated against him.

CHAP. XV.

That weak States are generally doubtful in their resolutions; and that slow determinations are always pernicious.

FROM these causes and beginnings of the war betwixt the Latins and the Romans, we may observe, that in all consultations it is the best way to come to some speedy resolution in the matter deliberated upon, and to avoid suspence and delay as much as possible. According to which maxim the Latins proceeded in the Council they held when they designed to revolt from the Romans. For the latter suspecting their fidelity, and being desirous, not only to satisfy themselves, but to regain that people without coming to an open rupture, gave them to understand that they wished they would send eight Deputies to Rome, as they wanted to consult with them upon certain affairs of importance. In consequence of this

meſſage, the Latins being conſcious to themſelves, that they had done ſeveral things that muſt have diſguſted the Romans, preſently called a Council to conſider who ſhould be ſent to Rome, and what they ſhould ſay upon that occaſion, when they came thither. Whilſt the matter therefore was in debate, the aforementioned Prætor Annius Setinus told the Council, "Ad ſummam rerum noſtrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum ſit: facile enim erit explicatis conciliis, accommodare rebus verba: That he thought it highly concerned their welfare, to conſider what was to be done, rather than what was to be ſaid: for when once they were come to any reſolution, it would be an eaſy matter to accommodate their words to their actions:" a piece of advice that certainly has much truth and reaſon in it, and ought to be well remembered by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilſt people are doubtful and uncertain what to do, they muſt likewiſe be at a loſs what to ſay for their conduct in ſuch caſes: but when they have determined how to act, there is no difficulty in the matter. This I thought fit to inculcate the more earneſtly, becauſe I myſelf have often known an irreſolute manner of proceeding, not only very prejudicial to the public affairs, but alſo very ſcandalous and diſgraceful to our own Commonwealth in particular: and indeed there will always be great doubts and uncertainty whenever things of a nice and delicate nature, and in which the utmoſt reſolution is required, come to be diſcuſſed by a Council compoſed of weak and puſillanimous members.

Delays and tardy deliberations are likewiſe no leſs prejudicial; eſpecially when a friend or Ally is to be ſuccoured: for they hurt one's ſelf, and do no body elſe any good. Such deliberations proceed from the want either of courage or ſtrength, or the malevolence of ſome of the Counſellors, who, in order to gratify their own private paſſions, chuſe rather to ruin the State, than not accompliſh ſome favourite point:

for

for which purpoſe, they not only oppoſe and thwart the neceſſary meaſures that are propoſed, but uſe all other means to embarraſs and defeat them: whereas good Citizens never endeavour to traverſe ſuch deliberations, eſpecially in affairs where diſpatch is requiſite, even though the cry of the populace ſhould be againſt them. After the death of Hieronymus, the Tyrant of Syracuſe, a ſharp war being carried on betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, the Syracuſans were divided amongſt themſelves, whether they ſhould take part with the former or the latter: and theſe diviſions grew to ſuch a height, that all public buſineſs was at a ſtand, and nothing could be determined upon; till Apollonides, one of the principal Citizens, repreſented to them in a grave and weighty ſpeech, that though neither thoſe that were inclined to adhere to the Romans, nor thoſe that thought it better to ſide with the Carthaginians, were to be blamed; yet, their ſlow and irreſolute manner of proceeding was very imprudent, and would certainly be the ruin of their State: but that if they would come to a reſolution, which ſide ſoever they took, ſome good or other might be expected from it. Indeed Livy could not have given us a more remarkable document of the evils that attend ſuch a tardy and undetermined manner of deliberating; which he likewiſe confirms by the example of the Latins, whoſe aſſiſtance being demanded by the Lavinians againſt the Romans, was ſo long deferred by their tedious deliberations, whether they ſhould grant them any or not, that at laſt when they had reſolved upon it, and their ſuccours were juſt got out of the gates of the City, they received news that their Confederates were routed: which gave Milonius their Prætor occaſion to ſay, "It is well if the Romans do not make us pay dear for this ſhort march." For if they could ſpeedily have reſolved either to aſſiſt the Lavinians, or not to aſſiſt them; in the latter caſe, they would not have drawn upon themſelves the reſentment of the Romans; and in the former, their Allies might probably have been victorious:

rious: but, as they could not determine to do either, they were ſure to ſmart for it, which ſide ſoever got the better, as indeed they did.

If the Florentines had duly conſidered this matter, they would not have ſuffered ſo much as they did when Charles XII. of France marched into Italy, againſt Lewis Sforza, Duke of Milan: for, when he had partly reſolved upon that Expedition, he would have entered into a Treaty with the Florentine Ambaſſadors, who were then at his Court: the terms of which were, that provided their Republic would ſtand neuter in that quarrel, he would take them into his protection, and ſupport them againſt all enemies. For the ratification of this Treaty a month was allowed: but being imprudently deferred, by the management of ſome who favoured the Duke's intereſt, till the King had ſucceeded in his deſigns, and the Florentines then offering to ratify it, his majeſty paid no regard to them, as he ſaw it proceeded from fear, and not from any good will or friendſhip to him. This delay coſt the Florentines a very large ſum of money, and brought them almoſt to the brink of ruin; as the ſame manner of proceeding did afterwards upon another occaſion. Moreover this behaviour was the more weak and dangerous, as it was of no ſervice to the Duke, who, if he had got the better of the French, would have handled them in a ſtill rougher manner than the King did. Now, though I have ſaid ſomething in a former diſcourſe, concerning the evils that are incident to Commonwealths from ſuch ſlow and irreſolute deliberations; yet as freſh matter occurred, I thought it might not be amiſs to make this addition to it; eſpecially as it is a Subject that ought to be well conſidered by ſuch Republics as that of Florence *.

* Compare theſe two laſt Chapters with Chap. xxxviii. Book I.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

How much our Military Diſcipline in theſe times differs from that of the Ancients.

THE moſt important battle the Romans ever fought with any other nation, was that in which they defeated the Latins, in the Conſulſhip of Manlius Torquatus and Decius: for as it is certain, that the Latins loſt their liberty by that overthrow; ſo the Romans muſt inevitably have become ſubject to them, if they had not gained the victory. Livy himſelf was of this opinion: for he tells us, that the two armies were equal in diſcipline, valour, reſolution, and numbers; and that the only difference betwixt them was, that the Romans had the more determined and courageous Generals. In this battle, there were two circumſtances very remarkable; of which there was no example before, and but very few ſince: for one of the Conſuls ſacrificed himſelf, in order to keep his Soldiers firm in their obedience and diſcipline; and the other put his own Son to death for diſobeying his orders *. The equality which Livy ſays was betwixt theſe two armies, was occaſioned by the Soldiers in both having long ſerved together under the ſame colours, ſpeaking the ſame tongue, obſerving the ſame diſcipline, and fighting with the ſame arms: for, in their order of battle they both followed one method, and there was no difference in the titles of their reſpective officers, or the names by which the ſeveral diviſions of their armies were called. Since both ſides therefore were thus equal in courage and ſtrength, there was a neceſſity for the exertion of ſome great and extraordinary quality on one ſide, in order to inſpire the Soldiers with ſuch a degree of firmneſs and obſtinacy, as might give it a ſuperiority over the other;

* See Livy, lib. VIII. chap. vii. viii. ix. x.

to

to which kind of obſtinacy, a victory is generally owing: for whilſt that laſts they will never turn their backs. And as it was ſo neceſſary to encourage and keep up this reſolution in the breaſts of the Romans, to a pitch beyond that of the Latins, it happened partly through chance, and partly through the bravery and rigour of the Conſuls, that Torquatus put his ſon to death, and Decius ſacrificed himſelf.

To give us a clearer notion of the equality betwixt theſe two armies, Livy deſcribes the order which the Romans obſerved in drawing up their forces, and in time of battle: but as he has done it at large, I ſhall only ſelect what ſeems moſt remarkable; and which, if it had been imitated by the Generals of theſe times, would have prevented much confuſion and many diſorders in their armies and engagements. According to him, there were three grand Diviſions or Lines in their Armies; the firſt conſiſted of *Haſtati* or *Pikemen*; the ſecond, of the *Principes*; and the third, of the *Triarii*; each of which had its cavalry. When they ſet their Battle in array, they placed the Haſtati in the firſt line, the Principes in the ſecond, behind the Haſtati, and the Triarii in the third. On the right and left of each of theſe lines, was poſted a body of Horſe; which from their form and ſtation were called *Alæ*, becauſe they reſembled *Wings*. The Haſtati, or firſt line, were drawn up very cloſe together, the better to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock of the enemy. The ſecond line, conſiſting of the Principes, who were not to engage ſo immediately, but rather to ſupport the front line if it was broken or gave way, was not drawn up ſo cloſe, but had a ſmall interval betwixt every man, that ſo it might receive the Haſtati into thoſe ſpaces without being put into diſorder, if they ſhould chance to be ſo hard preſſed by the enemy as to be obliged to fall back. The Triarii, or third line, were drawn up with ſtill larger intervals, in order to receive the two other lines upon occaſion. Being formed in this manner, the Haſtati began the attack, and if they were repulſed, they retired into the void

void ſpaces left for them by the Principes, and jointly renewed the battle; but if the ſecond line thus filled up, likewiſe happened to be thrown into confuſion, the men fell back into the intervals amongſt the Triarii, and they all advanced together once more to the fight. But as this was their laſt effort (becauſe there was no other ſupport or reſerve left) if they chanced to be worſted again, the battle was loſt. And, as matters were thought to be in a deſperate ſituation, whenever the Triarii came to be engaged, the Proverb "res reducta eſt ad Triarios," took its riſe from hence, *i. e.* "the laſt ſtake is upon the board, *or*, we are reduced to the utmoſt extremity *."

Now, as the Generals of our times have utterly laid aſide all other parts of ancient military diſcipline, this method of drawing up armies is at preſent likewiſe altogether neglected, and become obſolete; though indeed it is an excellent one, and worthy of the ſtricteſt attention: for a body of forces that is formed in this manner, may ſuſtain three vigorous attacks, and muſt be beaten three different times before the day is loſt: whereas, another that can ſtand but one ſhock (which is the caſe of all Chriſtian armies at this day) is liable to be ſoon routed; ſince every little diſorder, or any common degree of impetuoſity in the firſt onſet, is ſufficient to gain a victory over it. The reaſon that our armies cannot rally and return to the charge ſo often as the Roman troops uſed to do, is becauſe the method of receiving one line into another is now entirely loſt; for, according to the preſent method of ranging an army in order of battle, the Generals form their lines cloſe upon the back of each other, and extend them to ſo great a length, that they cannot poſſibly be of any conſiderable depth, which muſt make them very weak: or, if they draw them up deeper, after the manner of the Romans, in order to ſtrengthen them, yet, if the firſt line is broken, it cannot be received into the ſecond, and conſequent-

* See the Art of War, Book III. in the beginning.

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ly when it falls back upon it, muſt occaſion great confuſion and diſorder; in which caſe, the firſt line can neither retreat, nor the ſecond advance, if it ſhould be neceſſary: ſo that the firſt recoiling upon the ſecond, and both upon the third, they become ſo embarraſſed and entangled one amongſt another, that the whole army muſt preſently be ruined. At the battle of Ravenna, where Monſieur de Foix, the French General, was killed, and which was very well fought (conſidering the diſcipline of the times) the French and Spaniſh armies were drawn up in the manner juſt now deſcribed; that is, they both had their lines extended to a great length, and cloſe together: ſo that they could not be very deep, nor make any more than one front to the enemy. And this they always do in large plains, like thoſe about Ravenna: for, as they are ſenſible of the diſorder they muſt fall into, if they ſhould be obliged to retreat, by one line falling back upon another, they endeavour to avoid that danger as much as poſſible, by making a large front: but when the country is full of encloſures, and there is not room enough for that; if they ſhould happen to fall into confuſion, they know of no remedy for it. In the ſame manner, they march through an enemy's country, whether it be to plunder, or forage, or upon any other occaſion. Thus, at the battle of St. Regolo, betwixt the Florentines and the Piſans, in the war which was occaſioned by the defection of the latter from the former, upon the arrival of Charles VIII. in Italy, the defeat of the Florentines was entirely owing to their own Cavalry, which, being poſted in the front, was firſt charged by the enemy, and happening to be broke, fell back upon the Infantry, and threw them into ſuch diſorder, that they all ran away together: and I have often heard Criaco del Borgo, an old Officer in the Florentine Infantry, ſay, that he had never ſeen them defeated, but when they had been firſt diſordered by their own Horſe. The Swiſs, who excel all other nations at preſent in the art of war, always take particular care, when they

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ſerve in the French armies, to be poſted in the flanks, that their Cavalry, if it ſhould chance to be hard preſſed, may not recoil upon them.

Now though theſe things ſeem not only very eaſy to be underſtood, but alſo to be put in practice; yet there is not ſo much as one General in our times, that has hitherto endeavoured either to revive the ancient diſcipline, or correct the modern: and, notwithſtanding they have ſometimes drawn up their armies in three lines, the firſt of which, they call the *Van-guard*; the ſecond, the *Main-battle*; and the third, the *Rear-guard*; yet it has been for no other purpoſe, but for the greater conveniency of encamping: but when they come to action, they almoſt always employ them all three together in one attack, as I ſaid before. And ſince many, to excuſe their ignorance, pretend that there are ſeveral articles in the ancient military diſcipline, which the uſe of artillery will not allow them to practiſe in theſe times, I ſhall diſcuſs that point in the next chapter, and ſhew what weight there is in ſuch allegations.

CHAP. XVII.

What account is to be made of Artillery at preſent: and whether the opinion which the Generality have conceived of it is juſtly founded.

WHEN I conſider how many pitched battles the Romans fought, I cannot help reflecting at the ſame time upon a general received opinion, which is, that if there had been artillery in thoſe times, the Romans could not have over-run Provinces, made ſo many people tributary, nor have performed ſeveral other great exploits ſo eaſily as they did; that ſince it came into uſe, men have not ſhewn themſelves ſo bold and intrepid as they did formerly; and laſtly, that armies are now much more backward in coming to a cloſe engagement, and cannot poſſibly obſerve the ancient

cient diſcipline: ſo that it ſeems as if the whole buſineſs of war would in time be diſpatched by artillery only. As I apprehend therefore, that it may not be foreign to our purpoſe, to examine whether theſe opinions are founded upon reaſon, or not; whether the uſe of artillery has added to, or diminiſhed the ſtrength of armies; and whether it has given Generals more or leſs opportunities of diſtinguiſhing their courage; I ſhall begin with the firſt article, viz. that the Roman arms could not have made ſo great a progreſs, if the uſe of artillery had then been known.

In anſwer to this, I ſay, that war is either offenſive or defenſive: ſo that we muſt examine in the firſt place, in which of theſe two kinds of war artillery is the moſt effectual: and though there is much to be urged on both ſides; yet, I am of opinion, that it does much more miſchief to thoſe that act upon the defenſive, than the offenſive. For the former are generally beſieged, either in ſome town or fortified camp: if it be in a town, it muſt either be in a ſmall one (like moſt fortreſſes) or a large one. In the former caſe, the beſieged are undone: for ſuch is the force of artillery, that it will beat down the thickeſt wall in a few days: ſo that, if thoſe within have neither any place of ſecurity to retire to, nor room to throw up ditches or ramparts to defend themſelves, the enemy of courſe muſt enter the breach. Nor will their artillery ſave them: for it is now received as a general maxim, that when a breach is furiouſly ſtormed by a great number of men at once, it cannot be long defended by artillery. The aſſaults of the Ultramontanes, in particular, are ſo fierce, that it is not poſſible to ſuſtain them: whereas thoſe of the Italians, who lead up their men by few at a time, and in detached parties, are eaſily repelled: but this may more properly be called *Skirmiſhing*, than any thing elſe, and thoſe that approach a breach in ſo cool a manner, where there is any artillery planted, are all ſure to be knocked on the head; becauſe, in this caſe, it muſt do great execution: whilſt others who ruſh impetu-

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ouſly into the breach in great numbers at the ſame time, and puſh each other forwards, are ſure to ſucceed in ſpite of the artillery, except there are any ditches, or other works within to impede them: for though ſome of them muſt be killed, there will be enough left to carry the place. The truth of this has been ſufficiently experienced at the ſiege of many towns, which the Ultramontanes have taken in Italy, particularly at that of Breſcia: for that town having revolted from the French to the Venetians, and the Citadel only holding out for them, the Venetians, in order to ſecure themſelves from any ſallies that might be made from thence, fortified the ſtreet that leads from the Citadel down into the town, planting as many cannon as they poſſibly could, both in the front and flanks, and every other part of it where there was any room; but Monſieur de Foix made ſo little account of them, when he arrived there with a body of horſe to relieve the Citadel, that he ordered his men to diſmount, and puſhing through this ſtreet, preſently made himſelf maſter of the whole town, without ſuſtaining any conſiderable loſs. So that thoſe who are to defend a ſmall town after a breach is made, and have neither any place of ſecurity to retire into, nor ditches or ramparts to obſtruct the enemy, but are reduced to depend upon their artillery alone, muſt ſoon be obliged to ſurrender.

If the town to be defended is a large one, and the beſieged have all the conveniencies juſt now mentioned to truſt to, artillery will ſtill be of much more ſervice to the beſiegers than to them. For, in the firſt place, if you expect to do any material execution, your Guns muſt be planted upon ſome eminence that is elevated above the level of the town; otherwiſe, any little breaſt-work which the enemy may throw up will be ſufficient to cover them from your fire: ſo that being forced to mount your cannon, perhaps upon platforms, at the top of the walls, or ſome other ſuch elevated place, you muſt labour under two difficulties; in the firſt place, you cannot make uſe of

ſuch heavy pieces as the enemy may, becauſe the ſpace there will be too ſtrait to manage them, as they ought to be managed: and in the next, if that was poſſible to be done, yet you could not make parapets there ſtrong enough to ſecure them; both which the beſiegers may eaſily do, as they are upon a plain field, and have both room and materials ſufficient for both thoſe purpoſes. It is hardly poſſible therefore, for the beſieged to keep their cannon upon ſuch an elevation, if the enemy has many and heavy pieces; and, if they plant them on a flat, they will be of little or no ſervice, as I ſhewed before: ſo that after all, the place muſt be maintained as in former times, chiefly by dint of ſmall arms and the courage of the Soldier. Now, though ſmall arms are of ſome ſervice to the beſieged, yet, not of ſo much as to balance the miſchief done by the enemy's artillery, which batter down their walls into the ditches in ſuch a manner, that when the aſſault is given, the beſieged ſuffer more now-a-days, than they did formerly; for their walls being levelled, and their ditches filled up, they are no longer any ſecurity to them, as they were before the uſe of cannon was known: and therefore, as I ſaid above, artillery is of much greater ſervice to thoſe that beſiege towns, than to thoſe that are beſieged.

As to the third caſe, that is, when you are not in any town, but in an encampment which you have ſtrongly fortified, in order to avoid fighting an enemy, except you can do it with great advantage: I affirm, that even in that ſituation, you have no better means to ſecure you from being forced to an engagement, than the ancients had; and that ſometimes you will find yourſelf in worſe circumſtances than they ever did; which is owing to the uſe of artillery. For, if a numerous army ſhould attack you with any advantage of ground (which probably ſome neighbouring eminence may give them) or come upon you before you have finiſhed your entrenchments, and ſufficiently covered yourſelf, they will preſently diſlodge you, and oblige you to fight them whether you would

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or not: as it happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna, who having fortified themſelves upon the banks of the Ronco, in ſome works which they had not raiſed high enough, and being fired upon by the French from a hill above them, were forced to march out of their entrenchments and come to action. But ſuppoſing (as it muſt often happen) that the place which you have made choice of for your encampment ſhould command the whole country round about it, and that you have fortified yourſelf in ſuch a manner that the enemy, upon reconnoitring your camp, does not think proper to attack it; they will then have recourſe to ſuch methods of annoyance as were practiſed of old, when an army was ſo poſted, that it could not otherwiſe be forced to decamp: that is, they will ſcour the adjacent country, take and plunder your towns, and cut off your convoys, till at laſt you will be under a neceſſity of coming to a battle, in which (as I ſhall ſhew preſently) the uſe of artillery is of no great importance. So that conſidering what has been ſaid, and that the wars which the Romans had carried on were almoſt always of the offenſive kind; it will appear that they would have had ſtill greater advantages, and their conqueſts been more rapid and conſiderable, if the uſe of artillery had been common in that age.

With regard to the ſecond allegation, that men have not the ſame opportunity of diſtinguiſhing their courage, that they had before great guns were invented; I anſwer, that it is very true, they have not, and that the danger is much greater, where they make their aſſault in ſmall parties, when they have walls to ſcale, or ſome other attack of that kind to carry on, and inſtead of ruſhing on all together with fury and reſolution, advance, as it were, one by one, in a cold and fearful manner. It is likewiſe true, that the Generals and other Officers of armies are more expoſed to danger at preſent, than they were in former times, as they may be killed by a Cannon ball at a great diſtance, and would not be ever the ſafer if they were in

the very rear, and ſurrounded by the braveſt of their men. No remarkable loſſes however, or very few of either kind have been ſuſtained of late, even in ſieges: for it has not been much in faſhion to attempt a Scálade upon well fortified towns, nor to make feeble aſſaults, but to proceed by way of blockade, as formerly: and, in thoſe few towns that have been taken by ſtorm, the danger was not greater than in former times; for in thoſe days, the beſieged in all towns had their machines and engines of war, which (though perhaps they might not occaſion ſo much terror) did no leſs execution. As to the danger which Generals and other Officers are expoſed to, it may be anſwered, that fewer Commanders were killed during the twenty-four years which the laſt wars in Italy continued, than in any ten years war, in the time of the Romans: for except Count Lodovico della Mirandola, (who was killed at Ferrara when the Venetians invaded that State not long ago) and the Duke of Nemours (who was killed at Cirignuola) there was not one General Officer ſlain by a cannon ball: for Monſieur de Foix died by the ſword, at the battle of Ravenna. So that if particular men do not ſhew ſo much valour at preſent as in former times, it is not owing to the uſe of artillery, but to bad diſcipline and the weakneſs of our armies; for when there is no courage in an united corps, it cannot be expected in individuals.

As to the third allegation, that armies cannot eaſily now be brought to a cloſe engagement, and that the deciſion of battles will probably in time be left to the artillery; I anſwer, that this is altogether falſe, and will always be adjudged ſo by thoſe who ſhall think fit to revive the ancient military diſcipline and manner of fighting: for he that would make a good army, ſhould accuſtom his ſoldiers either in real or ſham fights, to advance ſo near the enemy, that they may not only make uſe of their ſhort weapons, but cloſe in and grapple with them: and in ſuch caſes to depend much more upon his Infantry than his Cavalry, for reaſons that ſhall be given in the next Chapter.

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Whoever purſues this method, will have but little to fear from artillery; for, by thus cloſing with the enemy, the Infantry will find it much eaſier to avoid the fire of their artillery, than to ſuſtain the weight of Elephants, Chariots armed with Scythes, and other ſuch inventions, now laid aſide, which the Roman Infantry had to encounter, and yet always found ſome means to elude their force: and certainly they would more readily have found means to eſcape the fire of great Guns, becauſe the danger from them is ſooner over, than it was from Elephants and armed chariots, the miſchief occaſioned by the latter, continuing as long as the battle laſted, but the execution done by the former being chiefly over before the action begins; which danger, nevertheleſs the Infantry may in a good meaſure eſcape, either by taking the advantage of ſome ſort of cover from the nature of the country, or by falling flat upon their bellies during the fire. This precaution however, as experience hath fully ſhewn, is not altogether neceſſary, eſpecially againſt very heavy cannon: for it is almoſt impoſſible not to point them either too high or too low; in one of which caſes, the balls will fly over you, and in the other, they will not reach you: and after the battle is once begun, it is evident that neither heavy pieces nor light ones can do you any damage: for, if they are placed in the front of the enemy's army, they muſt of courſe fall into your hands; if in the rear, it muſt hurt themſelves more than you; and if upon either of their flanks, it can gall you but little before you come at it by moving either to the right or left. This is clear from the example of the Swiſs at Novara, in the year 1513, who boldly marched up to the French camp, which was very ſtrongly fortified, not only with artillery, but deep entrenchments, and took it ſword in hand, notwithſtanding theſe impediments, though they had no Cavalry, nor ſo much as one piece of cannon.

Another reaſon that may be given for the inefficacy of artillery is, that it muſt be ſecured either by a wall,

or a rampart, or a ditch, or ſomething of that kind, if you expect any ſervice from it; otherwiſe it will either fall into the enemy's hands, or be of no uſe: as it happens in field battles, where it is guarded only by men. In the flanks they cannot be employed to any great purpoſe, except the ſame method is followed that the ancients obſerved in managing their engines of war, which were placed out of the ranks, that they might not occaſion any diſorder amongſt their own forces; and whenever thoſe that defended them were attacked and hard preſſed, either by Cavalry or otherwiſe, they drew them off and retired with them into the main body of the army. He that does not manage artillery in this manner, does not underſtand the nature of it, and puts his confidence in what will moſt probably deceive him. The Turk indeed obtained two or three victories over the Sophy of Perſia and the Sultan of Egypt, by the aſſiſtance of artillery: but that was owing to the confuſion into which their Cavalry were thrown by the thunder of ſuch unuſual exploſions, rather than to any great execution it did. To conclude therefore, I ſay, that artillery may be of uſe in an army, where the Soldiers are brave and diſciplined in the ancient manner: but if they are not, it will be of little or no ſervice againſt a reſolute and courageous enemy *.

CHAP. XVIII.

Whether in conformity to the authority of the Romans, and the example of ancient military diſcipline, one ought to make more account of Infantry than Cavalry.

IT may be clearly demonſtrated by many proofs and examples, that the Romans gave the preference to their Infantry, and depended much more upon them than their Cavalry, in all enterprizes and expe-

* See the Art of War, Book III. & paſſim.

ditions.

ditions. In the battle betwixt them and the Latins, near the Lake of Regillum, their troops beginning to give way, the Roman General ordered his Cavalry to dismount, and renew the fight on foot; after which, they recovered their ground, and got the day: from whence it appears, that they put more confidence in their men when they were on foot, than on horseback. The same expedient was made use of upon many other occasions, when they were reduced to extremities; and they always found their account in it. It is to no purpose in this case to object the opinion of Hannibal at the battle of Cannæ; who finding the Consuls had ordered their Cavalry to dismount, said in a taunting manner, "Quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites, i. e. They might as well have delivered them up to me tied and bound:" for though, without doubt, he was a General of consummate experience, yet the opinion of any one man ought not to be set in competition with the united judgment and practice of so many able Commanders, as were bred under the Roman Republic, especially when very strong arguments, exclusive of such an authority, may be adduced to support one, and refute the other. Men on foot may easily march through places where horse cannot come: they keep their ranks better, and are soon rallied if they happen to be thrown into disorder: whereas it is a very difficult matter to make horses keep their ranks, and almost impossible to rally them, when they are once broken. Besides, some horses, like some men, being dull and heavy, and others fiery and high spirited; it may happen that a coward may be mounted upon an unruly horse, and a brave fellow upon a jade: in either of which cases, confusion must naturally ensue. A body of Infantry well disciplined and drawn up, will soon break a squadron of Cavalry: but the same number of Cavalry will find it a hard matter to break a body of Infantry: the truth of which assertion is confirmed, not only by many facts and examples, both of ancient and modern date, but by the authority of all those that

have written upon military affairs, and the practice of States, whence we learn, that all wars at firſt were carried on by horſemen, becauſe the art of drawing up foot was not known; but after that was found out, it was ſoon ſeen how much the latter were to be preferred to the former. Cavalry however, are very neceſſary in an army, to ſcour the roads, to reconnoitre the country, to make incurſions, to plunder or forage, to face the enemy's horſe, and to purſue them when they fly: but the main ſtrength and vigour of an army certainly conſiſts in its Infantry, and therefore they are moſt to be depended on. Amongſt the many fatal errors by which the Italian Princes have made their country a ſlave to foreigners, none have contributed more to it, than their neglecting to train up good bands of Infantry, and applying all their care and attention to their Cavalry: and this has been wholly owing to the knavery of the Commanders and the ſtupidity of the Princes. For during theſe laſt twenty five years the Italian Soldiery have been entirely in the hands of Commanders, who not having a foot of land in the world, are no better than Adventurers or Soldiers of fortune; and conſequently make it a trade to hire themſelves and the Soldiers that follow their banners, to ſuch as have not ſenſe enough to keep any forces of their own. But as they thought there would be no occaſion for a large body of foot, which could neither be often employed, nor long maintained in pay, and that a ſmall one would not anſwer their end, they reſolved to make uſe of horſe only; imagining that two or three hundred Cuiraſſiers would give them ſufficient reputation, and not be too many to be paid by thoſe that hired them. To keep up their credit therefore, and to make themſelves neceſſary, it has been their conſtant endeavour to diſparage the uſe of Infantry, and to recommend that of Cavalry: in which they have ſucceeded ſo well, that in the largeſt armies there is but a very ſmall proportion of foot. To this error, and ſome others (but to this chiefly) it is owing, that the Italian Soldiery

Soldiery are now become ſo weak and contemptible, that their country has not only been over-run, but grievouſly plundered and laid waſte by every Ultramontane in his turn.

But to ſhew more fully the error of preferring the uſe of Cavalry to that of Infantry, I ſhall produce another example from the practice of the Romans, which happened at the ſiege of Sora: for a party of horſe ſallying out of the town to attack their camp, a Roman Colonel advanced to repulſe them at the head of another party; but the Commanders on both ſides being killed at the firſt onſet, and the fight ſtill continuing after they were ſlain, the Romans diſmounted in order to attack the enemy with more advantage, which forced them to do the ſame, to defend themſelves more effectually, though they were at laſt driven back again into the town. Nothing, I think, can be a ſtronger proof than this, that Infantry was in greater eſteem amongſt them than Cavalry: for though indeed, their Generals had ſometimes cauſed their horſemen to diſmount upon other occaſions, yet that was to ſupport their Infantry, when it was hard preſſed or overpowered: but, in this caſe they did not diſmount to ſuccour their own Infantry, for they had none there, nor to engage another body of the enemy's foot: but fighting on horſeback againſt another party of horſe, they thought if they could not deal with them that way, they ſhould eaſily be able to manage them the other. I conclude therefore, that it is hardly poſſible to break a well-diſciplined body of foot, except they are oppoſed by another that is better. Craſſus and Mark Anthony, two Roman Generals, over-run the Kingdom of Parthia for many days together, with a ſmall number of horſe, but a good army of foot; though the Parthians had a vaſt army of horſe to oppoſe them: Craſſus, indeed, and part of his forces were ſlain; but Anthony came off with great honour. Nevertheleſs, it was clearly ſeen in that diſtreſsful expedition, that Infantry are much more ſerviceable than Cavalry: for though they were

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in a plain open country, where there were very few mountains, and ſtill fewer rivers, to ſupply them with neceſſary cover and other conveniencies, at a great diſtance from the ſea-coaſt, and without any hopes of relief; yet Anthony conducted himſelf and his forces ſo well (to the great admiration of the Parthians themſelves) that their army of horſe, though ſo numerous, never durſt attack him: as to Craſſus, whoever reads the hiſtory of that war, will find that he was rather trepanned by the falſehood than overcome by the valour of the enemy, who would not venture to attack him in all his diſtreſſes, till they had firſt reduced him and his army to extreme want and miſery by hovering about him at a diſtance, and cutting off inſtead of furniſhing thoſe ſupplies which they had promiſed him.

But why ſhould we go ſo far back for proofs of the ſuperiority of Infantry, when we may have ſo many nearer home, and of more recent date? Nine thouſand Swiſs (as I ſaid in the laſt Chapter) attacked an army of ten thouſand horſe, and as many foot, encamped at Novara, and beat them without the aſſiſtance either of Cavalry or Artillery: for the horſe could not come at them to do them any harm; and as to the foot they made light of them, becauſe they were moſtly Gaſcons and very ill diſciplined. Since which, twenty-ſix thouſand Swiſs had the courage to march into the Milaneſe after Francis I. the French King, whoſe army conſiſted of twenty thouſand horſe and forty thouſand foot, with an hundred pieces of cannon: and if they did not beat the French, as they had done at Novara, yet they fought them bravely for two whole days together; and at laſt, after they were defeated, brought off above one half of their army ſafe. Marcus Attilius Regulus formerly oppoſed his Infantry, not only to the enemy's horſe, but to their Elephants: and though indeed the ſucceſs did not anſwer his expectation, yet it is a proof how much confidence he put in them, and that he thought them equal to any undertaking: I ſay again therefore,

fore, that a well disciplined body of Infantry cannot be broken, but by another that is better: and that to attempt it is only so much labour lost. In the time of Philip Visconti Duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand Swiss marched into Lombardy; against whom the Duke sent his General Carmignuola with a thousand horse and some Infantry. That Commander being unacquainted with their manner of fighting, took it for granted that his horse would break them at the first attack: but finding they stood firm and impenetrable in their ranks, and having lost a great many of his men, he was forced to retreat. However, as he was an able officer, and fertile in expedients to remedy any sudden misfortune, after he had received a fresh supply of forces, he went in pursuit of the enemy again; and coming up with them, he caused his Gens d' armes to dismount, and placing them in the front of his Infantry, he fell upon the Swiss and presently defeated them: for his Cuirassiers being then on foot, and armed at all points, easily broke into their ranks and made such a slaughter of them, without receiving any damage themselves, that none of them escaped, except such as Carmignuola, out of his humanity, thought fit to spare. Many, I am certain, are fully persuaded that foot are more useful than horse: yet such is the infatuation of the present times, that neither the authority of ancient or modern examples, nor the conviction of their error, is sufficient to make our Princes correct their mistakes, and prevail upon them to acknowledge that in order to restore the credit of their Soldiery, it is necessary to revive the ancient discipline, to keep troops of their own, to encourage them, to put life and vigour into them, and to make them respectable; that so they in their turn may likewise reflect honour and reputation upon their Masters. But since they deviate from these Rules, and the others above mentioned; what little acquisitions they happen to make, contribute rather to the prejudice and diminution, than aggran-

aggrandizement of their States, as I ſhall ſhew preſently *.

CHAP. XIX.

That acquiſitions made by Republics which are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, contribute to their ruin, inſtead of their exaltation.

TO theſe ill grounded opinions, confirmed by the abſurd practice of this corrupted age, it is owing that Princes never think of reforming their errors and reviving the ancient military diſcipline. Who could ever have perſuaded an Italian thirty years ago, that nine or ten thouſand well diſciplined foot durſt attack ten thouſand horſe and as many foot in an open plain, and were able to beat them, as they actually did at Novara; an inſtance which I have quoted more than once before? For though Hiſtory abounds with ſuch examples, yet they either meet with no credit at all; or if any one ſeems to believe them, they never fail to object, that the armour now made uſe of is ſo much better than that of the ancients, that one ſquadron of our Gens d'arms would make an impreſſion not only upon a body of foot, but even upon a rock. With ſuch ſimple excuſes they deceive themſelves and impoſe upon their own judgment; though they muſt know that Lucullus with a ſmall army of Infantry, routed one of an hundred and fifty thouſand horſe under the command of Tigranes, in which there was a great number of Cuiraſſiers armed exactly in the ſame manner that ours are at preſent. The weakneſs of theſe opinions therefore, we have ſeen fully proved at the expence of other nations alſo, as appears from this example in particular: and ſince what is related in Hiſtory concerning the excellency of Infantry holds good, we

* See the Art of War, Book II.

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ought to give no leſs credit to what is recorded to the advantage of ſeveral other ancient Inſtitutions that have been recommended: in which caſe, both Princes and Republics would find themſelves expoſed to fewer dangers, better able to ſuſtain any enemy, and not have the mortification of ſeeing their forces ſo frequently obliged to fly as they now do. And thoſe who are at the head of a Commonwealth, would find it much more eaſy to accompliſh their purpoſes, whether they deſign to extend their dominion, or only to maintain what they already poſſeſs, if they were convinced, that to fill their country full of inhabitants, to make allies and confederates rather than abſolute ſlaves of the people they conquer, to eſtabliſh Colonies for the ſecurity of what they have acquired, to convert the ſpoils of an enemy into funds for the uſe the State, to annoy them with incurſions and field battles, and not embarraſs themſelves with Sieges, to make the Public rich, and private men poor, and to employ all their care and attention to keep up good military diſcipline in full force, are the beſt ways to aggrandize a Republic and enlarge its Empire. But if theſe methods are not adopted, let them remember however, that any other will prove their ruin: for which reaſon, they ought to curb their ambition, and (inſtead of endeavouring to extend their dominion) to turn their thoughts only upon regulating their laws and interior polity in ſuch a manner as may beſt enable them to defend themſelves and what they have already got, like ſeveral free States in Germany, which, by ſo doing, have lived happily and undiſturbed for a long courſe of years.

Nevertheleſs (as I have ſaid elſewhere, in diſcourſing upon the different conduct that is to be obſerved in order to enlarge dominion, from that which is neceſſary only to ſecure what has been acquired before) it is impoſſible that any Republic ſhould continue long quiet and enjoy its liberty and dominions, how ſmall ſoever, in tranquillity: for though it ſhould not moleſt others, it will nevertheleſs be moleſted by them:

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and by being thus provoked, it will not only become desirous, but lie under a necessity of revenging itself and reducing its neighbours: but if it should be so fortunate as not to have any foreign enemies, it will be sure to fall into factions and divisions at home, as it always happens in such Governments. That the free States in Germany have continued so long in peace and liberty, is owing to some peculiar circumstances in that country which are not to be found in any other, and without which they could not subsist. That part of Germany which I now speak of was formerly subject to the Romans, like France and Spain: but when the Roman State was upon the decline, and the title of *Empire* transferred to Germany, some of the most powerful Cities in that Province taking advantage either of the pusillanimity or distress of the Emperors, shook off their yoke, and others became in a manner absolutely free, on condition of paying only a small annual tribute: so that all the States which were immediately subject to the Emperors and no other Prince, by degrees recovered their liberty. It happened about the same time that several Corporations dependent upon the Duke of Austria, as Fribourg *, the Swiss, and some others, revolted from him, and having re-established their freedom, became so strong and powerful in a short time, that they not only defended themselves effectually against his utmost endeavours to reduce them to obedience, but grew formidable to all their neighbours; and these are now called the Swiss Cantons. Germany then is divided betwixt the Emperor, the Swiss, the Princes or Electors, and certain little Republics called the *Free States* †: and the reason that

* The original says, Filiborgo, Philipsbourg, but that must be a mistake of the Author.

† The Imperial Cities, or Hans-towns. The former are Sovereign States, and send their Deputies or Representatives to the General Diets or Parliaments of the Empire. The latter are also Sovereign States, not differing from the Imperial Cities at present, but were about two hundred years ago allied or confederated for their mutual defence and the protection of their trade, and at first consisted only of the great

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ſo few wars, and thoſe of ſhort continuance, happen betwixt States ſo differently conſtituted, is the reſpect that they all pay to the Emperor, who, though his power is not very great, has ſo much reputation and authority amongſt them, that whenever any quarrel ariſes betwixt them, he interpoſes as a Mediator, and ſoon puts an end to it. The ſharpeſt and longeſt wars in that Country have been betwixt the Swiſs and the Dukes of Auſtria: and though the Title of Emperor has been in the Houſe of Auſtria for many years, they never could get the better of the Swiſs, nor could any quarrel be ever decided betwixt them but by the ſword: for the other States of Germany did not furniſh the Emperors with any aſſiſtance in thoſe wars, becauſe the Free Cities rather favoured the Swiſs as being friends to liberty like themſelves; and as to the Princes, ſome of them were ſo poor that they could not, and others ſo jealous of the Imperial power that they would not contribute to make it ſtill greater.

Theſe Communities therefore, live quietly and unmoleſted in poſſeſſion of their own little territories, without encroaching upon thoſe of others, being all kept in peace by the authority of the Emperor: and what makes them united at home is the apprehenſion they are under from ſo near an enemy, who would not fail to take the opportunity of any diviſions that might happen amongſt them, to reduce them into ſubjection to him, and deprive them of their liberties. But if Germany was not thus balanced, ſome of theſe States would be endeavouring to enlarge their dominions, and conſequently there muſt ſoon be an end of their tranquillity: and as no other Country is circumſtanced in the ſame manner, no other Republics can enjoy the ſame freedom; and therefore thoſe that find it neceſſary to extend their territory at the expence of their neighbours, muſt either have recourſe to

Sea-port towns on the German Ocean or the Baltic Sea, and near the mouths of their great rivers: but afterwards they took many inland Cities into their alliance, monopolized moſt of the trade in Europe, and were a formidable maritime Power.

Leagues

Leagues and Confederacies, or proceed as the Romans did of old: whoever takes any other courſe, inſtead of aggrandizing his Country, will certainly ruin it. For new conqueſts are dangerous and prejudicial a thouſand ways; as a State may eaſily enlarge its dominions without increaſing its ſtrength; in which caſe ruin muſt inevitably enſue: and this happens when the expence of an Enterprize exceeds the profit that reſults from it, even though it is ſucceſsful. Thus the Venetians were much weaker when they became poſſeſſed of Lombardy, and the Florentines after they had conquered all Tuſcany, than when the former were content with the dominion of the Adriatic, and the latter with a territory that did not exceed ſix miles in extent*; and this was owing to their ambition of making acquiſitions, and not knowing how to maintain them: for which they were the more inexcuſable as they had the example of the Romans immediately before their eyes, and might have imitated them in the method which that people obſerved upon ſuch occaſions, if they had not wiſdom enough to ſtrike it out themſelves as the Romans did. Beſides, ſuch acquiſitions ſometimes do great miſchief even to well governed Commonwealths; for inſtance, when the State conquered is voluptuous and effeminate, and the conquerors catch the infection by their communication with its inhabitants; as it happened to the Romans firſt, and afterwards to Hannibal, when they had made themſelves Maſters of Capua: for if that City had lain ſo near that the Soldiers could not have been ſoon reclaimed, or if the Roman State had been in any degree corrupted, without doubt that conqueſt would have proved the deſtruction of their Republic, as we may venture to affirm from what Livy ſays, "Jam tunc minime ſalubris militari diſciplinæ Capua, inſtrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinitos militum animos avertit a memoriâ patriæ: Capua, at that time the nurſery of all ſoft pleaſures, ſo relaxed the military diſcipline, and debauched the

* Suppoſing Florence to be the center of it at that time.

minds

minds of the Soldiers, that they totally forgot their love and duty to their own Country." And indeed ſuch Cities or Provinces ſufficiently revenge themſelves upon thoſe that conquer them, without blows or effuſion of blood: for as the corruption ſpreads, and at laſt becomes general, it enervates them to ſuch a degree that they muſt in the end become a prey to any one that attacks them; as Juvenal well remarks in one of his Satires, when he is ſpeaking of the change of manners in Rome, the luxury and many other vices which their conqueſts had introduced there in the room of that temperance, frugality, and other excellent virtues, for which they had been ſo remarkable before.

Sævior armis
Luxuria incubuit victumque ulciſcitur orbem.

What arms could ne'er effect, dire Luxury
Has done at laſt, t' avenge the conquer'd world.
Sat. VI. 291, 292.

If then ſuch an acquiſition had almoſt effected the ruin of the Romans, notwithſtanding their great wiſdom and virtue; what muſt become of thoſe States that are weak and corrupt; and beſides their other errors and ill conduct, (which I have mentioned above) employ either mercenary or auxiliary troops, the folly and danger of which I ſhall make the Subject of the next Chapter.

CHAP. XX.

How dangerous it is for any Prince or Republic to employ either Auxiliary or Mercenary forces.

IF I had not diſcuſſed this point at large in another part of my works, I ſhould have dwelt longer upon it in this place than I deſign to do at preſent *. But

* See Chap. xii xiii. xiv. of the Prince, Pol. Diſc. book I. chap. xxi. xliii. and the Art of War, book I.

as I have met with a moſt remarkable inſtance in Livy how dangerous it is to employ Auxiliaries, I cannot paſs it over without ſome notice. By *Auxiliaries*, I mean ſuch troops as one State ſends to the ſuccour of another, under Officers of its own, and in its own pay.

That Hiſtorian informs us, that after the Romans had defeated the Samnites in two battles at different places, with the forces which they ſent to the relief of the Capuans, and thereby put an end to the war betwixt thoſe two people, they left two Legions in the territory of Capua to ſecure it from any further danger or apprehenſion of the enemy, after the reſt of their forces had returned to Rome. But thoſe Legions ſinking into indolence and faſcinated by effeminate delights, began not only to lay aſide all remembrance of their own Country and the reverence they owed to the Senate, but to think of ſetting up for themſelves, and ſeizing upon the Country which they had defended, and which they thought the inhabitants no longer worthy to enjoy, ſince they were not able to protect it. This conſpiracy however being timely diſcovered by the Roman Government, was ſoon ſuppreſſed, as we ſhall relate more fully when we come to diſcourſe of Conſpiracies.

I ſay again therefore, that of all troops Auxiliaries are the moſt dangerous; becauſe neither the Soldiers nor the Officers receiving any pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are ſent, like the Legions that were left at Capua, they have little or no regard either to your intereſt or authority: and as ſoon as the war is over, if it ends ſucceſsfully, they often plunder thoſe that employ them, with as little ceremony as they did thoſe whom they were ſent to fight againſt: which is owing ſometimes to their own avarice or ambition, and ſometimes to that of their Maſters. The Romans had no deſign to violate the league they were in with the Capuans: but their Soldiers imagining it would be a very eaſy matter to ſeize upon that State themſelves, actually determined upon it. I could cite many other inſtances of this kind, but let one

one more ſuffice, namely that of the Regini *, who were not only plundered and diſpoſſeſſed of their territories, but maſſacred by a Legion which the Romans had ſent to defend them. A Prince then had better have recourſe to any other expedient than Auxiliaries, eſpecially when he is to depend chiefly upon them for his ſecurity: for any terms that he can obtain from an enemy, how hard ſoever, will be leſs prejudicial to him than ſuch ſuccours. Indeed if we either read the Hiſtory of former times, or conſider the preſent with due attention, we ſhall find a thouſand inſtances wherein they have proved fatal, for one in which they ever did any ſervice to thoſe that employed them. An ambitious Prince or Commonwealth therefore cannot be furniſhed with a fairer opportunity of making themſelves maſters of another State, than by being ſollicited to ſend ſuch troops to its aſſiſtance: for he that is ſo indiſcreet as to call in Auxiliaries not only for his own defence, but to conquer others, endeavours to make acquiſitions which he cannot keep any longer than they pleaſe to let him; becauſe they can eaſily take them away from him again whenever they have a mind. But ſo blind is the ambition of ſome men, that if they can but gratify their preſent appetites, they never think of the inconveniencies that muſt probably ſoon enſue: whereas if they would reflect upon the inſtances which we have quoted from ancient Hiſtory to confirm this point as well as ſome others inſiſted upon in theſe Diſcourſes, they would be convinced that the more generoſity Princes or Republics ſhew to their neighbours, and the leſs inclination to injure or diſtreſs them, the more ready they will be to throw themſelves into their arms, as we ſhall prove in the next Chapter, from the example of the Capuans.

* The inhabitants of Rhegium, now called Reggio, a town in Calabria, almoſt oppoſite to Meſſina. There is another town of the ſame name in Lombardy belonging to the Duke of Modena.

CHAP. XXI.

The first Prætor the Romans ever sent abroad, was to Capua, four hundred years after they first began to make war.

WE have already shewn at large how different the methods which the Romans took to enlarge their Empire, were from those that are now pursued for the same purpose; and how they suffered those States which they did not utterly destroy, to enjoy their former liberty, and to live under their own laws; even such as were not joined with them as Confederates, but had submitted to be their Subjects; and that without any other mark of their dominion over them than some few conditions, upon the observation of which, they were protected in their ancient rights and privileges. This method they followed till they carried their arms into foreign countries, and began to reduce the States and Kingdoms which they conquered into Provinces subject to their Empire; as may plainly appear from the example of the first Prætor they ever sent to any place (which was to Capua) not out of any ambitious design, but because it was sollicited by the Capuans, who had fallen out amongst themselves, and were desirous to have some Roman Citizen of authority to compose their quarrels and reduce them to good order. This example was soon followed by the inhabitants of Antium, who being in the like circumstances, voluntarily submitted to receive a Roman Magistrate for the same purposes: upon which new method of acquiring dominion Livy says, "Quod jam non solum arma, sed jura Romana pollebant: that the Romans now began to extend their Empire not only by the valour of their arms, but by the reputation of their Laws." We see therefore how much this manner of proceeding contributed to aggrandize their State: for Republics, in particular, that have been used to live in freedom, and under

under the government of their own Countrymen, ſubmit with more ſatisfaction to Maſters that are at a diſtance (though upon terms that may be ſomewhat hard) than to others that are nearer at hand, and would, they think, be continually upbraiding them with their dependence. There is likewiſe another advantage reſulting from this; for as the Sovereign does not employ Officers of this own immediate appointment in the adminiſtration of juſtice, whatever ſentence may be given either in civil or capital cauſes, cannot excite any odium againſt the Supreme power; which therefore exempts it from thoſe calumnies and reproaches that muſt often ariſe from ſuch deciſions, whether they be juſt or unjuſt. The truth of this may plainly appear not only from ſeveral paſſages in ancient Hiſtory, but from an occurrence which lately happened in Italy. Every one knows that as often as the French made themſelves maſters of Genoa (which has been ſeveral times), the King of France always uſed to ſend ſomebody thither to govern it in his name: but at preſent he ſuffers it (rather out of neceſſity than choice) to be governed by a Genoeſe, elected by his Fellow-citizens: and without doubt, whoever conſiders which of theſe two ways beſt ſecures their obedience to the King, and is moſt agreeable to the inhabitants, muſt needs determine in favour of the latter. Beſides, the leſs inclined you ſeem to diſtreſs men, the leſs apprehenſion they will have of your depriving them of their liberties; and the more humane and gentle you ſhew yourſelf the more cheerfully they will throw themſelves into your arms. To this lenity and moderation it was owing that the Capuans deſired the Romans to ſend them a Prætor: but if the latter had ſhewn the leaſt inclination to intermeddle in their affairs, or officiouſly endeavoured to obtrude ſuch a Magiſtrate upon them, they would preſently have taken alarm and driven him back again.

But what occaſion have we to go ſo far as Rome or Capua for examples of this kind; when we have enow in Tuſcany? It is well known that Piſtoia long ago

voluntarily put itſelf under the protection of the Florentines; and at the ſame time what a bitter enmity ſubſiſted betwixt the Florentines and the Piſans, the Luccheſe, and the Sieneſe; which diverſity of diſpoſition did not proceed from the little value the Piſtoians ſet upon their liberty in compariſon of the others, but from the different behaviour of the Florentines, who treated the former like brothers, and the latter like enemies: upon which account, the Piſtoians willingly ſubmitted to their dominion; whilſt the others have always taken every poſſible method to defend themſelves againſt them: but if the Florentines, inſtead of exaſperating their neighbours by harſh uſage, had behaved in a gentle and friendly manner, they would certainly have been Maſters of all Tuſcany at this time. It is not my intention however to infer from what has been here ſaid, that one ought never to proceed with rigour and force of arms upon ſuch occaſions: but that they ſhould be reſerved for the laſt expedient, when all other means have failed.

CHAP. XXII.

That men often err in the judgment they form concerning things of great importance.

HOW apt mankind are to err in their judgment, is well known to thoſe that have been much converſant in Councils; which if not conducted by wiſe and able men, are often deceived and impoſed upon: and as ſuch men have always many enemies in corrupt Commonwealths (eſpecially in time of peace), who oppoſe them either out of envy or ambition, that advice is moſt commonly followed, which is either falſely thought good, by an error of judgment common enough to a majority, or given by ſelf-intereſted men, who have more regard to popularity, than the good of the Public. But when the pernicious effects of theſe counſels come to be diſcovered in difficult and trouble-

troubleſome times, danger and diſtreſs make it neceſſary to comply with ſuch meaſures as were recommended, but rejected and diſcountenanced in the calm and ſunſhine of proſperity; as I ſhall ſhew more at large in another place. Several events likewiſe happen, in judging of which, men of ſmall experience in publick affairs may eaſily be deceived; as they are frequently attended with ſuch circumſtances and probability of ſucceſs, as may induce them to perſuade themſelves, that the things which they fondly hope for, will actually come to paſs. This is fully verified by the advice which Numicius, the Prætor, gave the Latins, after they had been defeated by the Romans; and by what was generally believed not many years ago, when Francis I. King of France invaded Milan, and the Swiſs defended it againſt him.

After the death of Lewis XII. Francis of Angoulême ſucceeded to the Crown, and being deſirous to recover poſſeſſion of Milan (which the Swiſs had made themſelves maſters of a few years before, by the aſſiſtance of Pope Julius II.) endeavoured to make ſome friends in Italy, to facilitate the accompliſhment of his deſigns: for which purpoſe, beſides the Venetians (whom King Lewis had ſecured before) he endeavoured to gain over Leo X. and the Florentines to his intereſts; imagining he ſhould then meet with little or no impediment in that enterprize; eſpecially as the Spaniſh forces were at that time employed in Lombardy, and thoſe of the Emperor at Verona. The Pope, however was not to be prevailed upon to comply with his ſollicitations; being perſuaded by his Council (as it is ſaid) that if he ſtood neuter, he might greatly ſerve himſelf by it: that it was not for the intereſt of the Church, to throw any more weight into the ſcale, either of the French or the Swiſs: that in order to reſtore the liberty of Italy, it was neceſſary to rid himſelf of them both; that ſince he was not able to cope with either of them, much leſs with both, as things then ſtood, he ought to ſit ſtill till one of them had utterly ruined the other, and then to call in the aſſiſtance of his allies, and fall

upon the Conqueror: that he could not have a fairer opportunity than the preſent, ſince both their armies were in the field, and his Holineſs's forces were in ſuch order and readineſs, that he might immediately ſend them to the confines of Lombardy to watch their motions, under a pretence of guarding his own territories, but in reality to wait there till they had come to a battle, which (conſidering the bravery of the troops on both ſides) it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe would be a very bloody one, and muſt leave even the Victor in ſuch a weak condition, that his Holineſs might ſoon cruſh him, and with great reputation to himſelf, become not only maſter of Lombardy, but Arbiter of all Italy. But the event ſhewed the futility of this counſel: for the Swiſs being defeated after a long and obſtinate engagement, the forces of the Pope and the King of Spain, were ſo far from daring to attack the French, that they had determined to fly; but even that would not have ſaved them, if either the humanity, or coldneſs of the French King had not inclined him to reſt contented with that victory, and to come to an accommodation with the Pope. This advice, therefore, though plauſible enough at firſt ſight, will appear ſimple and abſurd upon a nearer examination: for, it ſeldom happens, that he who gains a victory loſes many men; thoſe that he does loſe being killed in battle, not in flight: and in the heat of the fight, when armies are cloſe engaged, many cannot fall, becauſe ſuch conflicts are generally ſoon over; and, if they ever chance to laſt ſo long, that great numbers are ſlain, even on the ſide of thoſe that get the day, yet ſuch is the advantage that reſults from the reputation of a victory, and the terror which it inſpires, that it more than balances the loſs they ſuſtain by the death of their Soldiers.

Whoever then ſhall think fit to attack ſuch an army, upon a ſuppoſition that is muſt be much weakened, will find himſelf egregiouſly miſtaken, unleſs his ſtrength be ſuch, that he was able to have engaged it, even before it had ſuſtained any loſs at all: for, in

that

that caſe, indeed, he may have a chance to gain a victory, as well as to be defeated, if he be a man of conduct and abilities, and is befriended by fortune. But an army that has been already flushed with victory, will ſtill have the advantage; as may appear from the example of the Latins, when they had been beaten by the Romans: for Numicius their Prætor, ſoon after the battle was over, run all up and down the country, exhorting them to fall upon the Romans again, now they were ſo much reduced by the late engagement, and had gained nothing but the name of a victory, having in all other reſpects ſuffered as much as themſelves; and aſſuring his countrymen, that any new attack, how feeble ſoever, would certainly ruin them. In conſequence of which, they raiſed another army, and attacked the Romans a ſecond time: but they ſoon paid dear for their credulity; for they were utterly routed with great loſs, and treated in ſuch a manner as all thoſe deſerve that liſten to ſuch fooliſh advice.

CHAP. XXIII.

That the Romans always avoided taking a middle courſe, when they had occaſion to paſs Judgment upon any of their Subjects.

"JAM Latio is ſtatus erat rerum, (ſays Livy) ut neque pacem neque bellum pati poſſent. The Latins were now reduced to ſuch a condition that they could neither make war, nor accept of peace." A condition indeed, of all others, the moſt miſerable; but ſuch a one as every Prince or Commonwealth muſt of neceſſity labour under, that can neither ſubmit to unreaſonable terms of accommodation on one hand, nor carry on a war on the other, without either delivering themſelves up as a prey to auxiliaries, or being utterly ruined by the enemy. To this wretched alternative, they are reduced by evil counſels, and by coming to a determination before they have duly conſidered

conſidered their own ſtrength, as we have ſaid before: which conſideration, if properly attended to, would prevent them from falling into ſuch diſtreſs as the Latins did, who made peace with the Romans, when they ought to have carried on the war, and declared war againſt them, when they ſhould have continued in peace; ſo that the friendſhip and enmity of the Romans were equally prejudicial to them. The Latins then being reduced to the laſt extremity by Manlius Torquatus, were afterwards totally ſubdued by Camillus, who obliged them to ſurrender at diſcretion to the Romans, and not only put garriſons into all their towns, but took hoſtages from them: after which he returned to Rome, and reported to the Senate, that all Latium was in ſubjection to them: and as the judgment of the Senate upon this occaſion, was very remarkable, and worthy of being imitated by other Princes in the like circumſtances, I ſhall here quote the words which Livy puts into the mouth of Camillus, when he made his report: from whence we may further obſerve, what methods the Romans purſued in extending their dominion, and that in their determinations they always avoided a middle way, and had recourſe to extremes: for the nature of government makes it neceſſary to keep Subjects upon ſuch a footing, and under ſuch reſtrictions, that they may either have no deſire, or at leaſt no power to injure or inſult it. And this may be effected either by abſolutely depriving them of all means to hurt you, or by treating them with ſuch lenity and tenderneſs, that they cannot wiſh to change their condition. There is no middle courſe that can be followed with ſecurity: and therefore, Camillus having propoſed the choice of theſe two expedients to the conſideration of the Senate, that wiſe body acted according to them both, as the circumſtances of the different towns in Latium required. His advice was as follows. "Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus conſilii fecerunt, ut ſit Latium, an non ſit, in veſtrâ manu poſuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum,

perpetuum, vel ſæviendo, vel ignoſcendo poteſtis. Vultis crudeliter conſulere in deditos victoſque? Licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo? Materia creſcendi per ſummam gloriam ſuppeditat. Certe id firmiſſimum imperium eſt, quo obedientes guadent. Illorum igitur animos, dum expectatione ſtupent, ſeu pœnâ, ſeu beneficio præoccupari oportet: i. e. The Gods have now put it in your power to determine whether the Latins ſhall be any longer a people or not. It is in your own option effectually to ſecure yourſelves from any further apprehenſions of that enemy, either by pardoning or puniſhing them. If you have a mind to proceed with rigour againſt a people that are vanquiſhed, and have ſubmitted to you, they lie at your mercy, and you may totally extinguiſh the very name of them if you pleaſe; but, if you rather chuſe to enlarge your Empire by ſhewing clemency, and making the conquered your Subjects and friends, as your Anceſtors uſed to do, you have a noble opportunity of imitating their example with great glory and advantage to yourſelves: for that Dominion is built upon the ſureſt foundation, under which the Subjects live ſecurely and contented. It is abſolutely neceſſary therefore, to take either one courſe or the other; and immediately too, whilſt their minds are yet fluctuating betwixt hope and fear, and the uncertainty of their doom prevents them from taking any deſperate reſolution." The Senate, after ſome deliberation, determined to follow this advice, and having made a particular enquiry into the behaviour of every town in Latium, they ſpared ſome, and puniſhed others: the inhabitants of thoſe that were ſpared, were made free Citizens of Rome, and had ſeveral other privileges, favours, and immunities granted them, which effectually ſecured their fidelity and affection; but as to the others, ſome of them were totally demoliſhed, ſome had Colonies ſent to ſettle amongſt them, and others brought priſoners to Rome; ſo that they were diſperſed in ſuch a manner, that

that they were for ever incapacitated to give the Romans any more trouble or disturbance.

This was the method which the Romans always took upon such occasions; and certainly it is worthy of being imitated by all other states. The Florentines should have acted thus in the year 1502, when Arezzo and all the Vale of Chiana rebelled against them; for if they had, they might not only have firmly established their dominion over them, but likewise have made Florence a great and flourishing State, and taken such lands from the rebels as that City stood in need of, for the subsistence of its own inhabitants. But they simply took the middle way betwixt the extremes of rigour and clemency, which is always dangerous in such cases: for, though they banished some of the inhabitants, and put others to death, and degraded every man that was in office or authority, yet they left the City entire and untouched: and when they were advised to demolish it, those who pretended to be the wisest amongst them, made answer, that it would be a disgrace to their own Republic, and look as if they were so weak that they could not keep it: which is one of those arguments that seem to have some reason in them, but in reality have none at all. For by the same rule, a Prince must not hang any villain, though ever so notorious, because it would be a shame to have it thought he had not power enough to bridle one rascal, without putting him to death. But those that are of this opinion ought to consider, that when either particular men, or a whole City offend a State, that State is under an absolute necessity of destroying them for its own preservation, and to deter others from following their example: and as to any reflections which such a manner of proceeding may happen to occasion, it is sufficient to say, that it will be more for the reputation of a State to punish delinquents, than to spare them at its own peril: and that a Government which does not do that so effectually, that they can never hurt it afterwards, will always be thought weak and pitiful.

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How properly the Romans acted upon such occasions, may likewise appear from the example of the Privernates: from which we may observe, in the first place, that people who are conquered, should either be treated with great lenity and indulgence, or totally cut off, as I said before; and in the next, what a powerful impression generosity, frankness, and speaking truth, make upon the minds of wise and good men. The Roman Senate, as Livy informs us, was assembled to consider in what manner they should treat the Privernates, who had rebelled against them, but were then reduced to obedience by force of arms: but the people of Privernum having sent several of their Citizens to make their submission, and implore pardon, one of them being introduced to the Senate, was asked, "Quam pœnam meritos Privernates censeret? what sort of punishment he thought his Fellow-citizens deserved?" made answer, "Eam quam merentur qui se libertate dignos censent: such as those deserve who think themselves worthy of liberty." Being asked again, "Quid si pœnam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus? Suppose we should pardon you this time, how will you behave yourselves for the future?" he replied, "Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam; si malam haud diurturnam: well and dutifully, if you grant us good terms: if not, we shall soon do the same again." Upon which, the wiser part of the Senate declared, "Se audivisse vocem et liberi et viri, nec credi posse illum populum, aut hominem, denique in eâ conditione cujus eum pœniteat diutius quam necesse sit mansurum. Ibi pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati sint, neque eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fidam sperandam esse: That he had spoken like a brave and free man; that it was not to be expected that any particular person, much less a whole people, would submit to lead a life that was grievous to them, any longer than they were compelled to it by invincible necessity; that no terms could be long or faithfully observed, which were not voluntarily

voluntarily and cheerfully agreed to and accepted; nor was it to be imagined that any people would continue ſteddy in their allegiance and affection, if they were reduced to ſlavery." Upon which it was reſolved, that the Privernates ſhould be incorporated into the Roman State, and honoured with all the privileges that were enjoyed by their own Citizens and Subjects, " Eos demum qui nihil præterquam de libertate cogitant, dignos eſſe qui Romani fiant; ſince thoſe whoſe chief care was to preſerve their liberties, were worthy of being Romans." Such was the effect of theſe frank and bold anſwers, upon great and generous men, who would have deſpiſed any other ſort of reply as mean and inſincere: and thoſe will generally find themſelves deceived, who judge otherwiſe of mankind, eſpecially of ſuch people as have either been actually uſed to live in liberty, or at leaſt have thought themſelves free: in conſequence of which error, they muſt naturally take ſuch meaſures as will prejudice themſelves, and be grievous to others, which commonly ends in rebellion, and the ruin of a State.

It appears then from the method which the Romans took with the Latins and inhabitants of Privernum, that when the fate of a conquered people, which have been powerful and accuſtomed to liberty, is to be decided, it is the beſt way either to exterminate them entirely, or to treat them in ſuch a manner, as to make them your firm and faithful friends; otherwiſe you are doing nothing: but, above all things a middle courſe is to be avoided, becauſe it is the moſt dangerous; as the Samnites experienced to their coſt, when, after they had hemmed in the Romans at the Furcæ Caudinæ, they would not liſten to the counſel of an old officer, who adviſed them either to diſmiſs them with honour, or to knock them all on the head: but as they took a middle way, and not only diſarmed, but made them paſs under the yoke, they ſent them away ſo full of ſhame and reſentment, that they ſoon after had ſufficient cauſe to repent they had not taken the old man's advice, inſtead of acting in the

the manner they did upon that occaſion, as we ſhall ſhew more at large in another place.

CHAP. XXIV.

That Fortreſſes generally do a State more harm than good.

IT may ſeem ſtrange, perhaps, to the wiſe men of our times, that the Romans never thought of building Fortreſſes to keep the Latins in obedience; eſpecially, as it is a maxim with our Florentine Politicians, that Piſa and other ſuch States muſt be kept in ſubjection by that means: and indeed, if the Romans had been like them, it is probable they would have built Fortreſſes; but, as they were of a very different caſt, and not only much braver, but wiſer, and more powerful, they thought fit to let it alone. For whilſt they enjoyed their liberties, and adhered to their excellent maxims and inſtitutions, they never erected any ſtrong places to maintain poſſeſſion of ſuch Cities or Provinces as they had reduced; though they ſometimes left thoſe ſtanding which they found there. When we compare this method of proceeding with the practice of theſe times, it ſeems worthy of examination, whether ſuch places are of more ſervice or diſſervice to thoſe that build them.

It muſt be conſidered then, that the end propoſed by ſuch people as build Fortreſſes, is either to defend themſelves againſt their own Subjects, or their enemies; but in the former caſe they are prejudicial, and in the latter unneceſſary. For, if a Prince is afraid of his Subjects rebelling againſt him, it muſt be becauſe he is hated by them; which hatred proceeds from ill treatment; and that ill-treatment, either from a perſuaſion that he may govern them arbitrarily, or from ſome other indiſcretion. Now, one of the reaſons that induce him to think and act in this manner, is, that they are bridled with Fortreſſes: ſo that the harſh uſage, which is the cauſe of their diſaffection,

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is chiefly owing to the confidence he puts in thoſe ſtrong holds, which therefore he will find much more prejudicial than ſerviceable to him. For, in the firſt place, they tempt him, as I juſt now ſaid, to treat his Subjects with much more rigour than he would otherwiſe dare to do; and in the next, there is not ſo much ſecurity in them as he vainly perſuades himſelf: for all the violent and forcible meaſures he can make uſe of to over-awe his people, will ſignify nothing, except he either has a good ſtanding army always at hand (as the Romans uſed to have) or thinks fit to cut off ſome, ſeparate others, and diſperſe the remainder in ſuch a manner, that they can never aſſemble again to do him any miſchief: for though he ſhould ſtrip them of their properties, "Spoliatis arma ſuperſunt; they will ſtill find arms:" and if he diſarms them once, "furor arma miniſtrat; revenge will ſoon furniſh them with other weapons:" if he puts the Chiefs to death, others will ſoon ſpring up in their room, like Hydra's heads: if he builds Fortreſſes, they may ſerve his turn, perhaps, in time of peace, and prompt him to oppreſs his Subjects with leſs reſerve: but ſhould a war break out, they will do him no ſervice; for when they are aſſaulted by his own people, and a foreign enemy at the ſame time, it is impoſſible they ſhould hold out againſt them both. If then they were ſo inſignificant in former times, ſurely they muſt be much more ſo ſince the invention of Artillery, againſt the fury of which no Fortreſs can long defend itſelf, where the beſieged have neither room to caſt up new works within, when the old ones are battered down, nor any other place to retire into, as we have ſhewn elſewhere *.

But to enter into a further diſcuſſion of this matter. Let us ſuppoſe that a Prince wiſhes to govern his own people with a high hand, or that either a Prince or a Republic intend keeping a State which they had

* See the Prince, chap. xx. and the Art of War, book vii. and Paola Paruta's Political Diſcourſes, book II. Diſc. viii.

taken

taken from an enemy, in ſtrict ſubjection, by building Fortreſſes in it. As to a Prince, who is deſirous of keeping his Subjects in awe, I ſay, that inſtead of anſwering that end, they will be of great prejudice to him, for the reaſons above mentioned; becauſe they will embolden him to oppreſs them, and that oppreſſion will prove his ruin, as it will exaſperate them to ſuch a degree, that the Fortreſſes which are the principal cauſe of it, cannot poſſibly protect him againſt their rage. A good and wiſe Prince therefore, who would not lay either himſelf or his poſterity under any temptation to abuſe their Subjects, and become Tyrants, will never build Fortreſſes amongſt them, but depend altogether upon their fidelity and affection, which are a much better ſecurity. Count Franciſco Sforza, though accounted a wiſe man, built a Citadel at Milan, after he became Duke of that place; but in that he did not ſhew much wiſdom, as the conſequence fully proved; for it afterwards was of great prejudice to his Succeſſors, who thinking themſelves ſecure there, and at liberty to commit any ſort of violence upon their ſubjects with impunity, gave themſelves up to all manner of oppreſſion and licentiouſneſs, till they became ſo odious to every one, that they were preſently driven out of their dominions by the firſt enemy that invaded them. So that the Citadel did them but little good in time of war; and in time of peace it did them much harm; becauſe, if it had never been built, and they had been weak enough to have treated their Subjects with more aſperity than they ſhould have done, they would ſoon have been made ſenſible of their error, and might have deſiſted from it in time: in which caſe, they would have been able to make a more vigorous reſiſtance againſt the French, whilſt their Subjects were yet well affected to them, though they had had no Citadel to truſt to, than they did after they had forfeited the affection of the people, notwithſtanding they were poſſeſſed of that Fortreſs. In ſhort, nothing is more precarious than the aſſiſtance that is expected from ſuch places; as they may be

loſt, either by the venality of the Governor, or taken by ſtorm, or forced to ſurrender by famine.

But if a Prince is in hopes of recovering a City or State that has been loſt, whilſt ſome Citadel or Fortreſs only ſtill holds out for him, he will find himſelf deceived, except he has a good army, and is able to engage thoſe that have taken it from him: in which caſe, he may make himſelf maſter of it again, even if he has no Fortreſs there; and much ſooner too than if he had; as the inhabitants will be more inclined to favour him, than if he had abuſed and oppreſſed them without mercy, out of a vain confidence in that ſecurity. Experience, indeed, has clearly evinced that the Caſtle at Milan never was of the leaſt ſervice, either to the Sforzas or the French, in time of diſtreſs: but on the contrary, that it proved the ruin of them both; as it made them neglect the more ſafe and honourable means of defending themſelves. Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, the moſt renowned Soldier of his time, was driven out of his territories by Cæſar Borgia; but happening to recover them ſoon after, he ordered all the Fortreſſes in that Sate to be demoliſhed, becauſe he thought them rather prejudicial to him than otherwiſe: for, as he was beloved by his Subjects, he did not care to diſguſt them; and from his enemies, he found by experience, they could not ſecure him without a good army in the field. Pope Julius II. having taken Bologna from the Bentivogli, built a Citadel there, and put a Governor into it, who oppreſſed the people to ſuch a degree, that they ſoon rebelled, and forced him out of it: ſo that it was ſo far from doing him any good, that it was the occaſion of his loſing that place, which he might eaſily have kept, if there had been no Citadel there, and he had treated the people in a different manner. Niccoló da Caſtello, father of the Vitelli, who had been deprived of his dominions for a while, preſently cauſed two Fortreſſes to be pulled down, which Pope Sixtus IV. had built there, after he got poſſeſſion of his Country again; as he put more confidence in the love of his people, than

than in Caſtles and ſtrong holds. But we have a more recent and remarkable example of the inſignificance, or rather the miſchief of building Fortreſſes, and the neceſſity of demoliſhing them, which happened at Genoa, in the year 1507: for when that City rebelled againſt Lewis XII. King of France, who was then poſſeſſed of it, he came thither in perſon with a powerful army, to reduce it to obedience; which he did, and afterwards built the ſtrongeſt Citadel that is known at preſent: for, being ſituated upon the point of a rock cloſe to the ſea, it commanded not only the harbour, but the whole City, and was looked upon as impregnable. But afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven out of Italy, and the Citadel of Genoa alone held out for them, the Genoeſe, without troubling themſelves about the Citadel, revolted again, and choſe Octavian Fregoſa for their Governor, who laid cloſe ſiege to it on every ſide, and cut off all manner of proviſions and other neceſſaries in ſuch a manner, that at the end of ſixteen months, it was forced to ſurrender to him: after which (as it is generally ſaid) he was adviſed by many to keep it for his own ſecurity upon any emergency; but he very wiſely pulled it down, and choſe rather to rely upon his own goodneſs, and the affection of his Fellow-citizens; in conſequence of which reſolution, he has ſupported himſelf in the Government of Genoa ever ſince: and, though a thouſand men where ſufficient before to have turned it upſide down, he has, ſince that time, bravely defended itſelf, againſt an enemy that made an attempt upon it, with an army of ten thouſand. Hence we ſee, that Octavian fared not the worſe for demoliſhing the Caſtle, nor the King of France the better for building it; for when he marched into Italy with a good army, he ſoon recovered Genoa, though he had not the Citadel then to truſt to; but when he was not able to bring an army into the field, he could not keep the town, though he was poſſeſſed of the Citadel: ſo that as the King had been at a vaſt expence in building it, the loſs of it was a great diſgrace to him; whereas

Fregoſa, on the contrary, not only gained much reputation by taking, but great advantage by demoliſhing it.

It is now time to ſay ſomething (as we propoſed) concerning Republics that build Fortreſſes not in their own Country, but in places which they have conquered: the inutility of which (if the example of the French and Genoeſe juſt now mentioned be not thought ſufficient) may be fully ſhewn from that of the Florentines with regard to Piſa; where they had built Fortreſſes to keep the Citizens in Subjection, not conſidering that the Piſans had always been their declared enemies, that they had been uſed to live in freedom, that they looked upon rebellion as the only means they had left of recovering their liberties; and conſequently if the Florentines had a mind to prevent it, they ought either to have made them their friends and Fellow-citizens, or utterly to have extirpated them. For it was plainly ſeen how little theſe ſtrong places anſwered their expectations, upon the arrival of Charles VIII. in Italy, to whom they were preſently ſurrendered, either through the corruption or puſillanimity of the Governors; ſo that if they had never been built at all, the Florentines could not have truſted to them only for the preſervation of Piſa; nor could the King of France have otherwiſe deprived them of it: for the methods they had taken to keep poſſeſſion of it before, would moſt probably have been ſufficient to ſecure it at that time; at leaſt they could not have been attended with worſe conſequences.

I conclude then, that it is dangerous to build Fortreſſes in order to keep one's own Country in ſubjection; and that they are of no ſervice in maintaining poſſeſſion of others that are conquered; as may plainly appear from the practice and example of the Romans, who inſtead of erecting Fortreſſes in their new acquiſitions, generally demoliſhed ſuch as they found there. If it be objected that Tarentum in ancient times, and Breſcia not long ago, were recovered by means of Fortreſſes, after the people had rebelled againſt their Gover-

Governors and ſeized upon thoſe places: I anſwer, that Fabius Maximus was ſoon after ſent to the relief of the Citadel at Tarentum (which ſtill adhered to the Romans) with an army ſufficient to have reduced the town, even if there had been no Citadel there: and if there had not, he certainly would have found other means of doing it. It appears then how little ſervice was expected from the Citadel, by their ſending ſo great a man as Fabius with a Conſular army to recover Tarentum: and that he would have taken it without any ſuch aſſiſtance, is manifeſt from the example of Capua, which that army retook alſo, though there was no Citadel there to befriend them. With regard to Breſcia, it very ſeldom happens (though it did indeed in that rebellion) that a Fortreſs, which continues firm to you after the town has rebelled, has a good army near at hand to ſuccour it, as the French then had; for Monſieur de Foix the King's General, who then lay with his forces at Bologna, being informed that Breſcia was loſt, immediately marched thither, and arriving there in three days, recovered it by the help of the Caſtle. It was not wholly owing to the Citadel therefore that Breſcia was re-taken, but to the vicinity and expedition of Monſieur de Foix and his army: ſo that the authority of this example is not ſufficient to balance that of the others which have been before adduced: for we have ſeen numbers of Fortreſſes taken and retaken in the wars that have lately happened, not only in Lombardy and Romagna, but in the Kingdom of Naples, and every other part of Italy, in the ſame manner that other towns and States have been.

But as to building ſtrong places to defend yourſelf againſt foreign enemies, they are alſo unneceſſary if you have a good army; and if you have not, they are of no ſervice at all: for a good army will be a ſufficient ſecurity without any Fortreſs; but a Fortreſs without ſuch an army, will ſignify nothing *. The

* There cannot be a ſtronger proof of this than in what happened to the States General in the laſt Century, when ſo many of their

truth of this may be confirmed by the practice and conduct of thoſe people that have been moſt remarkable for their wiſdom and policy, particularly of the Romans and Spartans; the former of whom never built any Fortreſſes; and the latter truſting to their own valour alone, carried the matter ſo high, that they would not even ſuffer their Capital to be walled about, much leſs did they think of erecting ſtrong holds any where elſe. Accordingly a Spartan being aſked one day by an Athenian, "whether he did not think the walls of Athens very fine and ſtrong." "I ſhould much approve of them, ſaid he, if the City was inhabited by women only." A State however that has a good army, may reap ſome little advantage from a Fort or two near the Sea, if any part of its dominions lie upon the coaſt, as they may keep off an enemy perhaps till its own forces can be got together: though they are not altogether neceſſary even in that caſe. But when it has not a good army, Fortreſſes upon the Sea coaſt or Frontiers are either prejudicial, or at leaſt unſerviceable: prejudicial, becauſe they are eaſily taken, and once loſt may be turned againſt you; or if they be ſo ſtrong that the enemy cannot make themſelves Maſters of them, they may leave them behind; and then what ſervice can they do? For when a good army, that is not vigorouſly oppoſed by another as good or better than itſelf, happens to enter into an enemy's country, it pays no regard to the Towns and Fortreſſes which it leaves upon its back, as we ſee from many inſtances in ancient Hiſtory, and from the example of Franciſco Maria not long ago, who left ten Cities behind him that belonged to the enemy, and boldly marched on to beſiege Urbino, without giving himſelf the leaſt trouble about them.

A Prince therefore who has a good army will have no occaſion for Fortreſſes; and he that has not, ought

ſtrong towns were taken in a very ſhort time, which had formerly been ſo redoubtable when ſupported by good armies under the command of Prince Maurice.

not

not to build any: let it be his chief care to fortify the place of his reſidence as ſtrongly as he can, to put a good garriſon into it, to keep his ſubjects in good humour and well affected to him; that ſo they may defend him againſt any attack, till he can either obtain honourable terms from the enemy, or receive relief from others: all other means being too expenſive in time of peace, and ineffectual in war. So that conſidering what has been ſaid, it will appear that the Romans, who acted wiſely in all other reſpects, ſhewed no leſs wiſdom in their proceedings with the Latins, when they deſpiſed Fortreſſes, and had recourſe to more prudent and generous methods of ſecuring themſelves.

CHAP. XXV.

That it is imprudent to attack a people who are divided amongſt themſelves, in expectation of conquering them merely upon that account.

THE animoſities betwixt the Patricians and Plebeians began at laſt to run ſo high at Rome, that the Veientes and Hetruſci thought they had a fair opportunity of utterly extinguiſhing that Republic. Having raiſed an army therefore, and made an incurſion into the Roman territories, the Senate ſent out another to oppoſe them under the command of Cneius Manlius and Marcus Fabius, who encamping very near the enemy, were ſo inſulted with all manner of taunts and abuſive language, that the Roman Soldiers forgetting all private quarrels and hatred amongſt themſelves, heartily united together, and coming to an engagement with the enemy entirely defeated them. From hence we may obſerve how apt we are to err in the judgment we form of things (as hath been ſaid before *) and how often we are

* See Chap. xxii. of this Book.

diſappointed in obtaining our ends, by the very means whereby we propoſed to accompliſh them. The Veientes fully expected to have conquered the Romans when they found them ſo diſunited: in conſequence of which opinion, they ventured upon a war with them, which united one ſide and ruined the other: for as peace and idleneſs are, generally ſpeaking, the cauſes of faction and diſcord in Commonwealths; ſo war and apprehenſion of danger moſt commonly unite them again*: and therefore if the Veientes had rightly conſidered the matter, the more they ſaw the Romans embittered againſt each other, the more cautious they ſhould have been of engaging in a war with them, and taken very different methods to effect their ruin. They might have pretended a friendſhip to them, and offered their mediation to compoſe all differences betwixt the contending factions before they came to an open rupture: but when they had ſeen them once heartily engaged together they ſhould have given ſome aſſiſtance to the weaker ſide, in order to keep the flame alive till it conſumed them both: but that aſſiſtance ſhould not have been too conſiderable, leſt it might have occaſioned a ſuſpicion that they had a deſign to cruſh one ſide as well as the other, and reduce them equally into ſubjection to themſelves. for when ſuch a part is well conducted, it almoſt always anſwers the purpoſes of thoſe that act it. To this conduct it was owing that Piſtoia fell into the hands of the Florentines, as we have ſhewn elſewhere: for the Citizens there being divided into two parties, the Florentines threw weight ſometimes into one Scale, and ſometimes into the other, (but in ſuch a manner as to keep them in a ſort of equipoiſe) till both grew ſo weary of that factious ſort of life, that they mutually agreed to throw themſelves into the arms of the Flo-

* Has not this been ſometimes the caſe of Kingdoms as well as Republics? and have not the Britons (under good Princes) conſtantly united againſt any Invader, how much ſoever they were divided before, either by the vile ſuggeſtions of ſelf-intereſted men to poiſon their honeſt minds, or imaginary conceits of real danger?

rentines.

rentines. They likewiſe made themſelves Maſters of Siena by the ſame arts, which would never otherwiſe have become ſubject to them; I mean by fomenting the factions which raged there, and privately ſending both parties feeble ſuccours, as they were wanted: for if they had done it to any great degree, or in an open manner, it would have excited a jealouſy of their deſigns and united both ſides againſt them. I might likewiſe here add the example of Philip Viſconti, Duke of Milan, who engaged in ſeveral wars with the Florentines, in hopes of ſubduing them on account of the inteſtine diviſions that reigned in their City: but finding himſelf diſappointed in that expectation, he ſaid, "the follies of the Florentines had coſt him above two millions of gold to no purpoſe." The Veientes therefore and the Hetruſci (as I ſaid before) were guilty of a great and fatal error in their calculation; as thoſe will always be who build upon the ſame bottom, and purſue the ſame methods to reduce any State into ſubjection to them.

CHAP. XXVI.

That contemptuous and reproachful language, inſtead of doing a man any good, only ſerves to provoke others and make himſelf more hated.

IT is a great ſign of wiſdom in a man to refrain from threats and injurious language; becauſe inſtead of doing an enemy harm, one of them puts him more upon his guard, and the other ſtill adds to his rage, and makes him more active in ſeeking revenge. Of this we have juſt given an example in the behaviour of the Veientes, who beſides the enmity, which is uſually incident to people that are at war, could not forbear treating the Romans with particular marks of contempt and reproach; a thing which ought not to be ſuffered by any prudent commander: becauſe there is nothing that exaſperates an enemy ſo much,

much, or excites him more furiouſly to revenge; nothing that does him ſo little real damage, or yourſelf ſo little good, as the miſchief generally falls upon your own head.

To confirm this, I ſhall bring a remarkable proof from an event that happened in Aſia. Gabades the Perſian, having laid ſiege to Amida for a conſiderable time, and growing weary of it, as he made little or no progreſs, reſolved to raiſe it: but whilſt he was decamping, the Garriſon exulting at his diſgrace got up to the top of the walls, and inſulted him and his Soldiers in the moſt provoking terms, calling them cowards, poltroons, and all manner of opprobrious names: at which Gabades was ſo nettled that he changed his reſolution, and began the ſiege afreſh with ſo much vigour and reſentment that he took the town in a few days after, and delivered it up to the mercy of his Soldiers. The ſame thing happened to the Veientes, who, as I ſaid before, not being content with making war upon the Romans in the common way, could not forbear going up to their very entrenchments to affront and abuſe them, the conſequence of which was, that the Soldiers who were but little inclined to fight before, grew ſo outrageous that they compelled their Generals to give them battle, in which the Veientes were totally routed, and ſuffered the puniſhment they had ſo juſtly deſerved.

All wiſe Generals and Governors of States ſhould ſtudiouſly endeavour therefore to prevent the people under their command from reviling and reproaching each other, or even an enemy: for with regard to the latter, ſuch conſequences muſt naturally enſue as have been juſt now related; and ſtill worſe in reſpect to themſelves, if not anticipated by ſuch precautions as have always been uſed by prudent men. The legions which were left by the Romans for the ſecurity of Capua, having formed a deſign to make themſelves Maſters of that State (as I ſhall ſhew more at large in another place) grew ſeditious and mutinied: but being reduced to reaſon by Valerius Corvinus, amongſt

other methods which he took to quiet them, he ſtrictly enjoined every one, upon the ſevereſt penalties, never to upbraid any of thoſe Soldiers with their paſt behaviour. Tiberius Gracchus having a body of Slaves in his army (whom the Romans were obliged to employ in their wars with Hannibal for want of other men) forbade all the reſt of his Soldiers, on pain of death, to reproach any of them on account of their former ſervitude: ſo dangerous did the Romans think it to ſuffer any reflections on the infirmities or misfortune of others; as they well knew nothing could be more provoking than ſuch taunts, whether ſpoken in earneſt or in jeſt, eſpecially if they ſhould have any foundation in truth. Tacitus therefore ſays very juſtly, "facetiæ aſperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxêre, acrem ſui memoriam relinquunt: When Jokes border too near upon Truth, they leave ſtings behind them *.

* "At Sieges and elſewhere (ſays Montaigne, book I. chap. xlvii. of his Eſſays) where occaſion draws us near to the enemy, we willingly ſuffer our men to brave, inſult, and affront them with all ſorts of injurious language; and not without ſome colour of reaſon: for it is of no little conſequence to take from them all hopes of mercy and compoſition, by repreſenting to them, that there is no favour to be expected from an enemy they have ſo incenſed, nor any other remedy left but a victory. And yet Vitellius (or rather the Lieutenants who commanded in his abſence) found themſelves deceived in this point: for in an engagement with Otho's army, whoſe Soldiers were unaccuſtomed to war, and effeminated with the delights of the City, he ſo nettled them at laſt with injurious language and reproaching them with cowardice and the regret they felt at leaving their miſtreſſes and ſoft entertainments behind them at Rome, that he inſpired them with a reſentment which no exhortations could produce, and drew thoſe upon his back himſelf, whom their own Commanders could not puſh upon him before. And indeed, when reproaches touch the quick, it may well be expected that he who went but coolly to work in behalf of his Prince, will proceed with another temper when the quarrel is his own."

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

That wiſe Princes and well-governed Republics ought to be contented with victory: ſince others that graſp at more, are often loſers by it.

OPPROBRIOUS and reproachful language to an enemy, is commonly owing to the inſolence of thoſe who have either gained a victory or make themſelves ſure of one; which hopes, though often vain and ill grounded, occaſion errors both in their words and actions: for when once they get poſſeſſion of the underſtanding, they tranſport men beyond the bounds of reaſon, and frequently make them loſe the opportunity of obtaining a certain good, by flattering themſelves with the expectation of ſomething better which is precarious and uncertain. Now ſince this is a matter that is worthy of ſerious conſideration, as men are ſometimes miſled by ſuch fallacious hopes, to the great prejudice of their affairs, it may not be amiſs, I think, to illuſtrate what I have here advanced, by ſome inſtances both from ancient and modern Hiſtory, which ſeem more proper for that purpoſe, than reaſoning and argumentation. After Hannibal had defeated the Romans at the battle of Cannæ, he ſent Meſſengers to Carthage with the news of his victory, and to deſire ſupplies: upon which, the Senate deliberating what was to be done, Hanno, an old and experienced man, adviſed them to make a prudent uſe of their victory, and come to an accommodation with the Romans, as they might do, now they had beat them, upon more honourable and advantageous terms than they could expect if they ſhould chance to be beaten themſelves: and conſidering they had ſhewn the Romans they were able to cope with them, they ſhould not be tempted, he ſaid, to run the riſque of loſing what they had got, by the hopes of gaining ſomething more. This advice, however, was not liſtened

tened to, though the expedience of it was afterwards acknowledged when it was too late.

Alexander the Great, having conquered all the Eaſt, except the Republic of Tyre, (a powerful and opulent City in thoſe times, and ſituated, like Venice, upon the Sea) the Tyrians conſidering his power, ſent Ambaſſadors to inform him, they were ready to ſubmit to him and become his good and faithful ſubjects, provided they might be excuſed from admitting either him or any of his forces into their City. But Alexander diſdaining to be ſhut out of that City, when all the reſt in thoſe parts had thrown open their gates to receive him, would not hearken to any ſuch conditions, and having diſmiſſed the Ambaſſadors, immediately laid ſiege to the town; which being ſurrounded with water, and very well furniſhed with all ſorts of proviſions and ammunition that were neceſſary for its defence, made ſo vigorous a reſiſtance, that at the end of four months, he found that enterprize would coſt him more time, and add leſs to his glory than any other of his conqueſts had done: ſo that he reſolved to grant the conditions upon which they themſelves had offered to ſubmit to him. But the Tyrians, elated with ſucceſs, were then grown ſo inſolent, that they not only rejected all terms, but hanged the perſon whom he had ſent to offer them; at which he was ſo incenſed that he proſecuted the Siege with ſuch vigour and application, that he took the place ſoon after; and having entirely demoliſhed it, put moſt of the inhabitants to the Sword, and made Slaves of the reſt.

In the year 1512, a Spaniſh army marched into Tuſcany, to re eſtabliſh the Medici at Florence, and to lay the people under contribution. This was undertaken at the inſtigation of ſome Citizens of Florence, who had promiſed, that as ſoon as the Spaniards arrived in their territories, they would take up arms in their favour: but when they had reached the plains near that city, and not only perceived that no body appeared to join them, but alſo that they were

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in great want of proviſions, they endeavoured to accommodate matters with the Florentines in an amicable way: upon which the latter behaved in ſo inſolent a manner, that the Spaniards ſeized Prato and all its dependencies.

A Prince therefore who is attacked by an enemy that is much more powerful than himſelf, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than refuſing terms of accommodation, eſpecially if they are offered him: for they can never be ſo hard, but he will find ſome advantage in them, or perhaps eſcape utter deſtruction. The Tyrians then ought to have accepted the conditions which Alexander at firſt refuſed to grant them, but afterwards would have complied with; ſince it would have been ſufficient honour for them to have obliged ſo great a Conqueror by dint of arms to acquieſce in their demands. The Florentines likewiſe ſhould have been content, and looked upon it as a ſort of victory, that the Spaniards would have taken up with moderate terms; as they knew the deſign of that expedition was utterly to change the conſtitution of Florence, to break its connections with France, and to lay it under contribution. If the Spaniards had ſucceeded in the two laſt points, and the Florentines been ſecure of the firſt (that is of preſerving their State) the latter might in ſome meaſure have gloried in that, at leaſt been ſatisfied, and not given themſelves much trouble about the other two, ſo long as their Government continued entire and unchanged: nay if they had been almoſt ſure of obtaining a complete victory, they ſhould not have wholly abandoned themſelves to the mercy of Fortune, by venturing their laſt ſtake; which is a thing that no wiſe man will ever do, except he is compelled to do it by downright neceſſity.

After Hannibal had carried on a war for ſixteen years in Italy with great reputation, he was recalled by the Carthaginians to defend their own country, where he found the armies under Syphax and Aſdrubal entirely defeated, the Kingdom of Numidia loſt, the

the Carthaginians cooped up within their own walls, and deſtitute of all hope but what they placed in him. Perceiving therefore that his country was reduced to its laſt ſtake, he was determined not to hazard that till he had tried all other means: upon which account, he was not aſhamed to ſue for peace, as he knew that was the only remedy left. But that being refuſed, he reſolved to fight the Romans, (though with very little proſpect of ſucceſs) that ſo, if he could not gain a victory, he might at leaſt have the ſatisfaction of ending his days with honour. Now if ſo able a Commander as Hannibal, at the head of an army yet entire, endeavoured by all means to obtain peace, before he would run the riſque of a battle, becauſe he ſaw his Country would be utterly ruined if he loſt it; ought not his conduct to be a pattern to others of leſs experience and abilities? But men who can neither keep their hopes within the bounds of reaſon, nor make a due eſtimate of their own ſtrength, muſt of neceſſity be led into errors that will prove fatal in the end.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That Princes and Republics ought to puniſh ſuch as have injured either a whole people, or any particular perſon.

WE have a remarkable example how far men may be tranſported by their reſentment, in what happened to the Romans when they ſent the three Fabii Ambaſſadors to the Gauls, who had marched into Tuſcany and laid ſiege to Cluſium. For the Cluſians having ſollicited the aid of the Romans, the latter diſpatched theſe Ambaſſadors to require the Gauls, in the name of the Roman Republic, to withdraw their forces out of Tuſcany: but the Fabii having delivered their Embaſſy more like Soldiers than Orators, and ſeeing the Gauls and Tuſcans juſt going to engage, put themſelves at the head of the

the latter, and fought againſt the enemy, who was ſo provoked at this behaviour, that they turned their enmity from the Tuſcans upon the Romans. But what ſtill added to their reſentment, was, that after they had complained of this uſage to the Roman Senate, and demanded that the Fabii ſhould be delivered up to them, they were ſo far from either complying with their requeſt or puniſhing them in any other manner, that at the next election of Magiſtrates, they made them Tribunes with Conſular power. The Gauls therefore ſeeing them honoured and advanced, inſtead of being puniſhed, took it as a wilful affront, and were ſo enraged, that they immediately marched to Rome, and not only took, but ſacked the whole City, except the Capitol: all which the Romans brought upon themſelves, by rewarding their Ambaſſadors, when they ought to have diſcountenanced them for violating the law of nations.

It behoves all Princes and Republics therefore to be very cautious how they offend either a whole people, or any private perſon in the like manner: for in caſe a man is grievouſly injured, either by a whole Community, or by any individual, and meets with no redreſs when he complains of it; if he lives in a Commonwealth he will certainly endeavour to revenge himſelf, though it ſhould ruin the State: or if he lives under a Prince, and has the leaſt ſpark of generoſity in him, he will never reſt till he thinks he has righted himſelf, though he be ſure to ſuffer the ſevereſt puniſhment for it. A remarkable proof of this we have in the caſe of Philip of Macedon, (father of Alexander the Great) in whoſe Court there was a handſome young Nobleman, named Pauſanias, who was ardently importuned by Attalus, (one of Philip's chief favourites) to ſubmit to his luſt: but the youth conſtantly refuſing it, he determined to force him, ſince other means were in vain. For this purpoſe, having made a great entertainment, to which Pauſanias and many others of the Nobility were invited, he took an opportunity when they had all drank pretty

pretty freely, of having him carried by violence into another apartment, where he not only gratified his own brutal desires, but suffered several others to do the same: at which he was so outrageously provoked, that he complained of it frequently to Philip in the most bitter terms; who, though he always promised to bring the other to justice for the enormity he had been guilty of, was so far from performing it, that he made him Governor of a Province. Pausanias therefore seeing him exalted in this manner, instead of being punished, grew cooler with regard to Attalus who had injured him, and turned all his rage upon Philip who had refused him justice: in revenge for which, he took an opportunity of stabbing him one morning, upon a rejoicing day, as he was going to the Temple, attended by his Son and Son-in-law, to celebrate the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus. An example which much resembles that just now quoted from the Roman History, and deserves to be carefully attended to by all Princes, who ought never so far to despise any man as to think a repetition of injuries will not oblige him some time or other to revenge himself, though it cost him ever so dear.

CHAP. XXIX.

That Fortune throws a mist before people's eyes, when She would not have them obstruct her designs.

WHOEVER attentively considers the course of human affairs, may see, that many accidents and misfortunes happen to mankind, against which Heaven will not suffer us to make any sort of provision: and as there were many instances of this amongst the Romans, who were so much distinguished for their piety, valour, discipline, and good conduct; it is no wonder if such things happen more frequently amongst people that are much less eminent for their

virtues. Now ſince it may be neceſſary here to ſhew what influence Heaven has over the affairs of this world, I ſhall take ſome notice of a remarkable paſſage in Livy, where he ſays, that Heaven, in order to make the Romans ſenſible of its power for ſome great purpoſe, firſt made the Fabii fall into that error when they went Ambaſſadors to the Gauls, which excited the latter to make war upon Rome, and afterwards would not ſuffer the Romans to perform any thing worthy of their former valour, to extricate themſelves out of that war; but had incited them to baniſh Camillus to Ardea; who was the only man that could effectually have oppoſed ſuch an enemy. that when the Gauls were upon their march towards Rome, they did not create a Dictator to make head againſt them, as they had often done before, when they were invaded by the Volſci and others: that they were ſo careleſs in the choice of their men, and ſo tardy in raiſing and furniſhing them with arms, that they hardly had time to face the enemy with what force they could muſter, upon the banks of the Allia, about ten miles from Rome; where the Tribunes encamped without their uſual precaution of making choice of an advantageous ſituation, or ſurrounding it with entrenchments or paliſades, or having recourſe to any other means proper upon ſuch an occaſion, either human or Divine: that when they drew up in order of battle, their lines were thin and weak, and neither the Officers nor private men behaved themſelves like Romans: ſo that the battle was neither obſtinate nor bloody; for being routed at the firſt onſet, the greater part of their army fled to Veii, and the reſt to Rome, where they retired into the Capitol, even before they had ſeen their wives and children; upon which, ſome of the Senators (without making any proviſion for the defence of the City, or ſo much as ſhutting the Gates) ran away, and others took ſhelter in the Capitol. However they ſhewed ſome ſigns of good order and diſcipline in preparing for the defence of that place: for they turned out all

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the uſeleſs people, got together what proviſions they could to ſupport the Siege, and ſent moſt of the old men, women, and children into the neighbouring towns, leaving the reſt to the mercy of the enemy: ſo that if any one ſhould conſider the great exploits which the Romans had performed before, and compare them with their behaviour upon this occaſion, he could hardly believe that they were the ſame people. Livy therefore having given an account of this event, ſays, "adeo obcæcat animos fortuna, cum vim ſuam ingruentem refringi non vult: to ſuch a degree does fortune blind the underſtandings of men, when ſhe has not a mind to be diſturbed in her career." Which is a very juſt reflection.

The Proſperity or Adverſity therefore, which ſo remarkably diſtinguiſh the lives of particular men, is not to be wholly imputed either to their own merit or demerit; ſince we often ſee ſome hurried on to deſtruction, and others puſhed up to the higheſt pitch of worldly greatneſs by the impulſe of their deſtiny; Heaven diſpoſing things in ſuch a manner as to favour one man with opportunities of exerting his abilities, whilſt it denies them to another. Thus when it is pleaſed to exalt a man to great proſperity, it makes choice of ſuch a one as knows how to avail himſelf of thoſe occaſions and opportunities: on the contrary, when ſome remarkable ruin is to be effected, ſuch men are pitched upon as muſt naturally contribute to further and promote it; and if any one dares to oppoſe it, he is either taken off by death, or otherwiſe incapacitated to do it with any ſucceſs. It plainly appears from the paſſage in Livy juſt mentioned, that Fortune, in order to aggrandize the Roman Republic, thought proper to humble it in the firſt place, but not to reduce it to utter ruin, as we ſhall ſhew more particularly in the beginning of the next book: for which purpoſe ſhe ſuffered the Romans to baniſh Camillus, but not to put him to death; and the City to be taken, but not the Capitol; preventing them from uſing any proper mea-

ſures to defend the one, but leaving them ſenſe enough to ſecure the other: and that Rome might be taken, ſhe cauſed the greater part of the army that was routed upon the banks of the Allia, to fly to Veii, by which the City was left deſtitute of ſufficient defence. This however paved a way for the recovery of it; for as many of the forces had retired to Veii near Ardea where Camillus then was, (a General of great abilities, whoſe reputation had never been ſtained with the ignominy of a defeat) he put himſelf at the head of them, and drove the enemy from Rome. I might bring ſeveral other inſtances of more modern date to confirm the truth of what I have laid down: but as this is ſufficient, they are altogether unneceſſary, and therefore I ſhall poſtpone them. To conclude, it appears from all Hiſtory, that men may ſecond their fortune, but cannot reſiſt it; and follow the order of her deſigns, but not defeat them. However, they ought never to abandon themſelves to deſpair, becauſe they cannot fathom her deſigns: for as her ways are dark and intricate, there is always room left for hope; and whilſt there is hope, they ſhould not be wanting to themſelves in any change or viciſſitude of their affairs.

CHAP. XXX.

Princes and Republics that are truly magnanimous and powerful, never make Leagues and Alliances by dint of money; their friendſhip and protection being courted by others on account of their valour, reputation, and Power.

THOUGH the Romans had ſome expectation of Relief from Camillus, and their forces at Veii, when they were beſieged in the Capitol by the Gauls; yet, being diſtreſſed by famine, they were at laſt obliged to capitulate, and agreed to pay a certain ſum of money for their ranſom. But whilſt they were weighing

weighing the money that was to be paid upon that occaſion, Camillus fell upon the enemy with the forces under his command, and drove them away from Rome. Such was the will of Fortune, ſays Livy, "Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent; that the Romans might not owe their redemption to money." And it is very remarkable, that in the whole progreſs of their affairs, as well as upon this occaſion, they never made themſelves maſters of any State, nor procured a peace by dint of money, but ſolely by their own valour and conduct: which is a circumſtance that I believe no other Republic in the world could ever boaſt of.

Amongſt other marks which ſerve to diſcover the ſtrength or weakneſs of a State, it muſt be obſerved upon what terms it is with its neighbours; for if they put themſelves under its protection, and pay handſomely for it, it is a ſign that it is ſtrong and powerful: but, if they draw ſums of money from it (though they may poſſibly be inferior States) it is a certain ſign of its weakneſs. Whoever reads the Roman Hiſtory, will find that the Maſſilians, the Edui, the Rhodians, as well as Hiero of Syracuſe, Eumenes, and Maſſiniſſa, who all lived near the confines of the Roman Empire, were tributaries to that Republic, and furniſhed it with money in its occaſions, merely for the ſake of protection. But it is otherwiſe in weak States, as we may ſee particularly in the practice of Florence, which formerly, when it was in its moſt flouriſhing condition, paid ſtipends to moſt of the little Governments in Romagna, beſides the Perugians, Caſtellans, and many other neighbouring States: which would not have been the caſe of the Florentines, had they been powerful and well armed: for then all their neighbours would have paid them tribute for their protection, and have purchaſed their friendſhip inſtead of ſelling their own. But the Florentines, are not the only people that have been forced to do this; for the Venetians, and even the King of France (though ſo great a monarch) are tributaries

butaries to the Swiſs, and the King of England: all which proceeds from having diſarmed and weakened their own people, in order to oppreſs them at their pleaſure, and to avoid an imaginary, rather than a real danger; inſtead of making ſuch proviſions for their ſecurity, as would effectually have made both themſelves and their Subjects powerful and happy for ever. This ſhameful manner of proceeding may indeed procure a little temporary repoſe; but in the end, muſt be attended with troubles, loſſes, and inevitable ruin. It would be tedious to recount how often the Florentines, Venetians, and French, have bought off their wars, and ſubmitted to ſuch ignominious terms as the Romans could never be induced to think of but once: nor would it be leſs diſagreeable to relate how many towns the Florentines and Venetians have purchaſed with money; which have proved the occaſion of great diſaſters, and fully proved that they were not able to protect with the Sword thoſe poſſeſſions they purchaſed with their money.

The Romans, on the contrary, diſdained theſe mean arts of acquiring dominion, and owed the maintenance of their conqueſts ſolely to their arms: from which manner of proceeding they never deviated whilſt they continued free; but when they fell under the yoke of Emperors, and thoſe Emperors grew bad, and preferred eaſe and indolence to glory and military toil, that brave people began likewiſe to degenerate, and uſed to ward off the attacks of the Parthians, Germans, and other nations by pecuniary means, which ſoon proved the deſtruction of their Empire. This evil was occaſioned by diſarming the people, and the neglect of military diſcipline, which is always attended with a ſtill greater misfortune, namely, that the nearer an enemy approaches, the more he diſcovers your weakneſs; for, whoever is guilty of theſe errors, muſt be obliged to oppreſs his Subjects, by extorting money from them, to hire other people to keep an enemy at a diſtance; that is,

he muſt give ſtipends and penſions to all the neighbouring States. Hence it comes to paſs, that the utmoſt a State is able to do in ſuch circumſtances, is to make ſome feeble reſiſtance upon the confines; but when an enemy has once paſſed them, all is over and it is ruined without remedy. Such Governors therefore ſeem not to be aware, that this method of proceeding is contrary not only to all good policy, but the common practice of mankind: for when a man is going to battle, he takes more care to guard the heart and vital parts, than his hands and feet; becauſe, a wound in the latter may probably not be mortal, but in the others it is certain death: now theſe Governors fortify the extremities of their States, and neglect the heart. How fatal ſuch a conduct has often been to the Florentines, every one knows: for, whenever an enemy has paſſed their confines, and advanced towards the Capital, he has met with no further reſiſtance. The ſame happened to the Venetians not many years ago; and if their City had not been ſurrounded with water, it muſt infallibly have been deſtroyed. With regard to France, this has not often been the caſe there, becauſe it is ſo powerful a Kingdom, and has but few enemies that are ſuperior to it: nevertheleſs, when the Engliſh invaded it, in the year 1513, the French were in great conſternation; and the King, as well as every body elſe was of opinion, that the loſs of one battle, would be the loſs of France. Very different was the caſe of the Romans. The nearer an enemy approached their City, the ſtronger he found them: for after they had been three times routed, and loſt ſo many brave officers and Soldiers in their wars with Hannibal in Italy, they were ſtill able not only to ſtand their ground againſt the enemy, but to ſubdue him at laſt: all which was owing to their having fortified the heart of their country ſo well, that there was no occaſion to be in much pain about the extremities: for the vitals of their State were their own Citizens, the Latins, the neighbouring people that were confederated with

them, and their Colonies, from which they had such continual supplies as enabled them to conquer the whole world, and to keep it in obedience. The truth of this may appear from what Hanno said to the Ambassadors that were sent to Carthage with news of the victory at Cannæ: who, having given an account of Hannibal's great exploits in Italy, were asked by Hanno, "Whether any of the Roman Cities, or Confederates, or Colonies, had either sued to him for peace, or revolted from the Romans:" but being answered in the negative, he replied, "the war then is just as fresh as it was at first."

It is plain therefore, from what I have said in this Chapter, and in many other places, that the Republics of these times act in a very different manner from what the Romans did: in consequence of which, we daily see such surprizing acquisitions made by some nations, and no less wonderful losses sustained by others: for where men have but little valour and conduct, fortune will have an opportunity of exerting her influence so much the more: and as she is changeable, Republics and other States also must and always will fluctuate, till some great Spirit shall arise to restore the ancient discipline, restrain her caprice, and prevent her from giving such hourly proofs of her wantonness and power.

CHAP. XXXI.

That it is dangerous to put confidence in Exiles.

IT may not be amiss, perhaps, to say something here, concerning the danger of trusting to those that have been banished their own country; since it is a matter of great importance to the governors of States, who often have to do with such people. Of this, Livy introduces the following remarkable example in his History, though something foreign to the purpose he is treating of. When Alexander the Great

Great marched with his forces into Asia, Alexander of Epirus, his near relation, invaded Italy at the instigation of some Lucanian Exiles, who persuaded him that he might make himself master of all that Province by their assistance. But when he arrived there in consequence of the strongest assurances, they perfidiously murdered him, upon a promise of being restored to their country on that condition.

We may observe therefore, how little confidence is to be reposed in the fidelity and promises of Exiles; as to their fidelity, you may assure yourself that whenever they have an opportunity of returning to their own country without your assistance, they will certainly abandon you, and make their peace at home; notwithstanding the most sacred engagements to the contrary: and with regard to the promises of success which they feed you with, these people naturally growing weary of exile, and impatient to return to their families, are prompted not only to believe many stories that are false, but to invent others to impose upon you: so that if you build upon such a foundation, you either throw away a great deal of money to no purpose, or utterly ruin yourself. To the example above quoted, let me add that of Themistocles the Athenian, who having rebelled against his country, fled into Asia to Darius, whom he flattered with such magnificent hopes, that he prevailed upon him to invade Greece; but, afterwards finding he was not able to perform the promises he had made that Prince, he poisoned himself, either out of Shame, or fear of punishment. Now, if a man possessed of such eminent virtue and abilities as Themistocles confessedly was, could be guilty of such an error, and promise much more than he could fulfil; we may well expect that those of much inferior merit and power will naturally be hurried away by their prejudices and passions, to deceive others as well as themselves *.

* The conduct of Zopyrus, a Nobleman of Persia, might here likewise be instanced, (if further examples were wanting) who, according to Justin, after his Sovereign Darius had long besieged Babylon to no

Princes

Princes therefore ought to be very cautious how they engage in any undertaking, on the encouragement of an Exile; becauſe ſuch enterprizes are generally attended either with very great loſs or diſgrace. And as it alſo ſeldom happens, that towns are taken by treachery or private intelligence; I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter by what means the Romans uſed to reduce them.

CHAP. XXXII.

Concerning the ſeveral methods by which the Romans made themſelves maſters of Towns.

THE Romans being a martial people, conſidered war in every point of view, and always proceeded in ſuch a manner, with regard to their expences and all other particulars in their military operations, as might tend moſt effectually to command ſucceſs. In conſequence of this, they ſeldom laid ſiege to a place, if it was poſſible to avoid it, becauſe they thought it not only a very expenſive way of proceeding, but attended with ſo many other inconveniencies, as would much over-balance the advantage that might reſult from the reduction of a town in that manner: upon which account, as they judged it better and more profitable to have recourſe to other means, there are but very few inſtances of regular ſieges in the whole courſe of their wars. The methods therefore, by which they made themſelves maſters of fortified places, were either by ſtorm, or by ſtratagem. When they took a town by ſtorm, they did not batter the

purpoſe, cut off his own noſe and ears, and fled to the Babylonians, pretending it was done by the order of Darius: upon which the Babylonians, moved with compaſſion and deteſtation at the barbarity of the fact, not only gave credit to his report, but made him their General. Not long after, however, he took an opportunity of betraying the confidence they had ſimply repoſed in him, and delivered up the City to the Enemy. The ſame Hiſtorian tells us, that Darius was ſo aſtoniſhed at his loyalty, that he ſaid, "he had rather ſee Zopyrus whole again than take twenty ſuch Cities as Babylon."

walls,

walls, but ſurrounded them with their whole army (which they called Aggredi urbem coronâ) and carried on the attack in all parts at the ſame time: ſo that they often ſucceeded in the firſt aſſault; as Scipio did at new Carthage in Spain. But if they failed in that attempt, they either began to batter the walls with rams, and other ſuch warlike engines, or to undermine them and force a paſſage into the town that way (as they did into Veii), or built wooden towers that they might fight upon a level with thoſe on the walls; or threw up Cavaliers* againſt them, to command the town. When the beſieged were ſurrounded and aſſaulted on all ſides from without, they certainly were in the greateſt danger, and had the feweſt reſources to depend upon: for as it was neceſſary to defend every part at the ſame time, they ſeldom could have men enough for that purpoſe; much leſs others to relieve them: but if they had, thoſe men could not all be equally ſtout and reſolute; ſo that if an impreſſion was made in any part, the whole was loſt; and therefore ſuch places, as I ſaid before, where often taken at the firſt aſſault. But if that miſcarried, they ſeldom or never renewed it, or kept their army any longer in a poſture that muſt neceſſarily expoſe it to great danger; for as it was extended over ſo large a compaſs of ground, the ranks muſt of courſe be very thin, and not able to oppoſe the enemy, if they ſhould chance to make a ſally: beſides, the Soldiers would be apt to grow weary of ſuch a ſtation, and conſequently mutinous; for which reaſon, this method was never attempted but once, and then with the utmoſt ſurprize and vigour. When a breach was made in the walls, the beſieged endeavoured to repair it with entrenchments and ramparts thrown up within, as they do at preſent: and from the effect of mining they uſed

* The Original, ſays "argini di terra apoggiati alle mura di fuora," i. e. banks of earth againſt the outſide of the walls, now called Cavaliers, which are mounts of earth, with a platform on the top, and a parapet to cover the cannon planted upon it, cut with embraſures to fire through.

to

to defend themſelves by countermines, in which they either oppoſed the enemy ſword in hand, or threw caſks full of feathers and ſuch like combuſtibles ſet on fire, into their works; the ſmoke and ſtink of which, would not ſuffer them to continue long there. As to wooden towers, they endeavoured to deſtroy them by fire; and when the beſiegers began to throw up Cavaliers againſt the outſide of the wall, thoſe in the town made holes in the bottom, through which they drew the earth they were made of into the inſide; ſo that they could never be raiſed to a ſufficient height to do them any harm, as the foundations were conſtantly giving way.

But ſince theſe methods of attacking a place cannot be long continued, the beſiegers muſt reſolve upon one of theſe two things; i. e. either to raiſe their camp and proſecute the war in ſome other manner (as Scipio did, who having made a ſudden but fruitleſs aſſault upon Utica in Africa, immediately marched away from thence, in order to force the Carthaginian army to an engagement), or to form a regular ſiege as the Romans did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jeruſalem, and ſome other Cities which they took in that manner.

As to taking a place by means of a private correſpondence with ſome of the Citizens (as the Romans took Palæopolis), that method of proceeding, though often tried by the Romans and other people, was ſeldom attended with ſucceſs; becauſe in ſuch an undertaking many impediments muſt intervene, and the leaſt is ſufficient to defeat it. For in the firſt place, conſpiracies are generally diſcovered before they are ripe for execution, either through the perfidy of ſome accomplice, or the difficulties that occur in conducting them; becauſe you muſt have a correſpondence with the enemy who are reſtrained from having any intercourſe with you, except upon ſome very particular occaſion. But let us ſuppoſe the deſign ſhould not be diſcovered, till it is upon the point of being executed; many diſappointments and obſtructions may ſtill happen: ſome of the conſpirators, perhaps, may aſſemble

aſſemble too ſoon, and others too late; in either of which caſes, they are undone: ſome dark rumour, ſome unexpected alarm (like that of the geeſe which ſaved the Capitol at Rome), nay the leaſt miſtake or moſt trifling change either in the plan, or manner of executing it, is more than enough to overſet the whole. To theſe contingencies we might add the darkneſs of the night (a time when ſuch things are generally brought to a criſis), the terror with which it inſpires guilty minds, the blunders men are liable to fall into, who are not intimately acquainted with the nature and ſituation of the particular places that are to be the ſcenes of action (as many of the conſpirators cannot be), and the diſmay that naturally preſents itſelf to people concerned in ſuch perilous enterprizes; all which circumſtances greatly contribute to confound, embarraſs, and diſcourage them to ſuch a degree, that the moſt inſignificant accident or ſhadow of danger throws them into diſorder and ſuſpicions that commonly end in their deſtruction *. No man was ever bolder or more fortunate in theſe clandeſtine and nocturnal practices than Aratus the Sicyonian; though he was no leſs cautious and circumſpect in the field, and in open day light: which would tempt one to think that this was rather owing to ſome peculiar and innate diſpoſition in him, than to any good opinion that ſound reaſon and judgment can form of ſuch enterprizes. This manner of proceeding therefore, when often tried, may ſometimes prove ſucceſsful; but I will venture to affirm in general, that it can ſeldom be conducted to the point of execution, and ſtill more rarely anſwer the intended purpoſe.

The laſt method by which the Romans got poſſeſſion of towns, was by treaty; that is, when the inhabitans, either voluntarily ſubmitted to them, or were reduced to accept of terms: the firſt was generally owing to ſome urgent neceſſity or danger which hung over their heads, and obliged them to ſeek protection

* See Chap. vi. of the next book.

from

from others (as the Capuans did) or to a desire of living under a happier Government, which they perceived others enjoy who had thrown themselves into their arms, particularly the Rhodians, and Massilians, and some other Cities that have been mentioned before. But when people are compelled to accept of terms, it commonly proceeds either from the usual consequences of a long siege, or being harrassed with continual incursions and devastations, and otherwise distressed; to avoid which, they think it more eligible to submit to the enemy. This method was more generally practised by the Romans than any other, during the course of four hundred and fifty years, in which they never ceased to harrass their neighbours in every manner that was possible to devise, till they were forced to submit to some conditions or other, and acknowledge their superiority: a method which they chiefly depended upon, after they had tried all others, and rejected them, either as dangerous or unserviceable; considering that sieges were tedious and expensive, assaults doubtful and perilous, the success of private correspondencies uncertain, and that a victory in the field often determined the fate of a whole Kingdom in one day, when the reduction of a City that was obstinately defended, sometimes could not be effected in several years.

CHAP. XXXIII.

That the Romans upon any Expedition gave the Commanders of their Armies free and discretionary Commissions.

WHOEVER would improve himself by reading Livy's History, should attentively consider the whole scope and tendency, as well as the particular conduct observed by the Romans in all their actions and designs. It may not be amiss then, to say something of the authority with which they vested their Consuls,

Conſuls, Dictators, and other Commanders of their forces, when they ſent them upon any expedition; which indeed was ſo great, that the Senate reſerved no other power to itſelf than that of confirming a peace, or declaring war; leaving all other operations entirely to the conduct and diſcretion of the General, who was at liberty either to fight the enemy, or to decline it; to lay ſiege to a town, or to let it alone, juſt as the thought fit. This is obvious from many examples, particularly from what happened in an expedition againſt the Tuſcans, when Fabius the Conſul had defeated them near Sutrium. For after the battle was over, that General having determined to march through the Ciminian foreſt into Tuſcany, was ſo far from conſulting the Senate about it, that he did not give them the leaſt notice of his deſign; though the war was to be tranſported into another country, and likely to be attended with much danger and hazard. This is evident from the ſteps taken by the Roman Senate upon that occaſion: for having received an account of the victory he had gained, and apprehending he might be inclined to purſue his advantage, and puſh through that foreſt into the enemy's territories, they ſent an expreſs to diſſuade him from it: but their advice arrived too late; for before he received it he had routed the Tuſcans a ſecond time, and over-run all their country: ſo that, inſtead of preventing that expedition, the meſſengers returned with the news of a victory.

Now if this manner of proceeding be duly conſidered, it will be found very wiſe and expedient: for if the Senate was to have been conſulted upon every particular occaſion, it would have damped the vigour and activity of the Generals, and made them leſs vigilant in their enterprizes; ſince they muſt have thought the honour of a victory would not have redounded ſo much to them as to the Senate, under whoſe immediate inſtructions they had acted. Beſides, the Senate in that caſe muſt ſometimes have given very improper orders: for though the Senators were all

all men of great experience in military affairs, yet as they were not upon the ſpot themſelves, they could not know many particular circumſtances that it was neceſſary to be acquainted with, in order to gain or improve an advantage; and conſequently muſt be guilty of numberleſs errors; for which reaſon they left their Generals to act according to their own diſcretion, that ſo they might be the more effectually incited to exert their utmoſt abilities, when they knew no body elſe was to ſhare with them in the glory. This I thought fit to obſerve, becauſe I ſee how differently the Commonwealths in theſe times (eſpecially the Venetians and Florentines) act upon ſuch occaſions: for if a battery (for inſtance) is to be raiſed againſt a town that is beſieged, the Senate muſt be conſulted about it in the firſt place, and give their orders how it is to be managed. A manner of proceeding, indeed, that is of a piece with the reſt of their conduct; which all together has reduced them to the pitiful condition they are now in.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

POLI-

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL,

Secretary of State to the Republic of Florence.

BOOK III.

POLITICAL

DISCOURSES

UPON THE FIRST DECAD OF

LIVY.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

That no State or Religious Eſtabliſhment can ſubſiſt long, except it is frequently reduced to its firſt Principles.

EVERY thing in this World is ſubject to diſſolution. Thoſe bodies that finiſh the courſe appointed them by Heaven, are ſuch as obſerve ſo regular an order, that they either undergo no change at all, or if they do, it is ſuch only as tends rather to their preſervation than their deſtruction. With regard to mixed bodies, as Republics and Religious Orders, I ſay, that ſuch changes as reduce them to their firſt principles are ſalutary: and therefore thoſe are the beſt conſtituted and continue the longeſt, which either have eſtabliſhments and inſtitutions of their own, by the application of which they may be reduced to that condition; or eaſily fall, by accident as it were, into ſome courſe that tends to ſuch a renovation: for it is a moſt evident truth, that no Body can long ſubſiſt without it. The fundamentals of all Religions,

Republics, and Kingdoms, muſt have had ſomething good and wholeſome in them at firſt, to which they owed their origin and progreſs: but as that virtue is liable to be corrupted in time, the body muſt of neceſſity languiſh and die, except ſomething happens to reſtore its efficacy. Thus, Phyſicians (ſpeaking of the human body) ſay, "quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione; it daily contracts ſome impurity which muſt be purged off in time."

This renovation then is affected in Republics, either by ſome external accident, or internal policy. In the firſt caſe, we have ſeen how it was owing to Fortune that Rome was taken by the Gauls; that ſo it might be reſtored to its ancient vigour by reſuming new life and virtue, and by the revival of Religion and Juſtice, which had begun to decay. This plainly appears from Livy, who tells us that when the Romans led out their army againſt the Gauls, and created Tribunes with Conſular power, they obſerved no religious rite or ceremony upon that occaſion, as they uſed to do before; and that inſtead of puniſhing the Fabii, who had violated the law of nations by fighting againſt the Gauls, they loaded them with honours and rewards: from whence we may reaſonably ſuppoſe, that the Inſtitutions upon which Romulus and other wiſe Princes had founded that State were falling into a degree of contempt and neglect that was inconſiſtent with the preſervation of its liberties *. Such an accident therefore as befel them from the Gauls was highly requiſite at that juncture to revive their ancient diſcipline and inſtitutions; and to ſhew the people how neceſſary it was, not only to maintain Religion and Juſtice in full force, but to reverence virtuous and worthy Citizens, and to ſhew a greater regard to their merit than to any private conſideration whatſoever. All which actually came to paſs: for as ſoon as they had recovered the City, they immediately applied themſelves to revive all the ancient rites and

* See book II. chap. xxviii. xxix.

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inſtitutions of their Religion, chaſtiſed the Fabii for their deliquency, and laying aſide all envy and contentions amongſt themſelves, not only vied with each other in ſhewing all manner of reſpect to the virtue and goodneſs of Camillus, but committed the management of the whole State to him alone.

It is neceſſary then, as I ſay before, that all States ſhould often be reformed, either by ſuch external accidents or by ſome interior power: the latter of which muſt ariſe either from laws that may frequently call the individuals to account; or from the authority of ſome great and good man amongſt them, whoſe example and virtuous actions may have the ſame effect. The laws that were made to reduce the Roman Republic to its firſt principles, were ſuch as created Tribunes and Cenſors; and ſome others that were enacted to curb inſolence and ambition: but ſuch inſtitutions muſt be kept in full force and vigour by ſome virtuous and ſpirited man, who will maintain them againſt powerful tranſgreſſors, and ſee them duly put in execution. The moſt ſtriking examples of this ſort before the taking of Rome by the Gauls, were the execution of the Sons of Brutus, the puniſhment of the Decemviri, and the death of Spurius Melius: and afterwards, that of Manlius Capitolinus, the Son of Manlius Torquatus, the proſecution carried on by Papirius Curſor againſt Fabius his General of the Horſe, and the accuſation of the Scipos; which being extraordinary acts of ſeverity were much noticed when they happened, and ſerved to remind other Citizens of their duty: but as they grew more rare, the people began to degenerate again into corruption and licentiouſneſs in ſuch a manner, that examples of this kind could not be made without much danger and tumult. It is neceſſary therefore that ſuch events ſhould happen once in ten years, at leaſt, to awaken the remembrance of former puniſhments, and to ſtrike a terror into the people: otherwiſe they will ſoon begin to forget and deſpiſe the laws, and delinquents multiply ſo faſt, that it will be very difficult if

impoſſible to bring them to juſtice, without expoſing a State to great perils and troubles. For this reaſon, thoſe that governed Florence from the year 1433 to the year 1494, reformed the State every five years; without which it could not have exiſted: and in theſe reformations they were particularly careful to revive that dread of puniſhment, which they had at firſt excited in the breaſts of the Citizens, when they took the Government into their hands, by doing ſtrict juſtice, and calling all offenders to a ſevere account: but as the Remembrance of theſe puniſhments began to wear away, the people alſo began to grow bold and inſolent again, and not only ſaid, but did what they pleaſed; againſt which no remedy was found ſo efficacious as reducing the State to its firſt principles.

Such a reduction is likewiſe owing ſometimes to the virtue of one man alone, without the co-operation of any law to enforce it: for ſo great is the authority of ſuch an example, that all good men are ready to follow it, and thoſe that are bad are aſhamed to do otherwiſe. The moſt remarkable examples of this kind in Rome were thoſe of Horatius Cocles, Scævola, Fabritius, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius, and ſome others, whoſe rare and uncommon virtue produced the ſame effects that any law or inſtitution could have done. If then either ſome ſuch executions as we have mentioned, or ſome ſuch particular example of virtue had happened every ten years in Rome, that State would never have become corrupt; but as they both became leſs frequent, corruption began to grow more general, after the time of Marcus Regulus, there were very few or no ſuch examples: for though indeed thoſe of the two Catos, might be inſtanced, yet it was at ſuch a diſtance of time from the abovementioned, and there was ſo long an interval betwixt one and the other of them, that they ſtood ſingle in their virtue and could do no manner of good; eſpecially the younger, who finding the Republic almoſt totally corrupted, found alſo all his endea-

endeavours to reform it ineffectual. So much for Republican Governments.

With regard to Religious Eſtabliſhments, it will plainly appear how neceſſary reformations are in theſe alſo from the example of our own, which would have been utterly ruined if it had not been reduced to its firſt principles by St. Francis and St. Dominic, who by their voluntary poverty and imitation of Chriſt, revived true Religion in the minds of men, when it was almoſt effaced, and would ſoon have been wholly obliterated by the wickedneſs of Prelates and Popes: for as they lived in extreme poverty, and were very diligent in hearing Confeſſions and preaching, they gained ſuch an influence over the people by renewing theſe inſtitutions, that they began to be convinced it was their duty not to ſpeak evil of their Superiors, how bad ſoever; but to obey them, and to leave the chaſtiſement of their crimes to God: whereas the others muſt of neceſſity lead very wicked lives, ſince they feared not that vengeance which they ſeldom or never heard of and did not believe. This reformation then has been, and ſtill is the preſervation of our Religion *.

Monarchies have likewiſe occaſion ſometimes for ſuch renovations and a reduction to their firſt principles, in order to re-eſtabliſh the authority of their fundamental laws: and we ſee what good effects they have had in the Kingdom of France, which lives in ſtricter obedience to ſuch inſtitutions than any other that we know of. The Parliaments indeed, and eſpecially that of Paris, are the maintainers and conſervators of thoſe laws and inſtitutions, which are always revived and put in execution, when it is neceſſary to proceed againſt any Prince in that Kingdom, or to oppoſe the King's Edicts: and they have hitherto preſerved their liberties by putting the laws duly in execution againſt great offenders †. Whereas if ſuch

* See the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, vol. ii. ſect. 4. where this poſition is more fully illuſtrated.

† The State of France is much altered in this reſpect ſince Machiavel's time: the Parliaments now having very little authority in compariſon of what they had formerly.

delinquents were ſuffered to eſcape with impunity, they would ſoon encreaſe ſo faſt, that it would be impoſſible to reform the State without great danger and diſturbance, and perhaps the utter diſſolution of it.

I conclude then that nothing is more neceſſary either in a Republic, or a Religious Eſtabliſhment, or a Monarchy, than a frequent reformation of the abuſes that have crept into them, by reducing them to their firſt principles, in order to reſtore their original vigour and reputation: and this ought to be done by good laws, or the virtue of particular men (which will have the ſame effect) rather than by exterior force. For though this proves the beſt remedy ſometimes (as the Romans experienced when their City was taken by the Gauls) yet it is ſo dangerous that it is by no means to be deſired. But to ſhew how much the actions of particular men contributed to the grandeur and eſtabliſhment of the Roman Republic, and what other good effects they wrought, I ſhall confine myſelf chiefly to that ſubject in this my third and laſt book of Diſcourſes upon the firſt Decad of Livy's Hiſtory: and though ſome of the Kings indeed performed great and remarkable exploits, yet as Hiſtory has related them at large, I ſhall omit all mention of them here, except in ſuch things as they did for their own private emolument, and begin with Brutus, the Father of the Roman liberties.

CHAP. II.

That it is the part of a wiſe man to ſeem a fool upon occaſion.

NO man ever acted more wiſely, or deſerved greater praiſe than Junius Brutus when he pretended to be a fool: and though Livy aſſigns but one reaſon for his ſo doing, namely, that he might live quietly and preſerve his eſtate; yet when we thoroughly

roughly consider his manner of proceeding, it seems probable that he put on that disguise that he might be taken less notice of, and deliver his Country from the yoke of Kings, whenever a convenient opportunity of expelling them should present itself. That this was his intention may appear in the first place, from the interpretation he put upon the Oracle of Apollo, when he fell down, as it were by accident, and kissed the ground, out of a persuasion that the Gods approved of his designs *: and in the next, from his pulling the dagger out of Lucretia's body after she had killed herself, and obliging her father, husband, and many others of her relations and friends who were assembled upon that occasion, to take an oath that they would no longer suffer any King to reign in Rome.

This example may serve to warn those that are discontented under the government of a Prince, to consider their own strength; and if they find they are able to cope with him, it is the safest and most honourable way to declare themselves his enemies,

* Delphos ad maxime inclytum in terris oraculum mittere statuit; neque responsa fortium ulli ali committere ausus, duos filios in Græciam misit. Titus & Aruns profecti: comes his additus L. Junius Brutus, Tarquiniâ sorore regis natus; juvenis longe alius ingenio quam cujus simulationem induerat. Is quum primores civitatis, in quibus fratrem suum, ab avunculo interfectum audisset; neque in animo suo quicquam regi timendum, neque in fortunâ concupiscendum relinquere statuit: contemptu tutus esse, ubi in jure parum præsidii esset. Ergo ex industriâ factus ad imitationem stultitiæ, quum se suaque prædæ esse regi sineret, Bruti quoque haud abnuit cognomen; ut sub ejus obtentu cognominis, liberator ille populi Romani animus, latens aperiretur tempore suo. Is tum ab Tarquiniis ductus Delphos, ludibrium verius quam comes, aureum baculum inclusum corneo cavato ad id baculo tulisse donum Apollini dicitur, per ambages effigiem ingenii sui. Quo postquam ventum est, perfectis patris mandatis, cupido incessit animos juvenum sciscitandi: "ad quem eorum regnum Romanum esset venturum:" ex infimo specu vocem redditam ferunt, "Imperium summum Romæ habebit, qui vestrûm primus, o juvenes, osculum matri tulerit." Tarquinii, ut Sextus, qui Romæ relictus fuerat, ignarus responsi, experseque imperii esset, rem summâ ope taceri jubent: ipsi inter se, uter prior quum Romam rediisset, matri osculum daret, sorte permittunt. Brutus aliò ratus spectare Pythicam vocem, velut si prolapsus cecidisset, terram osculo contigit; scilicet quod ea communis mater omnium mortalium esset. Liv. lib. I. cap. lvi.

and

and to make open war upon him: but if they are too weak for that, they muſt court his favour, and endeavour by all means to ingratiate themſelves with him, eſpecially by an obſequious attention to his will, and ſeeming to be delighted at every thing that pleaſes him: by which conduct they may not only live ſecure from all danger, but partake in the good fortune of their Prince, and procure an opportunity of accompliſhing their private deſigns. Some indeed are of opinion that ſuch men ought neither to live ſo near a Prince, as to be buried in his ruin, if he ſhould fall; nor ſo far off as not to be able to advantage themſelves by it. And this certainly would be the beſt courſe if it could be followed, but as I think that is hardly poſſible *, it ſeems neceſſary to have recourſe to one or other of the two juſt mentioned, and either to alienate one's ſelf totally from him, or endeavour to ſecure his favour: for whoever does otherwiſe, eſpecially if he be a man of any eminence, muſt live in continual danger. It is not ſufficient to ſay, "I expect nothing, I want neither honour nor preferment, I only deſire to live quietly and unmoleſted without meddling in any thing:" for ſuch declarations meet with little credit, and men of diſtinguiſhed qualities, though void of ambition, cannot live in obſcurity and repoſe, be they ever ſo deſirous of it; becauſe no body believes them to be in earneſt: ſo that although they ſhould really chuſe retirement themſelves, other people will not let them continue in it. It is neceſſary therefore ſometimes to act the fool, as Brutus did †: and that is ſufficiently done by flat-

* And yet Lepidus did ſo, as Tacitus tells us, Annal. IV. c. xx. "Hunc ego Lepidum, (ſays he) temporibus illis, gravem & ſapientem virum fuiſſe comperio. Nam pleraque ab ſævis adulationibus aliorum in melius flexit: neque tamen temperamenti egebat, cum æquabili auctoritate & gratiâ apud Tiberium viguerit. Unde dubitare cogor, fato & ſorte naſcendi, ut cætera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offenſio in illos; an ſit aliquid in noſtris conſiliis, liceatque inter abruptam contumatiam, & deforme obſequium, pergere iter ambitione ac periculis vacuum."—

† We find David doing the ſame, long before Brutus, at the court of Achiſh: when "he changed his behaviour and feigned himſelf

tering,

tering, and fawning, and doing, and saying every thing that can gratify a Prince, how disagreeable soever it may be to a man's own private judgment and inclination. But since we have given due honour to the wisdom of Brutus, in making use of such means to recover the Liberty of his Country; let us now say something of the severe measures he took to preserve it.

CHAP. III.

That in order to preserve Liberty when newly recovered, it is necessary to put such men as the Sons of Brutus to death.

THE rigour with which Brutus proceeded in maintaining the Liberties of Rome after he had recovered them, was absolutely requisite; though it was a very rare, if not an unparelleled action for a Father to sit in judgment upon his own Sons, and not only condemn them to death, but be present at their execution *. Those however that are conservant in ancient History, well know that in any change of Government, either from Liberty to Slavery, or from Slavery to Liberty, it is necessary that some of those that are enemies to the ruling establishment should be punished in an examplary manner: for whoever converts a free State into a Tyranny, and does not cut off such men as Brutus; or a tyrannical Government into a Free State, and does not rid himself of such men

mad, and scrabbled on the doors of the gates, and let the spittle fall down upon his beard." 1 Sam. xxi. 13.

Incipiens esto cum tempus postulat aut res,
Stultitiam simulare loco prudentia summa est,

are therefore no bad maxims.

* Consules in sedem processêre suam, missique Lictores ad sumendum supplicium nudatos virgis cædunt, securique feriunt: cum inter omne tempus pater, vultusque, & os ejus, spectaculo esset, eminente animo patrio inter publicæ pœnæ ministerium, Liv. lib. II. cap. 5.

as

as his Sons, will not be able to ſupport himſelf long. But ſince this matter has already been largely diſcuſſed in another place, I refer to what is there ſaid upon it *, and ſhall add only one example which happened lately, and in our own Country.

Pietro Soderini having reſtored the liberties of Florence, was of opinion, that by patience and clemency he ſhould be able to mollify the minds of ſome, who, like the Sons of Brutus, were impatient under the new Government †. But in this he found himſelf miſtaken, and was ſo much the more to be blamed, as he was a very wiſe man, and not only ſaw the neceſſity of proceeding with rigour, but that the behaviour and ambition of thoſe that oppoſed him, would furniſh him with a ſufficient handle to cut them off; and yet he could never prevail upon himſelf to do it: for beſides the hope which he entertained of extinguiſhing their malevolence by his lenity, moderation, and generoſity, he thought (as he often declared to his acquaintance) that in order to depreſs his adverſaries effectually, he ſhould be obliged to aſſume an extraordinary degree of authority, which would be a breach not only of the laws, but of that civil equality which he himſelf had ſo ſtrenuouſly endeavoured to reeſtabliſh; and that though he ſhould not make an ill uſe of it, it would yet alarm the people in ſuch a manner, that after he was dead they would never make another Gonfalonier for life; which he thought was abſolutely neceſſary. Now though theſe conſiderations were wiſe and good in themſelves, yet it is not proper at any time to let an evil grow too predominant, in hopes of doing good in the end, eſpecially when it will probably fruſtrate your intention. He ought rather to have perſuaſed himſelf, that if he lived and maintained his ground, he ſhould be able to convince the world, that what he had done was for the ſake of the Public, and not out of private ambition

* See the Prince, chap. v. vii. viii. & paſſim. See alſo chap. vii. of this book, and book I. chap. xvi.

† Compare this with chap. xxxiii. book I. of theſe Diſcourſes.

or

or ſelf-intereſt; and to have made ſuch proviſions, that no ſucceeding Gonfalonier ſhould have it in his power to do evil by the ſame meaſures which he had taken to do good. But he was miſtaken in his account, and forgot that ſuch enmities are neither to be extinguiſhed by time, nor appeaſed by generoſity: an error that was attended with the loſs of his authority, reputation, and the liberties of his Country; all which might have been prevented, if he had followed the example of Brutus. Now if it is no eaſy matter to preſerve a free Government, it is no leſs difficult to maintain one that is abſolute, as I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV.

That a Prince can never be ſafe in a State, whilſt thoſe are alive whom he has deprived of it.

THE death of Tarquinius Priſcus by the Sons of Ancus, and that of Servius Tullus by Tarquinius Superbus, may ſerve to ſhew how dangerous a thing it is to deprive a Prince of his State, and ſuffer him to live, though you heap ever ſo many favours upon him. Tarquinius Priſcus thinking his right to the Kingdom indiſputable, as it was given him by the people, and confirmed by the Senate, ſimply imagined that the Sons of Ancus could not be diſſatisfied with him, ſince he had been choſen by the general voice of the Romans to reign over them: and Servius Tullus found himſelf deceived, after he had endeavoured to ſooth the reſentment of Tarquin's Sons by all manner of favours. From the firſt example therefore, a Prince may learn that he can never be ſafe upon his throne, whilſt thoſe are alive whom he has diſpoſſeſſed of it, and from the ſecond, that a former injury is never to be called by any ſubſequent obligations; eſpecially if the obligation is not equivalent to the injury.

Without

Without doubt it was very weak in Servius Tullus, to imagine that the Sons of Tarquin would be contented with being his Sons-in-law, when they ought to have been his Sovereigns: for ſo general is the thirſt of dominion in mankind, that it is not only common to thoſe that have a right to rule, but to thoſe that have none; as we may ſee in the inſtance of Tullia, daughter to Servius and wife to Tarquinius Superbus; who was ſo enflamed with this paſſion, that not contented with being a King's daughter, ſhe longed to be a Queen, and laying aſide all filial tenderneſs and affection, incited her huſband to murder her father, and uſurp his Kingdom. But if Tarquinius Priſcus and Servilius Tullus had taken care to ſecure themſelves againſt thoſe whom they had ſupplanted, neither of them would have loſt either his life or his Kingdom. Tarquinius Superbus indeed was afterwards expelled, becauſe he could not keep within the bounds obſerved by his predeceſſors, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter.

CHAP. V.

How a King may loſe his Kingdom though it be hereditary.

SErvius Tullus dying without heirs, Tarquinius Superbus, who had ſlain him, took poſſeſſion of his Kingdom, without encountering any of thoſe difficulties or dangers which his predeceſſors had to ſtruggle with: and though the manner by which he obtained it was baſe and ſcandalous, yet if he had kept himſelf within the ſame bounds that the former Kings had done, and not provoked the people and the Senate, his deportment would have been borne with, and he might have ſupported himſelf in the government. The reaſon of his expulſion then, was not that his Son Sextus had raviſhed Lucretia, but becauſe he had violated the laws of the Kingdom, and governed like a Tyrant; having wholly deprived the Senate of their

their authority, which he took upon himſelf, and cauſed all public buſineſs, which uſed to be tranſacted openly and in their preſence, to be carried on privately in his Palace, to the great diſguſt and diſſatisfaction of his ſubjects: ſo that he ſoon deprived the Romans of the liberty they had enjoyed under their former Kings. Nor was he content with making the Senate his enemies, but likewiſe excited the hatred of the common people, by confining them too ſeverely to hard labour contrary to what they had been accuſtomed to in the days of his predeceſſors. The Romans therefore, thus groaning under his pride and cruelty, were ſufficiently diſpoſed to rebel as ſoon as they had a convenient opportunity; and though the rape of Lucretia had never happened, any other freſh inſtance of oppreſſion would have produced the ſame effect. But if Tarquin had acted like the other Kings, and ſhewn due reverence to the laws of his country, Brutus and Collatinus would have applied directly to him, and not to the people, for juſtice upon his Son. From hence Princes may learn this leſſon, that whenever they begin to trangreſs the laws, and deſpiſe the cuſtoms which their ſubjects have been long uſed to, that moment they likewiſe begin to loſe their power and authority: and if ever they ſhould become ſo wiſe when reduced to a private ſtation, as to perceive how eaſy a matter it is for a prudent and good Prince to maintain himſelf in his State, ſuch a diſcovery muſt ſtill add to the bitterneſs of their loſs, and be a more exquiſite puniſhment than could otherwiſe be inflicted upon them; for it moſt certainly is a matter of much leſs difficulty to gain the affections of good men, than of bad, and ſafer to obſerve laws than to trample upon them.

Whoever then would learn to do this, needs not be at any great pains about it, as he has nothing elſe to do but to look into the lives of good Princes, ſuch as Timoleon the Corinthian, Aratus the Sicyonian, and ſome others; where he will find that both the Governors and the governed lived in ſuch mutual ſatiſ-

satisfaction and security, that he cannot help being desirous to imitate their conduct, especially when he sees how little difficulty there is in it: for when people live under a good Prince, they neither wish for nor would suffer any change of government; as may appear from the example of the Corinthians and Sicyonians with regard to the two great men above-mentioned, whom they obliged to reign over them as long as they lived, though they often attempted to lay down their authority, and retire to a private condition. Now since in this and the two preceding Chapters we have taken some notice of the disaffection and hatred which bad Princes excite in their Subjects, of the conspiracy in which the Sons of Brutus engaged against their country, and of the murder of Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullus, it may not be amiss to discourse more largely of Conspiracies in the next Chapter, as it is a Subject that deserves to be well considered both by Princes and private men.

CHAP. VI.

Of Conspiracies.

SINCE Conspiracies are of such dangerous consequence both to Princes and private persons, I thought it necessary to say something of their nature and tendency in this place, especially as many more Princes have lost both their dominions and their lives by them, than by open war; for few people are able to make war; but it is in every one's power to form a conspiracy. On the other hand, a private man cannot engage in any enterprize that is subject to more difficulties and dangers; which is the reason that very few conspiracies have succeeded. That Princes therefore may learn how to guard against these dangers, and private persons be cautious of embarking in them, I shall enlarge upon this Subject, and

and omit no circumſtance that may ſeem neceſſary for the inſtruction either of the one or the other.

The maxim which Tacitus puts into the mouth of a Roman Senator is indeed a golden one, viz. "That he admired the times that were paſt, but conformed to the preſent; and though he could not help wiſhing for good Princes, he would bear with thoſe that were bad *:" and they that do otherwiſe often ruin both themſelves and their country. If we conſider then in the firſt place, againſt whom men generally form Conſpiracies, we ſhall find that it is either againſt their Prince or their country: and to theſe two ſorts I ſhall confine myſelf at preſent, becauſe I have ſaid enough elſewhere concerning thoſe that relate to delivering up a town to an enemy, and others of that kind †. Let us begin then with thoſe that are formed againſt a Prince, and enquire into their cauſes which are many and various: but there is one more frequent and of greater importance than any of the reſt, and that is the general diſaffection of the people. For when a Prince has excited ſuch hatred againſt him, it is no wonder that ſome of them, who have been the moſt grievouſly injured and oppreſſed, ſhould meditate revenge: and to this they will be the more effectually animated by the univerſal diſcontent which they obſerve amongſt their Fellow-ſubjects ‡.

A Prince therefore ought above all things to take care not to incur the general hatred of his people, (and how he is to do that I have ſhewn in another place) § for then he will have the leſs to apprehend from being guilty of any particular act of oppreſſion or violence: in the firſt place, becauſe few men carry their reſentment ſo high, as to run any great riſque to revenge themſelves; and in the next, if they were ſo diſpoſed, and had an opportunity of doing it, they would be reſtrained by the general affection which

* See the Prince, chap. iii. note 12.
† See book II. chap. xxxii. of theſe Diſcourſes.
‡ See the Prince, chap. xix.
§ See the Prince, chap. xv. xvi. xvii. xix. xx. & alibi paſſim.

they ſaw the reſt of the people bore to their Prince. As to the violence which Princes commit upon their Subjects, it affects either their property, their life, or their honour: in matters of blood it is much more dangerous to threaten, than to put to death; for in one caſe, a Prince expoſes himſelf to a thouſand perils; but in the other, he runs little or no riſque at all; for when a man is once dead, he can no longer think of revenge, and thoſe that are alive will ſoon forget him: whereas a man that is threatened, and finds that he muſt either kill or be killed, is the moſt dangerous enemy a Prince can have, as I ſhall ſhew more particularly hereafter. Next to a man's life, his honour and eſtate lie neareſt his heart, and nothing affects him ſo much as an attack on either of them: upon which account, it behoves Princes to be very careful not to aggrieve their Subjects in theſe points: for it is neither poſſible to ſtrip any one ſo bare that he cannot find a knife to revenge himſelf; nor to diſhonour and debaſe him to ſuch a degree, as totally to extinguiſh every ſpark of courage and reſentment in his breaſt. In regard to honour, no outrage or affront touches a man ſo ſenſibly as thoſe that are offered to his wife, daughter, or other female relation; and next to this we may reckon the contempt of his own perſon: the latter of which provoked Pauſanias to aſſaſſinate Philip of Macedon, and the former has frequently proved fatal to ſeveral Princes; even in our own times Julio Belanti conſpired againſt Pandolpho, Lord of Siena, who, though he had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her away from him, as we ſhall relate in another place. The chief reaſon that induced the Pazzi to conſpire againſt the Medici at Florence, was the loſs of Giovanni Borromei's inheritance, which he was deprived of by the award of the Medici *. There is alſo another motive, and a very powerful one too, which often engages men to conſpire againſt their Prince, and

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, Book viii. at the beginning.

that

that is the desire of delivering their country. This it was that spirited up Brutus and Cassius to plunge their daggers into the heart of Julius Cæsar, and occasioned the conspiracies against Phalaris, Dionysius, and many others who had enslaved their country: and indeed it is not possible for Tyrants to skreen themselves from such dangers, any other way than by abdication. But as they very rarely can be prevailed upon to consent to this, they generally come to miserable ends: hence the Poet truly says,

Ad generum Cereris sine cæde & sanguine pauci
Descendunt Reges, & siccâ morte Tyranni.
Juv. Sat. x. v. 112.

To Pluto's dreary realms most Tyrants go,
Besmear'd with blood, and full of wounds and woe.

The dangers which occur in Conspiracies are so many and various (as I said before) that there is great hazard not only in conducting and executing them, but even after the execution; because many persons must be privy to them: for where one man only is concerned, it cannot so properly be called a conspiracy, as a design to kill his Prince: in which case he is free from the first danger that attends all Conspiracies; that is, he cannot be betrayed before the time of execution, because he has not trusted any one with the secret. Such a resolution as this may be formed by any person whatsoever, high or low, rich or poor, an intimate or a stranger; for every man has an opportunity one time or other, of coming near his Prince; and he that can do that may easily take his revenge, if he has been injured. Pausanias (of whom we have had occasion to speak before) killed Philip of Macedon as he was going to the Temple in the midst of his guards, with his Son on his right hand, and his Son-in-law on the left. But as he was a Nobleman, and familiar with his Prince, we shall quote two other examples of meaner quality: the first is a poor miserable Spaniard, who stabbed Ferdinand

King of Spain in the throat; and though the wound was not mortal, yet it ſhewed that he had both reſolution and opportunity ſufficient to have killed him. The next is a Turkiſh Dervis, who drew a dagger upon Bajazet, father of the preſent Sultan, with which he ſtruck at him, but miſſed his blow. From theſe inſtances, and many others of the ſame kind, which it would be tedious to enumerate, we may conclude that there are many perſons who wiſh to take the ſame revenge upon Princes that have injured them, (as there is no danger in wiſhing) though few have courage to attempt it: for ſince ſcarce any one that ventures to ſtrike ſuch a blow, eſcapes being cut to pieces upon the ſpot, it deters people from embarking in an undertaking wherein they are almoſt ſure to periſh. So much for the reſolution and attempts of a ſingle perſon: let us now proceed to Conſpiracies, in which more are concerned.

We find in Hiſtory that Conſpiracies are always formed and conducted either by great men, or ſuch as are intimate with their Prince: no other men can think of conſpiring, except they be fools; becauſe private perſons, and ſuch as have not the opportunity of frequent acceſs to him, muſt want all thoſe means and conveniencies that are neceſſary for the execution of ſuch deſigns. In the firſt place, they cannot meet with aſſociates that will be faithful to them, as they have nothing to give them, nor is it in their power to buoy them up with ſuch hopes and promiſes as generally make men willing to expoſe themſelves to great dangers, when it is well known they are not able to fulfil them: ſo that when the ſecret is communicated to three or four perſons, ſome one of them betrays the reſt, and they are all ruined. But, ſuppoſing they ſhould not be betrayed; yet they muſt have ſo many obſtacles and impediments to encounter when they come to the point of execution (not having free acceſs to their Prince) that it is not poſſible they ſhould ſucceed: for, if great men, and ſuch as meet with a ready admiſſion into his preſence, find many

ſuch

ſuch difficulties (as we ſhall mention hereafter) it may reaſonably be expected, that thoſe of meaner condition muſt find infinitely more and greater. Such men therefore, when they are not abſolutely reduced to deſpair by the certainty of loſing either their lives or their eſtates, may be outrageouſly provoked at their Prince, but conſidering they are too weak to revenge themſelves, they generally vent their rage in libels and curſes, and leave it to men who have greater abilities and fairer opportunities to avenge their cauſe: for if any one is hardy enough to attempt it himſelf, without waiting for ſuch aſſiſtance, it may truly be ſaid of him, that his courage is greater than his prudence.

All Conſpiracies therefore have been formed by great men and favourites of Princes; of whom, as many have been encouraged to it by being too much careſſed, as have been provoked to it by ſuffering the ſevereſt injuries, which we might ſhew at large from the ingratitude of Perennius to Commodus, Plautianus to Severus, and Sejanus to Tiberius, who had all been advanced to ſuch honours, authority, and riches, by their reſpective maſters, that they wanted nothing but the title of Emperor: and as they aſpired to that alſo, they engaged in conſpiracies againſt their Princes, and all met with the fate they juſtly deſerved. That indeed, which was formed not long ago by Giacopo Appiano againſt Pietro Gambacorti, Lord of Piſa, was more ſucceſsful; for, though Appiano had been brought up, careſſed, and preferred to great eminence by him, he depoſed his benefactor, and ſeized upon the Government. Another attempt of this kind happened in our own times, when Coppola conſpired againſt Ferdinand, King of Arragon, who had heaped ſo many favours upon him, and exalted him to ſuch a degree of power, that he ſeemed to be King himſelf in every thing but the name, but not content with that, he loſt his life by graſping at the crown. Now if ſucceſs may reaſonably be expected in any plot that is carried on by

great men againſt Princes, that ſurely is moſt likely to ſucceed, which is conducted by thoſe whoſe authority is almoſt equal to that of the Prince himſelf, and who have all the opportunities and conveniencies they can wiſh for: but that eagerneſs to become Sovereigns which induces them to form ſuch projects, blinds them when they come to put them in execution: for, if they could conduct them with prudence and coolneſs, it would be impoſſible they ſhould miſcarry.

A Prince therefore, who would preſerve himſelf from ſuch dangers, ſhould be more upon his guard againſt thoſe whom he has honoured with the greateſt favours and authority, than thoſe whom he has moſt cruelly oppreſſed; the former have many opportunities of hurting him, but the latter can have few or none; and their motives are equal, ſince the deſire of reigning is at leaſt as ſtrong as that of revenge. He ought never to give ſuch a degree of power to any favourite, as to put him on a level with himſelf, but to leave an interval, as it were, and ſomething more to be wiſhed for; leſt, if he ſhould not be content with what he had, he ſhould aſpire immediately to the crown; this caution being neglected, he muſt be greatly befriended by fortune, if he does not meet with the ſame fate which the Princes did whom we have juſt now mentioned. But to reſume the order of our diſcourſe.—As thoſe that engage in Conſpiracies muſt be great men, and have free acceſs to their Prince, I ſhall ſay ſomething of the execution of ſuch undertakings, and the cauſes or circumſtances that contribute either to their ſucceſs or miſcarriage. And ſince they are always attended with great danger, both before, and after, as well as at the time of executing, (as I have already ſaid) very few of them ſucceed; it being almoſt impoſſible that ſomething ſhould not happen, in one or other of theſe three periods, that muſt render them abortive.—To begin with the firſt and moſt important. The Conſpirators muſt be very fortunate as well as

artful, if their design is not discovered whilst it is carrying on: as it easily may be, either by the information of some, or the suspicion and conjectures of others. Now such discoveries are owing either to the want of fidelity or caution in the accomplices; the former of which may easily be accounted for, as such designs are never communicated but to those you either have so much confidence in, that you think they will cheerfully run the risque of their lives on your account, or are disaffected to their Prince: and though such a degree of fidelity may be found perhaps in one or two persons, yet when the secret comes to be imparted to numbers, it is impossible they should all prove true to you; for great indeed must be their affection, if the prospect of danger, and the fear of death are not more powerful. Besides men are often deceived in the friendship which they think others have for them; for they cannot be sure of it, except they have sufficiently tried them before; and experiments of this kind would certainly be very hazardous: and though you may have had some proofs of their fidelity in other things of trust and importance, you are not upon that account to depend upon their fidelity in these matters, because they are attended with infinitely more danger and terror. But if you build your hopes upon their disaffection to their Prince; in this likewise you are liable to be fatally mistaken: for as soon as you have opened your designs to such people, you give them an opportunity of obtaining his favour; and then surely their discontent must either be very great, or your influence over them exceeding powerful, if they continue any longer steddy to you. Hence it is, that so many conspiracies have been discovered and nipped in the very bud; and that, when any one has been kept private a considerable time, it has been looked upon as next to a miracle; especially where many were concerned in it; as there were in that of Piso against Nero, and lately in that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Guiliano de' Medici at Florence;

to which, above fifty perſons were privy, and yet it was not diſcovered till it came to be put in execution.

It likewiſe happens, that conſpiracies are ſometimes diſcovered from want of proper caution and diſcretion in the Conſpirators; that is, when any of them either chances to talk of their deſigns with ſo little reſerve, that they are overheard by a ſervant or ſome other perſon; as it happened to the ſons of Brutus, whoſe negotiations with Tarquin's Ambaſſadors were brought to light in that manner; or when they lightly diſcloſe them to ſome careleſs perſon whom they love; as Dymnus did, who having joined in a conſpiracy with Philotas againſt Alexander the Great, inadvertently blabbed it out to Nicomachus, a boy he was fond of, who preſently carried it to Cebalinus his brother, and Cebalinus to the King.

As to diſcoveries that ariſe from ſuſpicions and conjectures, we have an inſtance in the Piſonian conſpiracy againſt Nero: for Scevinus, one of the Conſpirators, having made his will the day before Nero was to have been diſpatched, ordered Melichius his freedman to whet an old ruſty dagger, made all his ſlaves free, diſtributed ſums of money amongſt them, and cauſed ſeveral bandages and pledgets for wounds to be got in readineſs: from all which preparations, Melichius ſuſpecting that ſomething extraordinary was in hand, went and informed Nero of it, who cauſed Scevinus to be immediately apprehended, and then ſecured Natales, another of the Conſpirators, with whom he had been ſeen talking in private for a long time the day before: and as they did not agree, when examined, in the account which they gave of that converſation, they were forced at laſt to diſcover the whole, by which all thoſe that had any ſhare in it were utterly ruined. It is impoſſible therefore to prevent diſcoveries being occaſioned, either by want of fidelity, prudence, or caution, whenever the accomplices exceed the number of three or four: and if more than one of theſe ſhould be taken up on ſuſpicion,

ſuſpicion, and examined, the whole muſt come out, ſince they cannot poſſibly agree in the ſame ſtory: one man indeed, if he is a perſon of great reſolution, may perhaps conceal his aſſociates; but if they have not as much courage as himſelf, they will be apt to betray themſelves by flying: for if there ſhould be a deficiency of ſteadineſs and reſolution either in him that is taken up, or in them that are at liberty, the conſpiracy muſt infallibly be diſcovered. There is indeed a very rare and uncommon example of fidelity in thoſe that conſpired againſt Hieronymus, King of Syracuſe: for though, according to Livy, one of them, named Theodorus, was apprehended, and put to the torture, he reſolutely concealed the names of his accomplices, and accuſed ſome of the King's friends; whilſt the other Conſpirators had ſuch confidence in the courage and conſtancy of Theodorus, that not ſo much as one of them either fled out of the City, or betrayed the leaſt ſign of fear.—Such are the difficulties that occur in forming a conſpiracy and conducting it to execution; but as there are dangers, there are alſo ſome ways of guarding againſt them.

The firſt, the ſafeſt, and perhaps, the only one, is not to give your accomplices time to diſcover you; for which purpoſe, they ſhould not be made privy to your deſign till it is upon the very point of execution. Thoſe that obſerve this rule will at leaſt eſcape the dangers that may happen whilſt the plot is carrying on, and very often all others, for we may venture to affirm, that all the conſpiracies that have been thus conducted, have ſucceeded; and that it is in any wiſe man's power to act in the ſame manner. Let two or three examples ſuffice. Nelematus not being able to bear with the tyranny of Ariſtotimus, King of Epirus, aſſembled ſeveral relations and friends in his own houſe, and exhorting them to deliver their country, ſome of them deſired time to conſider of it, and make neceſſary preparations for ſuch an undertaking: upon which, he ordered his ſervants to lock the doors,

and

and proteſted that if they would not take an oath to proceed directly to execution, he would deliver them all up priſoners to Ariſtotimus: being terrified with theſe menaces, they all took the oath, and following him, immediately fell upon the Tyrant, and happily recovered their liberties by the conduct of Nelematus. The next is of one of the Magi, who had got poſſeſſion of the Kingdom of Perſia by artifice; but the cheat being diſcovered by Ortanus, a Nobleman of that Kingdom, he privately conferred with ſix other great men, and conjured them to aſſiſt him to kill the Uſurper, and ſet their country free: ſome of them however ſeeming rather ſcrupulous about the matter, and deſiring further time to conſider of it, Darius (one of the ſix whom he had called together) got up and ſaid, "Either reſolve to do it inſtantly, or I will inform againſt you all;" which had ſuch an effect upon them, that without any further delay or heſitation, they unanimouſly determined to concur with him, and ſucceeded in the enterprize. The method which the Etolians took to rid themſelves of Nabis, the Tyrant of Sparta, was not unlike the two examples juſt quoted: for they ſent Alexamenes, one of their Citizens, with thirty horſe and two hundred foot, as auxiliaries; but communicated the ſecret to Alexamenes alone, whoſe commands they ordered all the reſt to obey on penalty of perpetual exile. Alexamenes accordingly marched to Sparta; and not communicating his commiſſion to any one till he had an opportunity of executing it, ſoon found means to diſpatch the Tyrant. In this manner all the perſons abovementioned eſcaped the dangers that uſually occur, in bringing conſpiracies to maturity; and others may likewiſe ſucceed by the ſame precaution, which is in every one's power, as I ſhall ſhew from the example of Piſo, whom I have mentioned before. Piſo was a man of great diſtinction, and in ſuch confidence with Nero, that the latter went frequently to ſup with him in his gardens; he therefore, might eaſily introduce ſome of his friends whilſt Nero was there,

there, and ſuch only as he knew to be men of reſolution, and fit for an undertaking of that kind: after which, he might have communicated to them his deſign of aſſaſſinating the Emperor immediately, and prevailed upon them to aſſiſt in the affair, when they had not time to demur, and the opportunity was ſo fair, that it was impoſſible it ſhould miſcarry. And if we conſider other conſpiracies, we ſhall find that there have not been many which might not have been ſucceſsfully conducted in ſome ſuch a manner; but as few men are ſufficiently converſant either in Hiſtory, or the affairs of the world, they often are guilty of great errors; eſpecially in undertakings of ſo extraordinary a nature as thoſe we are ſpeaking of.

A plot then ſhould never be communicated till it becomes abſolutely neceſſary, and is ripe for execution; and in that caſe, it ſhould be communicated to one man only, who has either ſufficiently convinced you of his fidelity by many repeated trials, or has had as much provocation to conſpire as yourſelf; for it is an eaſier matter to find one man that will be faithful to you than a number, and conſequently there muſt be leſs danger of being diſcovered. Beſides, if he ſhould betray you, you will even in that caſe have a better chance to ſave yourſelf, than when more are concerned: for I have heard wiſe men ſay, that you may truſt one perſon with any ſecret, provided you give nothing under your hand, which may afterwards be produced in evidence againſt you, which ought moſt carefully to be avoided; becauſe in that caſe the poſitive denial of one man, will have as much weight as the affirmation of another: but if your own hand-writing appears againſt you, you are undone, as there can be no ſtronger teſtimony of your guilt. Plautianus having formed a deſign to kill the Emperor Severus and his Son Antoninus, communicated the affair to Saturninus, one of the Tribunes; who, inſtead of concurring with him, reſolved to diſcover it to the Emperor: but as he was afraid that when he came to make good his charge, Plautianus would

would meet with more credit than himſelf, he deſired to have the particulars of the matter in writing to conſider of; that ſo there might be no doubt concerning the truth of his information. Plautianus therefore, blinded by ambition, raſhly gave him the particulars he demanded in his own hand writing, which afterwards ſerved to convict him*: whereas, without that proof and ſome other circumſtances to confirm it, he would have baffled the Tribune, as he boldly and poſitively aſſerted his innocence: from whence it appears that there is ſome ſecurity againſt the accuſation of one perſon only, when a man cannot be convicted by his own writing, or ſome other ſtrong and circumſtantial proofs, which he ought to guard againſt with particular care. In the Piſonian conſpiracy a woman was concerned whoſe name was Epicharis, and who had been one of Nero's miſtreſſes. This woman finding it neceſſary to draw a certain Captain of Nero's guards into the plot, acquainted him with the affair, but concealed the names of the conſpirators: ſo that although the Captain betrayed her, and informed Nero of the deſign, ſhe denied it with ſuch firmneſs that the Emperor was confounded, and ſhe eſcaped with impunity. Whoever then imparts a ſecret of this kind to one man only, and that too by word of mouth, has but two things to fear: the firſt is, that he may voluntarily inform againſt him; and the next, that he may do it when apprehended upon ſome ſuſpicion or diſcovery of his own actions, and be forced to accuſe him by torture: in both which caſes he may in ſome meaſure defend himſelf; for in one, he may inſiſt that it is owing to private malice in the informer; and in the other, he may alledge that the accuſation is falſe and extorted by the extremity of pain. It is beſt however either not to truſt any one at all with ſuch a deſign, till it is ready for execution, and to imitate the example of thoſe whom we have mentioned above; or, if it

* In this manner Catiline likewiſe was convicted.

ſhould

ſhould become neceſſary to communicate your intentions ſooner, not to admit of more than one accomplice; for if there be ſome danger even in this, there is certainly much more in having many. Such is the conduct generally obſerved by thoſe who find that if they do not kill their Prince he will certainly kill them; in which caſe, the neceſſity is ſo urgent that they have nothing to do but to provide immediately for their own ſafety: and theſe ſudden reſolutions are commonly ſucceſsful, as may appear from the two following examples.

The perſons in whom the Emperor Commodus put moſt confidence were Letus and Electus, two Captains of the Prætorian bands, and Marcia, his favourite Miſtreſs. But as they ſometimes took the liberty to repreſent to him how much he debaſed both himſelf and his authority by his ſcandalous courſe of life, he reſolved to put them to death; in conſequence of which, he wrote down their names, and thoſe of ſome others whom he deſigned to have diſpatched the enſuing night, upon a piece of paper, which he laid under his pillow; but going out of his apartment to bathe, a boy whom he was fond of happening to be left behind, who finding the paper, carried it into another room, where he was met by Marcia, who took it out of his hand and read it. Upon which, ſhe immediately ſent for Letus and Electus, and acquainting them with the danger they were in, they murdered the emperor that very evening. The next inſtance relates to Antoninus Caracalla; who being in Meſopotamia with his army, had appointed Macrinus his Lieutenant, a man more converſant in civil intrigues than military affairs. And as the Emperor, like all bad Princes, was conſcious of his own demerits, and ſuſpected that ſome conſpiracy was forming againſt him, he wrote to his friend Maternianus at Rome, deſiring him to conſult the Aſtrologers upon this ſubject, and to let him know their anſwer. In anſwer to which, Maternianus ſent him word that he had obeyed his orders, and that the Aſtrologers

ſaid

ſaid Macrinus aſpired to the Empire: but as the letter fell into the hands of Macrinus inſtead of the Emperor, and the Lieutenant perceiving he muſt either kill his Maſter, before he could receive any other letters from Rome, or be killed himſelf, ordered Martialis, a Centurion who was firmly attached to his intereſts, (and whoſe brother Caracalla had put to death but a few days before) to diſpatch him; which he accordingly did without any difficulty or oppoſition. We ſee then, that when the neceſſity is ſo preſſing that it allows no time for deliberation, it has the ſame effect with the method taken by Nelematus to diſpatch the Tyrant of Epirus: we likewiſe ſee the truth of what I laid down in the beginning of this diſcourſe, viz. that threats are more prejudicial to Princes, and occaſion more dangerous conſpiracies, than the actual commiſſion of violence: upon which account, a Prince ought ſtudiouſly to avoid making uſe of them; and either to careſs thoſe whom he ſuſpects, and make them his friends by kind and beneficent meaſures; or to ſecure himſelf againſt them ſome other way; but never to reduce them to ſuch a deſperate ſituation, that they muſt either kill him or be killed themſelves.

As to the dangers which attend the execution of a plot, they ariſe either from ſome ſudden change in the plan and order of it, or from want of courage in thoſe that are to ſtrike the finiſhing ſtroke, or from ſome blunder, or laſtly, from doing things by halves, and leaving ſome of thoſe alive, who were marked out for ſlaughter. With regard to the firſt, there is nothing that occaſions ſo much confuſion and perplexity in any buſineſs as an unforeſeen change in the firſt eſtabliſhed plan; and if theſe ſudden alterations are prejudicial in all caſes, they muſt be particularly ſo in military operations, and in ſuch enterprizes as we are now ſpeaking of: for in affairs of this nature, nothing is more neceſſary than that every man ſhould know the part he is to act, that he may thoroughly prepare himſelf for it: becauſe when men have once duly

duly conſidered theſe matters with themſelves and dwelt upon them ſome time, and determined to proceed, they muſt of neceſſity be embarraſſed to ſuch a degree by any variation of orders at the moment of execution, that every thing will be turned upſide down, and all their deſigns entirely defeated. It is therefore much better to proceed according to the plan firſt eſtabliſhed, though it may be attended with ſome inconveniencies, than to run into more and greater embarraſſments by reverſing it, which muſt be the caſe when the neceſſity is urgent, and the time for action near at hand; but when there is ſufficient opportunity to alter your meaſures, and lay a new ſcheme, you may change them as you think proper. The Conſpiracy in which the Pazzi engaged againſt Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici at Florence, is freſh in every one's memory. According to the firſt deſign they were to be invited to dine with the Cardinal of St. George, and there to be aſſaſſinated. In this plot, every man had his particular part aſſigned him; ſome were appointed to kill them, ſome to ſeize upon the Palace, and others to ſcour the ſtreets, and excite the people to take up arms for the recovery of their liberties. But whilſt the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were attending a ſolemn ſervice in the Cathedral, the Conſpirators received intelligence that Giuliano could not dine with the Cardinal at the time appointed: upon which, they aſſembled together and reſolved to murder them in the Church. But this entirely diſconcerted their plan; for Giovanni Battiſta da Monteſecco, who was to have been one of the perſons that were to ſtab the Medici, peremptorily refuſed to do it in the Church: ſo that they were forced to employ others, who not having time to compoſe themſelves ſufficiently for ſuch an action, were guilty of ſo many blunders, that they all periſhed in the attempt.

Want of courage at the time of executing proceeds either from reverence to the perſon that is to be diſpatched, or baſeneſs and puſillanimity in the Conſpirators:

rators: for the preſence and Majeſty of ſome Princes inſpire the beholders with a ſort of reverential awe and veneration, which either damp the reſolution or mollify the reſentment of their enemies. When Marius was taken by the Minturnians, a Slave was ſent to put him to death in priſon: but when the wretch came to execute his commiſſion, he was ſo ſtruck with the preſence of ſo great a man, and the remembrance of his actions, that his heart failed him, and he had not the courage to kill him. Now if the preſence of a man in priſon, in diſtreſs and miſery, had ſuch an effect; that of a Prince attended by his Courtiers and all the pomp of Royalty, muſt certainly ſtrike an awe into the boldeſt and ſoften the hardeſt heart. A conſpiracy being formed againſt Sitalcis King of Thrace, a day was fixed for putting it in execution: but when the accomplices met at the place where he then reſided, not one of them offering to move, they all returned without making any attempt, blaming each other, without being able to aſſign any reaſon for not having executed their deſign. The ſame thing happened to them ſeveral times afterwards: ſo that the Conſpiracy being diſcovered, they were all put to death, after they had had ſo many opportunities of killing their Prince. Alphonſo Duke of Ferrara had two brothers who conſpired againſt him, and were joined by one Giannes, a Prieſt and ſinging man in the Duke's Chapel: and though this man had often at their requeſt brought the Duke into their Company, and given them an opportunity of aſſaſſinating him, yet neither of them having the heart to attempt it, they were diſcovered, and puniſhed as they juſtly deſerved. Now this irreſolution in conſpirators ariſes either from the reverence with which the preſence of a Prince inſpires them, or from his courteſy and affability which takes off the edge of their revenge. But the blunders and miſcarriages which often happen in the execution of conſpiracies are owing either to raſhneſs or terror, both which blind the underſtanding and occaſion ſuch a hurry and trepidation of Spirit, that they make men

both

both ſay and do things which they ought not. Livy, ſpeaking of Alexamenes the Etolian, who delivered his country from the Tyranny of Nabis the Spartan, ſays, that when he had opened his deſign to his Soldiers, and was juſt going to put it in execution, "collegit & ipſe animum, confuſum tantæ cogitatione rei; he collected his Spirits together, which had been in ſome meaſure diſconcerted, by reflecting upon the execution of ſo great a deſign:" and indeed it is almoſt impoſſible that any one, though ever ſo reſolute and accuſtomed to bloodſhed, ſhould be altogether calm and unmoved upon ſuch occaſions It is neceſſary therefore in undertakings of this kind to make uſe of men that have been ſufficiently hardened and tried, and to truſt no others, how courageous ſoever they may be accounted: for no man can anſwer even for his own reſolution, if he has not thoroughly proved it before; for the confuſion he muſt naturally be in at ſuch a time may either make him drop the dagger out of his hand, or ſay ſomething which may have the ſame effect. Lucilla, Siſter to Commodus, having ſpirited up Quintianus to kill her brother, he waited for him as he came to the Amphitheatre, and ſtepping up towards him with a drawn dagger in his hand, told him "the Senate had ſent him that:" upon which, he was immediately ſeized before he could get near enough to ſtab him. Antonio da Volterra being fixed upon to kill Lorenzo de' Medici, cried out, as he advanced towards him, (Hah Traitor!) which proved the preſervation of Lorenzo, and the ruin of the conſpiracy.

If then the event of conſpiracies is very precarious when they are directed againſt one man only, it muſt of neceſſity be much more ſo when they are directed againſt two; indeed in ſuch a caſe it would be folly to entertain the leaſt expectation of ſucceſs: for to execute ſuch an enterprize in two different places at the ſame time is next to impoſſible: and if it is attempted at different times, one will defeat the other; ſo that conſpiring againſt one Prince is a doubtful,

dangerous, and imprudent undertaking; but to conſpire againſt two at the ſame time, muſt either be downright folly or madneſs; and was it not out of the great opinion I have of the Author, I could not believe what Herodian ſays of Plautianus, when he tells us that he ordered one ſingle Centurion, whoſe name was Saturninus, to aſſaſſinate both Severus and Antoninus, though they lived in different places: for it ſeems ſo ſtrange and ſo inconſiſtent with reaſon and common ſenſe, that nothing but the authority of ſo noble an Hiſtorian could ever perſuade me to give any credit to it. In a conſpiracy that was formed by ſome young Athenians againſt the two Tyrants Diocles and Hippias, the former was killed, but the latter eſcaped and revenged his death. Chiones and Leonides, two of Plato's diſciples, conſpired againſt Clearchus and Satirus, Tyrants of Heraclea, and diſpatched Clearchus, but Satirus ſaved himſelf, and puniſhed the Conſpirators; and the Pazzi, whom we have ſo often mentioned, killed Giuliano de' Medici only. A man therefore ought carefully to avoid engaging in a conſpiracy againſt more than one perſon at the ſame time; otherwiſe he will neither do himſelf, nor his friends, nor his country, any ſervice, but probably much prejudice, as thoſe that eſcape will afterwards become more tyrannical and inſupportable, which was the conſequence of the abovementioned conpiracies at Florence, Athens, and Heraclea. The ſucceſs indeed of that conſpiracy in which Pelopidas engaged to ſet the Thebans free, was wonderful, becauſe he had all manner of difficulties and dangers to encounter; and yet he ſurmounted them all: for inſtead of two Tyrants, he had ten to deal with; he was ſo far from being a favourite, or having free acceſs to them, that he was in baniſhment: nevertheleſs he found means not only to get admiſſion into Thebes, but to kill the Tyrants, and reſtore the liberties of his country: but this could not have been effected without the aſſiſtance and co-operation of Charon, one of the Tyrant's Counſellors, who let him into the City, and furniſhed

furniſhed him with an opportunity of executing his deſigns. It would be very dangerous however for any man to build upon the ſucceſs of this conſpiracy; which indeed was almoſt miraculous, and is mentioned by all writers that ſpeak of it, as not only a rare, but almoſt unexampled event.

Conſpiracies are likewiſe ſometimes defeated when they are juſt upon the point of execution, by ſome groundleſs ſuſpicion, or unexpected accident. The very morning that Brutus and the other Conſpirators were to aſſaſſinate Julius Cæſar, it happened that the latter had a long converſation with Popilius Lenas, one of their accomplices; which being obſerved by the reſt, they ſuſpected he had diſcovered their deſign to Cæſar: upon which, they determined not to wait till Cæſar came into the Senate, but to kill him immediately: and they would actually have done it, if they had not diſcovered that they had no reaſon for ſuch a ſuſpicion, by obſerving that there was no alteration in his countenance after the converſation was ended. Such ſuſpicions then ought to be well weighed and conſidered; eſpecially as they are very common: for when a man who knows himſelf guilty ſees people talking together, he naturally imagines they are talking of him; and ſometimes a word or two overheard by chance (though ſpoken with a very different intention) throws him into an alarm, as he thinks they allude to his affair: the uſual conſequence of which is, that he either diſcovers it by running away, or defeats it by too precipitate an execution; eſpecially if he has many accomplices.

As to accidents, they are ſo various, and often ſo ſudden and unexpected, that no certain rule can be laid down how to prevent them. Let it ſuffice then to give an inſtance of one only, and to warn men to guard againſt them as well as they can. Julio Belanti of Siena (whom we have mentioned before) was ſo provoked at Pandolpho, who had firſt given him his daughter in marriage, and then taken her away from him, that he reſolved to murder him: and as

Pandolpho went every day by his door to ſee one of his relations that was ſick, the other, having got a parcel of armed men at his own houſe for that purpoſe, placed one of them to watch at a window and give him notice when Pandolpho came by. But it happened when Pandolpho drew near the houſe, and the man had given Julio notice of it, that he met an acquaintance who ſtopped him; and his attendants going forwards, and hearing a great buſtle and noiſe of arms in the houſe, diſcovered the deſign; ſo that Pandolpho eſcaped, and Julio and his accomplices were forced to fly their country: all which was owing to the accidental meeting of Pandolpho and his friend. But as accidents are ſudden and unexpected, as well as various, no particular remedy can be preſcribed: all that a man can do, is to conſider what is moſt likely to happen, and to make the beſt proviſion againſt it that lies in his power.

It now remains to ſay ſomething of what is to be apprehended after a Conſpiracy has actually been carried into execution: and in that caſe there is little or nothing to be feared, except ſome are left alive that may revenge the death of the Prince who has been killed; as his brothers, ſons, or others who have a right to ſucceed him in the Government. Now this is generally owing either to want of proper care in the Conſpirators, or to ſome of the reaſons which we have already given: as it happened in the Caſe of Giovanni Lampognano and his accomplices; who having killed the Duke of Milan, left his Son and two brothers alive, who afterwards revenged his death *: and indeed there is ſomething to be ſaid in favour of Conſpirators in ſuch caſes; as it is not always in their power to prevent it; but when it proceeds from their own imprudence or want of due care, they have no excuſe. Some of the inhabitants of Forli having murdered their Prince Count Girolamo, ſeized his Counteſs Catharina and two of his children; but not

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, book vii. towards the end.

thinking

thinking themſelves ſecure, except they could get poſſeſſion of the Caſtle, which the Governor refuſed to deliver up, the Counteſs told them, that if they would let her go to him, ſhe would make him ſurrender immediately; and that ſhe would leave her children with them as hoſtages for the performance of her promiſe: upon which, they ſuffered her to go. But as ſoon as ſhe was in the Caſtle, ſhe got upon the walls, and not only reproached them moſt bitterly with the murder of her huſband, but threatened to take the ſevereſt revenge that lay in her power: and to convince them that ſhe was not to be reſtrained from it by any affection to her children, ſhe ſo far forgot the modeſty of her Sex, that ſhe pulled up her cloaths, and told them ſhe was ſtill young enough to have more: ſo that the Conſpirators perceiving their error when it was too late, and not knowing what other courſe to take, were forced to leave their country and ſpend the reſt of their lives in exile *. But of all the dangers that may happen after the execution of a plot, that which is moſt to be dreaded and moſt difficult to avoid, is, when the Prince that is killed was much beloved by his Subjects; for then it is impoſſible for the Conſpirators to ſave themſelves: as may appear from the death of Julius Cæſar, which was ſoon revenged by the Roman people, becauſe they adored his memory; for the Conſpirators being driven out of the City and ſcattered about the world, ſome of them periſhed in one manner, and ſome in another.

Conſpiracies againſt a Republican Government are not attended with ſo much danger to the accomplices as thoſe againſt Princes: for in conducting them the riſque is not ſo great, and in executing them it is but equal, and after that there is none at all. In conducting them the danger is not ſo great, becauſe any ſubject may aſpire to the Government, and lay his ſchemes without communicating them to any one:

* See the ſame Hiſtory, towards the end of book viii.

after which, if they are not fruſtrated by ſome new law, he muſt neceſſarily ſucceed; and if they are, he has nothing to do but to wait for another opportunity and to take different meaſures. This however is to be underſtood only of a Republic that is become in ſome degree corrupt: for in one that is not ſo, there can be no hopes of ſucceſs in ſuch deſigns, as there is nothing either to occaſion or encourage them; and therefore no individual will harbour any thoughts of that kind. But in thoſe that are corrupt, there are many ways and means by which a Subject may aſpire to Sovereignty without expoſing himſelf to any great danger: for in the firſt place, all Republics are not only more tardy and phlegmatic in their operations than Princes, but likewiſe more free from ſuſpicion, and conſequently not ſo much upon their guard; and in the next, they ſhew more tenderneſs and reſpect to their great men, which makes them bolder and more enterprizing. Every body that has read the Hiſtory of Catiline's conſpiracy written by Salluſt, muſt remember that Catiline not only continued in Rome after the conſpiracy was diſcovered, but came into the Senate, and inſulted both the Senators and the Conſul: and that after he had left the City and was at the head of an army, Lentulus and the reſt of the Conſpirators would not have been taken up, if the ſtrongeſt proofs of their guilt had not appeared from Letters in their own hand-writing: ſuch was the lenity with which that Commonwealth treated its Subjects. Hanno, a Citizen of very great power and authority in Carthage, deſigning to make himſelf Sovereign of it, invited the whole Senate to a great entertainment which he had made to celebrate the marriage of his daughter, with an intention to poiſon them and to ſeize upon the government; and though his deſign was diſcovered, the Senate did not think fit to inflict any puniſhment upon him; but contented themſelves with making a Law to reſtrain the expences of ſuch feaſts for the future: which ſhews what regard they had for Citizens of his diſtinction. It is true the

the execution of a Conſpiracy againſt the liberty of one's country, is attended with many great difficulties and dangers: becauſe it ſeldom happens that a perſon who conſpires againſt ſuch numbers of people, has ſtrength enough to inſure ſucceſs; for it is not every one that has an army at command, as Julius Cæſar, Agathocles, Cleomenes, and ſome others had; by the aſſiſtance of which, they preſently enſlaved their country, without either difficulty or danger. But others who have no army to ſupport them, and yet aſpire to Sovereignty, muſt either have recourſe to artifice, or call in foreign aſſiſtance: of the former caſe we have an inſtance in the conduct of Piſiſtratus the Athenian, who having made himſelf very popular by the victory which he had gained over the Megarians, appeared in public one day all over blood, and pretended that he had been wounded and otherwiſe abuſed by ſome of the Nobility, out of the envy they bore him; upon which account, he deſired a guard might be allowed him for the ſecurity of his perſon: which being granted, he availed himſelf of it in ſuch a manner, that he ſoon became abſolute. Pandolpho Petrucci, at his return to Siena with ſome others who had been baniſhed from thence, was made Captain of the palace-guards, a poſt which was thought to be of ſo little conſequence that ſeveral had refuſed it: nevertheleſs, he acquired ſuch a degree of authority and reputation in a ſhort time, by the command which he had over thoſe guards, that at laſt he ſeized upon the Government. Many others likewiſe, by ſuch arts, have ſucceeded in the ſame manner, without expoſing themſelves to much danger. But thoſe who have endeavoured to overturn the conſtitution of the country, either by dint of their own ſtrength, or calling in foreign aſſiſtance, have ſucceeded accordingly as they were befriended by fortune. Catiline periſhed in the attempt: Hanno, having failed in his deſign to poiſon the Senate, armed ſeveral thouſands of his partizans, but they were all killed together with their Chief. Some of the principal Citizens

of Thebes who had conſpired againſt their Country, called in a Spartan army to their aid, and made themſelves Tyrants over it: ſo that if we examine the event of all the Conſpiracies which men have engaged in againſt their Country, we ſhall find that few or none have been cruſhed whilſt they were forming; but that the ſucceſs or miſcarriage of them all has wholly depended upon the execution; which being once over, the Conſpirators are ſubject to no other dangers than thoſe that are naturally incident to a tyrannical government: againſt which, there are no other means to ſecure one's ſelf but thoſe which have been already mentioned.

This is all that I have to ſay of Conſpiracies: and if I have ſpoken of thoſe only that are executed by the ſword, without taking any notice of ſuch as are attempted by poiſon, it is becauſe they are both conducted in the ſame manner, and have the ſame event. It is true indeed, that poiſoning is attended with more danger, and is more uncertain than the other; becauſe very few people have an opportunity of doing it, and therefore they muſt employ others that have, which makes it very hazardous. Beſides, the doſe may not prove mortal, as it happened in the attempt upon Commodus, who throwing the poiſon up which the Conſpirators had given him, they were forced to ſtrangle him. There is nothing therefore which Princes ought to dread ſo much as Conſpiracies; ſince they generally loſe either their life or their reputation by them: for if a Conſpiracy ſucceeds, they are killed; but if they diſcover it, and put the Conſpirators to death, it is often looked upon as a trick of ſtate, and a contrivance in the Prince to gratify either his avarice or his cruelty with the blood or eſtates of his Subjects. I cannot conclude this diſcourſe, however, without adviſing all Princes and Republics, upon the diſcovery of a Conſpiracy carefully to examine into the nature of it, and to compare the ſtrength of the Conſpirators with their own, before they proceed to puniſh them; and if they find them

them many and powerful, not to take any notice of the matter, till they are ſufficiently able to cruſh them: otherwiſe, they muſt inevitably be ruined themſelves. They ſhould therefore have recourſe to diſſimulation upon ſuch occaſions; leſt the Conſpirators, when they find themſelves diſcovered, ſhould grow deſperate and proceed directly to execution. The Romans having left two legions at Capua to defend it againſt the Samnites, the Commanders of thoſe forces formed a deſign to make themſelves maſters of that place *, which being diſcovered by the Romans, they ordered Rutilius, one of the Conſuls, to take proper care to prevent it. The Conſul therefore, in order to lull them into ſecurity, gave out that the Senate intended to keep them there a conſiderable time: which report being credited, they thought they had no occaſion to be over haſty in the execution of their deſign, but might wait till they had a proper opportunity; ſo that they continued quiet till they perceived the Conſul was going to ſeparate them: upon which, they began to ſuſpect his intention, and finding they had no more time to loſe, they immediately ſeized upon the Government. An example very ſuitable to our purpoſe: for, on one hand, we ſee hereby how tardy men are in ſuch affairs whilſt they think themſelves ſecure, and have time enough to put them in execution: and on the other, how active and vigorous when the neceſſity is urgent. Nor can either a Prince or a Republic that is deſirous to conceal their knowledge of a Conſpiracy, act more prudently, than in artfully giving the Conſpirators reaſon to expect they ſhall have a fair opportunity of executing their deſigns at ſome certain time afterwards; that ſo, whilſt they are waiting for it, he may have leiſure to provide for his ſafety; and thoſe that have acted otherwiſe, have only haſtened their own ruin, like the Duke of Athens and Gulielmo de' Pazzi. For the Duke having ſeized upon the Government of Florence, and being inform-

* See book ii. chap. xx. of theſe Diſcourſes.

ed

ed that a Conſpiracy was hatching againſt him, immediately cauſed one of the Conſpirators to be apprehended, without making any enquiry into the nature of it: upon which, the reſt preſently took arms, and drove him out of the City *. Much like this was the conduct off Gulielmo de' Pazzi, who being Commiſſary for the Florentines in the Vale of Chiana, about the year 1501, and hearing that ſome perſons of Arezzo were conſpiring in favour of the Vitelli, to take that town from the Florentines, he went thither himſelf in all haſte, and inſtead of conſidering the ſtrength of the Conſpirators, and comparing it with his own, or taking other proper meaſures to ſuppreſs them, he followed the advice of his ſon, who was Biſhop of that place, and ordered one of them to be taken up; which ſo alarmed the others, that they inſtantly roſe upon him, and not only made him priſoner, but intirely ſhook off the yoke of the Florentines. But when Conſpiracies are weak and in their infancy, they may, and ought to be ſuppreſſed as ſoon as poſſible: for it would be ſimple in that caſe to follow the examples either of the Duke of Athens, or Dion of Syracuſe, though indeed they acted very different parts upon ſuch an occaſion: for the former cauſed one of the Citizens of Florence to be put to death, who had acquainted him with a Conſpiracy that was carrying on againſt him; to ſhew that he had more confidence in the affection of the Florentines than to believe any ſuch thing: and the latter, in order to diſcover ſome perſons whom he ſuſpected of conſpiring againſt him, gave Calippus, one of his confidants, a commiſſion to join him, under a pretence of ſecret diſaffection and diſguſt. But both theſe artifices proved of fatal conſequence to thoſe that made uſe of them: for the one not only deterred people from diſcovering any Conſpiracy, but encouraged them to conſpire, and the other made Dion the occaſion of a conſpiracy againſt himſelf, which ended

* See the Hiſtory of Florence, book ii.

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in his ruin; for Calippus perceiving he might act with ſecurity under that commiſſion, availed himſelf of it in ſuch a manner, that he killed his maſter, and made himſelf King of Syracuſe.

CHAP. VII.

How it comes to paſs that in changes of States from liberty to ſervitude, and from ſervitude to liberty, ſome are effected without violence or bloodſhed; and others are attended with both.

IT may ſeem ſtrange, perhaps, to many, that in the revolutions of States a free Government ſhould be ſometimes changed into a Tyranny, and Tyranny into a free Government, without any violence or bloodſhed; and at others, with great ſlaughter and confuſion: of which we have many inſtances in Hiſtory. Thus when the Roman conſtitution was altered from a Regal to a Conſular Government, no perſon was baniſhed or otherwiſe oppreſſed except the Tarquins. This however may eaſily be accounted for, if we conſider, that when a State has been acquired by violence, many muſt have been injured, and of conſequence will endeavour to revenge themſelves upon the authors of their ſufferings, whenever any ſuch change happens; from whence much bloodſhed and tumult muſt naturally enſue. But when a Government has been eſtabliſhed by the general conſent of the people, and they afterwards think proper to diſſolve it, they have no occaſion to diſturb or uſe violence to any one but thoſe whom they have placed at the head of it. Accordingly when the Tarquins were expelled Rome, and the Medici deprived of their authority at Florence in the year 1414, no other perſon whatſoever was injured by it. Such changes therefore are not attended with much danger: but thoſe that are effected by people who have been injured and deprived of either their power or their properties by the uſurpa-

uſurpation of their late Governors, and muſt conſequently be full of revenge, are always very terrible. Hiſtory abounds with examples of this ſort; to which I ſhall therefore refer the reader.

CHAP. VIII.

That whoever would change the form of a Government, ſhould duly conſider the manners and diſpoſition of the people.

I Have already ſhewn elſewhere, that a bad Citizen cannot do much harm in a State that is not corrupted *; a poſition, which (beſides the arguments there made uſe of to prove it) is fully confirmed by the examples of Spurius Caſſius and Manlius Capitolinus: the former of whom being an ambitious man, and endeavouring to make himſelf popular at Rome, by favouring the Plebeians in the ſale of ſome lands which the Romans had taken from the Hernici, the Senate began to penetrate into his deſigns, and alarmed the people to ſuch a degree, that after he had harangued them one day, and made them an offer of the money, for which the corn was ſold that had lately been imported from Sicily, they poſitively refuſed to accept of it, becauſe they looked upon it as the price of their liberties: whereas, if the people had been corrupt, they would not have refuſed the bribe, but have ſold their country, and made themſelves ſlaves. But the example of Manlius Capitolinus is ſtill more remarkable: from which we may ſee how ſoon the remembrance of all his excellent qualities, and the many great ſervices he had done his country, was extinguiſhed by his inordinate deſire of power, and the envy he bore to Camillus, who ſtood higher in the favour of the people: for being blinded by his am-

* See book i. of theſe Diſcourſes, chap. vii. xxxiv. lv. & alibi paſſim.

bition,

bition, and not content with a private ſtation, he endeavoured to form a party, and to raiſe tumults in Rome, in oppoſition to the Senate, and the authority of the laws; without conſidering the diſpoſition of his Fellow-citizens, and how unfit they were to receive ſuch impreſſions at that time. We may likewiſe ſee from hence, what a degree of perfection there was in the conſtitution of that Senate, and how much virtue and integrity in the individuals: for when he was accuſed, not ſo much as one of the Nobility offered to defend him, though they had always moſt ſtrenuouſly ſupported each other before, nor did any, even of his own relations, appear in his behalf: and notwithſtanding, it had always been cuſtomary for a man's friends and kinſmen to appear in mourning at thoſe times, and to ſhew all other ſigns of grief and dejectinn, in order to excite compaſſion, there was not the leaſt ſhew of any ſuch thing. Nay, the Tribunes of the people, who conſtantly uſed to favour the cauſe of thoſe whom they thought friends to the public, eſpecially if they were perſecuted by the Nobility, joined heartily with the latter in this caſe againſt one whom they looked upon as a common enemy to them both: and though the people were at all times ready enough to ſupport their own rights, and to thwart the Nobility, and had alſo a great regard for Manlius; yet when the Tribunes cited him to appear before them, and referred his cauſe to their judgment, they condemned him to die, without the leaſt conſideration of its former merits. This example is a moſt evident proof of the rigid and uncorrupted virtue which at that time was to be found in all the different ranks of people in the Roman Commonwealth: for though Manlius was a man of very eminent worth, and had done both his country and many private perſons great and ſingular ſervices, yet not ſo much as one of his Fellow-citizens appeared in his favour when he was arraigned as a Criminal: for, as the love of their country was more powerful than any other conſideration, and they were more affected by the preſent danger,

ger, than the memory of his paſt actions, they choſe rather to ſecure their liberties by putting him to death, than to expoſe them to any hazard by ſaving his life: "hunc exitum habuit vir, niſi in liberâ civitate natus eſſet, memorabilis: (ſays Livy,) ſuch was the fate of a man, who would have made himſelf illuſtrious, if he had not been born in a free State."

We may therefore obſerve, in the firſt place, that whoever affects power and authority, muſt take a very different courſe to obtain it in a corrupt State, from that which is to be followed in one that is not ſo: and in the next, that men ought to conſider the temper of the times, and conform to them in all their undertakings, but eſpecially in great deſigns: for thoſe that oppoſe the current of the times, either through indiſcretion, or natural inclination, are generally unfortunate, and meet with very different ſucceſs in their enterprizes, from what others experience who accommodate themſelves to it. If Manlius had been born in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the Romans had been long corrupt, and were become capable of receiving any impreſſion that ambition ſhould think fit to ſtamp upon them, he would certainly have ſucceeded in the ſame manner that they did, and ſome others, who afterwards aſpired to abſolute dominion: and on the contrary, if Marius and Sylla had lived in the times of Manlius, they would as certainly have been cruſhed in their very firſt attempts to overturn the liberties of their country. For one man indeed may lay the foundation of corruption, and in ſome meaſure debauch the principles and manners of his Fellow-citizens; but he ſeldom lives long enough to corrupt them all to ſuch a degree as to reap the fruit of his labours. And indeed, if he ſhould happen to live long enough for that purpoſe, it would be in a manner impoſſible for him to ſucceed in his deſigns: for ſuch is the natural impatience of mankind, eſpecially in projects which they are paſſionately bent upon, that they either cannot long forbear attempting to put them in execution, or take wrong meaſures

to

to obtain their end: ſo that either through want of patience, or judgment, they commonly proceed to execution at an improper time, and conſequently muſt be ruined.

A man therefore cannot well overturn the conſtitution of his country and make himſelf Lord over it, except he finds the people thoroughly infected by a corruption that has been introduced by degrees, and eſtabliſhed by length of time in ſuch a manner, that every thing is fallen into a ſtate of confuſion and diſorder; which muſt of neceſſity happen, if the virtue of the people is not frequently revived, either by the example of great and good men, or a reformation of abuſes by new and wholeſome laws, which may reduce the State to its firſt principles, as I have ſhewn in another place *. Manlius then would have been a great and illuſtrious man, if he had been born in a corrupt State: for whoever is deſirous either to reſtore liberty, or to ſet up an abſolute Government, ought maturely to weigh the diſpoſition and principles of the people he has to deal with; from whence he may be able to form a probable conjecture of the ſucceſs he is likely to meet with in ſuch an undertaking: becauſe it is no leſs difficult and dangerous a matter to attempt the reſtitution of liberty, when the people are diſpoſed to be ſlaves, than to endeavour to enſlave them, when they are diſpoſed to be free: and ſince I have ſaid above, that men ought always to conſider the quality of the times, and to act according to them in all their deſigns, I ſhall enlarge a little more upon that ſubject in the next Chapter.

* See chap. i. of this book.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

That in order to ſecure ſucceſs in great deſigns, a man muſt accommodate himſelf to the times.

I HAVE often had reaſon to think that the good or bad ſucceſs of moſt men's undertakings has depended chiefly upon their conforming or not conforming themſelves to the nature of the times they lived in. Some men are hot and impetuous, others cold and phlegmatic in the proſecution of their deſigns, which is the cauſe that they often miſcarry, eſpecially when they have no regard to moderation, either in one caſe or the other, but leave the middle way, and fall into extremes. That man however is moſt likely to ſucceed, whoſe temper is ſuited to the times, and who acts according to ſuch a diſpoſition *. Every one knows with what caution and circumſpection Fabius Maximus proceeded, when he commanded the Roman armies, and how different his coldneſs and delays were from the ancient ardour and intrepidity of that people: and yet his undertakings were crowned with ſucceſs, becauſe ſuch a conduct was ſuitable to the times. For Hannibal being a young ſpirited General, and elated with the reputation of two great victories, which had drained the Roman Commonwealth of its beſt ſoldiers, and thrown it into the utmoſt conſternation, it was very fortunate for them that they had, on the contrary, an old and cautious commander, whoſe warineſs and delays kept the enemy at bay, and abated the ardour of their courage: nor could Fabius have lived in any times, that would have been better adapted to his own genius and diſpoſition; ſo that every thing concurred to make him fortunate. And that this cold and tardy manner of

* Cornelius Nepos, in the Life of Alcibiades, ſays, in commendation of that great man, that amongſt the reſt of his virtues, he was "affabilis, blandus, temporibus callidiſſimè inſerviens."

acting

acting was really the effect of his natural diſpoſition, and not a matter of choice and prudent deliberation, plainly appears from his oppoſing Scipio with all his might, when that General was intent upon tranſporting an army into Africa, in order to put a ſpeedy end to the war with the Carthaginians; ſo that if his advice had not been over-ruled, Hannibal might have continued in Italy, as Fabius was ſtill for adhering to his old maxims, and the dictates of his own diſpoſition, and deſirous rather to remove preſent difficulties and dangers than to run into new ones; not perceiving that when the times and circumſtances of things were changed, it was neceſſary likewiſe to vary the manner of carrying on the war. If then, Fabius had been King of Rome at that time, it is very probable he would have been unſucceſsful in the further proſecution of the war; becauſe he neither could nor would have accommodated his meaſures to the exigency of the times: but happening to be born in a Commonwealth, where there were many great Commanders, and of different diſpoſitions and abilities; as he was thought to be the moſt proper man to protract and ſuſtain the war at one time; ſo when the circumſtances of it were changed, Scipio was pitched upon as the likelieſt to bring it to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion.

Hence it comes to paſs, that Republican Governments have more reſources in times of diſtreſs, and flouriſh longer than Monarchies: becauſe they can better accommodate themſelves to the neceſſities of different times, from the variety of Genius's which they produce, than a Prince can poſſibly do. For a Prince having been long accuſtomed to act according to one particular manner, cannot tell how to alter it when the times change, and it becomes abſolutely neceſſary to vary his meaſures. Pietro Soderini, of whom we have ſpoken before, was remarkable for his lenity and moderation in all things; and both he and his country proſpered exceedingly, whilſt ſuch a conduct was ſuitable to the times; but when it after-

wards became neceſſary to proceed with rigour and aſperity, and he could not prevail upon himſelf to do that, both he and his country were ruined by his patience and clemency. Pope Julius II. acted with violence and impetuoſity in every thing: and as the times required ſuch a conduct, he ſucceeded in all his undertakings: but if they had altered, and another ſort of conduct had become neceſſary, he muſt inevitably have been ruined, becauſe he could not have conformed himſelf to them. Now the reaſon why men cannot do this, is firſt, becauſe they cannot run counter to their own natural inclinations and deſires: and in the next, becauſe when a man has practiſed one method of acting a long while, and always ſucceeded in it, he cannot be perſuaded to try any other: from whence it comes to paſs, that we often ſee ſuch a variety of fortune in one perſon: for, if the wind changes, and he does not ſuit his ſails to it, how can he expect a good voyage *? It is the ſame with regard to Republics, which are often ruined by not altering their meaſures according to the times, as I have ſhewn at large elſewhere; but in this they are very ſlow, becauſe it is a difficult matter to change their former laws and inſtitutions, which cannot be effected except by ſome great event that ſhakes the whole conſtitution, no individual being able to bring about ſuch a revolution. Now ſince we have had occaſion to make mention of Fabius Maximus, who kept Hannibal ſo long at bay, I ſhall enquire in the next Chapter, whether or not it is poſſible for one General to prevent another from bringing him to an engagement, if he be determined to do it at any rate.

* "An cum videam navem ſecundis ventis curſum tenentem ſuum (ſays Tully, Orat. pro. Plancio. cap. xxxix.) ſi non ea eum petat portum, quem ego aliquando probavi, ſed alium non minus tutum atque tranquillum, cum tempeſtate pugnem periculoſè potius, quam illi ſalute præſertim propoſitâ, obtemperem & paream? neque enim inconſtantis puto ſententiam, tanquam aliquod navigium atque curſum, ex reipublicæ tempeſtate moderari." See alſo Epiſt. ix. lib. ii. ad familiares.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

That a General cannot avoid a battle, when the Enemy is resolved to fight him upon any terms.

"Caius Sulpitius Dictator, adversus Gallos bellum trahebat, nolens se fortunæ committere adversus hostem, quem tempus, deteriorem indies, & locus alienus facerent. Caius Sulpitius, the Dictator, in the war with the Gauls, resolved not to run any risque in engaging the enemy, when he saw that time alone, and the inconveniencies they suffered in a strange country, was daily diminishing their numbers," says Livy. As the greater part of mankind are apt to be misled by a particular error, they cannot be too often admonished, to be upon their guard against it. Upon which account, although I have already observed more than once, how much the practice of the moderns differs from that of the ancients, especially in things of the greatest importance, yet I do not think it altogether superfluous, to add something more to what I have said before upon that topic; particularly, as our military discipline at present is so different from those maxims and institutions which were in the greatest esteem with the ancients, that few or no traces of them are left. The reason of this, I take to be, that both Princes and Republics have now left the care of these things to other people, in order to avoid danger: and if at any time a Prince happens to command his forces, no great matter is to be expected from it; because he takes that command more out of pomp and ostentation, than upon any other account. Such Princes, however, are not liable to commit so many errors as Republics; because they keep the command in their own hands, and sometimes are personally in the field with their armies: whereas Republics, and especially the Italian States, not being acquainted with the na-

ture of military operations, are obliged to truſt ſolely to the conduct of others; though, at the ſame time, in order to keep up their authority, they pretend to adviſe and direct; by which manner of proceeding they muſt of courſe be led into more and greater errors than if they were preſent with their forces themſelves; ſome of which errors I have pointed out before, but ſhall here take notice of one that is of very great importance.

When any of theſe pitiful Princes or Commonwealths ſend out an army, the beſt inſtructions they think they can give their general, are not to hazard an engagement upon any account, if it be poſſible to avoid it: in which they think themſelves as wiſe as Fabius, who ſaved the Roman State by ſuch precaution; not knowing that a commiſſion of that kind can ſeldom be attended with any good conſequence, and often muſt be of great prejudice to themſelves. For they may take this for granted, that a General who is in the field cannot avoid a battle, if the enemy is determined to force him to it at all events: ſo that ſuch a Commiſſion is no better than giving him orders to fight the enemy when they pleaſe, but not when he ſees a proper opportunity himſelf. There are two ways, I know, of endeavouring to avoid an engagement in ſuch a caſe; and thoſe are, either by keeping at the diſtance of fifty or ſixty miles from the enemy, and ſending out ſcouts to give you timely notice if they ſhould offer to advance; that ſo you may retreat as faſt as you can *: or elſe, by ſhutting

* "Several very warlike nations in their wars, ſays Montaigne, book I. chap. xii. of his Eſſays, have found their chief advantage in a retreat, and done the enemy more miſchief by turning their backs to them than their faces: of which method the Turks retain ſomething to this day. Socrates (in Plato) rallies Laches, who had defined fortitude to be nothing more or leſs than ſtanding firm in the ranks to face the enemy: "What, (ſays he,) would it be cowardice to beat the enemy by giving ground?" At the ſame time he quotes that paſſage in Homer to him, where he commends Æneas for his ſkill in retreating. And as Laches, upon further conſideration, owns this was the practice of the Scythians, and in general of all Cavalry, he urges another proof from the conduct of the Lacedæmonian Infantry, (the moſt obſtinate

yourſelf

yourſelf up in ſome ſtrong town. But in either caſe, you muſt ſuſtain much damage; for in one, you muſt leave your whole country to the mercy of the enemy: and certainly a Prince of any courage or generoſity, would ſooner chuſe to venture a battle, than expoſe his Subjects in ſo cruel and ſhameful a manner. And in the other, your ruin is inevitable: for if you retire with your forces into a town, you will be blocked up there by the enemy, and reduced either to ſurrender, or to periſh by famine: ſo that, whichſoever of theſe ways you take to decline an engagement, you will find it a very bad one. It is right, indeed, to keep yourſelf cloſe intrenched in a ſtrong ſituation, as Fabius Maximus did, when you have ſo good an army, that the enemy dares not venture to attack you there; but Fabius could not ſo properly be ſaid to avoid an engagement, as to defer it till he could fight the enemy with advantage. For if Hannibal had advanced to attack him, the other, inſtead of retreating, would have fought him there: but Hannibal was too wiſe to riſque an engagement in ſuch circumſtances. So that Hannibal declined a battle as well as Fabius: but if either of them had been determined to fight at any rate, the other could not poſſibly have avoided it, except either by one or other of the methods juſt now mentioned, or by abſolutely running away.

The truth of what I have ſaid, is obvious from a thouſand examples; particularly from that of Philip

of all others in maintaining their ground) who at the battle of Platea, not being able to break into the Perſian Phalanx, thought fit to fall back; that ſo the enemy ſuppoſing them to be flying, might break and diſunite that firm body, when they were purſuing; by which means the Lacedæmonians obtained a Victory. As for the Scythians, it is ſaid of them, that when Darius ſet out upon his Expedition to ſubdue them, he ſent to reproach their King with cowardice, for always retiring before him: to which the King made anſwer, "that he did not do ſo out of fear of him, or any other man living; but that it was the cuſtom in his country, where there were neither tilled fields, nor town, nor houſe to defend, or for the enemy to make any advantage of. But that if he had ſo voracious an appetite, he might come and view their ancient place of Sepulture, and there he ſhould have his belly full." See Herodotus, lib. IV.

of Macedon, the father of Perseus, in the war wherein he was engaged with the Romans. For, when they invaded his dominions, he resolved not to come to any engagement with them, if he could help it: upon which account, he encamped with his army upon the top of a hill, where he fortified himself in such a manner, that he thought the enemy would not venture to attack him. But he was mistaken; for they not only attacked him, but drove him out of his entrenchments, and forced him to save himself by flight, which he could not have done, if the country had not been so rough, that the Romans could not pursue him. Being convinced therefore, by this trial, that he could no longer trust to the advantage of any situation in the field, and unwilling to shut himself up in a town, he resolved to take the other method, and to keep at a considerable distance from them; for which purpose, when the Romans entered one Province, he always retreated into another. But finding his affairs grow worse and worse every day, and that there was no prospect of putting an end to the war by such a manner of proceeding, and that his Subjects were harrassed and distressed to the last degree, sometimes by one army, and sometimes by the other, he took a resolution to try the fortune of a battle.

It is prudent then to decline an engagement, when you are in the same circumstances that Fabius and Sulpitius were: that is, either when you have so good an army that an enemy dares not venture to attack you in your entrenchments; or when he has not got much footing in your country, and finds great inconveniencies and difficulties in supporting his troops, in these circumstances the observation of Livy is very just, who says, "Nolens sese fortunæ committere adversus hostem, quem tempus, deteriorem indies, & locus alienus, faceret. Not to risque an engagement when time and their situation will daily weaken the enemy." But in any other case, there is no such thing as avoiding an engagement without great dishonour

honour and prejudice to yourſelf. For to fly as Philip did, is as bad as being routed; and much more diſgraceful; becauſe, in that caſe, you give no proof of your courage: and though he indeed ſaved himſelf by flight, another perſon may not have the ſame good fortune, who is not equally favoured in his retreat by the nature of the country. Every one muſt allow, that Hannibal was a very able and experienced General: and therefore, if he had found it would have been for his advantage to ſpin out the war with Scipio in Africa, he certainly would have done it; and perhaps (as he was a great Commander, and had a very good army) in the ſame method that Fabius had obſerved in Italy; but ſince he did not, we may take it for granted he had very good reaſons for acting otherwiſe. For a General who is at the head of an army, and finds he cannot keep it long together, either for want of pay or other ſupplies, muſt be mad if he does not hazard a battle, before his troops begin to diſband and dwindle away of themſelves: becauſe, if he does not, he is ſure to be ruined; but if he does, he has ſome chance to beat the enemy. Beſides, if the chance be ever ſo ſmall, a General ought always to have a particular regard to his reputation: and ſurely it is much leſs diſgraceful to be overcome in battle, after a brave reſiſtance, than to be ruined by doing nothing: upon which account, we may conclude, that Hannibal was by neceſſity forced to act as he did. On the other hand, if he had been inclined to prolong the war by avoiding an engagement, and Scipio durſt not have ventured to attack him in his ſtrong places, the latter would not have ſuffered any inconvenience from it: for he had defeated Syphax before, and had got ſuch footing in Africa, that he could have ſupported himſelf there with as little difficulty as in Italy. But this was not the caſe with Hannibal, when he had Fabius upon his hands; nor with the Gauls when they were engaged with Sulpitius. Much leſs can thoſe avoid an engagement who attempt an invaſion: for as ſoon as ever they ſet their

foot in an enemy's country, they muſt come to an action, if the enemy oppoſes them upon the confines; but if they are ſuffered to lay ſiege to any place, they will find the neceſſity of ſo doing ſtill greater: as it happened to Charles Duke of Bourbon not long ago; who was attacked and routed by the Swiſs, whilſt he lay before Morat, a town in Switzerland: and to the French army which had inveſted Novara, and was likewiſe defeated by the ſame people.

CHAP. XI.

Though a perſon who has many enemies to deal with at the ſame time, may be inferior to them all together; yet if he can ſuſtain their firſt ſhock, he commonly gets the better of them.

GREAT was the power of the Tribunes at Rome; and indeed it was neceſſary it ſhould be ſo, as I have ſaid more than once before; ſince the ambition of the Nobility could not have been ſufficiently controuled without it, and conſequently muſt have corrupted that Commonwealth much ſooner than it did. But as nothing is perfect, and every advantage is attended with ſome inconvenience which at laſt occaſions diſorders that require new laws and proviſions to remedy them: ſo the Tribunes in time grew ſo inſolent, and their authority ſo great, that not only the Nobility but the whole Commonwealth were alarmed at it; and it certainly would either have totally ſwallowed up, or greatly endangered the liberties of that State, if Appius Claudius had not hit upon an expedient to prevent it. For as there was always one or other of the Tribunes, who either had a real regard for the good of his country, or was liable to be corrupted, or prevailed upon by threats, ſome means were found to work upon him in ſuch a manner as to make him oppoſe the reſt, whenever they endeavoured to act contrary to the inclination of the Senate. Fro

this manner of proceeding, which ſerved in ſome meaſure to moderate the overgrown power of the Tribunes, and was for a long time of great ſervice to the Roman Republic, we may obſerve, that though ſeveral other States ſhould join againſt one which is not by any means ſo ſtrong as themſelves whilſt they are united; yet more is to be expected from that one State, than from all the others, however powerful. For to omit numberleſs inſtances which prove that one commander has the advantage over a number, a State thus circumſtanced will always find ways and means to diſunite ſuch a confederacy, and greatly reduce its ſtrength.

To confirm this, we have no occaſion to look back into ancient Hiſtory for examples; ſince our own times will furniſh us with ſufficient. In the year 1484, all Italy confederated againſt the Venetians; and though they were ſtripped of all their territories, and could not ſend an army into the field, yet they found means to corrupt Lewis Sforza, Duke of Milan, and detached him from the League in ſuch a manner, that they not only recovered what they had loſt, but had a good part of the Duchy of Ferrara ceded to them: ſo that notwithſtanding they had loſt all they had in the war, they were great gainers by the peace. Not many years ago all Chriſtendom ſeemed to have combined againſt France: but before the end of the war the Spaniards deſerted the Confederacy, which forced the reſt of the Allies to come to an accommodation. From hence we may ſee that when ſeveral Princes or States unite together againſt one Prince or Republic, if that Prince or Republic be ſtrong enough to ſuſtain the firſt ſhock and protract the war, he will certainly prevail againſt them at laſt. But if he is not able to do that, the danger is great indeed, as the Venetians found to their coſt in the year 1508: for if they could have held the French at bay till they had gained over ſome of the Confederates, they might have warded off the blow: but not having ſtrength enough to do that, they were

reduced

reduced to the brink of ruin. The Pope, it is evident from what happened afterwards, might eaſily have been taken off; for both he and the Spaniards were reconciled and became their friends, as ſoon as they had recovered what they had loſt before; and both of them would willingly have joined with the Venetians to defend Lombardy againſt the French, in order to prevent the latter from becoming too powerful in Italy. The Venetians then ought to have given up ſome part of their acquiſitions, to preſerve the reſt: which indeed would have been acting a very wiſe part, if it had been done before the war begun, that it might not appear to be extorted by neceſſity: for after the war was once commenced, it muſt have looked mean and pitiful, and perhaps would have done them little or no ſervice. But before that war broke out, there were few people at Venice that foreſaw the danger which hung over their heads, ſtill fewer that knew how to provide againſt it, and no body at all that was able to point out any remedy when it fell upon them. To recapitulate the contents of this Chapter, I ſay, that as the Roman Senate found means to preſerve the liberties of their country againſt the ambitious attempts of the Tribunes, chiefly from the number of thoſe Magiſtrates; ſo any Prince or State that is attacked by a Confederacy, may likewiſe be enabled to ſupport themſelves againſt it, if they have but the addreſs to diſunite the Confederates.

CHAP. XII.

A wiſe General ought to lay his own army under a neceſſity of fighting: but never to reduce an Enemy to ſuch circumſtances.

MANY glorious actions have been the effect of neceſſity, as I have ſhewn in another place *; inſomuch that ſome Philoſophers have affirmed, that

* See the Art of War, book IV. at the end.

neither

neither the tongue nor the hand (thoſe two noble organs which were given to mankind to diſtinguiſh and exalt them above all other creatures) could ever have done ſuch aſtoniſhing things, if neceſſity had not impelled them to it. Some of the moſt renowned Commanders in former times, well knowing the weight of neceſſity, and with what a degree of obſtinacy and reſolution it inſpires an army, always endeavoured to lay their Soldiers under a neceſſity of fighting: whilſt, on the contrary, they never reduced an enemy to ſuch circumſtances; but rather opened a way for their eſcape, when they became deſperate; though they uſed all means to deprive their own troops of the like opportunities. Whoever then would animate either a garriſon in a town that is beſieged to make a brave defence, or an army in the field to behave themſelves like men, muſt above all things endeavour to convince them of the neceſſity of ſo doing: and on the other hand, a wiſe Commander, before he ſits down before a town, will be able to form a pretty good judgment whether he ſhall meet with much difficulty or not in reducing the place, by conſidering the degree of neceſſity under which the beſieged lie of making an obſtinate defence: for if that is great, their reſolution will be proportionable to it; if otherwiſe, there will be ſo much the leſs difficulty in the matter. Hence it comes to paſs, that towns which have revolted are much harder to be reduced than they were to be taken at firſt: for as they had not been guilty of any offence before, they had no puniſhment to fear, and conſequently made no great difficulty of ſurrendering to a ſuperior force: but when they have rebelled, and know they deſerve to be chaſtized, they will endeavour to defend themſelves to the laſt man. Such a degree of obſtinacy is likewiſe owing to the natural hatred which ſometimes ſubſiſts betwixt neighbouring States: and this proceeds from ambition on one ſide, and jealouſy on the other; eſpecially betwixt Princes and Commonwealths; of which we have many examples in Tuſcany,

cany, where theſe mutual ſuſpicions put both parties upon their guard, and make them obſtinate in defending themſelves. So that, if we compare the towns which lie near Florence, with thoſe that are near Venice, we ſhall have no occaſion to wonder (as many do) that the Florentines have ſpent more and gained leſs in their wars than the Venetians; ſince the latter did not meet with ſo vigorous an oppoſition from the places they attacked, as the former did: becauſe thoſe that lay near Venice having been uſed to live under Princes and accuſtomed to ſervitude, were ſo far from being averſe to any change of Maſters, that it was a thing they often wiſhed for: ſo that though the States which lay near the Venetians were ſtronger and more powerful, than thoſe that bordered upon the Florentines, yet they were reduced with more eaſe than the latter, becauſe they had not been accuſtomed to liberty, and therefore did not make ſo obſtinate a defence.

When a General therefore lays ſiege to any place, he ought to make uſe of all his addreſs to convince the beſieged they are not under any neceſſity of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity: for which purpoſe, he ſhould promiſe them pardon if they have offended; that ſo they may not be reduced to deſpair by the apprehenſion of puniſhment: or if they are afraid of loſing their liberties, he ſhould aſſure them he has no deſign of infringing them, or of doing them the leaſt injury of any kind whatſoever; and that he has no further intention than to reſtrain the ambition of ſome few particular men amongſt them. Such a method of proceeding often facilitates the reduction of a town: and though theſe pretences are eaſily ſeen through by men of ſagacity and penetration, yet they generally impoſe upon the vulgar; who being deſirous of preſent eaſe and quiet, are not aware of the hook that is concealed under ſuch promiſes, and conſequently are often gulled either out of their lives or liberties that way: as it happened to the Florentines not long ago, and to Craſſus and his army

army of old. For though that General was convinced himſelf there was no confidence to be put in the Parthians, and that they made him fair promiſes, only to ſooth his Soldiers in ſuch a manner that they might not think themſelves in deſperate circumſtances, and under a neceſſity of being ſtrictly upon their guard; yet his men were ſo blinded with the offers of peace, that not being able to make them ſee the danger they were in, both he and his army were cut off.—The Samnites, at the inſtigation of ſome few of their countrymen, who had more ambition than the reſt, made an incurſion into the territories of a State in alliance with the Romans, and plundered all the country in contempt of the treaties that ſubſiſted betwixt them: but repenting of what they had done, they afterwards ſent Ambaſſadors not only to aſk pardon of the Romans, but to aſſure them they would likewiſe make ample reſtitution, and deliver up the Authors of thoſe hoſtilities into their hands. This ſubmiſſion however, being rejected at Rome, and the Ambaſſadors returning without any hopes of pardon, Claudius Pontius their General, in order to animate his men to behave valiantly, repreſented to them in an harangue, that ſince the Romans would accept of no ſatisfaction, but were determined to make war upon them, though they had offered to accommodate matters in an amicable manner, they were under an abſolute neceſſity of taking up arms for their own defence; "Juſtum eſt bellum (ſaid he) quibus neceſſarium; & pia arma quibus nulla niſi in armis ſpes eſt: a war is always juſt when neceſſary; and it is a man's duty to take up arms when there is no other way left to preſerve himſelf;" upon which neceſſity alone he founded his hopes of victory. But that we may have no occaſion to ſay any thing more upon this ſubject, I ſhall here add ſome other examples from the Roman Hiſtory which ſeem worthy of notice. In a war with the Veientes, Caius Manilius being at the head of the Roman army, which lay encamped not far from the enemy; the latter found means to force

force ſome part of his entrenchments: upon which, Manilius haſted with a body of troops to ſuccour his camp, and ſhut up all the avenues to it in ſo effectual a manner that he thought it impoſſible for the enemy to make their eſcape. But the Veientes ſeeing they were thus encloſed on every ſide, exerted themſelves with ſuch fury that they killed Manilius, and would have deſtroyed his whole army, if one of the Tribunes had not wiſely opened them a way for their retreat. Hence we ſee that whilſt the Veientes were under a neceſſity of fighting, they fought deſperately: but as ſoon as they had an opportunity of retreating, they choſe rather to do that than fight any longer. The Volſci and Æqui having invaded the Roman territories, two Conſuls were ſent at the head of two different armies to oppoſe them; and ſurpriſing the enemy in their camp, they encloſed them in ſuch a manner, that Vettius Mettius their General, finding they muſt either fight their way through, or all be cut to pieces, bravely called out to his Soldiers, "Ite mecum, non murus, non vallum; armati armatis obſtant; virtute pares, quæ ultimum ac maximum telum eſt, neceſſitate ſuperiores eſtis: follow me, there is neither wall, nor rampart in the way; you have arms in your hands, as well as they; your courage is equal; and in point of neceſſity, which is the ſharpeſt and beſt weapon, you are ſuperior:" in which paſſage, it is remarkable that Livy calls Neceſſity "the ſharpeſt and beſt weapon."—Camillus, the wiſeſt General Rome ever had, having entered Veii by Storm, commanded his Soldiers with a loud voice to ſpare every man that laid down his arms: and this he did to facilitate the total reduction of that town, which otherwiſe, perhaps, might have been a matter of great difficulty, if he had laid the garriſon under a neceſſity of defending themſelves to the laſt extremity. But as they were encouraged by theſe orders to lay down their arms, the town was taken without much bloodſhed; and many other Generals

Generals have ſince made uſe of the ſame expedient *.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether a good General and a bad army, or a good army and a bad General, are moſt to be depended upon.

WHEN Coriolanus was baniſhed, he retired to the Volſci; and having raiſed an army amongſt them, marched back to Rome at the head of it, in order to revenge himſelf upon his Fellow-citizens: but being prevailed upon by the tears and entreaties of his Mother, rather than any conſideration of the Roman arms, he deſiſted from the enterprize. From this event, ſay Livy, it plainly appeared that the Romans were more indebted to the excellency of their Generals than the valour of their Soldiers, for the aggrandizement of their Commonwealth: for though they had always beat the Volſci before; yet they were not able to cope with them, after they had got Coriolanus at the head of their forces.

Now though Livy ſeems to be of this opinion, yet we ſee from many other paſſages in his Hiſtory, that the bravery of the Soldiers alone often did very great things, and that they ſometimes ſtood more firm, and fought with greater reſolution after their General was killed than they had done before: as it happened in the army which the Romans had in Spain under the command of the two Scipio's, in which, the Soldiers behaved ſo well after the death of thoſe Generals, that they not only defended themſelves, but ſubdued the enemy, and maintained poſſeſſion of the whole Province for the Romans. So that

* See a further diſcuſſion of this matter, book i. chap. xlvii. of Montaigne's Eſſays: and book vii. of the Art of War. There is much good ſenſe without doubt in the old ſaying, make a golden bridge for a flying enemy. See alſo book ii. chap. xvii. of theſe Diſcourſes.

upon

upon enquiry, we ſhall find ſome inſtances in which the valour of the Soldiers alone gained a victory; and others, wherein the conduct of the Commander only had the ſame effect: from whence we may conclude, that if either one or the other of them is able to effect great things ſingly, nothing can ſtand before them when united.

But if it ſhould be aſked, whether a good army with a bad General, or a good General with a bad army is moſt to be dreaded; it may be anſwered, that in Cæſar's opinion, no great account is to be made either of one or the other. For when he marched into Spain againſt Afranius and Petreius, who were at the head of a good army, he ſeemed to deſpiſe the enemy, "quia ibat ad exercitum ſine duce, becauſe he was going to fight an army without a General," hinting at the weakneſs of thoſe two Commanders. On the contrary, when he led his forces into Theſſaly againſt Pompey, he ſaid, "Vado ad ducem ſine exercitu, I am now going to fight a General without an army" It may likewiſe be demanded, whether it is eaſier for a good General to make a good army; or for a good army to make a good General? But this queſtion I think is preſently anſwered: for certainly many able Soldiers in an army may ſooner diſcipline and inſtruct one man how to do his duty, than one man can form, diſcipline, and model a whole army. When Lucullus was ſent againſt Mithridates, he was totally unacquainted with military affairs: but as he had a very good army and many excellent officers under him, they ſoon made him an able General. The Romans not having free men enow to recruit their armies, were forced to arm a number of Slaves, and gave the command of them to Sempronius Gracchus, who diſciplined them in ſuch a manner, that in a very ſhort time they became good Soldiers. Pelopidas and Epaminondas (as I have ſhewn elſewhere) having delivered their countrymen the Thebans from the yoke of Sparta, ſoon made ſuch Soldiers of the very peaſants, that they not only

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ſupported a war againſt the Spartans, but totally ſubdued them at laſt *: from which we ſee there are examples on both ſides, and that it is either in the power of a good army to make a good General, or of a good General to make a good army. The beſt army in the world however will be apt to grow inſolent and mutinous, if it has not an able General to curb and reſtrain the licentiouſneſs of the Soldiers; as the Macedonian troops did after the death of Alexander the Great, and the Roman Veterans in the time of their civil wars. So that I think a good General who has time to arm and diſcipline a body of new raiſed men in a proper manner, is much more to be depended upon than an inſolent army, even of Veterans, which has made a ſudden and tumultuary choice of ſome officer to command it. Thoſe Generals therefore are certainly worthy of the higheſt praiſe and admiration who have not only gained victories but have been previouſly obliged to form and diſcipline their troops before they led them on to battle. For this is a taſk that is doubly arduous, and requires ſuch rare abilities that if it had fallen to the lot of many who have made a great figure in the world, perhaps they would not have been ſo much admired and extolled.

CHAP. XIV.

That new inventions and ſudden cries ſometimes have ſtrange effects in battle.

OF what importance a ſudden rumour, or unuſual phænomenon, or chance word may be in time of battle (amongſt many other inſtances) we have a remarkable one in an engagement betwixt the Romans and the Volſci, where Quintius the Roman General obſerving one wing of his army was be-

* See book i. chap. xxi. and book i. of the Art of War.

ginning to give way, called out aloud to the Soldiers "to ſtand their ground, for the other wing had beat the enemy;" an artifice which ſo animated his own men, and ſtruck ſuch a terror into the other army, that he got the day by it. Now if ſuch things have a great effect in a well diſciplined army, certainly they muſt have a much greater in one that is ill diſciplined and apt to be thrown into diſorder by every little accident: for a proof of which, let me relate an event that happened in our own times. Not many years ago the City of Perugia was divided into two factions, the Oddi and the Baglioni; the latter of whom prevailing, the former were baniſhed. But having raiſed ſome forces and conducted them with great privacy to a place near Perugia, they were let into the town one night by ſome of their friends, and got as far as the main ſquare without being diſcovered. But as the Streets in that City were barricadoed with ſtrong chains, the Oddi had a man at the head of their forces with an iron maul to break the links of the chains, and make way for the horſe: by which means they had penetrated as far as the great ſquare, and had only one chain to break which ſecured the paſſage into it. But a ſudden alarm being raiſed when they came thither, the man who was to break that chain was ſo preſſed upon by the Soldiers behind him, that not having room to manage the maul, he called out to them, "Keep back, keep back;" which cry paſſing from one to another, thoſe in the rear began to run away, and were ſoon followed by all the reſt in ſuch confuſion that the deſign was totally defeated. From hence we may obſerve that good order and diſcipline are neceſſary in an army, not only to prevent confuſion in time of battle, but to ſecure it from being thrown into diſorder and conſternation by accidents: for undiſciplined forces, beſides their other imperfections, are particularly apt to be terrified by any ſudden rumour or unuſual noiſe. A good General therefore ought to appoint officers on purpoſe to carry his orders to every part of his army, and

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to lay a ſtrict injunction upon his Soldiers to ſhew no manner of regard, nor ſo much as to liſten to any order or report but what they have from thoſe Officers; who muſt be charged to deliver his commands word for word as they receive them from his own mouth: the want of which precaution has often occaſioned very great confuſion in an army.

As to ſtrange and ſudden appearances, a General ought to introduce ſome ſuch thing in the heat of the battle, if poſſible, to encourage his own men, and diſmay the enemy: for nothing contributes more to the gaining of a victory. An inſtance of which we have in the conduct of Sulpitius the Roman Dictator, who, when he was preparing to engage the Gauls, cauſed all the ſuttlers and ſervants that followed his camp to be armed and mounted upon the mules and other beaſts that uſed to carry the baggage, with colours and other marks of diſtinction to make them look like a large body of horſe; and having poſted them behind a hill, he ordered them to make their appearance upon a proper ſignal when the battle began to grow hot: which being executed accordingly, ſtruck ſuch a terror into the Gauls that they loſt the day*. A wiſe General therefore is to ſtudy theſe two points with attention: in the firſt place to intimidate the enemy by ſome ſuch ſtratagem as this; and in the next, to make due proviſion to diſcover and defeat any thing of the ſame kind that may be practiſed againſt him; as an Indian King ſerved Semiramis, who perceiving he had a great many Elephants in his army, cauſed a number of Camels to be loaded with the Skins of buffaloes and other beaſts, and to be covered in ſuch a manner as to look like Elephants, which She ordered to advance againſt the Enemy to fright them, if it was poſſible: but the King

* See the 4th and 5th books of the Art of War. Let any one figure to himſelf with what terror and diſmay the ſight of men fighting on horſeback, and the exploſion of great guns muſt affect the poor American Indians when they were firſt introduced amongſt them by the Spaniards.

diſcovered the trick, and not only prevented the deſigned effect, but turned it to her own prejudice. Mamercus being appointed Dictator in a war wherein the Romans were engaged with the Fidenates, they ordered a number of men to ſally out of the town with fire at the end of their lances whilſt they were fighting near the walls, in hopes that the novelty of the ſight would have made the Romans break their ranks.

With regard to ſuch ſtratagems, we may obſerve, that when they have ſomething ſolid and efficacious to ſupport them, they may be made uſe of with advantage; becauſe the futility of the whole is not ſo ſoon diſcovered: but that when they are formidable rather in appearance than reality, it is better either to let them alone, or to play them off at ſuch a diſtance that their weak ſide may not ſo eaſily be found out; as Sulpitius did with his Mulateers. For if they are weak and ineffectual at the bottom, that will preſently be perceived if you come near the enemy, and may do you more harm than good; as the ſham Elephants did to Semiramis, and the blazing lances the Fidenates; which laſt indeed cauſed ſome little diſorder in the Roman army at firſt; but the Dictator coming up and reproaching his troops with puſillanimity, aſked them if they were not aſhamed to be ſmoaked away like flies, encouraging them at the ſame time to return to the charge like men, and "burn the enemy with their own fires, ſince they could not make them their friends by generous treatment; Suis flammis delete Fidenas, quas veſtris beneficiis placare non potuiſtis:" upon which they rallied, and utterly defeated the enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

That more than one Commander in chief over an army do more harm than good.

AFTER the Fidenates had rebelled againſt the Romans, and deſtroyed a Colony which they had ſent to ſettle amongſt them, the Romans created four Tribunes with Conſular power to chaſtiſe them for their inſolence. One of theſe Tribunes was to ſtay at home to take care of the City; the other three were ſent againſt the Fidenates and Veientes: but not agreeing amongſt themſelves, they neither gained much honour in that expedition, nor did the Republic ſuffer any material loſs by it; as the miſconduct of the Generals was in ſome meaſure balanced by the valour of their Soldiers. The Romans therefore, in order to remedy the diſorders which had been occaſioned by a diverſity of Commanders, immediately created a Dictator: that ſo when the power was in the hands of one man he might act with more vigour and ſteddineſs.

Hence we may obſerve how inconvenient, and indeed how prejudicial it is to have ſeveral Commanders in chief, either in an army or a town that is beſieged: and Livy very juſtly ſays, "Tres Tribuni, poteſtate conſulari, documento fuere, quam plurium imperium bello inutile eſſet: tendendo ad ſua quiſque conſilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occaſionem locum hoſti: The conduct of theſe three Tribunes with Conſular power plainly ſhewed how imprudent a thing it is to give the command of an army to ſeveral perſons; ſince one of them took one courſe and another another, according to the diverſity of their opinions; by which they gave the enemy an advantage over them." Now though this inſtance may ſeem ſufficient to prove the truth of what I have laid down, I will add two more, one of ancient, the other

of modern date, for a further confirmation of it. In the year 1500, Lewis XII. King of France, having retaken Milan, ſent his forces to reduce Piſa and to reſtore it to the Florentines; in which enterprize they were commanded by two Florentine Commiſſaries, Giovanni Battiſta Ridolfi, and Luca degli Albizi. But as the former was a man of great reputation and much older than the other, Luca left the management of every thing entirely to him: and though he did not openly and directly oppoſe him in any of his meaſures, yet he plainly ſhewed his diſapprobation of them, ſometimes by a ſullen ſilence, and ſometimes by carping and laughing at them behind his back; ſo that he was ſo far from aſſiſting his Collegue either in Council or any other way, that he did not give himſelf the leaſt trouble or concern about the matter. But Ridolfi being ſoon after obliged to return to Florence upon ſome occaſion or other, and the ſole command devolving upon Albizi, he exerted himſelf with great ſpirit, prudence and activity, and ſhewed that he was Maſter of many extraordinary qualifications, which he had ſuffered to lie dormant whilſt the command was divided betwixt him and Ridolfi. The other inſtance is out of Livy, who ſpeaking of the Expedition in which Quintius and Agrippa commanded the Roman army againſt the Æqui, ſays that Agrippa deſired that Quintius might have the ſole management of that war committed to him, becauſe, "Saluberrimum ad adminiſtrationem magnarum rerum eſt, ſummam imperii apud unum eſſe; in the adminiſtration of great affairs, it is of the utmoſt importance to lodge the ſupreme power in one perſon only." But Princes and Republics act in a very different manner at preſent; and ſend ſeveral Generals or Commiſſaries to command one army; which often creates infinite confuſion, and has been the ruin of many French and Italian armies in our times. We may venture to conclude then, that it is much better to commit the execution of an enterprize to one man

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of common abilities, than to two of the moſt able men you can find, with equal authority *.

CHAP. XVI.

That men of eminent virtue and merit are employed in time of danger and diſtreſs: but in peaceable and proſperous times, men of the greateſt riches and alliances are preferred.

IT always was, and always will be the fate of able and virtuous men, to be neglected and laid aſide in peaceable times, eſpecially in a Commonwealth: for the reputation which they have acquired excites ſuch a degree of envy that, during the tranquility of the State, many Citizens will aſpire to be their equals if not ſuperiours in power. Thucydides tells us accordingly, that the Athenians having got the better in the Peloponeſian war, not only humbled the pride of Sparta, but kept all Greece in awe, and became ſo powerful, that they formed a deſign of making themſelves maſters of Sicily. When the matter came to be deliberated upon, Alcibiades and ſome other Citizens promoted it with all their might; not ſo much out of any regard to the public good, as to gratify their own private intereſt and ambition, hoping they ſhould be employed as Chiefs in that expedition. But Nicias, a man of the greateſt reputation in Athens, oppoſed it with no leſs vehemence: and the principal argument he made uſe of in one of his harangues to convince the people that he had the good of the public alone at heart, and no private view or intereſt of his own to ſerve, was, that by diſſuading them from ſuch an enterprize, he rather prejudiced himſelf than otherwiſe; becauſe he very well knew, that whilſt they continued in peace, many of his Fellow-citizens would be put over his head; but that if

* Ουκ αγαθη πολυκοιρανιη εις κοιρανος εστω, ſays Homer.

war ſhould break out, he ſhould then probably have the ſupreme command. It is a common foible in all Republics to neglect men of the greateſt abilities and qualifications in times of peace and ſecurity; but it is very imprudent, becauſe it is ſure to raiſe their indignation, when they not only ſee themſelves overlooked and deſpiſed, but baſe and unworthy men preferred; which has been the ruin of many Republics; for great men, who are treated in this manner, and know that it is owing to the tranquillity of the times, will naturally endeavour to embroil their country in wars, which muſt of courſe be of great prejudice to it, and perhaps may end in its deſtruction.

Conſidering therefore ſometimes, how this evil might be prevented in a Commonwealth; I think there are but two ways of doing it: one of which is, by keeping the Citizens poor, or at leaſt from growing too rich; that ſo they may not have it in their power to advance themſelves by corruption inſtead of abilities and integrity: the other is, to be always ſo prepared for war, that you may enter into one when you pleaſe; for upon ſuch occaſions great and eminent men muſt of neceſſity be employed. This was the policy of the Romans in the firſt and beſt ages of their Commonwealth; for as they conſtantly had armies in the field, they never wanted opportunities of employing their beſt Citizens; ſo that they could not well deprive them of the reward due to their merit, by giving it to others that were unworthy of it: and if ever they either happened to miſtake their man, or had a mind to try his abilities, and any misfortune or diſorder enſued, they ſoon corrected their error. But other Republics which have no ſuch proviſions, and never make war but when they are forced to it by neceſſity, cannot prevent theſe inconveniencies; and therefore muſt be ſubject to great dangers and troubles, eſpecially when the perſon who is neglected happens to be of a revengeful diſpoſition, and has great intereſt and many partizans in the Commonwealth. Nevertheleſs, though the Romans kept clear

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of this evil for a conſiderable time, yet after they had vanquiſhed Antiochus and the Carthaginians, and had no other war of any great importance upon their hands, they ſeemed to diſpoſe of their honours and the command of their armies not according to merit, but the degree of favour and popularity which any one had acquired amongſt his Fellow-citizens. Paulus Æmilius was refuſed the Conſulſhip ſeveral times, and could never obtain that honour till the commencement of the Macedonian war; for then the Citizens apprehending it would be attended with much danger, unanimouſly made choice of him to conduct it. The Republic of Florence being engaged in many wars after the year 1494, and all the Florentine Generals having behaved ill, Antonio Giacomini was fixed upon at laſt to command their troops, and ſhewed himſelf ſo able a Soldier, that whilſt there was any appearance of danger left, the reſt of the Citizens ſeemed to have laid aſide all envy and ambition; for he had not ſo much as one competitor in the election of a Commiſſary: but afterwards when the danger was blown over, and a new war broke out, the management of which was more likely to be attended with honour and ſucceſs than any ſort of difficulty or hazard, there were ſo many Candidates for the Office of Commiſſary, that notwithſtanding three were to be appointed to go upon an expedition againſt Piſa, he had not intereſt enough to be choſen one of that number. And though there can be no certain eſtimate made of the loſs our Republic ſuſtained by neglecting Giacomini, yet we may pretty well gueſs at it: for as the Piſans were very ill provided for their defence, if he had conducted the Siege, he would ſoon have reduced them to ſuch extremities, that they muſt have ſurrendered at diſcretion: but the Siege being carried on by Commanders of little experience in military affairs, the Piſans held out ſo long that the Florentines were forced to buy the place at laſt, when they might otherwiſe have had it for nothing. Giacomini then muſt certainly be highly diſ-

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guſted at ſuch treatment: and indeed a man in ſuch a caſe muſt be poſſeſſed of a great degree of patience and goodneſs, not to take revenge, if it lies in his power, either upon the whole Commonwealth or ſome particular perſon: againſt which, every Republic ſhould take ſpecial care to guard itſelf, as I ſhall ſhew in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

That a man who has been injured or diſguſted, ſhould not be truſted afterwards in any Office of authority or importance.

A Commonwealth ought to take particular care never to prefer a man to any place of truſt or authority, whom they have firſt injured to any conſiderable degree. Claudius Nero was ſent into Spain with an army againſt Aſdrubal; and though he had poſſeſſed himſelf of all the paſſes in that part of the country where the enemy lay, and ſhut them up in ſuch a manner, that they were reduced to a neceſſity either of fighting him with diſavantage, or of periſhing with hunger; yet Aſdrubal had the addreſs to amuſe him with overtures of peace, till he had an opportunity of making a ſafe retreat, and eſcaping entirely out of his hands. When this came to be known at Rome, he was exceedingly blamed for his conduct, both by the Senate and people, and ſo cenſured by the whole City, that he was not a little mortified at it. But being afterwards created Conſul, and ſent out againſt Hannibal, he divided his army, and marched with one part of it to join another body of troops which was under the command of his Collegue, in order to fight Aſdrubal before he could be reinforced by Hannibal: which was reckoned ſo dangerous a ſtep, that the Republic was in great pain and anxiety till they received intelligence that he had defeated Aſdrubal. Being aſked, after the affair was over,

over, what could induce him to take ſo deſperate a reſolution, in which he riſqued the liberties of his country as it were upon one throw, and that too without any apparent neceſſity; he ſaid he did it becauſe he knew that if he ſucceeded, he ſhould recover the reputation he had loſt in Spain; but if he miſcarried, he ſhould ſufficiently revenge himſelf upon the State and thoſe Citizens who had abuſed him in ſo ungrateful and rude a manner. Now if the reſentment that is always excited by ſuch uſage could produce theſe effects in the breaſt of a Roman, and at a time when that Republic was yet incorrupt, it may well be expected to operate more powerfully in perſons who live in a Commonwealth that is leſs virtuous, and have not ſo much regard to the good of the public as the gratification of their own paſſions. And as it is impoſſible to preſcribe any certain remedy for ſuch evils, it is conſequently impoſſible that any Commonwealth ſhould be perpetual; ſince they are all liable to a thouſand unexpected accidents which may occaſion its ruin.

CHAP. XVIII.

That nothing ſhews the abilities of a General ſo much, as to penetrate into the deſigns of the Enemy.

EPAMINONDAS the Theban uſed to ſay that nothing was more neceſſary or of greater ſervice to a general than to penetrate into the deſigns of the enemy; and ſince it is generally a difficult matter, he certainly is worthy of much praiſe who ſucceeds in it. For if the very actions of an enemy, and thoſe too which fall under our immediate notice and obſervation are often myſterious and hard to be accounted for, certainly it muſt be much more difficult to diſcover their ſecret deſigns and intentions. It has frequently happened, when an engagement has laſted till night, that the conquering army has thought itſelf defeated, and that which has had the worſt of it, has looked

looked upon itſelf as victorious; an error that ſometimes proves fatal to thoſe that fall into it; as it did to Brutus and Caſſius, who were ruined by a miſtake of this kind. For the wing which Brutus commanded having routed the forces he was engaged with, Caſſius, on the contrary, thought it had been defeated, and killed himſelf in deſpair. At the battle of St. Cecilia in Lombardy which happened not long ago betwixt the French and the Swiſs, night coming on, a body of Swiſs, which remainded entire and unbroken, thought they had got the day, not knowing that the reſt of their army was routed and diſperſed: ſo that inſtead of retreating in the dark, as they might have done, they continued upon the field of battle till the next morning; at which time they were charged again and cut to pieces. The Pope's army and that of the King of Spain had like to have been ruined alſo by this miſtake: for upon a falſe report that the Swiſs had gained a victory, they paſſed the Po, and advanced ſo far that they very narrowly eſcaped falling into the hands of the French before they were undeceived. An error of the ſame kind happened in the camps of the Romans and the Æqui: for Sempronius the Roman Conſul being ſent with an army againſt the Enemy, and forcing them to an engagement which continued till night with various ſucceſs on each ſide; when it began to grow dark, and both armies had ſuſtained conſiderable loſs in the battle, neither of them returned to their camp, but drew off to the neighbouring hills, where they thought they ſhould be more ſecure. The Roman army was divided into two parts; one of which had followed the Conſul; the other Tempanius, a Centurion, to whoſe valour and conduct it was owing that the Romans had not been entirely routed that day. But in the morning, the Conſul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards Rome; as the Æqui likewiſe did towards their own country: for each ſide thinking they had loſt the day, marched away, and left their camps to the mercy of the enemy. It happened however,

ever, that Tempanius, who was likewiſe going to retreat with the reſt of the Roman army, had intelligence from ſome of the Æqui who were wounded and afterwards taken priſoners, that their Generals had quitted the field and left the camp which they had poſſeſſed; upon which, he in the firſt place returned to the Roman camp, and having ſecured that, immediately plundered the enemy's, and returned victorious to Rome: an advantage which was gained merely by his having received information of the enemy's miſtake, before they knew any thing of that into which the Romans had fallen themſelves.

Hence we ſee it ſometimes happens that two oppoſite armies may be in the ſame error, and preſſed by the ſame neceſſity; and that that will come off with the advantage at laſt, which is firſt acquainted with the diſtreſs of the other. To confirm this, I ſhall add another example which happened not long ago in our own country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had entered the territories of Piſa with a powerful army, and laid cloſe ſiege to that City, the Venetians having taken it under their protection, and ſeeing no other method to ſave it, reſolved to make a diverſion by invading ſome other part of the Florentine dominions: for which purpoſe, they ſent a large body of forces into the vale of Lamona, and not only ſeized upon Marradi, but laid ſiege to the Fortreſs of Caſtiglione, which ſtands upon a hill above it. The Florentines being alarmed at this, determined to ſuccour the fortreſs; but in ſuch a manner as not to weaken their army before Piſa: and therefore having made new levies both of horſe and foot, they ſent them towards that place under the command of Jacopo d'Appiano, Lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio da Marciano. But upon the arrival of theſe forces near Caſtiglione, the Venetians raiſed the ſiege, and retreated into the town: ſo that the two armies lying cloſe together for ſeveral days, both ſuffered greatly for want of proviſions and other neceſſaries; and as neither of them durſt come

to

to an engagement, nor was aware of the other's diſtreſs, it happened that they both reſolved to quit their ſituation the ſame morning; the Venetians deſigning to retreat towards Berzighella and Faenza, and the Florentines towards Caſaglia and Mugello. When the morning came, and each ſide had begun to ſend away their baggage, a poor old woman who lived in Marradi, happening to come into the Florentine camp to ſee ſome relations ſhe had there, informed them that the Venetians were marching off: upon which, the Florentine Generals taking courage, immediately purſued them with all their forces, and wrote word to Florence that they had not only obliged the enemy to quit Marradi, but had actually beat them, and put an end to the war. This victory then (if it may be ſo called) was wholly owing to chance; for if the Venetians had happened to have known that the Florentines were in motion, before the latter were aware of their decamping, the conſequence would certainly have been the ſame with regard to them, and the Florentines muſt have come off with diſadvantage.

CHAP. XIX.

Whether rigour, or clemency and gentle means, have a greater effect upon the multitude.

AT a time when the Roman Republic was miſerably divided by inteſtine diſcords betwixt the Patricians and the Plebeians, yet, as they were likewiſe engaged in wars abroad, they ſent out two armies under the command of Quintius and Appius Claudius. Appius behaving with great rigour and auſterity in his cómmand, was ſo ill obeyed by his Soldiers that he was forced to quit his Province with as much diſgrace, as if he had been driven out of it by the enemy: whilſt Quintius on the contrary, being of a benign and affable diſpoſition, was ſo well ſerved by

by his troops, that he ſucceeded in all his enterprizes. Hence it appears, that the command over a multitude is much better ſupported by gentle and benevolent meaſures, than by rigorous and ſevere puniſhments. But many are of a different opinion, eſpecially Tacitus, who ſays, "in multitudine regendâ plus pœna quam obſequium valet: it is an eaſier matter to rule a multitude with a high hand, than by gentleneſs and clemency."

In order to reconcile theſe two opinions, we muſt obſerve, that the people to be governed are either in ſome meaſure your equals and Fellow-citizens, or ſuch as are abſolutely ſubject to you. In the firſt caſe, you cannot ſecurely treat them with that ſeverity which Tacitus ſeems to recommend; and therefore, as the Roman people had an equal ſhare with the Patricians in the adminiſtration of the Government, they were not to be treated in an inſolent and cruel manner, by perſons who had but a temporary command over them. Accordingly, we ſee that thoſe Roman Generals who careſſed their Soldiers, and were beloved by them, always performed greater exploits than thoſe who uſed them harſhly, and made themſelves hated and feared; except they happened to be men of very extraordinary character, like Manlius Torquatus. But whoever has the command over people that are his own ſubjects (for of ſuch Tacitus ſpeaks) muſt of neceſſity have recourſe to rigour and ſeverity, inſtead of mildneſs and humanity, in order to prevent them from rebelling and trampling upon him. This however, ought to be practiſed with due moderation, and in ſuch a manner as not to excite public hatred, which is always of great prejudice to Rulers. Now the way to avoid it, is not to make too free with the properties of your Subjects: for as to their blood, few Rulers are deſirous of ſhedding it, except it is either to poſſeſs themſelves of ſome eſtate, or upon ſome extraordinary emergency, which they are neceſſarily obliged to comply with. In the former caſe, indeed, when they are governed by avarice,

rice, as they must naturally be tempted to take away the lives of their Subjects, so they never want opportunities of gratifying such an appetite, as I have shewn at large elsewhere *.

The conduct of Quintius, therefore, is more to be commended than that of Appius; and the opinion of Tacitus is just enough in other circumstances, and under proper restrictions.

CHAP. XX.

That one instance of humanity and generosity had a greater effect upon the Falisci, than all the weight of the Roman arms.

WHEN the Falisci were besieged by Camillus, a School-master, to whose care most of the Nobility in that City had committed their Sons, thinking to ingratiate himself with Camillus and the Romans, took all his Pupils out of the City with him, under pretence of exercise and recreation, and insensibly led them to the enemy's camp, where he delivered them up to Camillus, telling him that he had it then in his power to make the town surrender upon what terms he pleased. But Camillus abhorring the baseness of the deed, not only refused to receive them, but ordered him to be stripped naked, and to have his hands tied behind him; and having given every one of the boys a rod, made them whip him all the way back again into the town. An action so generous and humane, that the Falisci were struck with admiration; and instead of making any further defence, immediately surrendered.

Hence we may learn, that tenderness and humanity have sometimes a much greater effect upon the minds of men, than any sort of violence which can possibly be used: and that Cities, and even whole

* See the Prince, chap. xvii. xix. and Pol. Disc. book III. chap. vi.

Provinces,

Provinces have often been ſubdued by one act of Compaſſion, Continence, or Generoſity, when no human force could have conquered them: of which we have many other examples in Hiſtory. The Romans were never able to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy by dint of arms: and yet Fabricius obliged him to quit it, by giving him notice that one of his domeſtics had offered to poiſon him. Again, Scipio Africanus did not gain ſo much reputation in Spain by taking new Carthage, as he did by a noble example of his continence, when he immediately reſtored a young and beautiful Lady (whom he had taken priſoner) to her huſband; the fame of which action gained him the eſteem of all that nation, and made the people his friends, inſtead of enemies *.

We ſee then how greatly ſuch virtues are admired by all men, and how much they are celebrated and recommended by hiſtorians as well as philoſophers. Xenophon, in particular, takes great pains to ſhew what honour, and how many victories Cyrus acquired by his humanity, affability, freedom from pride, cruelty, luxury, and all other vices that ſtain the life of man. Nevertheleſs, as Hannibal acquired great reputation and many remarkable victories by very different methods, it may not be amiſs, perhaps, to enquire in the next Chapter to what cauſes that was owing.

CHAP. XXI.

How it came to paſs that Hannibal acquired as much glory in Italy, as Scipio did in Spain, but by quite different methods.

IT may appear ſtrange that ſome Commanders have performed very great things, and gained much glory and renown by quite different methods from thoſe preſcribed in the laſt Chapter. From whence

* See book II. chap. xxi. of theſe Diſcourſes.

many may be apt to conclude, that ſuch virtues do not contribute to make a Commander fortunate and renowned, any more than the qualities that are totally oppoſite to them; ſince the ſame degree of fame and reputation is to be acquired one way as well as the other. If Scipio made himſelf maſter of all Spain by his humanity and clemency; Hannibal, on the contrary, pretty nearly effected the ſame thing in Italy, by very different means; that is, by every ſpecies of violence, cruelty, rapine, and perfidy; for almoſt all the Cities and States in that Province ſurrendered to him. Conſidering therefore with myſelf, how this is to be accounted for, I think ſeveral reaſons may be aſſigned for it.

In the firſt place, all men are ſo fond of novelty, that people who live happy and free, as well as thoſe that are quite otherwiſe, often wiſh for a change of Government; it being the nature of mankind (as I have ſaid elſewhere) to be ſatiated with proſperity, as well as tired with adverſity. To this diſpoſition it is owing, that upon any rebellion or invaſion, the Chiefs of it, whether foreigners or natives, never want friends and followers to abet and aſſiſt them; and the greater the number of them is, the greater will be their progreſs. There are likewiſe two other powerful motives of human actions, viz. Love and fear, which operate very ſtrongly upon ſuch occaſions: ſo that if a General can make himſelf either much beloved or much feared, he will be followed and obeyed by many, and commonly by more in the latter caſe than in the former. Whichſoever of theſe two courſes therefore, ſuch a Commander ſhall think fit to purſue, the effect will be the ſame, if he is a man of great abilities and reputation, like Hannibal or Scipio, and knows how to remedy the inconveniencies that may proceed from his endeavouring to make himſelf either too much beloved, or too much feared. For each of theſe extremes has its inconveniencies, and ſuch too as may prove fatal to him: becauſe, by taking too much pains to gain the affections of the people, he may

may ſtoop ſo low as to make himſelf cheap and contemptible; and by too much ſeverity he will become odious: to ſteer a middle courſe is very difficult, if not impoſſible. It requires great abilities therefore, to remedy the inconveniencies that may ariſe from exceſſes of either kind, as Hannibal and Scipio did; for, though they both owed their ſucceſs and reputation to purſuing the different methods abovementioned, yet it muſt be confeſſed, that they both likewiſe ſuffered ſome inconveniencies from them. With regard to Scipio, part of his army and ſome of his friends revolted from him in Spain; which was entirely owing to want of proper ſeverity, and the little awe in which they ſtood of his perſon: for the generality of mankind are naturally ſo reſtleſs, that when they ſee any little opportunity of gratifying their ambition, they preſently forget the allegiance they owe their Governors, and the favours they have received from them: ſo that, in order to remedy this inconvenience, Scipio was in ſome meaſure obliged to proceed with a degree of ſeverity which he had not practiſed before. As to Hannibal, we do not certainly know of any particular inſtance in which his cruelty and perfidy was of prejudice to him: but we may ſuppoſe, that the reaſon why the Neapolitans and ſome other people continued ſo firmly attached to the Romans, was becauſe they were afraid of him. This we know, however, that his ſavage and barbarous manner of proceeding made the Romans more inveterate againſt him than any other enemy they ever had. For though Pyrrhus was at their very doors, and harraſſing all Italy with a powerful army, yet they had the generoſity to acquaint him with the deſign which one of his domeſtics had formed to poiſon him; but they never ceaſed to perſecute Hannibal, even after he was ruined, till they procured his death. This was the conſequence of his extreme cruelty and perfidy: but ſuch were his abilities, and the reputation which he had acquired, and ſo great was his authority, that it is mentioned by all Hiſtorians as a remarkable

markable circumſtance, that though his army was compoſed of many different nations, there never was any mutiny or diſſention in it.

I conclude, therefore, that it is not very material, which of the two abovementioned courſes a Commander takes, provided he is a man of ſufficient abilities to correct the inconveniencies that may flow from any undue exertion of them. And as Hannibal and Scipio both gained great reputation, the one by laudable, the other by deteſtable means, it may not ſeem altogether foreign to our ſubject, if we ſay ſomething in the next Chapter of two Roman Citizens, who acquired the ſame degree of glory, but by very different, though laudable means.

CHAP. XXII.

That Manlius Torquatus by his ſeverity, and Valerius Corvinus by his gentleneſs, acquired the ſame degree of reputation.

THERE were in Rome at the ſame time two great Commanders, Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, who were equally renowned for their proweſs and conduct againſt an enemy, and equal in their honours and the number of their triumphs, but very different in their manner of treating their Soldiers. Manlius proceeded with the utmoſt ſeverity, and never ſpared them upon any occaſion, either in point of duty or puniſhment: whilſt Valerius, on the contrary, always behaved towards them with the greateſt tenderneſs, affability, and familiarity. Manlius, in order to keep up military diſcipline in full force, and make himſelf punctually obeyed, put his own ſon to death, though victorious, for engaging the enemy without his orders: Valerius never puniſhed any one in that manner. Nevertheleſs, the methods they took, though directly contrary to each other, had the ſame effect; for they both triumphed over

over the enemies of Rome, both contributed to aggrandize their country, and both acquired very great reputation. None of their Soldiers ever declined fighting, or mutinied, or disobeyed their commands in any respect whatsoever; though those of Manlius were sometimes so harsh and rigorous, that afterwards, when any severe orders were issued out, they were called, "Manliana imperia, Manlian orders." It may not be amiss therefore to enquire, in the first place, to what causes it was owing that Manlius was obliged to act with such a degree of severity: in the next, what it was that enabled Valerius to proceed with so much lenity: thirdly, how it came to pass, that these two methods, so different from one another, produced the same effect; and in the last place, which of them is most worthy of imitation.

Whoever considers the character of Manlius, from the account which Livy gives of his conduct, will find that he was a very brave man, a true friend to his country, dutiful and affectionate to his parents, and strictly obedient in all things to the commands of his superiors. All this appears from variety of instances, particularly from his fighting and killing a gigantic Gaul, who had challenged any man in the Roman army to a single combat; from defending his father at the peril of his own life, against one of the Tribunes who had accused him; and from what he said to the Consul before he went out to fight the Gaul; "injussu tuo adversus hostem nunquam pugnabo, non si certam victoriam videam: Without your permission I will never fight any enemy, though I was sure of a victory." When a man of this stamp comes to command an army, it may naturally be expected, that he will endeavour to make others like himself; that his courage will prompt him to give bold orders; and that his regard to discipline will make him take care that they are punctually executed. For it may be looked upon as a never-failing maxim, that in great and arduous undertakings all orders must be obeyed, seem they ever so harsh and rigorous (as they must of

courſe be ſometimes upon ſuch occaſions) otherwiſe the enterprize will certainly miſcarry. Hence we may obſerve, that in order to be well obeyed, it is neceſſary in the firſt place to know how to command: for which purpoſe, a man ought to compare his own condition and abilities with thoſe of others that are to ſerve under him: and if he finds himſelf in a capacity to rule them, he may then enforce his commands with rigour; if not, he muſt let it alone. A certain wiſe man therefore uſed to ſay, that in order to govern a Republic with authority, there muſt be a due proportion eſtabliſhed betwixt thoſe that rule and thoſe that are to be ruled; in which caſe the power of the Governors will be durable and ſecure: but where the governed are ſtronger than their Governors, the power of the latter will be of ſhort continuance.

But to reſume my ſubject. I ſay, that harſh and ſpirited commands proceed from a rigorous and bold diſpoſition; and that whoever gives ſuch orders, muſt be very ſtrict in ſeeing them punctually executed, otherwiſe they will not be regarded. A perſon however, who is not of this caſt, ſhould not give ſuch orders, but content himſelf with others of a milder nature: for, if ordinary commands only are diſobeyed, he may act with clemency and gentleneſs, as the puniſhment uſual upon thoſe occaſions will be ſufficient, which, being imputed to the common eſtabliſhed laws, brings no particular odium upon himſelf. We may conclude then, that Manlius was obliged to act as he did by the extraordinary commands he gave, which were owing to the natural turn and bias of his own mind, and ſuch indeed, as are often of great advantage to a Commonwealth, becauſe they ſerve to reduce it to its firſt principles and original virtue. For, if a Commonwealth could be ſo fortunate as to have a number of great and virtuous men ſucceeding each other at reaſonable intervals, to reform their Fellow-citizens by their example, to reſtore the vigour of the laws, and to correct every thing that tended to corruption,

ruption, that State would be immortal, as I have ſaid before *. Such a one was Manlius, who by the rigour of his commands kept up the ancient military diſcipline amongſt the Romans, prompted thereto, in the firſt place, by his own natural diſpoſition, and in the next, by the deſire he had that the commands which he dictated ſhould be punctually obeyed.

Valerius, on the other hand, had an opportunity of indulging the clemency and gentleneſs of his nature, merely by retaining the orders and rules that had uſually been obſerved in the Roman armies; which being good and wholeſome in themſelves, gained him ſufficient reputation, and were neither hard to be obſerved, nor laid him under a neceſſity of puniſhing delinquents with extreme ſeverity, becauſe there were but few ſuch in his army, and thoſe meeting only with ordinary puniſhment, imputed it to the common courſe of the laws, and not to any rigour or ſeverity in their General. So that he was at liberty to treat his Soldiers with all manner of tenderneſs and humanity that could gain their affections and ſupport his authority: and thus it came to paſs, that theſe two Commanders were equally well obeyed, and each of them attained the ſame end, though by very different means. Thoſe however, that are deſirous to imitate either of them, ſhould take care of falling into extremes that may occaſion hatred on one ſide, or contempt on the other; (as I ſaid before with regard to Hannibal and Scipio) which is very difficult either to be avoided or remedied, except a Commander is poſſeſſed of extraordinary abilities.

It now remains to conſider, which of theſe two methods is moſt praiſe-worthy; and this ſeems to be a diſputable point; becauſe ſome writers recommend one, and ſome the other. Thoſe however who treat of the education of Princes, ſeem rather to prefer the conduct of Valerius to that of Manlius: and Xenophon in particular, extolling the virtues of Cyrus, ſays

* See chap. i. of this book.

almoſt the ſame things of him that Livy does of Valerius, when he was appointed Conſul in an expedition againſt the Samnites. For that General having harangued his Soldiers with his uſual affability, as they were going to engage the enemy, the Hiſtorian gives us the following character of him. "Non alias militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia haud gravatè munia obeundo. In ludo præterea militari, cum velocitatis viriumque inter ſe æquales certamina ineunt, comiter facilis vincere ac vinci, vultu eodem; nec quemquam aſpernari parem qui ſe offerret; factis benignus pro re; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienæ, quam ſuæ dignitatis memor; & (quo nihil popularius eſt) quibus artibus petierat magiſtratum, iiſdem gerebat. No Commander was ever more familiar with his Soldiers. For he never refuſed to ſhare any toil or duty with the meaneſt of them. He would often mingle with them in their military exerciſes and recreations, and uſed to run and wreſtle amongſt them; putting himſelf upon a level with any man that had a mind to contend with him, and never changing his countenance, or ſeeming to be in the leaſt altered in any reſpect, whether he got the better or not. In his behaviour he was courteous and bountiful, as occaſion required; in his converſation he knew how to ſupport his own dignity, without reſtraining the freedom of others; and (which made him ſtill more dear to them) he exerciſed his authority with the ſame goodneſs and moderation by which he had obtained it."

Livy ſpeaks much in favour of Manlius alſo; acknowledging that the Severity he exerciſed upon his own Son, had ſuch an effect upon his whole army, and made the Soldiers ſo obedient to his commands, that the victory which he gained over the Latins was entirely owing to it: and having given a circumſtantial account of the battle, the difficulties which the Romans laboured under, and the dangers they were expoſed to that day, he ſays it was the conduct of Manlius alone that gained the victory. Nay he goes ſtill further,

further, and after comparing the ſtrength of the two armies, makes no ſcruple to affirm that whichſoever of them had been commanded by Manlius, would certainly have got the day.

Conſidering therefore what is ſaid on both ſides of the queſtion, it ſeems hard to decide it. However, not to leave the matter wholly undetermined, I ſay, that it is ſafer and better for a perſon who lives under a Republican Government to act like Manlius; becauſe ſuch a manner of proceeding is for the advantage of the public, and cannot ſeem calculated to ſerve any private intereſt or ambition; ſince by treating every one with rigour and auſterity, and regarding the good of the commonwealth alone, a man cannot hope to gain friends and partizans ſufficient to carry on any particular deſign to the prejudice of his country. But the contrary may be ſaid of ſuch a conduct as that of Valerius under the like circumſtances: for though indeed, with reſpect to the public ſervice, the advantage would be the ſame, yet ſo popular and affable a behaviour to the Soldiery, is apt to excite jealouſies, and the people will naturally grow ſuſpicious (eſpecially if a General is continued long in command) that ſuch a degree of favour may be employed to deprive them of their liberties: and that ſuch an event did not actually happen in the Roman Republic under the adminiſtration of Publicola, was becauſe the people were not then become corrupt, and he did not continue long enough in power to debauch them.

But if we are to conſider theſe two different methods of proceeding as relative to a Prince, (which Xenophon does) we certainly muſt prefer the conduct of Valerius to that of Manlius: becauſe a Prince muſt above all things ſecure the obedience and affection of his Soldiers and Subjects by gentle and benevolent meaſures. They will obey him if he appears virtuous, and obſerves the laws; they will love him, if he is affable, humane, merciful, and endowed with ſuch other good qualities as Livy aſcribes to Valerius, and Xenophon to Cyrus; and to ſee a Prince beloved by

by his people, with an army at his devotion, ſuits well with the nature of a Monarchy. But the ſame cannot be affirmed with regard to a perſon who is only a Subject in a Republic, and upon a civil equality with the reſt of his Fellow-Citizens. We read in the Annals of Venice, that the Venetian Gallies returning from ſome Expedition, and lying at anchor near the ſhore, there happened a difference betwixt the Sailors and the Townſmen, which occaſioned a fray that was very bloody, and which was carried on with ſuch obſtinacy on both ſides, that neither the power of their officers, nor reverence to any particular Citizen, nor the authority of the Magiſtrates, was ſufficient to compoſe it: but a certain Noble Venetian, who had been their Commander the year before, coming amongſt them, they laid down their arms and diſperſed out of reſpect to him: a circumſtance which occaſioned ſuch jealouſy in the Senate, that they ſoon after had him diſpatched.

I conclude then, that a Prince will find it for his advantage to imitate Valerius; but that it would be dangerous for a Subject of a Republic, both with regard to his country and himſelf: for in the firſt place, it would be paving the way to Tyranny; and in the next, the Government would grow ſo jealous of his proceedings, that they would not fail to take ſome courſe to rid themſelves of him. On the other hand, I affirm that the conduct obſerved by Manlius would be prejudicial to a Prince; but advantageous to the Subject of a Commonwealth, and moſt of all to his country; for it ſeldom can do him any hurt, except the hatred which is occaſioned by his ſeverity ſhould be encreaſed by a jealouſy of his great reputation and abilities, as it happened to Camillus *.

* Compare this Chapter with the latter end of the 23d, and all the 24th Chapter of Montaigne's Eſſays, book ii. entitled, "Obſervations on Julius Cæſar's method of making War."

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Upon what account Camillus was baniſhed from Rome.

WE have ſaid, in the laſt Chapter, that the Subject of a Commonwealth, who imitates the conduct of Valerius, may injure both himſelf and his country: and that acting like Manlius may be of great ſervice to his country, though ſometimes prejudicial to himſelf; which is evident from the example of Camillus, whoſe manner of proceeding was more like that of Manlius than Valerius. Livy therefore, ſpeaking of him, ſays, "Ejus virtutem milites oderant & mirabantur: the Soldiers both hated and admired him for his virtues." They admired him on account of his vigilance, prudence, magnanimity, and the good diſcipline he cauſed to be obſerved in his army; they hated him becauſe he was more ſevere in puniſhing, than liberal in rewarding, to which the Hiſtorian adds the following reaſons for their hatred. In the firſt place, he ordered the money which was taken from the Veientes to be applied to public uſes, inſtead of dividing it amongſt the Soldiers with the reſt of the ſpoil: in the next, he cauſed his triumphal chariot to be drawn by four white horſes, which they ſaid was out of arrogance, and an ambition to emulate the glory of the Sun: in the laſt, he made a vow to dedicate the tenth part of the booty taken from the Veientes to Apollo; for the performance of which, he was obliged to take it away from the Soldiers, into whoſe hands it had fallen *.

Hence we may learn, that nothing makes a Ruler more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their poſſeſſions, an injury of ſo great importance, that it is never forgotten; for, upon every little diſtreſs it returns freſh upon their memories: and as

* See chap. xxix. and lv. book i. of theſe Diſcourſes, and the notes upon them.

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men are daily ſubject to diſtreſſes, they will daily remember it. That another thing which gives great diſguſt, eſpecially to a free people, is a proud and arrogant behaviour: and though perhaps they may not in any wiſe be materially hurt by it; yet it never fails to excite their indignation: upon which account, thoſe in office and authority ought always to avoid it as a moſt dangerous ſhoal; becauſe it is weak and raſh to the laſt degree to do a thing which muſt of neceſſity create hatred, and can be attended with no manner of advantage.

CHAP. XXIV.

That the prolongation of Commiſſions was the ruin of the Roman liberties.

IF we conſider the proceedings of the Romans with attention, we ſhall find that the diſſolution of their Republic was owing partly to the diſſentions that were occaſioned by the Agrarian Law, and partly to the prolongation of Commiſſions: for if the miſchiefs which aroſe from theſe cauſes had been foreſeen, and prevented in time, it is certain that Commonwealth would have ſupported itſelf much longer, and perhaps have enjoyed more tranquillity. For though we do not know that the prolongation of Commiſſions ever occaſioned any tumult or diſturbance at Rome; nevertheleſs it is evident that the extraordinary degree of authority which ſome particular Citizens acquired by that means, was of great prejudice to the State: whereas if all the Citizens who had an offer of being continued in their offices and commands had been poſſeſſed of as much wiſdom and virtue as Lucius Quintius was, theſe inconveniencies and misfortunes would not have enſued. His integrity and diſintereſtedneſs were very ſingular; for upon an accommodation betwixt the Plebeians and Patricians, the former having continued the ſame Tribunes in office for a year longer, as the moſt likely men to curb the ambition

ambition of the Nobility, the latter likewiſe, in imitation of the Plebeians, reſolved to prolong the Conſulſhip of Lucius Quintius for the ſame term. But he peremptorily refuſed to accept of it; alledging that bad precedents ought to be diſcountenanced, and not ſupported by ſuch as were worſe; and therefore deſired them to chuſe new Conſuls. Now if all the reſt of the Roman Citizens had been as wiſe and virtuous as Quintius, that cuſtom of prolonging offices and commiſſions could not have been introduced into their Commonwealth, which at laſt was the principal cauſe of its ruin.

The firſt whoſe command was extended beyond its uſual term, was Publius Philo, who having laid ſiege to Palæpolis at a time when his Conſulſhip was upon the point of expiring, was continued in office by the Senate with the title of Proconſul; becauſe they thought him ſure of ſucceeding in that enterprize, and therefore were unwilling to ſnatch the glory of it out of his hands, by ſending another perſon to ſuperſede him; which, though done with a good intent, and for the ſervice of the Public, was the firſt ſtep that occaſioned the loſs of the Roman liberties. For the further abroad they carried their arms, the more neceſſary ſuch prolongations appeared, and the more common they became: hence it aroſe, in the firſt place, that but a few of their Citizens could be employed in the command of armies, and conſequently few were capable of acquiring any conſiderable degree of experience or reputation; and in the next, that when a Commander in chief was continued for a long time in that poſt, he had an opportunity of corrupting his army to ſuch a degree that the Soldiers entirely threw off their obedience to the Senate, and acknowledgeg no other authority but his. To this it was owing that Sylla and Marius found means to debauch their armies and make them fight againſt their country; and that Julius Cæſar was enabled to make himſelf abſolute in Rome. So that if the Romans had not prolonged their Commiſſions beyond the uſual

date,

date, perhaps they might not have been ſo rapid in their conqueſts, nor ſo ſoon have arrived at the Empire of the World; but then, on the other hand, they would have preſerved their liberty much longer.

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning the Poverty of Cincinnatus and ſeveral other Roman Citizens.

I Have ſhewn, in another place, that the beſt way to preſerve the liberties of a Commonwealth is to keep the Subjects poor, at leaſt to prevent their growing too rich *. Now, though it is not ſufficiently clear that there was any proviſion made for this purpoſe in Rome, (as the Agrarian Law was conſtantly oppoſed) yet we ſee that during the courſe of four hundred years, after its foundation, that State continued in extreme poverty: the reaſon of which I take to be, that poverty was no bar to offices or honours of any kind, and that virtue and merit were preferred to all other qualifications, wherever they vere found. A remarkable proof of which we have in the following example. When Minucius the Conſul and his army were in a manner ſurrounded by the Æqui, and the whole City of Rome was in ſuch conſternation that they were forced to create a Dictator, (their laſt reſource in extremities) they made choice of L. Quintius Cincinnatus, who was at plough in his own little eſtate at the very time when he was ſent for to be inveſted with that authority: a circumſtance much admired by Livy, who ſays upon this occaſion, "Operæ pretium eſt audire qui omnia præ divitiis humana ſpernunt, ne ique honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant eſſe, niſi effuſe affluant opes. It is pleaſant after this, to hear ſome people talk of riches, as if nothing in this world was to be weighed in the ſcale againſt them; and that

* See chap. xvi. of this book.

neither

neither virtue nor merit of any kind were of the leaſt account, in compariſon of wealth." Cincinnatus (as I ſaid) was at plough in his own little eſtate, which did not exceed four acres of land, when the Deputies found him, who had been ſent by the Senate to acquaint him with the imminent danger the Republic was in, and the choice they had made of him for their Dictator. Upon which, he changed his clothes and immediately repaired to Rome; where he got together ſome forces, and marching directly againſt the enemy to reſcue Minucius from the danger he was in, he ſoon brought them to a battle, in which they were totally defeated and plundered. But when he divided the Spoil he would not ſuffer the army which he had delivered out of the hands of the Æqui to have any ſhare of the booty; telling them they were not worthy to partake of the Spoils of an enemy, by whom they were ſo near being plundered themſelves. As to Minucius, he deprived him of his authority, and reduced him to the degree of a Lieutenant, ordering him to ſerve in that capacity, till he had learnt better how to command. In this Expedition he made L. Tarquinius his General of horſe, though he had not ſo much as a horſe himſelf, being ſo poor that he was forced to fight on foot.

Hence we may ſee that poverty was no bar to honour or preferment amongſt the Romans in thoſe days; and that a wiſe and good man thought four acres of land ſufficient for his ſuſtenance. The ſame contempt of riches is obſervable in the time of Marcus Regulus; who being at the head of an army in Africa, where he had beat the Carthaginians, ſent to deſire leave of the Senate to return to Rome, that he might put his farm in order, which he heard was neglected by his Servants. From which example we may obſerve, in the firſt place, how contentedly he lived in poverty; and that he gave up all the fruit of his labours for the good of the Public, looking upon the glory he had acquired as a ſufficient reward: for if he had thought of enriching himſelf by the war

he would not have troubled his head about a few acres of land at home. In the next we may admire the generoſity, and magnanimity of the ancient Romans; for when they were advanced to the command of an army, they thought themſelves ſuperior to any Potentate upon earth: and yet when their Commiſſions expired, and they returned to their former condition, they were ſo modeſt, frugal, humble, laborious, obedient to the Magiſtrates, and reſpectful to their Superiors, that one could hardly have thought they had been the ſame men *. This neglect of riches continued till the days of Paulus Emilius, which were the laſt happy times of the Roman Republic: for though he enriched his country with the Spoils of the enemy, he continued ſo poor himſelf, that when he had a mind to reward his Son-in-law who had behaved with great bravery in the wars, he made him a preſent of a Silver cup, which was the firſt piece of plate he was ever poſſeſſed of. Indeed I might quote numberleſs examples to ſhew how much more mankind are obliged to poverty than riches; and that the former has been the honour and preſervation of ſome States and Religious Eſtabliſhments; whilſt ſeveral others have been ruined by the latter †. But this has been already done by ſo many other writers, that it is here altogether unneceſſary.

* "The Elder Cato returning Conſul from Spain, ſold his Warhorſe to ſave the money it would have coſt him to bring him back by Sea into Italy, (ſays Montaigne from Plutarch) and being Governor of Sardinia, made all his viſits on foot, without any other attendants than one officer of the Republic, who carried his robe and a cenſe for Sacrifices; and for the moſt part carried his Mail himſelf. He boaſted that he had never worn a Gown that coſt above ten Crowns, nor ever ſent above ten-pence to market for one day's proviſions. Scipio Æmilianus, after two Conſulſhips, and two triumphs, went on an Embaſſy with no more than Seven Servants in his train: Plato had but three, Homer but one, and Zeno, founder of the Stoic Sect, none at all. Tiberius Gracchus was allowed but five-pence halfpenny a day, when employed as a Commiſſioner for public affairs, though he was at that time the firſt man in Rome." Montaigne's Eſſays, book I. chap. lii.

† "I ſhall fill the remaining part of this paper (ſays Mr. Addiſon, Spec. vol. 6, No. 464) with a very pretty Allegory, which is wrought into a play by Ariſtophanes the Greek Comedian. It ſeems originally deſigned as a Satire upon the Rich, though in ſome parts of it, it is a

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

That the ruin of some States has been owing to Women.

IT happened in the City of Ardea that a young woman who was possessed of great riches, had two Suitors, one a Patrician, the other a Plebeian: but

kind of comparison betwixt wealth and poverty.—Chremylus, who was an old and a good man, but exceeding poor, being desirous to leave some riches to his Son, consults the Oracle of Apollo upon the Subject. The Oracle bids him follow the first man he should see upon going out of the temple. The person he chanced to see was to appearance an old, sordid, blind man; but upon following him from place to place, he at last found by his own confession that he was Plutus the god of Riches, and that he was just come out of the house of a Miser. Plutus further told him, that when he was a boy, he used to declare that when he came to age he would distribute wealth to none but virtuous and just men: upon which, Jupiter considering the pernicious consequences of such a resolution, took his sight away from him, and left him to strole about the world in the blind condition Chremylus beheld him. With much ado Chremylus prevailed upon him to go to his house, where he met an old woman with a tattered raiment, who had been his guest many years, and whose name was Poverty. The old woman refusing to turn out so easily as he would have her, he threatened to banish her not only from his own house, but out of all Greece, if she made any more words about the matter. Poverty upon this occasion pleads her cause very notably, and represents to her old Landlord that if she should be driven out of the country, all the trades, arts, and sciences would be driven out with her; and that if every one was rich, they could not be supplied with those pomps, ornaments, and conveniencies of life which made riches desirable. She likewise represented to him the several advantages she bestowed upon her votaries, in regard to their shape, their health and activity, by preserving them from gouts, dropsies, unweildiness and intemperance. But whatever she had to say for herself, she was forced to troop off.—Chremylus immediately considered how he might restore Plutus to his sight: and in order to it, conveyed him to the temple of Æsculapius, who was famous for cures and miracles of this nature. By this means the Deity recovered his eyes, and began to make a right use of them by enriching every one that was distinguished for piety towards the Gods, and justice towards men; and at the same time by taking away his gifts from the impious and undeserving. This produces several merry incidents; till at last Mercury descends with great complaints from the Gods, that since the good men were grown rich they had received no Sacrifices; which is confirmed by a Priest of Jupiter, who enters with a remonstrance, that since this late innovation he was reduced to a starving condition, and could not live upon his office. Chremylus, who in the beginning of the Play was religious in his poverty, concludes it with a propofal which was relished by all the good men who were now grown rich as

her father being dead, her guardians would have married her to the Plebeian, contrary to the desire and advice of her Mother, who would have given her to the Patrician. This occasioned such a tumult in the City, that all the people took up arms; the Patricians in favour of one Competitor, and the Plebeians to support the other. But the Plebeians being driven out of the City, applied to the Volsci for assistance; and the Patricians to the Romans. The Volsci happening to arrive first, joined the Plebeians and laid siege to the place: but the Romans coming suddenly upon them soon after, shut them up in such a manner betwixt their camp and the walls of the town, that they were compelled by famine to surrender at discretion: upon which, the Romans immediately entered the town, and having put the authors of the sedition to death, restored its former tranquillity.

In this affair there are several things worthy of observation. In the first place we see, that women sometimes occasion much mischief and discord in a State, to the great prejudice of those that govern it: for a further proof of which, it may be remembered (as we have shewn before) that the rape of Lucretia cost the Tarquins their kingdom, and the attempt upon Virginia was the cause of the Decemviri being deprived of their authority. Aristotle in his Politics, speaking of Tyrants, says that the rage and indignation which men conceive against them for debauching their wives, or daughters, or other relations, is frequently the occasion of their ruin, as I have observed before, in my discourse upon Conspiracies. All Princes therefore and Governors of Republics should carefully attend to this matter, and consider the disorders which may arise from such causes, that so they may either prevent them, or provide such remedies

well as himself, that they should carry Plutus in solemn procession to the temple, and instal him there in the place of Jupiter.—This allegory instructed the Athenians in two points: first, as it vindicated the conduct of Providence in its ordinary distributions of wealth: and in the next place, as it shewed the great tendency of riches to corrupt the morals of those that possessed them."

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in time as may not tend to the prejudice and disgrace of their State: for we see how the Republic of Ardea, by suffering the discords amongst its Citizens to rise to such a height, became so divided that it was necessary to call in foreign aid to re-unite it; which is generally a prelude to Slavery.—The next thing to be observed upon this occasion, is the method that ought to be taken to re-unite a divided State, of which I shall treat at large in the next Chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

What methods are to be taken in order to re-unite a divided State: and that they judge wrong who think the best way to keep a City in Subjection, is to keep it divided.

FROM the method which the Romans took to reconcile the two factions at Ardea, we may see which is the best way of composing civil dissensions in a divided City; and that is by cutting off the ring-leaders. For there are but three ways to re-unite such a State; which are, either by putting the Heads of the factions to death, or by banishing them, or by obliging them to be friends under certain penalties. Of these three ways, the last is the most dangerous and uncertain; because it is impossible that any forced reconciliation should continue long, where much blood has been shed, or other outrages committed; especially when the parties live together within the same walls, and cannot help seeing and perhaps conversing with each other every day; which must of necessity occasion fresh quarrels and animosities: of which we have a recent example in the City of Pistoia. That City, about fifteen years ago, was divided into the two factions of the Panciatichi and Cancellieri, and still continues so; but at that time there were great dissensions among them, though now they are tolerably quiet. After many bickerings and disputes they at last proceeded to bloodshed, burning and

plundering each other's houſes, and committing all manner of open hoſtilities. Upon which, the Florentines, who had often interpoſed, and endeavoured to compoſe their differences by the laſt of the methods above mentioned, finding they only enflamed their reſentment, and made things worſe inſtead of better by theſe means, grew ſo tired that they had recourſe to the ſecond method, baniſhing ſome of the Chiefs of both factions, and impriſoning others; by which they ſoon quieted the reſt, and have kept them in pretty good order ever ſince.

The firſt method however, is certainly the beſt and moſt effectual: but as a good degree of Spirit and reſolution is neceſſary, weak States are afraid to have recourſe to it; and it is pretty well if they venture upon the ſecond. This is one of the errors, which (as I ſaid before) the Princes of our times are apt to fall into, when they come to deliberate upon any matter of great importance; for inſtead of following the example of others upon the like occaſions, they think it in ſome caſes inhuman, and in others impoſſible to be imitated: which is owing to their pitiful education and their ignorance in the affairs of the world. Thus inſtead of adopting the wiſe Maxims of the Ancients, they fall in with certain modern opinions, equally ridiculous and abſurd: one of which I ſhall here take notice of, as it was eſtabliſhed by ſome wiſe politicians of our own City, who laid it down for a rule, "Che biſognava tener Piſtoia con le parti, & Piſa con le fortezze: that Piſtoia was to be kept under by fomenting diſcord amongſt the Citizens there; but Piſa by a Citadel;" not knowing how inſignificant and ineffectual both one and the other of theſe expedients was for ſuch purpoſes. As to Citadels I ſhall ſay nothing of them in this place, becauſe I have ſpoken of them at large elſewhere *, and therefore ſhall only take notice of the futility of this Maxim, "that in order to keep the towns that are under

* See the Prince, Chap. xx. and chap. xxiv. book II. of theſe Diſcourſes.

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your dominion in ſubjection, you muſt keep them divided."

In the firſt place, it is impoſſible that any Prince or Governor of a Republic ſhould keep fair with two factions at the ſame time in a town that is ſubject to their dominion: for as it is the nature of mankind to take either one ſide or the other in all diviſions, induced by different motives which influence their inclinations; ſo one of the factions being diſaffected to their Prince, he muſt of neceſſity loſe the town whenever he engages in a war: for how can he expect to keep poſſeſſion of a place, when he has enemies both within and without. But if it belongs to a Republic, there is no ſurer method to corrupt its own Citizens, and to ſow diſcord amongſt them, than to encourage factions: becauſe each ſide will naturally endeavour by ſome undue means or other to gain the favour of their Governors, and ſecure their protection; which muſt be attended with two very great inconveniencies: one of which is, that you never can make either of them your ſtedfaſt friends: for their Governors being ſo often changed, and ſometimes a perſon of one way of thinking, and ſometimes another of a quite different turn, being appointed to rule over them, it is impoſſible they ſhould ever be ſteadily and properly governed. The other inconveniency is, that by encouraging factions in other places, you muſt neceſſarily divide your own State: of which we have an inſtance in Bicondo's Hiſtory of Florence; who ſpeaking of the proceedings of that Republic with the Piſtoians, ſays, "Mentre che i Fiorentini diſegnavano reunir Piſtoia, diviſono ſe Medeſimi: whilſt the Florentines endeavoured to re-unite the Piſtoians, they fell into diviſions amongſt themſelves." From whence we may obſerve the evils that ariſe from ſuch diviſions in a town that is dependent upon a Republic.

In the year 1501, after Arezzo had revolted from the Republic of Florence, and the vales of Tevere and Chiana were over-run by Duke Valentine and

the Vitelli, the King of France ſent an army, under the command of Monſieur de Lant, to recover thoſe territories for the Florentines. But that General, finding numbers of people wherever he came, who declared themſelves of Marzocco's party, was much offended at their diviſions, and told them, "that if any of his Maſter's ſubjects in France ſhould declare themſelves of the King's party, they would be ſeverely puniſhed for it; as ſuch a declaration muſt imply that there was another party againſt the King; whereas his Majeſty would have it known that all his Subjects were well affected to him, and united amongſt themſelves."—Thoſe Maxims therefore which are now in ſuch vogue, though contrary to all manner of reaſon and good policy, proceed from the weakneſs of our Princes and other Rulers of States; who finding themſelves unable to ſupport their authority by laudable and ſpirited meaſures, are obliged to have recourſe to ſuch mean artifices: which perhaps may ſerve their purpoſes for a while, in quiet and peaceable times; but will be found altogether ineffectual in times of adverſity and diſtreſs.

CHAP. XXVIII.

That the Governors of a Republic ſhould keep a ſtrict eye upon the conduct of their Subjects; becauſe under the diſguiſe of beneficence and humanity they often aim at Tyranny.

THE City of Rome being diſtreſſed by famine, and the public Magazines not affording proviſions enough to ſupply the wants of the people, Spurius Melius, (a very rich man for thoſe times) diſtributed a great quantity of corn amongſt them at his own expence: by which he became ſo popular, that the Senate apprehending their liberties might be endangered by it, if he was not ſuppreſſed before he grew too powerful, immediately created a Dictator, who

who cauſed him to be put to death. Hence we may remark that many actions which appear good and laudable at firſt ſight, may yet prove prejudicial and deſtructive to a Republic in the end, if timely care is not taken to prevent it.

But to diſcuſs this matter more particularly: I ſay that a Republic can neither be well governed, nor indeed ſubſiſt at any rate without men of reputation: and on the other hand, that too great a degree of reputation in a private man, is ſometimes the cauſe of its ruin. To guard againſt which, no particular Citizen ſhould be ſuffered to gain any ſort of reputation but what may be of ſervice and advantage, inſtead of prejudice, to the Commonwealth and its liberties. Now the methods by which ſuch reputation is to be acquired, are either public or private: that is, in the firſt caſe, when a man diſtinguiſhes himſelf either by his abilities in Council, or in the field, or by doing ſome other great and material ſervice to the Commonwealth: and theſe ways of gaining reputation, inſtead of being precluded, ſhould be open to all Citizens, who muſt alſo be encouraged by ſuch rewards for their good counſels and actions, as may content themſelves, and make them honoured by others: for reputation acquired in this manner can never be attended with any prejudice to the public. But in the ſecond caſe, when it is done by private methods, it is very dangerous and deſtructive: by private methods, I mean ſuch as obliging particular perſons by lending them money, by giving their daughters marriage portions, by protecting them againſt the authority of the Magiſtrates, and other ſuch favours as create dependants and partizans, and embolden them to violate the laws and corrupt the Citizens. Upon which account, a well governed Republic, as I ſaid before, ought to encourage all Citizens that endeavour to gain favour and reputation by public methods, and ſuch as tend to the glory and advantage of their country: but to diſcourage thoſe that attempt it by private means, and for other purpoſes. The Romans accordingly grant-

ed triumphs and many other honours and rewards to Citizens who had ſignalized themſelves in the ſervice of the public: but always brought thoſe to a trial, before the people, who endeavoured to advance themſelves by private methods and undue practices: and if the people happened to be ſo blinded by plauſible appearances, that they would not ſuffer them to be puniſhed, a Dictator was immediately created, who being veſted with a ſort of abſolute authority, had it in his power to reſtrain ſuch irregularities by puniſhing the delinquents in a proper manner; as it happened in the caſe of Spurius Melius: for if but one offender of that kind is ſuffered to eſcape with impunity, it is ſufficient to ruin a Commonwealth; as it would be exceeding difficult to maintain any good order or equality in it after ſuch an example.

CHAP. XXIX.

That the faults of the people are generally owing to the Prince.

PRINCES ought not in reaſon to complain of any violence which their Subjects commit, becauſe it is entirely owing either to their own remiſſneſs, or to their being guilty of the ſame themſelves: and if the people of ſome States at preſent are infamous for thieving, robbing, plundering, and other ſuch enormities, it proceeds wholly from the oppreſſion and rapaciouſneſs of their Governors. Romagna, before Alexander VI. extirminated the petty Lords who ruled over it, and was full of raſcals who lived upon murder and rapine; which was not owing to the natural depravity of the people (as ſome think) but to the wickedneſs of thoſe little Tyrants, who being poor, and yet ambitious to live in ſplendour and magnificence, were obliged to have recourſe to oppreſſion

oppreſſion and extortion of every kind *. Amongſt other vile and nefarious methods which they practiſed

* "The Italians (ſays the Author of the Eſtimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, vol. ii. ſect. 5.) are an effeminate people, yet in the general opinion, void of humanity: they are given to cruelty, treachery, and aſſaſſination. The queſtion is then, from what cauſes this ſingular appearance may ariſe?—It is commonly affirmed and ſuppoſed to be natural to the country. But they who talk thus, I think, mean no more (ſo far as they mean any thing) than this, that there is ſome cauſe unknown, which produces this crime in Italy, rather than elſewhere. Machiavel, who knew mankind, aſcribes this degeneracy in the people, to the wickedneſs and ill example of their rulers." Here the author quotes the paſſage above marked from Machiavel, and then proceeds in this manner. "This, in ſome meaſure, accounts for the inhumanity of the people: but we are ſtill at a loſs as much as ever, how ſuch an extirminating principle came firſt amongſt the Great. What follows then, ſeems the natural ſolution of the queſtion. When Italy became divided into a number of petty States, the contentions and factions in thoſe States were endleſs. The parties were often too ſmall to levy armies. Hence conſpiracies, inſurrections, aſſaſſinations by ſword or poiſon, were the common, becauſe the readieſt, way of proſecuting the political deſigns either of the oppreſſors or the oppreſſed. See Machiavel's hiſtorical tracts paſſim. By this means the dreadful practice of aſſaſſination, by being applied politically, loſt a great part of its horror in the minds of the parties who practiſed it: thus it naturally crept into private uſe, and has been of courſe tranſmitted from one generation to another.—Hence appears the great importance of curbing the violence and horrors of public contention, by what are called the Laws of War and of Nations: ſince the oppoſite conduct is not only attended with immediate cruelties, but, what is worſe, is in danger of ſtriking its colours into private life, and giving even to ſucceeding times the complexion of inhumanity.—We muſt not leave this ſubject, without adding a remark upon Machiavel himſelf, who undoubtedly wrote under the influence of this habit of thinking, ſo peculiar to Italy. For we ſee in the paſſage now cited that although he ſpeaks with reſentment againſt the private murders ſo common in his days, yet he mentions thoſe political aſſaſſinations with a kind of approbation, for which Alexander VI. and his Son Valentine were ſo juſtly infamous through all Europe. He expreſsly treats of this method of acquiring Government; and with all the ſang froid of a man talking on a juſt and legitimate ſubject. See his Prince, chap. viii. Hence concluſions have been drawn much in his diſfavour, as a man abandoned to all wickedneſs; whilſt others have adopted the contrary opinion, and affirmed, that he pointed out theſe ways of iniquitous policy and aſſaſſination, that he might teach mankind more effectually to prevent them. Now in truth theſe two opinions are equally groundleſs: for on one hand, his writings abound with inconteſtible proofs that he was a well-wiſher to his country and mankind: and on the other, it muſt be allowed, that he hath rather ſhewn the methods of treacherous policy, than the ways of preventing them. The truth is, thoſe iniquitous practices which ſhock our humanity where familiarized to his imagination by the common uſage of his country: hence he treated them as he did other political maxims of a better ſtamp, and only talked the

to

to fill their coffers, they made laws to prohibit ſuch and ſuch particular things: after which, they ſoon broke them themſelves, and encouraged others to do ſo by their own example: but they never puniſhed any one till the number of delinquents became very conſiderable; and when they did, it was not out of any reſpect to juſtice, but to enrich themſelves with fines and confiſcations. Hence it came to paſs, that their Subjects being impoveriſhed, but not in any wiſe amended in their manners, endeavoured to make up their loſſes by plundering others who were ſtill weaker than themſelves, ſo that we may impute all the evils and enormities abovementioned to the ſcandalous and wicked example of thoſe Lords; and of how much weight the example of a Prince is, we may further learn from the following inſtance in Livy. The Ambaſſadors whom the Romans ſent with the ſpoils of Veii to the Temple of Apollo at Delphos, being taken by ſome Corſairs, were carried into Lipari, a port in Sicily. But Timaſitheus, Prince of that place, being informed of the nature of the prize, whither the Ambaſſadors were going, and by whom they were ſent, behaved like a Roman upon that occaſion, and repreſenting to the people, in the ſtrongeſt terms, how impious and ſacrilegious a thing it would be to ſeize upon an offering that was made to the Gods, the Ambaſſadors were immediately diſmiſſed with all their effects by the general conſent of the people. Upon which occaſion, the Hiſtorian ſays, "Timaſitheus

language of his time and nation. Nay it appears from a particular paſſage in his works, that he vindicated this practice of aſſaſſination, as being in ſome caſes a principle of the trueſt humanity. "Cæſar Borgia (ſays he, in his Prince, chap. xvii.) was accounted cruel; but his cruelty not only thoroughly reformed and united Romagna, but ſettled it in peace and kept it firm in allegiance to him. Which being duly conſidered, he will appear much more merciful than the Florentines, who to avoid the reproach of cruelty, ſuffered Piſtoia to be deſtroyed." Theſe, no doubt are horrid maxims, and could never have riſen in the mind of ſuch a man as Machiavel, but from the cauſe aſſigned above: and they are the more to be lamented, as they have thrown a cloud over the fame of one, who, in my opinion, is the greateſt political reaſoner upon facts that hath appeared in any age or country."

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multitudinem religione implevit, quæ ſemper regenti eſt ſimilis. Timaſitheus inſtilled a ſpirit of piety and devotion into the people, who are always governed by the example of their Prince". Much like which is the ſaying of Lorenzo de' Medici,

E quel che fa il ſignor fanno poi molti,
Che nel Signor ſon tutti gli occhi volti.

Princes attract the eyes of all, and good
Or bad, are copied by the multitude.

CHAP. XXX.

That a Citizen who would do any good in a Republic by dint of his own authority, muſt in the firſt place extinguiſh all envy: alſo what proviſions are to be made for the defence of a Town upon the approach of an enemy.

THE Roman Senate having intelligence that preparations were making throughout all Tuſcany to invade their dominions; and that the Latins and Hernici (who had long been in amity with their Republic) had entered into a league againſt them with the Volſci, (the perpetual enemies of the Roman name) began to apprehend that ſuch a war muſt be attended with very great danger. But as Camillus was one of the Tribunes, and veſted with Conſular power, they thought they ſhould have no occaſion to create a Dictator, if his Collegues would entruſt him with the chief command: which being propoſed to them was cheerfully complied with; "nec quicquam (ſays Livy) de majeſtate ſuâ detractum credebant, quod majeſtati ejus conceſſiſſent: for they looked upon it as no diſparagement to themſelves, to give the firſt place to him."

Camillus therefore, being aſſured of their obedience, immediately raiſed three armies; one of which he

he conducted himself against the Tuscans; the second was encamped near Rome, under the command of Quintius Servilius, to watch the motions of the Latins and Hernici; and the third was left at home with Lucius Quintius to defend the City, and to guard the Senate-house and the Gates, if occasion required. Besides this, he ordered Horatius, one of his Collegues, to fill the Magazines with corn, arms, and other stores that are necessary in time of war; appointing Cornelius, another of the Tribunes, to preside in the Senate and Councils, and to expedite the public business: thus the Tribunes in those times, we see, were ready eitheir to command or obey, as was most requisite for the good of the Commonwealth.

Hence we may observe what great things a good and wise man may do, and of how much service he may be to his country, when he has extinguished envy by his own merit and virtue: for that often prevents worthy and able men exerting themselves by keeping them down, and not suffering them to be advanced to such a degree of power and authority as is necessary to accomplish any great purpose. Now envy is extinguished two ways; first, by some sudden calamity, or arduous undertaking: for upon such occasions, men being sensible of the danger they are in, lay aside their ambition, and readily consent to obey those by whose abilities alone they can hope to be delivered. Thus it happened to Camillus, who having been three times Dictator, and given the most convincing proofs of his virtue as well as his abilities, by constantly attending to the public good, without any regard to his own private advantage, had so far extinguished all envy in the breasts of his Fellow-citizens, that they feared nothing from his power, nor thought it any diminution of their own honour to serve under a man of his established reputation and integrity. The other way by which envy is extinguished, is when your rivals in power and reputation are removed, either by violence or the course of nature: for such men will never be at rest, whilst they see you in greater esteem

eſteem and authority than themſelves; eſpecially if they are members of a corrupt ſtate: for then it is impoſſible they ſhould ever be moved by any danger or emergency, becauſe their education has not furniſhed them with any principles of virtue; ſo that out of the perverſity of their nature, they will rather ſee their country ruined, than relinquiſh their views. Nothing but death therefore is capable of extinguiſhing this ſort of envy: and if fortune is ſo propitious to a virtuous man that his competitors go off by natural death, he may then eſtabliſh his reputation without ſcandal, and exerciſe his power without oppoſition or offence. But if that does not happen, he muſt endeavour to rid himſelf of them by any means whatſoever; for this muſt be done before any thing elſe can be effected. Thus whoever reads the Bible with attention, will ſee that Moſes, in order to eſtabliſh his Laws, was obliged to put many people to death, who oppoſed him out of envy *. Girolamo Savonarola,

* Upon this paſſage, E. Dacres ſays as follows. "I doubt the unterſtanding which Machiavel adviſes others of, he wants himſelfe: not knowing the meaning of, or not beleeving the holy writt: whereby he puts men paſt ſuſpicion of his Atheiſme. For what he alleadges of Moſes, he muſt needs take originally from Moſes his bookes, being we have not any author of that antiquity as could write any thing of his owne knowledge touching thoſe times. But thoſe Machiavel ſeems not to beleeve further than ſerved his own humour, reading the ſcriptures only to a politique end, not ſo much for the ſtrengthening his beleefe, as the bettering his diſcourſe. Yet though Machiavel did not, I hope others will beleeve, that Moſes delivered to the Iſraelites the true oracles of God, and that it was not Moſes that puniſhed the delinquents among them, but God ſending his immediate judgments; as in the rebellion of Corah and his complices, Numbers xvi. Moſes did but cite them as to appearance; but God immediately ſent his vengeance, for the Earth under them opened, v. 31 And when that wretched fellow gathered ſtickes on the Sabboth, Numbers xv. Moſes awaited till God paſſed the ſentence upon him for his death and the manner thereof, v. 35. Therefore Machiavel may juſtly be taxed for traducing Moſes here of more than he hath warrant for, making no other eſteeme of Moſes his bringing the Iſraelites out of Egypt, and his leadinge them through the willderneſſe, than of Romulus gathering together a ſcattered multitude and laying the foundation of that Commonwealth; which action, his courage and ambition of rule and glory thruſt him upon: not ſeeming to take notice that Moſes was immediately called by God and ſent to ſhew his wonders and judgments againſt the Egyptians, and to conduct the Iſraelites into Canaan, (according to God's promiſes formerly made to their forefathers)

and

and Pietro Soderini, Gonfalonier of Florence, likewiſe ſaw the neceſſity of acting in this manner: but the former being only a Friar could not do it, becauſe he had not ſufficient authority; and ſuch of his followers as had, did not rightly comprehend his meaning; though that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of exclamations and invectives againſt the "wiſe men of this world;" a name which he gave to thoſe that envied him and oppoſed his meaſures *. As to Soderini, he flattered himſelf that time, moderation, the auſpiciouſneſs of his fortune, and his great beneficence, would at laſt extinguiſh the envy that ſome had conceived againſt him: for he was young, and ſo well ſupported by his friends (the number of whom was daily increaſed by his munificence and liberality), that he hoped he ſhould have been able to ſurmount all oppoſition, without having recourſe to violence, or exerting his power in ſuch a manner as might occaſion ſcandal and diſturbance: not conſidering that time and opportunities are not to be loſt, that beneficence is ineffectual, that fortune is inconſtant, and that envy is not to be appeaſed by any ſort of favours or good offices whatſoever. So that both theſe perſons were ruined at laſt; one of them becauſe he had not authority enough to rid himſelf of thoſe who envied him; and the other by not doing it when he had it in his power †.

Another thing to be obſerved in the conduct of Camillus, is the proviſion he made both at home and abroad for the preſervation of Rome: and indeed, ſuch Hiſtorians as Livy are much to be commended, for giving a particular and circumſtantial account of theſe occurrences, that ſo thoſe who come after them may know how to act upon ſimiliar occaſions. We ought therefore to remark upon this, that it is very imprudent and dangerous to leave the defence of a City to a parcel of tumultuous people, without order

wherein he behaved not himſelf either ambitiouſly or inſolently; nor was any thing done by his own proweſſe or policy, but merely by the ordinance of God."

* See the Prince, chap. vi. † See chap. ix. of this book.

or

or command: of which it is plain, that Camillus was ſufficiently aware, by leaving a regular army for the ſecurity of Rome; which many perhaps may think was altogether unneceſſary, becauſe the Romans were a brave people, and inured to war, and therefore it might have been ſufficient to put arms into their hands when occaſion required. But Camillus judged otherwiſe, and ſo would any prudent man in the like circumſtances: for the multitude ought not to be truſted with arms, except under certain reſtrictions and proper command. In imitation of this example then, a perſon who undertakes the defence of a City, ſhould above all things take care not to arm a giddy and tumultuous multitude, but rather ſelect ſuch as he dares truſt with arms, and is ſatisfied will obey him in whatever he commands; and order thoſe who are not made choice of for that purpoſe, to ſtay at home and guard their own houſes. Whoever purſues this method in a town that is beſieged, will find it an eaſy matter to defend it well; otherwiſe, it will be difficult, if not impoſſible *.

CHAP. XXXI.

That powerful Republics and truly great men retain their dignity and firmneſs of mind in all viciſſitudes of fortune.

AMONGST all the noble actions and ſayings which Livy aſcribes to Camillus, nothing ſhews the magnanimity of that great man more plainly than the following: "Nec mihi Dictatura animos fecit (ſaid he in one of his ſpeeches) nec exilium ademit: I am not elated with the Dictatorſhip, nor was I dejected in baniſhment." By which we ſee that great men are always the ſame in every reverſe of fortune: for though ſhe may change her counte-

* See the Art of War, book vii. at the beginning.

nance,

nance, and ſometimes exalt, and ſometimes depreſs them, yet they never vary, but conſtantly retain the ſame firmneſs of mind, and are ſo uniform in their conduct, that fortune ſeems to have no power over them: whereas mean and puſillanimous men, buoyed up with proſperity, and intoxicated with good fortune, impute all their ſucceſs to virtues of which they were never poſſeſſed; and thus become odious and inſupportable to thoſe who have any thing to do with them. This often expoſes them to ſudden revolutions of fortune, and then they preſently fall into the other extreme, and become as abject as they were arrogant before. Hence it comes to paſs, that when Princes of this ſtamp fall into adverſity, they generally fly, inſtead of exerting themſelves manfully to oppoſe it; for as they abuſed their proſperity, they are incapable of ſupporting themſelves in adverſity. Theſe virtues and theſe defects are common, not only to particular men, but to whole Republics: of which, I ſhall give two examples; one from the conduct of the Romans, the other from that of the Venetians.

The Romans were never diſmayed in adverſity, nor elated with proſperity: for a proof of which, we may alledge their behaviour after their defeat at Cannæ, and their victory over Antiochus. For after that defeat, though Annibal had routed them twice before, and reduced them to the laſt extremity, they were ſo far from being daunted, that inſtead of ſuing for peace, they bravely reſolved to continue the war; and, contrary to their uſual practice, refuſing to redeem the priſoners who had been taken by the enemy, they armed their old men and ſlaves, and ſent a freſh army into the field: an account of which being ſent to Carthage, Hanno told the Senate there, "He feared they were but little better for their victory at Cannæ:" from whence we ſee that the Romans were never dejected in the loweſt ebb of their fortune. On the other hand, they never grew arrogant in proſperity, as we may obſerve from the behaviour of Scipio to Antiochus: for when that Prince ſent Ambaſſadors with overtures of

of peace to Scipio, the latter told them he would not grant him any terms except he would retire into Syria, and submit entirely to the discretion of the Roman Republic. But Antiochus rejecting these conditions, came to an engagement with the Roman army, and was utterly defeated: after which, he sent other Ambassadors with orders to accept any terms from the Conqueror; who contented himself however with the same which he offered him before the battle, telling the Ambassadors, "Quod Romani, si vincuntur, non minuuntur animis, nec si vincunt insolescere solent; that as the Romans were never dejected when they lost a battle, so they knew how to behave with moderation when they were victorious."

Very different was the behaviour of the Venetians in their prosperity, which they attributed solely to their own bravery and good conduct, though without the least reason: for they became so insolent, that they called the King of France a Son of St. Mark, treated the Pope and all the rest of the Italian Princes with the utmost disdain; and, not content with their territories in Italy, vainly imagined they should soon extend their dominion as far as ever the ancient Romans had done. But fortune beginning to frown upon them, and their forces being worsted at the battle of Vaila, by the French, they lost all their acquisitions at once; for some of the States that were subject to them revolted, and the rest they meanly ceded to the Pope and the King of Spain: after which, they were so dispirited that they sent Ambassadors to the Emperor, with an offer of becoming tributary to him; and wrote letters to the Pope, in the most abject and submissive terms, to move his compassion. To this extremity of dejection they were reduced in four days, and when they had not lost one half of their army: for after the above mentioned battle, one of their Commissaries retreated safe to Verona with above twenty-five thousand horse and foot. So that if they had acted with any sort of spirit, they might soon have brought another army into the field: and if they

could not have beat the enemy, they might perhaps have obtained an honourable peace; at leaſt the loſs of their dominions would not have been attended with ſo much diſgrace. But their dejection was owing to the defect of their military inſtitutions and the conſciouſneſs of their inexperience in warlike affairs; which diſheartened them to ſuch a degree, that they were incapable of exerting themſelves as they ought. But this will always be the fate of ſuch people: for inſolence in proſperity, and dejection in adverſity, are owing to mean and pitiful inſtitutions. If men are improperly educated and diſciplined, they will never be good for any thing: if otherwiſe, they will know how to behave with equanimity in all conditions, and to make ſo true an eſtimate of the things of this world, as neither to become inſolent when fortune ſmiles, nor abject when ſhe frowns upon them. So that what I ſaid before of individuals will hold good with regard to whole communities; which will always act with ſpirit or puſillanimity, according as their diſcipline and inſtitutions are good and wholeſome, or mean and defective

Now though I have ſaid elſewhere that good military diſcipline is the foundation ſtone of all States, and that without it there can neither be good laws nor good order of any kind *, it may not be amiſs to repeat it here; becauſe we ſee the neceſſity of keeeping up a good army in almoſt every page of Livy's Hiſtory, and that no army can ever be good except it is well diſciplined and exerciſed, which cannot be done if it is not compoſed of your own ſubjects. For as no State, either is, or can be, continually at war, it is neceſſary that its forces ſhould be duly exerciſed and diſciplined in time of peace: but that is impoſſible if your army conſiſts of foreign troops, on account of the immenſe expence you muſt be at in maintaining ſuch an army both in peace and war. Ca-

* See the Prince, chap. xii. xiii. xiv. Pol. Diſc. book i. chap. xxi. book ii. chap. xx. and the Art of War, paſſim.

millus,

millus, as I ſaid above, marched out with an army againſt the Tuſcans: but when they came within ſight of the enemy, and found the Tuſcan army was much ſuperior to their own, they were not a little diſmayed: but Camillus being aware of it, calmly walked through the ranks, and without any further directions or altering the diſpoſition of his army, only ſaid to his Soldiers, "Quod quiſque didicit, aut conſuevit, faciat; practiſe what you have learnt, and I deſire no more." From whence we may conclude that he well knew they had been ſufficiently diſciplined and exerciſed before, both in peace and war, to make them good ſoldiers; and that he fully confided in them. For it is certain that no material ſervice can be expected from an undiſciplined army; that no General can truſt to it; and that if Hannibal himſelf ſhould riſe from the dead, and be put at the head of ſuch a body of forces, they would preſently be cut to pieces by a well diſciplined army, though much inferior in number; becauſe when an army is engaged, the General himſelf cannot be in all places at the ſame time; and therefore it is neceſſary that his ſubordinate officers ſhould ſtrictly obey the commands he had given them before the battle begun; that they ſhould enter into the ſpirit of their orders, and know how to execute them in a proper manner: otherwiſe he muſt inevitably be defeated.

If then any ſtate will follow the example of the ancient Romans, in exerciſing and diſciplining its forces in times of peace as well as war, and accuſtom its ſubjects not only to exert their virtues both in public and private, but to arm themſelves againſt the viciſſitudes of fortune; it will always be able to maintain its dignity both in proſperity and adverſity: but if it neglects this, and leaves itſelf entirely to the caprice of fortune, without any dependence upon its own merit and endeavours, as the Venetians did, it muſt be ſhaken by every blaſt of wind, and totally ruined at laſt.

CHAP. XXXII.

What methods ſome people have taken to prevent a peace.

THE Circei and Velitræ, two Roman Colonies, revolted from that Republic in hopes of being protected by the Latins: but the Latins themſelves being ſoon after ſubdued, and unable to give them any aſſiſtance, ſome of the revolters adviſed their Fellow-citizens to return to their obedience. This advice however was warmly oppoſed by the authors of that rebellion; who being afraid they ſhould be more ſeverely puniſhed than any of the reſt, endeavoured by all means to prevent an accommodation, and for that purpoſe perſuaded their countrymen to continue in arms and commence hoſtilities againſt the Romans. And indeed it muſt be confeſſed, that when any one has a mind to prevent either a Prince or a Republic, from coming to terms of agreement, there is no ſurer method to obtain that end than to prevail upon them to injure or affront the other party in ſo atrocious a manner, that the dread of the puniſhment they have juſtly deſerved may deter them from making any overtures of peace *.

At the end of the firſt war in which the Carthaginians were engaged with the Romans, the Soldiers who had been employed by the former in Sicily and Sardinia, were ſent back into Africa, where they mutinied for want of pay; and taking up arms under Matho and Spendius, whom they had made choice of for their leaders, they plundered ſeveral towns that belonged to the State. Upon which, the Carthaginians being deſirous to try all other means before they proceeded to force, ſent Aſdrubal, one of their principal Citizens, to treat with them, in hopes he would have been able to reduce them to obedience by the

* See the Speech of a Plebeian, Hiſt. Flor. book iii. about the middle of it.

influence

influence which they ſuppoſed he muſt have over them as he had been their Commander ſome time before. But when he arrived amongſt them, Matho and Spendius being determined to deprive their Soldiers of all hopes of ever coming to any terms with the Carthaginians, perſuaded them that it was the beſt way to kill Aſdrubal and all the reſt of the Carthaginians whom they had taken priſoners. This advice was accordingly followed: for they not only put them to the moſt cruel kinds of death they could deviſe, but afterwards publiſhed a proclamation in which they threatened to ſerve all other Carthaginian priſoners in the ſame manner that ſhould fall into their hands: by which they prevented all propoſals of peace, and made their Soldiers more obſtinate in their rebellion.

CHAP. XXXIII.

That it is of great ſervice in battle, to inſpire Soldiers with confidence both in themſelves and their General.

IT is a matter of the utmoſt importance to inſpire Soldiers with ſuch a degree of confidence before a battle, as makes them think themſelves ſure of Victory; for which purpoſe, it is neceſſary they ſhould be well armed, well diſciplined, and well acquainted with each other; which yet cannot be effected, except they are your own Subjects, and countrymen, and have lived long together. It is alſo requiſite that they ſhould have ſo good an opinion of their General, as to put great confidence in him; which they will always do, if they ſee that he is vigilant, active, brave, and keeps up his command with dignity; which he may eaſily do, if he puniſhes offenders in a proper manner, and does not harraſs his men with hard duty when it is unneceſſary: beſides which, he ſhould be punctual in fulfilling his promiſes, ready at all times to encourage them, by repreſenting how eaſy it is to ſurmount many things which ſeem difficult

cult only at a diſtance, and by either concealing or extenuating all dangers: for this is a certain way to ſecure their confidence, and contributes much to victory *. The Romans uſed to inſpire their troops with this confidence by Religious means, and always had recourſe to Auguries and Auſpices when they created Conſuls, raiſed armies, or were going to engage an enemy: in ſhort, without ſome ceremony of this kind, their wiſeſt and beſt Generals never went upon any enterprize or undertook any thing of moment; imagining that it would contribute greatly to their ſucceſs to have it thought the Gods were on their ſide: and if any of their Conſuls or Generals preſumed to engage an enemy in contempt of the Auſpices, they always puniſhed them for it, as they did Claudius Pulcher. Appius Claudius, accordingly, complaining to the people of the inſolence of the Tribunes, by whoſe means the Auſpices and other Religious rites had been corrupted, ſays as follows; "Eludant nunc licet Religionem: quid enim intereſt ſi pulli non paſcentur, ſi ex caveâ tardius exierint, ſi occinuerit avis? Parva ſunt hæc; ſed parva iſta non contemnendo majores noſtri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt. They may laugh at Religion if they pleaſe, and ſay what ſignifies it whether the poultry eat their meat or not, whether they come quickly or ſlowly out of their pens, and whether ſuch or ſuch a bird ſings? Theſe matters may ſeem trifling indeed; but trifling as they are, our Anceſtors exalted this Republic to the glory we now ſee it in by a Religious obſervation of them." For ſuch things ſerve to keep Soldiers in good ſpirits and united, which conduces not a little to the ſucceſs of any undertaking: but they muſt be ſeconded by valour and good conduct, otherwiſe they will not be ſufficient of themſelves alone, as may appear from the following inſtance. The Prænestines having taken the field againſt the Romans, encamped upon the banks of the Allia, in

* See the Art of War, book IV. towards the end, & alibi paſſim.

the

the very place where the Romans had once been defeated by the Gauls: which they did to inſpire their own army with courage, and to ſtrike a damp into that of the enemy, when they remembered how unfortunate they had been in that place before *. Now though there was ſome policy in this ſtep, yet the event ſhewed that true valour is not to be moved by ſuch trifling circumſtances; for the Roman Dictator having reconnoitred the enemy, ſaid to his General of horſe, "Vides tu fortunâ illos fretos, ad Alliam conſediſſe; at tu, fretus armis animiſque, invade mediam aciem: you ſee that the enemy have ſat down here, truſting to the fortune of the place; but truſt you to your own arms and courage, and fall on." True valour therefore, good diſcipline, and a confidence ariſing from many victories, cannot be diſconcerted by trivial accidents and little diſorders. The two Manlii being at the head of an army which the Romans ſent out againſt the Volſci, and having detached part of their forces to forage, it happened that both thoſe who went upon that errand, and thoſe that remained in their camp, were attacked by the enemy at the ſame time; out of which danger however, the Soldiers extricated themſelves by their own courage, rather than by any good conduct in the Conſuls, as Livy tells us, "militum etiam ſine rectore ſtabilis virtus tutata eſt."

I ſhould not conclude this Chapter without taking ſome notice of an expedient made uſe of by Fabius to encourage his Soldiers: for being ſent with an army againſt the Tuſcans, and knowing how neceſſary it was to inſpire them with confidence of ſucceſs, eſpecially as they were in a ſtrange country, and had a new enemy to deal with, he told them in an harangue when they were going to engage, that they had many reaſons to hope for victory, but he could give them another, why they might depend upon it with certainty, if it was not of ſuch a nature, that it

* See book I. chap. lvi. note 78, of theſe Diſcourſes, towards the latter end of it.

would be dangerous to diſcloſe it. An admirable piece of Generalſhip, and well worthy of imitation.

CHAP. XXXIV.

What ſort of reputation, or character, or opinion it is, that firſt inclines the people to favour ſome particular Citizen: and whether a People, or a Prince diſpoſes of their honours and employments with greater judgment and prudence.

WE have ſhewn before that Titus Manlius, (afterwards called Torquatus) defended his father in an accuſation that was brought againſt him by Marcus Pomponius, one of the Tribunes of the people. And though the method he took to do it was ſomething extraordinary, and ſavoured of violence, yet the remarkable affection which he ſhewed to his father was ſo pleaſing to the people, that inſtead of calling him to any account for what he had done, they ſhewed their approbation of it by chuſing him ſecond Tribune of the Legions, at the next election of thoſe officers *. It may not be amiſs therefore, to conſider the motives upon which the people commonly act in the diſpoſal of their honours: from whence we ſhall ſee, that they proceed with more prudence and judgment than Princes uſually do in ſuch diſtributions, as I have aſſerted elſewhere †.

I ſay then, that the people are determined in their choice upon theſe occaſions, either by the public character and reputation of a man, when his conduct and actions are not otherwiſe known to them; or by ſome particular prepoſſeſſion or opinion of their own; both which motives are ſometimes owing to a man's extraction, (for when his anceſtors have been good and worthy men, it is generally thought he will be ſo too, except he behaves himſelf in ſuch a manner as to

* See book I. chap. xi. † See book I. chap. lviii.

convince

convince them of the contrary) and ſometimes to his own converſation and way of life: that is, when he aſſociates himſelf with virtuous and honourable men, and ſuch as are in high eſteem for their prudence: for ſince there is no ſurer way of judging of a man than by the company he keeps, a perſon who aſſociates with good men will juſtly be thought ſo himſelf; becauſe when people are intimate, and much converſant together, there muſt of neceſſity be a ſimilitude in their manners. But there is another way of gaining credit amongſt the people; which is by great and honourable actions, either of a public or private nature. This is the beſt and moſt ſtable foundation that any man can build his reputation upon: for that which depends upon the merit of our Anceſtors ſoon fades and periſhes, except it is revived and renewed by a man's own virtues. The prepoſſeſſion which ariſes from your ordinary manner of life and aſſociating with good men, is a better foundation than this; though not ſo good a one as the other; for as it ariſes from opinion and expectation only, it is likewiſe apt to wear off, if not ſupported and confirmed, in ſome reaſonable time, by great and laudable actions: but the reputation which depends upon a man's own merit, takes ſo deep a root, and ſtands ſo firm, that he muſt behave very ill indeed to forfeit it afterwards.

Thoſe that live in a Commonwealth ought therefore to purſue this courſe, and endeavour by all means to begin their career with ſome great and extraordinary action, which may ſerve as a foundation to build their future reputation upon; as the young Romans did, who always ſet out either with promoting ſome law for the good of the public, or impeaching ſome great and powerful Citizen, who had tranſgreſſed the laws, or doing ſome other remarkable thing that made him the ſubject of popular applauſe. This manner of proceeding is no leſs neceſſary to maintain and increaſe a good reputation, than to acquire it at firſt: for which purpoſe it ſhould often be repeated; as it was by Titus Manlius through the whole

whole courſe of his life. For after he had defended his father in ſo ſtrenuous and extraordinary a manner, and thereby laid the foundation of his reputation, he ſome years after fought the Champion of the Gauls, as we have ſaid before, and having killed him in a ſingle combat, took a gold collar from his neck and put it upon his own; by which he gained the name of Torquatus. Theſe things he did when he was young: and afterwards, when he grew up to years of maturity, he put his own Son to death for having engaged the enemy without orders; though he had gained a victory. Such examples of perſonal courage, and ſtrict regard to diſcipline and juſtice, gave him much more reputation, both in his own times, and the ages that have ſince paſſed, than all the battles he had won, and the triumphs he had obtained, though he had been as ſucceſsful in that reſpect as any other of his countrymen: and not without reaſon; for in one caſe he had many equals, but in the other, very few, or none at all. Scipio the elder did not gain ſo much glory by his triumphs, as by ſaving his father's life in battle, when he was but a youth; and by drawing his ſword, and forcing ſeveral young Romans to take an oath that they would never deſert their country, which they had deſigned to do after the battle of Cannæ *: for theſe two actions were the foundation of his fame, and ſerved as ſteps to the triumphs which were afterwards decreed him by the Senate for his victories in Africa and Spain: and this reputation (great as it was before) he prodigiouſly increaſed, by ſending back a beautiful young Lady, whom he had taken priſoner in Spain, ſafe and inviolate to her friends. Now if ſuch a conduct muſt be obſerved by thoſe that would advance themſelves to honour and preferment in a Commonwealth, it is equally neceſſary that Princes ſhould do the ſame, in order to acquire and preſerve the eſteem of their Subjects: for nothing recommends a Prince ſo much to

* See book I. chap. xi.

his

his People, as either ſaying or doing ſomething extraordinary in his youth: eſpecially if it ſeems to proceed from a regard to their welfare, and has ſuch an appearance of magnanimity, juſtice, or liberality, as makes it much talked of †.

But to reſume our ſubject. I ſay that when the people begin to have a good opinion of any particular perſon, and are moved to confer their honours and employments upon him, by one or other of the abovementioned reaſons, their judgment is not ill founded: but certainly they judge beſt, when they do it after he has given ſome proofs of his merit; becauſe, in that caſe, they ſeldom or never can be deceived. I ſpeak only of that good opinion which they conceive of a man at firſt, before he has either ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed himſelf, and eſtabliſhed his reputation by repeated inſtances of his worth, or cancelled the merit of his good actions by others of a different nature: in both which caſes they are not ſo apt to err as a Prince. For ſince it is poſſible that the people may be deceived by report, or opinion, or even by the actions of a man, and think better of him than he deſerves, (which is an error that a Prince cannot well fall into, becauſe he has counſellors to adviſe and inform him better) wiſe Legiſlators have always taken care to obviate this inconvenience, by providing, that when any great office ſhould become vacant, and the people ſhould be ſo far miſtaken in their judgment as to make choice of an improper or unworthy perſon to fill it, any Citizen ſhould not only be at liberty to publiſh his incapacity or demerit, but have the thanks of his Fellow citizens for ſo doing; that the people, better informed, might correct their error. For a proof of this, we may appeal to an harangue which Fabius Maximus made to the people, in the time of the ſecond Punic war, when they were inclined to have created T. Ottacilius, one of their Conſuls: but Fabius thinking him by no means equal to ſuch a charge

† See the Prince, chap. xxi.

at

at that juncture, openly declared againſt him, and repreſented his inſufficiency in ſuch a light that he was ſet aſide, and another perſon elected of more worth and greater abilities. The people therefore, in the election of Magiſtrates, found their opinion of men upon ſuch circumſtances as are leaſt apt to deceive one: and when they have Counſellors to adviſe them, they are guilty of fewer errors than Princes: ſo that a Citizen who would gain their favour and good opinion, muſt firſt diſtinguiſh himſelf by ſome great and remarkable action, as Titus Manlius did *.

CHAP. XXXV.

That it is dangerous to be the chief promoter and adviſer of an Enterprize: and that the more important the Enterprize is, the greater is the danger.

IT would be too tedious a taſk to ſhew at large how dangerous it is for one man to take upon himſelf to preſide and direct in any new and extraor-

* "The moſt painful and difficult employment in the world, (ſays Montaigne, book III. chap. vii.) in my opinion, is worthily to diſcharge the office of a King. I excuſe more of their failings than men commonly do, in conſideration of the vaſt weight of their function, which really aſtoniſhes me. It is difficult for ſuch boundleſs power to obſerve any decorum. Yet ſo it is, that even to thoſe who are not of the moſt happy diſpoſition, it is a ſingular incitement to virtue, to be ſtationed in ſuch a place, that whatever good you do is recorded and placed to account, and the leaſt Benefaction extends to numbers of people; and where your talent, like that of Preachers, chiefly addreſſes itſelf to the people, who are not very nice judges, eaſily deceived, and eaſily ſatisfied. There are few things in which we can give a ſincere judgment; becauſe there are few wherein we have not in ſome ſort a particular intereſt. Superiority and inferiority, command and ſubjection, are naturally liable to envy and cavil, and muſt neceſſarily be continually encroaching upon one another. I believe neither one nor the other, touching its reſpective rights: let reaſon therefore, which is inflexible and diſpaſſionate, when it can be found, determine the caſe. It is ſcarcely a month ago ſince I turned over two Scotch Authors who contended with each other upon this point. He who takes the part of the People, makes the condition of a King worſe than that of a Carter; and the writer for the Monarch, lifts him up ſome degrees above Almighty God in Sovereignty and Power." See alſo book I. chap. xxix. xliv. and lviii. of theſe Diſcourſes.

dinary

dinary enterprize, wherein the concurrent advice and aſſiſtance of many are required, how difficult it is to conduct ſuch an undertaking, and how much more ſo, to bring it to a happy concluſion. I ſhall therefore reſerve what I have to ſay upon one part of this matter for a more convenient place; and ſpeak only at preſent of the dangers to which a man is expoſed who preſumes to give a Prince ſuch advice in any great and important enterprize, that the ſucceſs of it, whether good or bad, muſt be imputed wholly to himſelf. For as mankind commonly judge of things by the event, if an enterprize miſcarries, all the blame is laid upon him that adviſed it; and if it ſucceeds he may gain ſome little applauſe; but the reward in that caſe is not adequate to the danger he would have been in if it had failed. Selim, the preſent Grand Signior, having made preparations to invade Syria and Egypt (as it is reported by ſome who lately come out of Turky) was adviſed by one of his Baſhaws who lived upon the confines of Perſia, to turn his arms upon the Sophi. He therefore marched with a very powerful army againſt the Perſians; but arriving in a flat open country where there were vaſt deſarts and no water to be had, and meeting with many other difficulties and dangers which in former times had often proved fatal to the Roman armies in thoſe parts, his forces were ſo diminiſhed by hunger, thirſt, and ſickneſs, that, though he ſucceeded in that expedition, he loſt the greater part of his army: upon which, he was ſo enraged at the perſon who adviſed him to undertake it, that he put him to death. Many others have been treated in the ſame manner by Republics upon like occaſions, as we might ſhew at large from the hiſtory of former times. It happened that one of the Roman Conſuls being choſen out of the Plebeians, by the inſtigation of ſome particular Citizens, was defeated the firſt time he led an army into the field: for which the encouragers of that election would have been called to an account, if the whole body of Plebeians had not thought themſelves obliged

ed to protect them for the honour they had done them. Hence we see that the Counsellors of Princes and Republics lie under this dilemma; that if they do not give such advice as they think best for their Masters, without any other consideration, they fail in their duty; and if they do, they often hazard their own lives and fortunes: because (as I said before) most men are apt to judge of the goodness or badness of their counsel from the event.

Considering therefore with myself how these dangers are to be avoided, I think the best way is to proceed with calmness and moderation, and not to avow or patronize any undertaking with vehemence and earnestness, as a project of your own; but to give your opinion in a modest manner, and support it without passion: that so, if a Prince or a Republic should think fit to follow it, they may seem to do it voluntarily, and not to be forced into it by clamour and importunity. If you act in this manner, it would be unreasonable either in the Prince or the people to blame your advice, as it is not forced upon them without the concurrence and approbation of the other Counsellors: and therefore you have nothing to fear when your counsel is not opposed by the rest; but when it is followed with reluctance, you are in danger, because if it should not succeed, they will all combine to ruin you. Now though there is not so much honour to be gained this way, as when the authority of one man prevails over that of many, and his advice is crowned with success; yet it is attended with two advantages: for in the first place, you run no risque; and in the second, when you propose any thing with modesty, and it is carried against you by the obstinacy and perverseness of the rest; if any miscarriage should ensue in the execution, it will be still more for your reputation. Not that a good man should ever wish to build his reputation upon any misfortune that may befal his Prince or his country; but when such a thing has actually happened, it is more satisfaction to have given such counsel as would have

have prevented it, and to hear it applauded, than to be in danger of being puniſhed for it.

This is the beſt courſe, I think, that can be taken by Counſellors in ſuch caſes: to be ſilent and give no opinion would be not only betraying their country, but expoſing themſelves to danger; for in a little time they would become ſuſpected, and might be ſerved as the Macedonian was by Perſeus, who being defeated by Paulus Æmilius, and eſcaping into a place of ſafety with a few friends, was told by one of them (as they were talking over their misfortunes) of ſome errors he had been guilty of that were the cauſe of his ruin; at which, he turned to him, and aſking if he was not aſhamed to tell him of them, like a Traitor, when there was no remedy left, he immediately killed him with his own hands: ſo that he was juſtly puniſhed for being ſilent when he ſhould have ſpoken, and ſpeaking when he ought to have held his tongue. The preceding directions therefore deſerve our attention.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Why the French always have been, and ſtill are, accounted more than men at the firſt charge; and afterwards leſs than women.

THE ardour of the Gaul who challenged any man in the Roman army to a ſingle combat, and was killed by Titus Manlius upon the banks of the Anio, puts me in mind of what Livy ſays of the Gauls in ſeveral parts of his Hiſtory, viz. that at the beginning of a battle they are more than men, but afterwards leſs than women *. Many writers conſidering to what cauſes this may be attributed, aſcribe it to the natural emperament and conſtitution of the people: and indeed I think there ſeems to be ſome

* See the Sketch of France, vol. ii.

appearance

appearance of truth and reaſon in this opinion; but I am perſuaded at the ſame time, that this innate ardour which makes them ſo fierce at the firſt onſet might be ſo corrected and regulated by art as to be kept up till the end of a battle.

For a proof of my aſſertion let it be conſidered that there are three ſorts of armies; one, in which there is both courage and good order; the former of which is in a great meaſure owing to the latter †. Of this ſort were the Roman armies, which were always remarkable for the regularity and good order that were eſtabliſhed in them by ſtrict diſcipline and conſtant exerciſe: nothing was done without the expreſs command of their General; the Soldiers neither eat nor ſlept, nor bought, nor ſold, nor did any thing either of a civil or military nature without his permiſſion. The example therefore of thoſe armies which ſubdued the whole world ought certainly to be followed by all others: for ſuch as do not think it worth their imitation, cannot properly be called armies; and if they ever happen to do any thing extraordinary, it is rather to be imputed to a degree of fury and blind impetuoſity, than to true valour. But well diſciplined troops know how to moderate and reſtrain thoſe ſallies, and avail themſelves of their courage at proper times and places, in ſuch a manner that they are never diſmayed at any difficulty or danger: for good order and diſcipline conſtantly revive their ſpirits, and inſpire them with ſuch confidence of victory that they think nothing can ſtand before them whilſt they keep firm and compact in their ranks. Very different is the caſe in the ſecond ſort of armies, which, like the French, have ardour enough, but no good diſcipline; and therefore they always give way very ſoon; for if they do not immediately make an impreſſion upon the enemy, the fury of their firſt efforts being ſpent, and having no diſcipline to animate and ſupport them, they grow diſpirited and run away.

† See the Art of War, paſſim.

Whereas

Whereas the Romans, on the contrary, relying on their diſcipline and good order, were not to be daunted by any ſort of difficulty or danger, nor ever deſpaired of victory; but behaved with as much valour and firmneſs at the end of a battle as in the beginning, or rather more if poſſible, as their courage always increaſed according to the reſiſtance they met with. But there is a third ſort of armies which (like thoſe of the Italians at preſent) have neither any courage, nor diſcipline: and theſe in truth are good for nothing at all, nor ever can gain a victory, except they chance to fall upon an army that is routed by ſome other accident. What ſort of order may be expected in ſuch armies we may ſee from the ſpeech of Papirius Curſor in Livy, when he would have puniſhed Fabius his Maſter of horſe for diſobedience of orders. "Nemo hominum neque Deorum verecundiam habeat; non edicta Imperatorum, non auſpicia obſerventur: ſine commeatu, vagi milites in pacato, in hoſtico, errent; immemores ſacramenti, ſe ubi velint exauctorent; infrequentia deſerant ſigna; neque conveniant ad edictum; nec diſcernant interdiu, nocte; æquo, iniquo loco; juſſu, injuſſu Imperatoris, pugnent; & non ſigna, non ordines ſervent; latrocinii modo, cæca & fortuita, pro ſolenni & ſacratâ militia ſit. Henceforth no body will ſhew the leaſt reverence to any Inſtitutions either human or divine; they will laugh at the commands of their Generals, and deſpiſe the ſacred Auſpices; the looſe diſorderly Soldiers will wander about without any paſſport, and plunder their own country as well as that of the enemy; they will think no more of their oath, but diſcharge themſelves when they pleaſe; they will deſert their colours, and return to them no more upon any proclamation whatſoever; they will have no regard either to the advantage of time or place, when they are to engage an enemy; they will obey no ſignals or orders, but fight when they have a mind, whether their Commanders will or not, and become more like a parcel of banditti, a tumultuous and diſorderly rabble, than a re-

gular and well disciplined army." Hence we may judge whether our armies at present "are more like a parcel of banditti, a tumultuous and disorderly rabble, or regular and well disciplined troops," how different they are from such as may properly be called good soldiers, how far from being either brave and orderly at the same time, like the old Romans, or even from being brave alone, like the French.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Whether Skirmishes before a battle are necessary; and how the nature and disposition of a new enemy is to be discovered without them.

NOT to mention the difficulties that occur in conducting all human affairs to any degree of perfection, there is no good without some evil so intimately united and interwoven with it, that it seems impossible to separate them, or to obtain the one without partaking of the other. It is a hard matter therefore to arrive at perfection, except a man is favoured by fortune in such an extraordinary manner as enables him to surmount these usual and natural impediments. These reflections I cannot help making whenever I read the account given by Livy of the single combat betwixt Titus Manlius and the Champion of the Gauls: upon which that Historian says, "Tanti ea dimicatio ad universi belli eventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepidè castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam transierit. The event of this combat was of such consequence, that it in a great measure determined the success of the war: for the Gauls immediately decamped in the utmost consternation, and retreated first into the territories of the Tiburtines, and from thence into Campania." For we must consider on one hand, that no General ought to do any thing, which, though seemingly of small importance, may have

have an ill effect upon his army; and that to ſtake his whole fortune upon part of his forces only where he cannot exert all his ſtrength, is very raſh and imprudent, as I have ſhewn before at large in my obſervations on defending defiles *. On the other hand it is to be conſidered, that when a General has a new Enemy to deal with of any reputation, he is obliged to make ſome trial of them by light ſkirmiſhes and fighting in ſmall parties before he comes to a general engagement; that ſo his Soldiers beginning to be acquainted with their diſcipline and manner of fighting, may not be diſmayed at the report they have heard of their proweſs; which indeed is a precaution of great importance, and ſo neceſſary, that without it he runs no ſmall riſque of being defeated. Thus when Valerius Corvinus was ſent by the Romans with an army againſt the Samnites, (an enemy with whom they had never been engaged before) Livy tells us that he frequently ſent out ſmall parties to ſkirmiſh and reconnoitre the enemy, "ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hoſtis terreret; that ſo his Soldiers might not be daunted at a new enemy, or a new way of fighting." It muſt be confeſſed however, that this method of ſending out ſmall parties to ſkirmiſh with the enemy is ſubject to great dangers: for if they ſhould be defeated, it would have a very different effect from what was deſigned, and diſmay your troops inſtead of animating them: ſo that this is one of thoſe things in which good and evil are ſo cloſely united, that you may eaſily miſtake the one for the other.

I ſay then, that a General ſhould endeavour by all means to prevent any thing that may ſtrike a terror into his army, to which all troops are naturally ſubject when they are beat; and therefore he ought not to ſuffer them to ſkirmiſh with the enemy, except they can do it with great advantage, and are ſure of ſucceſs; neither ſhould he attempt to maintain paſſes, where he cannot employ his whole ſtrength; nor be

* See book I. chap. xxii. xxiii. and the Art of War, paſſim.

too obſtinate in defending any town, unleſs he knows he muſt inevitably be ruined by the loſs of it: and when that is the caſe, he is to draw all the reſt of his forces out of other places into the field; that ſo they may be able to act in concert with the garriſon, and exert their whole ſtrength to prevent its being taken. For when an enemy gets poſſeſſion of ſuch places only as you abandon, and you have ſtill an army entire in the field, it is no diſcredit to you, nor diſcouragement to your Soldiers: but when you loſe a place which you had undertaken to maintain, and every body expected you would do it effectually, it hurts your reputation and diſmays your troops in ſuch a manner, that you will probably be ruined, as the Gauls were, by riſquing the event of the whole war upon a trifling occaſion. Philip of Macedon (the father of Perſeus) a Prince well experienced in war, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the Romans, abandoned and laid waſte a conſiderable part of his country which he thought he ſhould not be able to defend; wiſely judging it would be leſs diſgrace to leave it to the enemy as not worth keeping, than to undertake its defence and fail in his endeavours. The Romans being reduced to great diſtreſs after the battle of Cannæ, and not by any means in a condition to protect ſome of their Subjects and allies who deſired their aſſiſtance, gave them leave to defend themſelves as well as they could. Now certainly ſuch reſolutions as theſe are much more honourable than pretending to defend others when it is not in your power: for in one caſe, you loſe your friends only; but in the other, you ruin both them and yourſelf.

But to return to the matter of ſkirmiſhing; I ſay, that if a General is obliged by a new enemy, and a manner of fighting of which his troops have had no experience, to try ſomething of that kind for the purpoſes abovementioned, he ought either to do it with ſuch advantage that he may be ſure of ſucceſs; or to follow the example of Marius, (which is the better way of the two) when he marched againſt the Cimbri,

bri, a brave and warlike people, who had invaded Italy, and were plundering all the country: for seeing his troops were seized with a sort of panic at the approach of such a swarm of people, who, though naturally fierce, were not a little elated with a victory which they had already gained over the Romans, he thought it necessary, before he came to an engagement with them, to take some method that might animate his Soldiers, and dispossess them of the terror they had conceived of those barbarians: for which purpose, like a wise General, he often encamped in places where they might observe the march of the enemy at a distance and in security: that so his Soldiers, keeping themselves close within their entrenchments, and being used to see them every day, when they perceived they had only to deal with a disorderly multitude, encumbered with baggage, some of them armed with such weapons as could not much annoy them, and others without any arms at all, they might recover their Spirits, and instead of declining an engagement, be desirous to fight them. A manner of proceeding worthy of so great a General, and of being followed by others who would avoid the dangers above-mentioned, and not be reduced to the same necessity that the Gauls found themselves in, "Qui ob rem parvi ponderis, (says the Historian,) in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transierint: who being terrified at an accident of little moment, retreated first into the territories of Tibur, and then into Campania."

CHAP. XXXVIII.

How a General ought to be qualified to make his Troops confide in him.

VALERIUS CORVINUS (as I said in the last Chapter) was sent with an army against the Samnites, a new enemy at that time to the Roman Republic.

public. To encourage his men therefore, and to make them acquainted with the enemy they had to do with, he ſometimes ſent ſmall parties out to ſkirmiſh, and ſometimes uſed to harangue them all together: in which harangues, eſpecially in one that he made juſt before they were coming to a general engagement, he repreſented to them with great energy, how little account they ought to make of ſuch an enemy, when they conſidered their own valour and his conduct. From one part of this Speech we may learn, in what manner a Commander ought to be qualified, in order to gain the confidence of his Soldiers: "Tum etiam intueri (ſays he) cujus ductu auſpicioque ineunda pugna ſit: utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator ſit, verbis tantum ferox, operum militarium expers; an qui & ipſe tela tractare, procedere ante ſigna, verſari mediâ in mole pugnæ ſciat. Facta mea, non dicta, vos milites ſequi volo, nec diſciplinam modo, ſed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hâc dextrâ mihi tres conſulatus, ſummamque laudem peperi: Conſider the man under whoſe conduct and auſpices you are going to engage; whether he who now ſpeaks to you is only a magnificent boaſter, valiant in words, but ignorant in the duty of a Soldier; or whether he is not a perſon who knows how to handle his own weapons, and is uſed to put himſelf at the head of his men, and charge the thickeſt of the enemy. Obſerve my actions, and not my words only, Fellow-ſoldiers; follow my example, as well as my orders, and confide in me, who have obtained three Conſulſhips, and immortal honour with this arm." Whoever duly conſiders this ſpeech, will ſee what courſe a man ought to take in order to make himſelf reputed a great general: and he that does otherwiſe, will find in time, that his command (in what manner ſoever he obtained it, whether by favour or good fortune) will rather diſgrace than honour him: for it is not the title alone that gives dignity to the man, but the man that dignifies the title.

It muſt be obſerved likewiſe from what we have ſaid

ſaid above, that if great Commanders have been obliged to make uſe of extraordinary means to animate a veteran army, when they were to engage a new enemy, all poſſible care and art muſt be uſed for that purpoſe, in an unexperienced body of troops, which have never looked an enemy in the face before: for, if a new enemy, and an unuſual manner of fighting, are apt to ſtrike a terror even into veterans, it may well be expected that any enemy whatſoever will make a greater impreſſion upon a raw new raiſed army. Good Commanders, however, have always taken care to guard againſt theſe inconveniencies, and found means to ſurmount ſuch difficulties, as we may ſee from the examples of Gracchus the Roman, and Epaminondas the Theban, who beat veteran and well diſciplined armies with new raiſed troops; but they had not only exerciſed them continually for ſome months before, but accuſtomed them to ſham fights, to ſtrict obedience, and to keep firm in their ranks; after which, they had ſo much confidence in them, that they boldly advanced againſt the enemy. Any one therefore, who is a good Soldier himſelf, and has men enow, may ſoon make a good army: ſo that a Prince who has great numbers of Subjects and wants Soldiers, ought not to impute it to the incapacity of his people, but to his own indolence and bad conduct *.

CHAP. XXXIX.

That a General ought to be well acquainted with the Country which is the Seat of war.

AMONGST other qualifications that are neceſſary to make a good Commander, we may reckon the knowledge of countries and their ſituations; with-

* See chap. xxxiii. of this book. Book I. chap. xxi. See alſo the Art of War, book i. & alibi paſſim.

out which it is impoſſible to execute any conſiderable enterprize. Now, as all ſorts of knowledge are perfected by practice and experience, this requires much of both, and is gained chiefly by hunting and other ſuch field exerciſes: for which purpoſe, we are told by ancient Hiſtorians, that the Heroes who governed the world in former times, were all brought up, and educated as it were in woods and foreſts. For hunting teaches you many other things that are of great uſe in war, as well as this ſort of knowledge in particular; and Xenophon tell us, in the life of Cyrus, that when that Prince was marching to invade the King of Armenia's dominions, he talked of that Expedition to his Officers, as if it was nothing more than one of thoſe chaces, in which they had often accompanied him: the men whom he ſent to lie in ambuſh amongſt the mountains, he ſaid, were like thoſe who ſet ſnares and nets in places where wild beaſts uſed to paſs; and thoſe who ſcoured the plains, he compared to ſuch as were employed to rouſe the beaſts and chaſe them into the toils. This I mention to ſhew, that according to Xenophon's opinion, there is a great reſemblance betwixt hunting and war: upon which account, ſuch exerciſes are not only honourable but neceſſary to be uſed by great men; becauſe nothing can give them ſo perfect a knowledge of a country, or imprint it more deeply and particularly in their memory: and when a man has made himſelf thoroughly acquainted with one country, he will be able to form a pretty good judgment of another, though he has never ſeen it before; becauſe there is ſome ſort of ſimilitude and conformity betwixt all countries. But, if a man has not made himſelf well acquainted with the nature of one, it will be a long while (if ever) before he can be able to judge rightly of any other. Whereas, a perſon that is well verſed and practiſed in one, will gueſs pretty nearly at firſt ſight, how far ſuch a plain extends, in what manner ſuch a mountain riſes, how far ſuch a valley ranges, and other things of that kind, the knowledge of which he has gained by former

mer experience *. An example of this ſort we have in the conduct of Publius Decius, (a Tribune in the army with which Aulus Cornelius the Conſul was ſent againſt the Samnites) who perceiving the danger into which the Conſul had led the whole army, by marching through a valley where they might eaſily be hemmed in by the enemy, called out to him, "Vides tu, Aule Corneli, cacumen illud ſupra hoſtem? Arx illa eſt ſpei ſalutiſque noſtræ, ſi eam (quoniam cæci reliquêre Samnites) impigre capimus: Do you ſee yonder eminence, which commands the enemy's camp? we have no reſource left but to make ourſelves maſters of that poſt as faſt as we can, ſince the Samnites have blindly neglected it:" a little before which, Livy ſays, "Publius Decius Tribunus militum, conſpicit unum editum in ſaltu collem, imminentem hoſtium caſtris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem: Publius Decius the Tribune obſerved a hill in a wood, which hung over the enemy's camp, and ſeemed difficult of aſcent to heavy-arm'd troops, but acceſſible enough to thoſe that were light-armed." Upon which, being ſent by the Conſul, with three thouſand picked men, to take poſſeſſion of it immediately, he ſaved the whole Roman army; and deſigning to march off himſelf with his own men in the night, the Hiſtorian tell us, that he firſt ordered ſome of his officers to attend him in the duſk of the evening, whilſt he reconnoitred the enemy, to ſee how their guards were poſted, and which way he might beſt make his retreat: and all this he did in the habit of a private Soldier, that ſo, if he ſhould be ſeen by the enemy, they might not ſuſpect he was a Commander.

Whoever then conſiders this paſſage, will ſee how neceſſary it is for a Commander to be well acquainted with the nature of the countries where he is to act: for if Decius had not been ſo, he could not have known of what importance it was to get poſſeſſion

* See the Prince, chap. xiv. and the Art of War, book V.

of that hill, nor been able to judge at that diſtance whether it was eaſy or difficult of aſcent: nor could he afterwards, when he had taken poſſeſſion of it, and intended to retreat when the night came on in order to join the Conſul, have formed any probable conjecture ſo far off (and when he was in a manner ſurrounded by the enemy) where they would poſt their guards, and which way he might beſt retreat. It is certain therefore that Decius had a perfect knowledge of the country, and ſaw the neceſſity of ſecuring that hill; by which, he not only ſaved the Conſul's army, but found means to retreat in ſafety with his own men, though he was entangled in that manner with the enemy.

CHAP. XL.

That it is not accounted diſhonourable, but quite otherwiſe, to deceive an Enemy in time of war.

THOUGH artifice and deceit are deteſtable in all other tranſactions, yet in matters of war they are not only juſtifiable, but praiſeworthy; and thoſe Generals are as much extolled who overcome an enemy by ſtratagem, as thoſe that ſubdue them by main force *. This plainly appears from the judgment which Hiſtorians paſs upon Hannibal, and ſome other great men, who were moſt remarkable for this manner of proceeding: of which there are ſo many examples, that it is needleſs to cite any here, as they muſt be well known to every one; I ſhall therefore only add at preſent, that when I ſay artifice and deceit are praiſeworthy, I do not mean that ſort which conſiſts in breaking your word, betraying your truſt, or violating a treaty: for though indeed Kingdoms and States are ſometimes acquired this way, as I have

* See this point diſputed by Montaigne, book I. chap. v. of his Eſſays.

ſhewn

ſhewn elſewhere*, yet it is certain, you can never acquire true glory by it. I ſpeak only of that kind which is practiſed upon an enemy, who is ſo far from repoſing any confidence in you, that he ſets you at defiance: ſo that it relates only to military operations. Such were the artifices made uſe of by Hannibal, at the lake of Thraſymene, when he pretended to fly before the Roman Conſul; but in reality did it only to ſecure ſome paſſes, in order to block up him and his army the more effectually: and when he tied fire-brands and torches to the horns of his cattle in the night, to diſengage himſelf from Fabius Maximus. Of the ſame nature likewiſe was the Stratagem uſed by Pontius, General of the Samnites, when he hemmed in the Roman army at the Furcæ Caudinæ: for having concealed his forces in the mountains, he ſent ſome of his men cloathed like peaſants, with droves of cattle into the plains; who being taken by the Romans and aſked where the Samnite army was, all agreed in one ſtory (as they had been inſtructed by Pontius) and ſaid it was gone to lay ſiege to Nocera: which being credited by the Conſuls, they marched away with their forces to the relief of Nocera; but they had no ſooner entered the Furcæ Caudinæ, but they were ſurrounded and ſhut up there by the enemy. A victory indeed, which though gained by ſtratagem, would have been very glorious to Pontius, if he had taken his father's advice, who perſuaded him either to diſmiſs the Romans freely and generouſly, or to put them all to the ſword; but by no means to take the middle way, "Quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit: which neither makes men your friends, nor diſables your enemies;" and has always been prejudiciable in affairs of importance, as I have already ſhewn in another place†.

* See book ii. chap. xiii. † See book II. chap. xxiii.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

That all means are to be used, whether honourable or dishonourable, to save one's Country.

THE Roman army and their Consuls being surrounded by the Samnites (as I said in the last Chapter) were informed by the enemy that the only terms they must expect, were to be disarmed, to pass under the yoke *, and to be sent back to Rome: conditions so ignominious that the Consuls and the whole army were astonished at them. But Lentulus their Lieutenant General told them, "that in his opinion, they ought to submit to any conditions to save their country; that as the safety of Rome entirely depended on the preservation of that army, they should upon no account suffer it to be destroyed; that all means whatsoever, whether honourable or dishonourable, were allowable for the support of their country; and that if they could save their army, they perhaps might some time or other wipe off that disgrace; if not, though they perished with ever so much honour, their country and its liberties must inevitably be lost." His advice therefore was followed; and indeed it is worthy of being recommended to all Counsellors of State, and such as have any share in the management of public affairs: for when the safety of our country is at stake, all regard to what is just or unjust, merciful or unmerciful, honourable or dishonourable, is entirely to be laid aside, and every method to be taken that may in any wise conduce to the preservation of our liberty †. The French are so zealous in this respect,

* This Jugum or Yoke was a Pike or Halberd laid over the tops of two others fixed in the ground, in the form of a gallows or cricket wicket, under which the Romans used to make their enemies pass when they had overcome them; and were sometimes so served themselves after the loss of a battle, as in this case.

† Some people are of a different opinion. "I have formerly placed Epaminondas in the first class of excellent men, (says Montaigne,

pect, both in their words and actions, when either the glory of their Monarch or the intereſt of their country is concerned, that they cannot bear to hear any one ſay, the King acted ſhamefully upon ſuch or ſuch an occaſion; for they think their Prince incapable either of doing or ſaying any thing that is ſhameful or diſhonourable either in proſperity or adverſity, and that in whatever he does, he always behaves in a manner becoming his Majeſty.

CHAP. XLII.

That promiſes extorted by force are not binding.

WHEN the Conſuls abovementioned arrived at Rome with their troops diſarmed and loaded with ignominy on account of the diſhonourable terms they had ſubmitted to, the firſt who declared againſt obſerving the agreement made at the Furcæ Caudinæ was Spurius Poſthumius himſelf, one of the Conſuls; who ſaid in full Senate, that only he and thoſe who had conſented to that agreement were bound by it, and therefore the obligation did not include the whole people of Rome; upon which account, if they had a mind to refuſe their conſent, they ought to ſend him back again to the Samnites with all thoſe that had promiſed to obſerve it. This opinion he maintained with ſo much obſtinacy, that the Senate at laſt ac-

book III. chap. i.) and do not retract it. To what a pitch did he carry his regard to private obligation, who for the ineſtimable benefit of reſtoring his Country, made a conſcience of putting a Tyrant and his accomplices to death without the forms of juſtice! .... After the example of ſo great a man, let us not make any ſort of doubt that there is ſomething unlawful even againſt an enemy; that the common cauſe ought not to require all things of a man, againſt private intereſt, for the ſervice of his King, his country, or the Laws. "Non enim Patria præſtat omnibus officiis:" the obligation to one's country does not ſuperſede every other obligation, ſays Tully." .... The utility of an action is but a ſorry plea for the beauty and honour of it; and it is wrong to infer, that becauſe ſuch a thing is uſeful, it is therefore incumbent on every one to perform it; and not only a Duty, but for his honour."

quieſced

quieſced in it and ſent them all back again as priſoners to the Samnites, proteſting againſt the peace which had lately been concluded with them: but fortune was ſo favourable to him that he was ſoon diſmiſſed by the enemy and returned to Rome, where he lived in greater reputation, though he had been vanquiſhed, than Pontius did at Samnium, who had beat him.

Hence we may obſerve two things: in the firſt place, that honour is to be acquired even by contrary and oppoſite means; for as it is the uſual conſequence of victory; ſo after a defeat, if a man can either ſhew that it was not owing to any miſconduct in him, or do ſomething that is great and gallant to throw into the balance againſt it, he will be no leſs admired and applauded than if he had gained a victory. In the next, that it is not diſhonourable to break a promiſe that is extorted by force and neceſſity: for ſuch promiſes, if they affect the welfare of the ſtate, will always be broken when the cauſe ceaſes that occaſioned them; and that too without any reflexion upon the honour of thoſe that break them. Of this we might produce a thouſand inſtances from Hiſtory, if daily experience did not make it unneceſſary. Princes make no ſcruple of violating the engagements they have been forced into as ſoon as ever they have an opportunity: nay, it is no uncommon thing for them to break others into which they have voluntarily entered, when the motives ceaſe that induced them to lay themſelves under ſuch obligations. But whether that is juſtifiable in them, or whether ſuch engagements are binding or not, I have no occaſion to determine at preſent, as the Reader may find this point already diſcuſſed in my Treatiſe entitled the Prince *.

* See the Prince, chap. xviii. The above quoted French Author ſays in the ſame Chapter, "the profit by the increaſe of the public revenue, which ſerved the Roman Senate for a pretence to the baſe concluſion I am going to relate, is not ſufficient to warrant ſuch injuſtice. Certain citizens, by the order and conſent of the Senate had redeemed themſelves and their liberty, by money, out of the hands of L. Sylla. But the affair coming upon the carpet again, the Senate

CHAP.

CHAP. XLIII.

That the ſame diſpoſition is obſervable at all times in the natives of the ſame country.

WISE men ſay (and very juſtly I think) that in order to form a probable conjecture of what is yet to come, we ought to conſider what is already paſſed; for there is nothing in this world at preſent, nor ever will be hereafter, but what has and will have a near reſemblance to what has happened in former times: becauſe mankind having the ſame paſſions in all ages, will, for the moſt part, act in the ſame manner upon ſimilar occaſions. It is true they are ſometimes more virtuous in one Province than in another, and vice verſâ, according to their education,

condemned them to be taxable as they were before, and ordered that the money they had diſburſed for their redemption ſhould never be repaid them. Civil wars often produce ſuch vile examples, that we puniſh private men for having taken our word when we were in power; and one and the ſame Magiſtrate makes another man pay the penalty of his change, though he is in no fault. The Schoolmaſter laſhes his Scholar for his docility, and the Guide beats the blind man whom he leads by the hand. A ſhocking picture of juſtice! There are ſome rules in Philoſophy that are both falſe and puſillanimous. The example that is propoſed to us for preferring private benefit to the obligation due to faith once given, has not weight enough from the circumſtances mixed with it. Robbers have ſurprized you, and after having made you ſwear to pay them a ſum of money, give you your liberty. It is wrong to ſay that an honeſt man may be quit of his oath without payment, after he is out of their clutches. The caſe is quite otherwiſe. When fear has once prevailed upon me to intend, I am obliged to keep the ſame purpoſe, when I am no longer in fear: and though fear ſhould only force my tongue, and not my will, yet I am bound to ſtand to my word. For my own part, when my tongue has ſometimes raſhly outrun my thought, I have afterwards however made a conſcience of diſowning it: otherwiſe we ſhall by degrees aboliſh all the right which another claims to the performance of our promiſes. "Quaſi vero forti viro vis adhiberi poſſit, ſays Tully. Offic. Lib. III. cap. xxx. as if violence could poſſibly operate upon a brave man." The only condition wherein private intereſt can excuſe us for the non-performance of a promiſe, is when we have promiſed a thing that is wicked and unjuſt in itſelf: for the claim of virtue ought to ſuperſede any obligation of our own." The beſt Divines and Caſuiſts are of the ſame opinion. See this matter fully diſcuſſed by the learned Biſhop Sanderſon, in his Prælectiones de juramenti obligatione. Prælect. IV.

from

from which all men take their ſubſequent turn and manner of living. We may likewiſe judge with more eaſe and certainty of future events by what is paſt, in a people amongſt whom the ſame appetites and inclinations have been predominant for a long courſe of time: as ſome nations have been remarkable for many ages either for their rapacity, or perfidy, or ſome other particular virtue or vice. Thus whoever reads the annals of Florence and compares the tranſactions of former times with thoſe of the preſent, will find that the French and Germans have always diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their avarice, pride, cruelty, and falſehood in all their dealings with us, to the great prejudice of our ſtate. Every one knows what ſums of money we paid at different times to Charles VIII. of France, upon a promiſe of reſtoring the Citadel of Piſa to us, and yet he never performed that promiſe. But to omit other modern inſtances of this kind as invidious, what paſſed betwixt our Republic and the Viſconti, Dukes of Milan, in former times, is no leſs notorious: for the Florentines being at war with them and deſtitute of all other aſſiſtance, ſolicited the Emperor of Germany to make an incurſion into Lombardy in their favour; which he readily promiſed to do with a powerful army, and to defend them againſt the Viſconti, provided they would furniſh him with an hundred thouſand Ducats to raiſe ſuch and army, and as much more when he arrived in Italy. This being agreed to, and all the money paid, he advanced as far as Verona: but pretending upon his arrival there that the Florentines had not fulfilled ſome other articles of the treaty betwixt them, he marched back again with all his forces without doing any thing in their favour. So that if the Florentines had not been either compelled by downright neceſſity, or blinded by ambition and reſentment, or if they had but read and conſidered the manner in which theſe Barbarians have treated them in all ages, they would not have been deceived by them at that time, nor any other, as they often have

have been; for then they would have found that their diſpoſition was always the ſame, and that they had conſtantly treated every body with whom they had any dealings in that manner. A remarkable example of this we have in their behaviour to the Tuſcans of old; who having been often defeated by the Romans, and reduced to ſuch diſtreſs that they found themſelves unable to make head againſt them any longer, agree to pay a large ſum of money to the Gauls, who lived on the ſaid of the Alps next to Italy, upon condition they would join forces with them againſt the Romans. But when the Gauls had received the money, they refuſed to fulfil the conditions upon which it was given them; alledging that they had taken it, not to make war upon the Romans, but to keep them from commencing hoſtilities againſt the Tuſcans. In this manner the poor Tuſcans were at the ſame time cheated out of their money, and diſappointed of the aſſiſtance they expected, through the avarice and perfidy of the Gauls: ſo that we ſee from theſe examples, that the Gauls and Germans have at all times behaved in the ſame manner: from whence other Princes may eaſily judge what degree of confidence they may put in them for the future *.

* The famous friar Roger Bacon, in the ſixth part of his Opus Majus, ſpeaking in praiſe of experimental Philoſophy, tells us that it inveſtigates the ſecrets of nature by its own power, and without any regard to the other Sciences. And this, he ſays, conſiſts in two things; viz. in the knowledge of things to come, as well as of thoſe that are paſt and preſent; and in the wonderful works by which it ſurpaſſes judiciary Aſtrology in the method of forming a judgment of things future. Under this, he ſays, that ſome Authors have aſſerted the poſſibility of changing the genius and diſpoſition of a nation by altering the conſtitution of the air. Upon which occaſion, he tells us, that when Alexander the Great enquired of Ariſtotle whether he ſhould extirminate the barbarian nations he had conquered, on account of their brutal ferocity, or ſuffer them to live; that Philoſopher anſwered him, in his book of Secrets, that if he could alter the air of the country, he ſhould ſuffer them to live; if not, he ſhould deſtroy them. For he thought that the air might be changed to advantage; ſo that the conſtitution of their bodies would be altered, and by that means their minds might produce good actions from the freedom of their wills; and this is one of his Secrets. He obſerves afterwards that ſome writers have affirmed, that an army has been ſtruck with ſuch a terror as to fly immediately; and tells us that Ariſtotle directed Alexander to

CHAP. XLIV.

That things are sometimes affected by bold and sudden resolutions, which could not have been done by ordinary means.

THE Samnites being invaded by the Romans, and not able to keep the field against them, left garrisons in their towns, and marched with all the rest of their forces into Tuscany, (which was then in truce with the Roman Republic) in hopes that the sight of their army might induce them to renew the war against their common enemy, though they had refused to do it before when they were solicited by Ambassadors whom the Samnites had sent to them for that purpose. Amongst other reasons therefore which the Samnites gave for taking up arms, they told the Tuscans, "quod pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum esset; that peace was more insupportable to Slaves, than war to men that were free:" so that partly by persuasions and partly by the presence of their army, they at last

carry a particular stone about him, by which means his enemies would always fly before him. These and a great many other things, says he, are asserted by some Philosophers to be true; though they do not pretend that any violence is offered to the freedom of the will: for Aristotle, who proposes this, tell us, in his Ethics, that the will cannot be forced, but that the body may be changed by the virtues of things, and the mind excited and induced to chuse that voluntarily to which it is not inclined; as by means of Medicinal potions many persons have been changed, not only with regard to their bodies, but likewise their passions and inclinations.

As to Aristotle's panic Stone, no serious man can give credit to the effects he ascribes to it. But methinks much may be said in favour of his other notion of altering the constitution, and consequently the disposition of men, by altering the air of the Country they live in by natural means; such as cutting down huge forests, draining fens, ploughing great quantities of land, &c. For the nations whom Alexander conquered are now very different in point of ferocity from what they were in former times, and so are the Gauls and Germans, mentioned by Machiavel, in other respects. But this perhaps may be owing to other means, and it may be said they are more humanized by commerce and the influence of Christianity than any change in their air.

prevailed

prevailed upon them to break their truce with the Romans.

Hence we may obſerve, that when one Prince wants to make another comply with ſome requeſt or demand, he ought not to give him time to deliberate upon it, (if he has it in his power to prevent it) but to act in ſuch a manner as may oblige him to come to a ſpeedy determination; that is, by convincing him of the miſchief he muſt of neceſſity bring upon himſelf either by refuſing or delaying to grant the requeſt. In this manner Pope Julius II. proceeded with the French; and Monſieur de Foix, the French King's general, with the Marquis of Mantua, not long ago: for his Holineſs deſigning to drive the Bentivogli out of Bologna, perceived he ſhould have occaſion for ſome French forces, and that it was neceſſary the Venetians ſhould ſtand neuter: but as he had ſounded them both for theſe purpoſes, and received ſuch ambiguous anſwers that he could not thoroughly depend upon them, he reſolved to make them comply with his demands, by acting in ſuch a manner as ſhould not give them time to do otherwiſe. For which purpoſe, having got what forces he could together at Rome, he marched away to Bologna; from whence he ſent in a peremptory manner to let the Venetians know they muſt ſtand neuter; and to the French, that they muſt immediately furniſh him with ſuccours: ſo that being afraid of incurring the Pope's diſpleaſure, if they either refuſed or delayed to comply with him, and finding themſelves under a neceſſity of returning a direct anſwer, they both ſubmitted to his terms. Monſieur de Foix likewiſe being at Bologna another time with an army, and hearing that Breſcia had revolted, was determined to reduce it to obedience if poſſible. But there were only two routes by which he could march thither: one, through the territories that were ſubject to the French, (but that was a very bad one, and a long way about) the other, through the Marquis of Mantua's dominions, where he might be oppoſed by that Prince in ſeveral narrow paſſes and defiles betwixt the

Lakes and Moraſſes with which that country abounds, and which were very well fortified and defended. Reſolving however to take the neareſt road in ſpite of all difficulties, he immediately marched that way; and without giving the Marquis time to conſider whether he would grant or refuſe him a paſſage, he ſent to him for the keys of thoſe ſeveral paſſes, as ſoon as ever he arrived in his territories. So that the Marquis being ſurpriſed by the ſuddenneſs of the demand, and having no time to deliberate upon it, was forced to deliver them up to him: which he would not have done if de Foix had proceeded in a cooler and more phlegmatic manner; becauſe he was at that time in league with the Pope and the Venetians, and had a Son in the Pope's hands at the Court of Rome: which he might have pleaded as very good reaſons for acting otherwiſe, if the occaſion had not been ſo unexpected.

CHAP. XLV.

Whether it is a better way in battle to receive the enemy's firſt ſhock, and not to exert your ſtrength till they have in ſome meaſure ſpent their fury; or to attack them vigorouſly at firſt.

THE Conſuls Decius and Fabius being ſent out by the Romans with two armies againſt the Tuſcans and Samnites, and coming to an engagement with the enemy, their methods of fighting were ſo different, that it may not be amiſs to conſider which of them is moſt worthy of imitation. Decius for his part fell furiouſly upon one of the enemy's wings, and with all his force at once: but Fabius endeavoured only to ſuſtain the firſt attack of the wing he was engaged with; judging it better to act coolly and firmly in the beginning, and reſerve the vigour of his men till the enemy had ſpent their firſt ardour and began to grow faint and feeble. From the event of the

the battle it appeared that Fabius acted with more judgment than Decius: for the latter having exhausted his strength in the first onset, and seeing his men almost surrounded by the enemy, determined to sacrifice himself at the head of his troops (as his father had done before him) in hopes of gaining some glory, at least by an honourable death, when he found he could not obtain a victory. But Fabius being informed of this, and no less ambitious to distinguish himself by living and acting like a man, than his Collegue had shewn himself by dying in that manner, advanced with the forces which he had reserved for that purpose, and gained a complete victory. From whence it is plain, that it is safer and more prudent to follow the example of Fabius, than of Decius upon the like occasions.

CHAP. XLVI.

How it comes to pass that the same families in a Commonwealth often retain the same manners and customs a long time.

WE see that not only one City has customs and institutions very different from those of another, and produces men either of a more rigid or more gentle disposition; but that there is such a difference likewise betwixt several particular families in the same City. The truth of this is evident from the history of all States, particularly from that of the Roman public; in which we see the Manlii were always rigid and inflexible; the Publicolæ gentle and humane; the Appii ambitious and oppressors of the common people; and that many other families had some peculiar quality which distinguished them from all the rest. Now this distinction cannot proceed from blood alone, (which must of course be often altered by variety of marriages) but from the different manner in which different families are educated: for what a man has

been taught in his infancy, and accuſtomed to hear either praiſed or condemned in his youth, makes ſuch an impreſſion upon him, that he generally forms the ſubſequent part of his life according to thoſe inſtructions: otherwiſe it would have been impoſſible that the Appii ſhould all have had the ſame turn, and been conſtantly actuated by the ſame paſſions and deſires, as Livy remarks upon ſeveral of them: particularly upon one, who having been appointed Cenſor refuſed to lay down his authority at the end of eighteen months, (as the Laws required, and his Collegue had actually done) alledging that he might continue in office five years if he pleaſed, according to the firſt Law that was made concerning Cenſors, which was not then repealed: and though there were many debates and much contention about it, there was no remedy; nor could he be prevailed upon to reſign, notwithſtanding both the Senate and the people tried all means to force him. Again, whoever reads his ſpeech againſt P. Sempronius, one of the Tribunes of the People, will ſee how full it is of the inſolence and arrogance peculiar to his family: whilſt all the reſt of his Fellow-citizens were vying with each other in inſtances of modeſty and ſtrict obedience to the Laws and Religion of their country.

CHAP. XLVII.

That a good Citizen ought to forget private injuries, when the public good requires it.

WHEN Manlius commanded the Roman army which was ſent againſt the Samnites, he happened to receive a wound in an engagement which diſabled him from acting as General any longer. Upon which, the Senate apprehending their army might ſuffer for want of a Commander, thought it neceſſary to create Papirius Curſor Dictator, to ſupply the place of Manlius. But as the Dictator was to be nominated by

by Fabius, who was then with an army in Tuſcany, and the Senate was afraid he would not appoint Curſor, becauſe there was an enmity betwixt them, they ſent two of their body to wait upon Fabius, and deſire he would lay aſide all private reſentment and confirm their choice for the ſake of the public: which he did out of regard to his country, though it was plain from many circumſtances that it was much againſt his inclinations. An example which ought to be followed by all who would be eſteemed good Citizens.

CHAP. XLVIII.

When an enemy ſeems guilty of any remarkable error, it ought at firſt to be ſuſpected as an artifice.

FULVIUS being left with the command of the Roman army in Tuſcany, during the abſence of the Conſul, who was gone to aſſiſt in the celebration of ſome ceremonies at Rome, the Tuſcans endeavoured to draw him into an ambuſh they had laid for him near his own camp: for which purpoſe, they ſent out ſome of their Soldiers, diſguiſed like Herdſmen with droves of cattle, who paſſed not only in ſight of the Roman camp, but almoſt cloſe by the entrenchments. But the General ſuſpecting they would not have had the boldneſs to have taken ſo unuſual a ſtep, if it had not been to draw him into ſome ſnare, acted with ſuch circumſpection that he diſcovered their deſign and defeated it.

Hence we may obſerve, that a General ought to take great care to avoid being deceived by what may look like a palpable error in an enemy, and to ſuſpect there is ſome artifice at the bottom; for it is not reaſonable to imagine, that people can be ſo raſh and imprudent. But the hopes of victory often dazzle men in ſuch a manner, that they cannot diſcern the danger that is concealed under theſe appearances, and therefore run blindly upon their deſtruction.

The Gauls having defeated the Romans upon the banks of the Allia, marched directly to Rome; and finding

finding all the Gates not only open, but unguarded, continued under arms all that day and the night following before they would enter the City, apprehending ſome ſnare was laid for them; as they could not prevail upon themſelves to believe the Romans would ever have abandoned their laſt reſource in ſo fooliſh and cowardly a manner. In the year 1508, when the Florentines laid ſiege to Piſa, Alphonſo del Mutolo, an inhabitant of that City being priſoner in their camp, promiſed, if they would ſet him at liberty, that he would deliver up one of the gates of the town into their hands: upon which they releaſed him, but afterwards, when he came to the camp (as he often did) to treat more particularly about the matter with certain deputies appointed for that purpoſe, he did not do it privately, but in an open manner, and always attended by ſeveral other Citizens, whom he deſired to withdraw when he entered into any converſation with the deputies. From which behaviour, they might very well have doubted of his ſincerity; becauſe, if he had really deſigned to fulfil his engagement, he would have acted with more privacy. But the Florentines were ſo eager to get poſſeſſion of the City that they raſhly confided in his promiſe, and advancing at a certain hour to take poſſeſſion of one of the gates according to his appointment, they met with ſuch a reception that they loſt many of their officers and a great number of private men, to their great mortification and diſgrace (*).

CHAP. XLIX.

That a Republic ought frequently to make new Laws and Proviſions for the preſervation of its Liberties: and how Q. Fabius obtained the name of Maximus.

I Have ſaid before that new diſorders of one kind or other muſt neceſſarily happen very often in a great Commonwealth, which require new remedies;

(*) See chap. XVIII. of this book.

and

and that the more dangerous they are, the greater need they have of a ſkilful Phyſician. Now though we read of many ſtrange and unexpected accidents and diſorders, in the Hiſtories of all States, we ſhall find ſtill more and ſtranger in that of the Roman Republic, than perhaps in any other. For the confirmation of which, we may quote the conſpiracy wherein all the married women of Rome had engaged to murder their huſbands; ſome of whom they actually poiſoned, and had prepared materials to diſpatch the reſt. Another inſtance of the ſame kind, was the conſpiracy formed by the Bacchanals, and diſcovered in the time of the Macedonian war: for ſo many thouſands both of men and women were concerned in it, that it muſt probably have overturned the State, if it had not been diſcovered in time, and moſt of the offenders put to death, according to the cuſtom of the Romans, who made no ſcruple of puniſhing a multitude at once upon ſuch occaſions. And if other proofs were wanting to ſhew the power, the authority, and magnanimity of that Republic, it might fully appear from their puniſhing ſuch numbers of delinquents at one time. Thus they ſometimes condemned a whole Legion, ſometimes all the inhabitants of a City to death; and ſometimes not only baniſhed eight or then thouſand people at a time, but impoſed ſuch conditions upon them as are difficult to be borne by a ſingle man, much more by ſo many. In this manner they treated the remainder of the army that eſcaped with their lives from the battle of Cannæ: for they baniſhed them all to Sicily, where they were forbidden either to live in any town, or to eat their meat any otherwiſe than ſtanding. But the moſt remarkable of all their executions was the decimation of their forces; that is, when they put every tenth man to death by lot quite through an army: and certainly no way can be deviſed that could be more juſt, or ſtrike a greater terror into a multitude; becauſe when the deliquency is general, and no certain author or ringleader can be pitched upon, is is impoſſible to puniſh

niſh them all; and to puniſh one part only and ſpare the other, would be hard upon thoſe that ſuffered, and encourage thoſe that did not to offend another time.

The women therefore, who deſigned to have poiſoned their huſbands, and the Bacchanals were puniſhed as they deſerved: and though ſuch maladies have very bad effects in a Commonweath, yet they are not mortal; becauſe they are generally diſcovered before it is too late to remedy them. But that is not the caſe with regard to thoſe that affect the State: for they are ſeldom diſcovered in time, except by very able Phyſicians, and even then, if not treated with great prudence and care, commonly end in the ruin of the Government: of which we have a remarkable inſtance in Livy. The Romans having been very liberal in granting the freedom of their City to ſtrangers, they grew ſo numerous at laſt, and had ſuch a weight in the public Councils, that the Government began to vary from its uſual courſe; new men being employed, and different meaſures purſued from what had been cuſtomary before. But Quintus Fabius being aware of this when he was Cenſor, and foreſeeing the miſchievous effects that muſt enſue from it, took care to prevent them in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four tribes; that ſo when their influence was contracted in ſuch a manner, they might not have it in their power to overturn the ancient conſtitution of the Republic. A piece of ſervice ſo grateful to his Countrymen, that they conferred upon him the ſurname of Maximus.

THE END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.